The House and Senate leadership may advance legislation this
year to close the so-called tax gap, or the amount of taxes that
government accountants say should be paid but is not. Some small
progress toward this end can be made simply by tightening existing
rules, according to a recently released Treasury Department
study.[1] After all, only a small percentage of
taxpayers intentionally fail to pay their taxes each year, while a
much larger number make innocent reporting errors.
Major progress, however, will require one of two approaches:
either a substantial expansion of IRS enforcement processes or
fundamental tax reform that simplifies the overly complex tax code
and reduces tax rates. The Treasury Department estimates that about
91 percent of the total tax gap is due to nonfiling of returns and
underreporting of income.[2] Of the two, noncompliance due to
underreporting is ten times larger than nonfiling, which Treasury
accurately attributes to the enormously confusing tax code that
Congress has created.[3]
Either approach will close the tax gap to a significant extent.
Simplification and rate reduction assures greater compliance over
the long term, as the taxpaying experience in country after
country, when tax policy is changed to reduce confusion and rates,
proves.[4] Unleashing the IRS on honest taxpaying
families who are confused about their tax obligations may give
Congress more revenue in the short run, but it comes at the cost of
vastly expanded legal tax avoidance schemes and taxpayer resistance
in the long run, thus reducing revenues. It also means further
losses of individual liberty in an age when liberties in so many
other areas are declining.
If, as expected, the majority party in Congress chooses police
power over good tax policy and increases compliance through more
audits, more investigations of taxpayers, and more penalties, the
new congressional leadership will have set the stage for a
resurgence of abusive behavior by the IRS. Because that appears to
be the likely outcome of this season's tax gap campaign, it is
important to review what the Senate Committee on Finance heard
about the history of IRS illegal activity and taxpayer abuse in a
stunning, three-day winter hearing in 1998.
Some context: The Republicans won the election of 1994 and the
congressional majority, in part on promises to rein in the IRS and
reform the tax code. By 1997, most members of the Republican caucus
in the House and Senate (and many in the Democratic Party) were
smarting under increasingly sharp taxpayer complaints of IRS abuse.
The Senate Finance Committee hearings in 1998 were designed to
publicize that abuse and spark much-needed reforms of IRS
practices.
The Finance Committee focused primarily on the Collection
Division, which is charged with making certain taxpayers send to
Washington exactly what the IRS believes they owe. In today's
jargon, the hearings focused on abusive behavior that stemmed in
part from the IRS's efforts to close the "tax gap."
For those old enough to remember the news coverage, what stands
out is the image of IRS agents testifying behind translucent
screens and talking through voice alteration mixers. These
whistle-blowers so feared reprisals from their own colleagues that
they could not show their faces in a hearing of a Senate committee.
Here's why:
Anonymous Agent #1 testified that over his long career in
collections he had seen senior IRS staff and executives "violate or
ignore Internal Revenue Manual procedures and Treasury regulations
simply because they wanted to punish a taxpayer.... I have seen
more violations of IRS procedures and policies than I can count.
The most appalling aspect of the foregoing examples is that in most
every instance, IRS management supported the erroneous actions of
the Revenue Officer."[5]
Anonymous Agent #2 testified that "[o]ver my 20 years of
service, I have become painfully aware of the ability of the IRS to
retaliate against employees who dare to speak out. Many of the
witnesses you will have before you in this heating [sic]
could be retaliated against for their testimony before this
Committee. At times, I have been assigned an employee case and been
told that management does not like that employee, and I have been
told that I need to find something that they can use to terminate
their employment. In the IRS, retaliation is swift and severe. I
hope you will respect the risk that these witnesses took to appear
before you, and protect them from any act of revenge by IRS
management."[6]
Anonymous Agent #3, another long-serving employee of the IRS,
testified that he had seen "[t]ax data being accessed by IRS
employees to check on prospective boyfriends; [t]ax data being
accessed by IRS employees to check ex-husbands for increasing
income in order to receive increased child support payments; [t]ax
data being accessed on people with whom IRS employees were having
some kind of personal disagreement;...; [t]ax data being accessed
on individuals who are perceived as critical of the IRS, such as
tax protestors or, as in one case, a person who had simply written
a Letter to the Editor.... [t]ax data being accessed on relatives
and acquaintances of the subject taxpayer, such as cases where the
taxpayer is suspected of using friends and relatives to hide income
or assets; [t]ax data being accessed on potential witnesses in
government tax cases; [t]ax data being accessed on jurors sitting
on government tax cases."[7]
One particularly noteworthy non-agent witness, official IRS
historian Shelley Davis, testified to one of the most spectacular
periods of IRS abuse in the agency's history: the period between
1969 and 1973 when the Special Services Staff compiled tax
information on about 11,000 Americans that the Nixon Administration
believed were its enemies. As Davis noted:
Ten employees of the SSS dutifully clipped newspaper articles
each day. The FBI willingly sent over its own files on political
dissidents and protesters, and subscriptions were taken to radical
publications which were perused for names and other leads. All in
all, the SSS targeted individuals with no known tax problems for
audit simply because of their political activities.
She also testified that she believed that the list still
existed, though she also believed that no one at the IRS continued
to maintain it.[8]
As author and journalist David Burnham testified, IRS abuses
were nothing new. Indeed, when Administrations as far back as
Herbert Hoover's empowered the agency to be especially aggressive
collecting taxes, significant abuse of taxpayer privacy and
fundamental law ensued. Franklin Delano Roosevelt "ordered the
agency to mobilize its enforcement powers against former Treasury
Secretary Mellon, Senator Huey Long, the singer Paul Robeson,
Republican Representative and neighbor Hamilton Fish, Father
Charles Coughlin and many others." During the Kennedy years, the
IRS was unleashed to go after "extremist organizations." Burnham
noted, however, that:
Although the memos describing the program said the extremists of
concern were on both the right and the left, it appears that all of
those who lost their tax exempt status in connection with this
program were fundamentalist conservatives who had been criticizing
the president.[9]
The Senate Finance hearings led Congress and the IRS to make a
number of reforms that reined in abusive collection agents and
overzealous political operatives. Taxpayers are safer today than
they were in 1998.
But the history of the agency shows that this is a fragile
peace. The record of abuse points to one crucial lesson:
Strengthening the police powers of the IRS should be the very last
step taken to collect more revenues. If Congress ignores that
lesson, it may find itself one day again listening to testimony on
IRS abuses from witnesses hidden by translucent screens and voice
alteration mixers.
Bill Beach is Director of
the Center for Data Analysis at The Heritage Foundation.
[1] A
U.S. Department of the Treasury report on tax compliance issued in
September 2006 contains the Bush Administration's proposals for
reducing noncompliance. See U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office
of Tax Policy, "A Comprehensive Strategy for Reducing the Tax Gap,"
September 26, 2006, at www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/otptaxgapstrategy%20final.pdf
(February 22, 2007). Table 2 of this report contains estimates of
the components of the tax gap. Non-filing and underpayment account
for 18 percent of the total. The Treasury Department subsequently
refined its proposals and summarized them in the President's budget
submission for fiscal year 2008. See Office of Management and
Budget, Fiscal Year 2008: Analytical Perspectives
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2007), pp.
261-263, Table 17-3: Effect of Proposals on Receipts. The
Administration estimates that its proposals will reduce
noncompliance by $29.5 billion over the ten-year period from 2008
through 2017. That cumulative amount is 0.09 percent of forecasted
federal revenues without the policy changes and about 1 percent of
the cumulative "tax gap" over that same period. For total
forecasted revenues, see Congressional Budget Office, The Budget
and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2008 and 2017, January 2007,
Table 1-3, p. 8, at www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/77xx/doc7731/01-24-BudgetOutlook.pdf
(February 22, 2007).
[2]
Office of Tax Policy, "A Comprehensive Strategy for Reducing the
Tax Gap," p. 7, Table 2.
[5]
"Prepared Statement of Witness Before the Senate Finance Committee
Oversight Hearing on the Internal Revenue Service, Thursday,
September 25, 1997," Anonymous #1, at http://enzi.senate.gov/theirs.htm (February
22, 2007).
[6]
"Prepared Statement of Witness Before the Senate Finance Committee
Oversight Hearing on the Internal Revenue Service, Thursday,
September 25, 1997," Anonymous #2, at http://enzi.senate.gov/theirs.htm (February
22, 2007).
[7]
"Prepared Statement of Witness Before the Senate Finance Committee
Oversight Hearing on the Internal Revenue Service, Thursday,
September 25, 1997," Anonymous #3, at http://enzi.senate.gov/theirs.htm (February
22, 2007). Other agents testified in a similar vein about patterns
of abuse and disregard for the law.
[8]
"Prepared Statement of Shelley L. Davis Before the Senate Finance
Committee Oversight Hearing on the Internal Revenue Service,
Tuesday, September 23, 1997," at http://enzi.senate.gov/theirs.htm (February
22, 2007).
[9]
"Prepared Statement of David Burnham Before the Senate Finance
Committee Oversight Hearing on the Internal Revenue Service,
Tuesday, September 23, 1997," at http://enzi.senate.gov/theirs.htm (February
22, 2007).