The fourth round
of the six-party talks aimed at ending North Korea's nuclear
weapons programs finally concluded in Beijing on September 19th
with a Joint Statement adopted by all the parties. While supporters
and critics alike will be tempted to begin their congratulations
and recriminations now, temperance, combined with cautious optimism
for the future of the six-party process, would be the more
appropriate response.
The most important
part of the agreement is North Korea's (DPRK) "commitment to
abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs and
return at an early date to the Nonproliferation Treaty and to IAEA
safeguards." Also included is a statement that both Koreas would
return to the "observation" and "implementation of the 1992 Joint
Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula." This
provision is critical because it includes all North Korean
nuclear programs, whether plutonium- or uranium-based. Pyongyang's
reluctance to discuss its uranium program had been a sticking point
in previous rounds of talks.
Critics of this
agreement will be skeptical about the vague wording of North
Korea's commitment, and rightly so. Pyongyang has a long history of
making and breaking agreements with the international community,
and no one should be naïve about the difficulty of getting
North Korea to stick to this or any agreement. Critics will also
object strongly to the inclusion of the statement that "the DPRK
has the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy" and the parties
"agreed to discuss at an appropriate time the subject of the
provision of a light-water reactor to the DPRK." North Korea's
demand that it receive a light-water reactor before it takes action
to dismantle its nuclear programs was the key issue of impasse with
the United States, with Washington rightly refusing this
consideration as a "non-starter" for future talks.
In the agreement,
the United States acknowledges that in principle, sovereign states
do have a right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy without
committing to the provision of light-water reactors, but only to
discuss the issue at an "appropriate time." This would be,
presumably, after North Korea has taken action to abandon its
existing nuclear programs and, at a minimum, returned to the
Non-Proliferation Treaty.
There is reason to
view this agreement in a positive light because it achieved several
important U.S. goals. First, it includes a written statement of
principles that conforms to the consistent U.S. insistence on
"CVID"-complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement-of
North Korea's nuclear weapons. Second, the agreement clearly
identifies the party responsible for future progress and failure:
North Korea, not the United States. Third, it narrows the focus of
the six-party process to the specific issue of North Korean nuclear
dismantlement and sets aside other outstanding bilateral issues,
such as a permanent peace treaty on the Korean Peninsula, Japanese
abductees, and normalization of diplomatic relations with the
United States, for resolution in different forums.
But there is also
cause for a healthy does of caution as preparations begin for a new
round of talks in November. This agreement did cross an immense
hurdle in reaching a written statement of principles for future
negotiation. Still, many and perhaps even greater hurdles lie
ahead, such as working out how and when North Korea will abandon
its nuclear weapons program. The next steps will be neither quick
nor easy and will require a great deal of patience. Washington must
continue to work closely with its allies and partners to ensure
that divisions do not occur and that the process proceeds. No
doubt, Pyongyang will keep a watchful eye on developments at the
International Atomic Energy Agency over the coming weeks on whether
to refer Iran to the U.N. Security Council over its nuclear
program. Much is at stake for the future of global nuclear
non-proliferation.
Balbina Y. Hwang,
Ph.D., is Policy Analyst for Northeast Asia in the
Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation.