The
debate between static and dynamic scoring may seem an esoteric
inside-the-Beltway squabble, but the choice of how to estimate
revenues has important implications. In the short term, better
revenue estimating methods would make it easier to implement tax
rate reductions. In the long term, shifting
to a simple and fair tax code would be expedited if revenue
estimators were allowed to consider the beneficial impact of tax
reform on economic performance.
When
lawmakers consider tax policy changes, Congress's Joint Committee
on Taxation (JCT) and the Treasury Department's Office of Tax
Analysis (OTA) are responsible for estimating the likely impact on
future tax collections; but these estimates assume that tax policy
changes--regardless of their magnitude--have no impact on the
economy's performance. As a result, these "official" estimates
commonly overstate both the amount of tax revenue that will be
generated by tax increases and the amount of revenue the government
will "lose" due to tax rate reductions. This static methodology has
been widely criticized because it provides policymakers with
inaccurate numbers and creates a bias against lower tax rates.
Though defenders of the status quo argue
that dynamic effects are incorporated into revenue forecasts, this
claim is only correct for "microeconomic" changes. If asked to
estimate the revenue impact of a change in the gasoline tax, for
instance, the current process attempts to measure the degree to
which the change in the tax will affect the amount of gasoline
purchased. Likewise, changes in income tax rates will include some
calculation of tax avoidance behavior.
Missing from the equation, however, is any
effort to capture the revenue effects caused by changes in
macroeconomic variables. Within the static system, revenue
estimators assume that economic growth, job creation, and income
will remain unchanged regardless of how much taxes are reduced or
increased. The OTA, for example, in a 1995 analysis of the flat tax
wrote that
No attempt is made to estimate the
tax-induced behavioral responses of either individuals or
corporations. Following the standard revenue estimating conventions
used by both the Office of Tax Analysis and the Joint Committee on
Taxation, the macroeconomic aggregates, such as the level of
compensation, prices, employment, and gross domestic product, have
been assumed to be unchanged by the proposal.
These assumptions effectively require the
Treasury Department and the Joint Committee on Taxation to ignore
the real world. This approach may be reasonable for minor
alterations of the tax code, but it certainly produces inaccurate
answers when examining significant, substantive policy proposals.
If asked to predict what would happen if tax rates were doubled,
for instance, revenue estimators would assume that tax collections,
with some minor modifications, would double as well.
The
absurdity of this approach became clear in 1988 when Senator Robert
Packwood (R-OR), then ranking Republican on the Finance Committee,
asked the JCT to estimate the revenue impact if the government
confiscated all income over $200,000 annually. The revenue
estimators at JCT responded that such a tax would raise $104
billion the first year, $204 billion the second year, $232 billion
the third year, and $263 billion and $299 billion in the fourth and
fifth years, respectively. Needless to say, this was a
nonsensical estimate. As Senator Packwood noted, the JCT's
calculation "assumes people will work if they have to pay all their
money to the Government. They will work forever and pay all of the
money to the Government when clearly anyone in their right mind
will not."
Another example of the flaws and
inconsistency resulting from bad methodology is the JCT's analysis
of the death tax during last year's tax bill. The "scoring" of the
death tax provisions of the President's plan by the staff of the
joint committee changed dramatically between April 3 and May 4,
2001. On
April 3, it was estimated that the phaseout of federal death taxes
would lower revenue by (or, as opponents of tax cuts say, would
"cost") about $186 billion over the 10-year period from 2002
through 2011. By May 4, one month later, the estimate for the costs
of the phaseout of death taxes was $306 billion.
This
dramatic revision came as a great surprise and devastated plans by
the House leadership and President Bush to repeal death taxes
permanently. In fact, it appeared just a week before the Ways and
Means Committee was scheduled to report the President's tax plan to
the full House. Not only did this additional amount put the total
cost of the bill well beyond the congressional budget resolution
and the President's own budget proposal, but it also forced the
bill writers to create the oddest loophole in recent tax history:
All of the changes in tax policy made by the law were to be
reversed in 2011.
In
their defense, the staff of the joint committee argued that their
higher score assumed a "dynamic" response by taxpayers to death tax
repeal. The JCT staff argued that high-income taxpayers would
transfer income-producing assets to their children, who would pay
taxes at lower marginal rates if the gift tax was repealed. Thus,
the real cost of the estate tax should include taxpayer
responses.
Even
though this anticipated taxpayer response is based on sheer
speculation by the JCT staff, it is a realistic consideration; but
the JCT staff should also have included in their revenue estimates
any effects from positive taxpayer behavior (such as more and
better investment, harder work, lower taxpayer compliance costs).
Had they done so, the total "cost" of the death tax repeal--and,
indeed, all of the provisions of President Bush's tax plan--would
have been significantly less. In fact, Heritage economists have
estimated that the President's overall tax plan has an economic
feedback of about 33 percent, which reduces the revenue loss of the
plan by $568 billion--more than enough to pay for full death tax
repeal.
It
appears that the bureaucrats who made critical decisions in
calculating revenue estimates--both in response to Senator Packwood
and with regard to "scoring" the death tax--put ideology ahead of
logic and evidence, and they should have been penalized. But there
are others who should share the blame for the mismanagement of the
revenue-estimating process. The Joint Committee on Taxation staff
serves at the pleasure of the committee's chairman, yet no
significant changes in methodology were made when Republicans took
control of Congress in 1995. Likewise, the Office of Tax Analysis
staff theoretically is controlled by presidentially appointed
officials at the Treasury Department, yet there is no indication
that meaningful reform in the system is being implemented.
DYNAMIC SCORING: THE THEORETICAL
ARGUMENT
The
Laffer curve depicted in Chart 1 demonstrates the links between tax
rates, economic performance, and tax collections. As shown in Chart
1, the government collects no revenue if tax rates are set at zero;
but a 100 percent tax rate also generates no revenue because it
eliminates all incentive to earn income--not to mention what
happens when the economy grinds to a halt. Consider what will
happen, though, if the government imposes a modest tax rate of, for
example, 10 percent. With a low, flat rate, very few people will
have an incentive to avoid taxes, so the economy will do well and
the government will collect about one-tenth of the income
earned.
As tax rates rise, however, taxpayers gradually
become discouraged and businesses discover that it is not
profitable to employ as many people. These factors combine to
reduce earnings--and therefore lead to a reduction in taxable
income. Dynamic scoring captures this relationship, but static
scoring ignores the changes in income caused by higher tax
rates.
As
long as tax rates are not excessive, the increase in revenue
associated with the higher tax rate exceeds the revenue loss caused
by lower levels of income. However, the Laffer curve also
demonstrates that there is a point at which the tax rate reaches a
revenue-maximizing level. Any attempt to raise tax rates beyond
this level will reduce revenues because the fall in taxable income
will have a greater impact on tax collections than the higher rate
has. Static scoring, once again, is unable to measure this revenue
reduction because of the untenable assumption that tax burdens have
no impact on economic output.
It is very important to recognize, however, that
the revenue-maximizing tax rate is not the growth-maximizing tax
rate. Indeed, it is quite likely that there is a large gap between
these two tax rates. It is possible, for instance, that the
revenue-maximizing rate on labor income is more than 30
percent--particularly for middle-income workers who presumably do
not have much discretion over the timing and composition of their
remuneration. Yet a 30 percent tax rate will discourage work,
saving, and investment. Excessive tax rates also allow more
government spending. The combination of these factors explains why
lawmakers should seek to keep tax rates below the
revenue-maximizing level.
DYNAMIC SCORING: THE PRACTICAL
ARGUMENT
In
simple terms, dynamic scoring means that revenue estimates would be
designed to measure how any changes in overall economic conditions
will affect tax collections. Rather than deliberately ignoring
these variables, as is the convention today, revenue estimators--or
experts designated for this purpose--would consider whether a
change in policy would be likely to affect the economy, the level
of compensation, prices, employment, and gross domestic product
(GDP). If one or more of these variables are likely to be affected,
estimates would be calculated for the amount of revenue feedback or
loss.
Two
steps are needed to prepare a dynamic estimate. The first is
measuring how changes in economic output affect the budget.
Fortunately, this is not a challenging task. The government already
publishes "sensitivity tables" that illustrate the effect of
alternative economic scenarios on government finances. According to
the Office of Management and Budget, for instance, a one percentage
point drop in economic growth during the 10-year period from
2003-2012 would reduce tax revenues by nearly $1.7 trillion and
increase government spending by more than $200 billion. (See Chart
2.)

The second step is estimating how a tax policy
change will affect the economy. This is the hard part. What would
happen, for instance, if lawmakers eliminated the capital gains
tax? Would the economy grow two-tenths of a percent faster each
year? Or three-tenths? If the top tax rate fell to 28 percent, how
much bigger would the economy be after five years compared to a
baseline forecast that assumes tax rates remain unchanged? And what
would happen if the Internal Revenue Code were replaced with a
simple and fair flat tax? After 10 years, would the economy be 7
percent greater than it would have been without a flat tax? Or
would it be 12 percent larger?
Some
argue that the inability to provide precise answers to these
questions makes dynamic scoring impractical. Yet this assertion
makes the perfect the enemy of the good. Dynamic scoring may never
generate perfect answers, but the results will be much closer to
the truth than the easy to calculate but grossly flawed numbers
produced by static scoring. Indeed, it is quite likely that dynamic
forecasting would require the JCT and OTA to estimate a range of
results instead of producing a single number; but contrary to
conventional wisdom, this approach would be a positive development
since it would force lawmakers to recognize that fiscal policy
decisions have a real impact on private-sector activity.
DYNAMIC SCORING: A NEUTRAL PROCESS TO FIND
HONEST ANSWERS
Contrary to popular misconception, dynamic
scoring does not mean that tax cuts necessarily "pay for
themselves." The degree of revenue feedback depends on the tax rate
that is being reduced and the amount by which it is being reduced.
Only in extremely rare circumstances would a tax rate reduction
generate enough economic activity to offset all of the revenue loss
associated with the lower rate, and if that did occur, the full
impact of the reduction would probably not be felt for several
years.
Nevertheless, there are some tax cuts that
might "pay for themselves," including the following.
Reductions in
confiscatory income tax rates.
Wealthy taxpayers are particularly sensitive to high tax
rates. Not only can they afford the best tax lawyers, accountants,
and financial planners, but they also receive most of their income
in the form of dividends, interest, capital gains, and other
business income. (See Chart 3.) When tax rates become too onerous,
these taxpayers can shift their assets to tax-free status, move
their money offshore, or take other steps to alter the timing or
composition of their income. According to research by
James Poterba of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, lower
tax rates on the richest 0.5 percent would generate higher rather
than lower tax revenues.

Death
taxes.
The government confiscates 50 percent of a person's assets in
excess of $3.5 million upon death. Those who have the
wherewithal to build up businesses and portfolios of this value,
however, typically are also aware of ways to protect their
families' wealth from the government. For this reason, even
though the estate tax collects about $28 billion annually, it is
estimated that the government actually loses money due to reduced
income tax collections that result from aggressive estate planning
through which, years before their death, wealthy taxpayers transfer
funds, cease working, set up trusts, give to charity, and take
other steps to reduce the tax value of their assets.
Capital gains
taxes.
Revenue estimators from both Congress and the
Administration acknowledge that lower capital gains taxes will
boost sales (or realizations) of stock, bonds, real estate, and
other assets. This "unlocking effect" alone may be large enough to
produce a net revenue increase within the first year or two
following a capital gains tax rate reduction.
Unfortunately, both the JCT and the OTA
fail to calculate what happens when a lower capital gains tax
increases both the amount of investment and the efficiency of
investment. Both of these factors lead to more economic growth--and
higher corporate income taxes, personal income taxes, and payroll
taxes. If the revenue estimates included the effects of higher
growth, they almost surely would show a significant revenue gain in
subsequent years as well.
Tax rates that are so punitive that they actually
lose revenue certainly should be reduced. The lower rate would
please conservatives who want to promote economic growth as well as
liberals who want the government to collect more money.
It
is important to recognize, however, that there is a huge difference
between the revenue-maximizing tax rate and the economic
growth-maximizing optimal tax rate. Largely because of hefty
value-added taxes (a form of national sales tax), many countries in
Europe take a much higher percentage of their citizens' money than
America does. These nations may be near
the revenue-maximizing point of the Laffer curve, but this income
comes at a heavy price. European countries, compared to the United
States, suffer from higher unemployment, slower growth, larger
budget deficits, and lower incomes.
CHOOSING A TOOL FOR MEASURING TAX
IMPACT
Because dynamic scoring would make tax
rate reductions more attractive, opponents of tax cuts want to
maintain the current system of static scoring. An objective
examination of the historical evidence, however, demonstrates that
dynamic scoring gives policymakers more accurate information. Dynamic
scoring does not predetermine outcomes; it simply ensures that
lawmakers will have the most comprehensive data when making
decisions.
When
taking steps to modernize and correct the revenue-estimating
process, policymakers should consider the following points:
- Learn from
history. Static scoring routinely overestimates how much
revenue will be generated by tax increases. The 1990 luxury tax,
the income tax rate increases of 1990 and 1993, and the 1986
capital gains tax rate increase are all examples in which revenues
fell far short of static predictions. Conversely, the 1981 Reagan
tax cuts, the 1978 capital gains tax reduction, the Kennedy tax
cuts of the 1960s, the 1986 Tax Reform Act, and the 1997 capital
gains tax cut all demonstrate how pro-growth tax changes will
generate revenue feedback.
- Don't make the
perfect the enemy of the good. It is impossible to predict
all of the effects of any single change in government policy. The
fact that dynamic scoring cannot pinpoint all of the multiyear
effects of a change in tax policy, however, is not an argument for
maintaining a static process that guarantees an answer that is
wrong and farther from the truth.
- Not all tax cuts
are created equal. The higher the tax rate, the bigger the
supply-side response when the rate is reduced. Likewise, since
capital is more mobile than labor, reducing tax rates on capital
will have a greater impact than similar tax reductions on labor
income. And some tax cuts, such as credits and rebates, will have
little or no revenue feedback effects since incentives to engage in
productive behavior remain unchanged.
- Open the process
to public scrutiny. Even though they are the ones who pay
the bills, taxpayers today are not allowed to examine the static
models and methodology used by the Joint Committee on Taxation and
the Office of Tax Analysis. Even if the revenue-estimating process
is not improved, policymakers should insist on full disclosure. If
policymakers adopt dynamic scoring, an open process will keep the
system honest by inhibiting those who are tempted to overstate or
understate the dynamic impact of tax policy changes.
- The goal of tax
policy is to maximize economic growth, not tax revenues.
For years, budget deficits and surpluses have played a big role in
the political debate. As a result, some tax policy proposals, such
as reductions in the capital gains tax, are judged primarily by
their effect on tax collections. Yet there is no evidence that
fiscal balance has any impact on the economy. Putting revenue
maximization ahead of sound tax policy is therefore a misguided
approach and should be discarded.
- Include
estimates of private and governmental compliance costs.
According to the Tax Foundation, the current tax system imposes
$194 billion in compliance costs on the productive sector of the
economy.
In addition to these costs to the private sector for lawyers,
lobbyists, accountants, tax preparers, and lost man-hours,
approximately $13 billion in direct government expenditures is
associated with taxation. Yet in calculating
projected gains and losses, revenue estimators confess that "staff
does not estimate the administrative costs incurred by either the
IRS or taxpayers that may result from proposed legislation."
HISTORICAL EXAMPLES
The
strong theoretical argument for dynamic scoring is buttressed by a
great deal of historical evidence. The United States has
experienced significant shifts in tax policy over the years, and
the historical record both demonstrates the shortcomings of static
analysis and provides ample proof that the revenue-estimating
process should be modernized.
Before looking at specific examples,
however, it may be useful to look at the broad picture. As Chart 4
illustrates, tax revenues traditionally have consumed about 19
percent of America's economic output. This relationship has been
remarkably stable even though tax rates have shifted by large
amounts. At times, the top income tax rate has exceeded 90 percent,
while at other times it has fallen to less than 30 percent.
Chart 4 also shows income tax collections
as a percentage of GDP. As is the case with total tax revenues,
income tax collections are remarkably stable, hovering around 9
percent of GDP. It also is worth noting that the economy slumped
during the three years in which income tax revenues climbed above
that level: in 1969, 1981, and 2000.

The Tax Cuts of
the 1920s.
Income tax rates were slashed dramatically during the 1920s, with
the top rate falling from 73 percent to 24 percent. The
economy boomed, growing at an average annual rate of 6 percent
between 1921 and 1929. Personal income tax
revenues increased substantially, rising from $719 million in 1921
to $1,160 million in 1928. This 61 percent increase in
revenue occurred at a time of no inflation. As Chart 5 shows, the
percentage of the tax burden borne by the rich jumped dramatically,
climbing from 44.2 percent in 1921 to 78.4 percent in 1928. These
results, not surprisingly, would not have been predicted by static
analysis.

The Kennedy Tax
Cuts.
Lower taxes on savings and investment were approved in
1962, followed by across-the-board tax rate reductions in 1964.
Economic growth improved, with GDP increasing at an average annual
rate of 5 percent between 1961 and 1968. The Kennedy tax cuts
triggered record expansion, and revenues grew by 62 percent over
the seven-year period.
One
of the most compelling pieces of evidence for a supply-side
strategy is the way different income groups responded to lower tax
rates. As seen in Chart 6, wealthy taxpayers wound up paying
significantly more tax revenues after their tax rates were
reduced--exactly as dynamic forecasting would have predicted.

The 1978 Capital Gains
Tax Cut.
The more control a taxpayer has over a taxable activity,
the more pronounced the supply-side effect. Capital gains taxes are
the best example of this phenomenon, because a taxpayer can avoid
the tax by not selling assets. In 1968, legislation was approved
that raised the capital gains tax from 25 percent to 49 percent.
(Effective tax rates almost always were higher--sometimes over 100
percent--since the government did not, and still does not, allow
taxpayers to adjust asset prices for inflation.) Not surprisingly,
capital gains revenues were sluggish throughout the 1970s. In 1978,
however, the rate was reduced to 28 percent. The very next year,
revenues jumped 45 percent. Capital gains tax revenues
continued to rise, climbing even more when the Reagan tax cuts
lowered the rate even further, down to 20 percent in 1981.
Windfall Profits
Tax.
During the Carter Administration, a heavy tax was imposed on crude
oil. The Joint Committee on Taxation estimated in 1979 that the tax
would collect $184.5 billion between 1980 and 1985, but it brought
in just $77.7 billion. To be fair, the huge
revenue gap probably was due to President Reagan's decision to
decontrol oil prices, something the JCT could not have predicted in
1979. At the same time, however, foreknowledge of this move may
have caused the revenue estimators to make an even bigger mistake,
since most opponents of market-oriented policy believed that
restoring competition to the petroleum market would cause oil
prices to skyrocket.
The Reagan Tax
Cuts.
Campaigning on across-the-board tax cuts, Ronald Reagan took
office at a time when the economy was in horrible shape. The
economy was in the middle of a severe double-dip recession.
Inflation was running at double-digit rates, unemployment was
rising, and interest rates had climbed to more than 20 percent. Critics
claimed the tax cuts would be inflationary and would do nothing to
boost growth, but just the opposite occurred. Americans did not
receive a net tax cut until sometime between July 1982 and January
1983 because previously legislated payroll tax increases and
bracket creep offset the portions of the tax cut that took effect
in 1981 and 1982. However, once the tax cuts
did take effect, they initiated the longest peacetime economic
expansion up to that point in the nation's history.
The
most comprehensive analysis of the revenue effect of the Reagan tax
cuts shows two things: The lower tax rates on the rich more than
paid for themselves, and there were substantial feedback effects
from lower tax rates on other income classes as well. (See Chart
7.)

Defenders of high tax rates condemn the Reagan
program, noting that tax revenues in the early 1980s were well
below the Administration's original projections, but this reasoning
is seriously flawed. First, it blames the tax cuts for the second
half of the double-dip recession of 1980-1982, a drop in the
economy that actually began before the tax cut was initiated.
Second, it fails to recognize the irony in the fact that two-thirds
of the revenue shortfall occurred because inflation was reduced
much faster than was originally thought. Significantly, the forecast
of the Democrat-controlled Congressional Budget Office closely
matched the Administration's.
The 1986 Tax
Reform Act.
This legislation provides one of the best examples of why dynamic
forecasting is needed. The Tax Reform Act lowered tax rates on
individual income and increased the tax burden on corporate
income.
According to the static estimates, the shift in taxes should have
amounted to more than $100 billion in revenues over the five-year
period. Actual tax collections, however, showed a very clear and
pronounced supply-side effect. As taxpayers responded to lower
rates, individual income tax revenues grew faster than
expected--nearly 6 percent above projections. The higher tax burden
on corporate income, meanwhile, had the opposite effect; corporate
income tax receipts were very sluggish, falling nearly 25 percent
below the static estimates.
The
divergent responses of personal and corporate income tax
collections are critical. Proponents of static forecasting often
argue that the dynamic correlations between tax rates and the state
of the economy are merely coincidental. For example, they deny that
the booming economy and rapid revenue growth of the 1920s, 1960s,
and 1980s had anything to do with lower tax rates. Conversely, they
hold that the economy's poor performance during the 1930s, 1970s,
and early 1990s is simply a matter of bad fortune, completely
unrelated to higher tax rates. These arguments fall apart when
analyzing the Tax Reform Act, since it is inconsistent to blame
sluggish corporate tax collections on a weak economy while at the
same time claiming that increased personal tax collections are the
result of a strong economy.
The 1986 Capital
Gains Tax Rate Increase.
When, as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, policymakers
increased the capital gains tax from 20 percent to 28 percent, two
noteworthy things happened: Capital gains realizations (asset
sales) and revenues soared before the tax rate increase took effect
and then collapsed by more than 50 percent when the higher rate
took effect. Nevertheless, when the
Congressional Budget Office put together its revenue baseline in
1990, it assumed that capital gains realizations would grow at the
same rate they did during the early 1980s when the tax rate was
low.
This
assumption proved to be a huge error. In fact, the high capital
gains tax discouraged asset sales, and realizations were
stagnant--usually less than half of CBO's projections. Moreover,
the Joint Committee on Taxation used this inflated baseline in 1990
to put together static revenue estimates suggesting that a
reduction in the rate would lose money and primarily benefit the
wealthy. To the contrary, the 1986 increase in the capital gains
tax rate actually hurt middle-income taxpayers more than the rich,
since the tax rate on their gains rose from 14 percent to 28
percent.
The Luxury
Tax.
The 1990 budget agreement included provisions imposing
excise taxes on products thought to be purchased by the "rich,"
including luxury boats and private airplanes. These taxes backfired
so badly that Congress repealed them. Actual collections from the
boat tax reached only $32.5 million, according to the Treasury
Department--far below the $53 million originally forecast. The Joint
Committee on Taxation, meanwhile, admitted that the airplane tax
collected just 10 percent of the static estimate.
Defenders of the tax have argued that the
revenue shortfall was coincidental, but the effects of the
luxury tax were in fact even worse than these numbers indicate.
When boat builders lost their jobs and boatyards shut down, the
federal government lost income and payroll taxes and also had to
pay out unemployment benefits. The static estimates
recognized that some people could lose their jobs as a result of
the tax but assumed that those workers would immediately get jobs
paying the same wage someplace else. Life in the real world,
unfortunately, does not operate in accord with the assumptions of
static blackboard models.
The 1990 Bush
Tax Rate Increase.
In 1990, President George H. W. Bush reneged on his
no-new-taxes promise and signed into law a major tax increase,
including an increase in the top rate from 28 percent to 31
percent. Rather than bringing in new revenues, however, the
government began to collect less revenue than was projected before
tax rates were increased. In 1991 alone, revenues
fell by more than $6 for every $1 the tax increase was supposed to
generate.
Defenders of static scoring admit this
happened but blame the stagnant economy for the drop in revenues.
Since the tax increase certainly played a significant role in the
economic slump, however, this excuse rings hollow. Even if one
accepts the unlikely assumption that the tax increase had nothing
to do with the recession, other compelling numbers demonstrate the
dynamic effect. In 1991, income tax receipts from those making more
than $200,000 fell by more than 6 percent, but tax collections from
those making less than that rose by 1 percent. In other words, the
government wound up collecting less in revenue from the taxpayers
who were slapped with higher tax rates and more from those whose
tax rates did not go up.
The 1993 Clinton
Tax Rate Increase.
Without a vote to spare in either the House or the Senate, during
his first year in office, President Clinton imposed the largest tax
increase in history. His increase in the top tax rate from 31
percent to 39.6 percent was the biggest jump since
Herbert Hoover boosted the rate from 25 percent to 63 percent in
1930. Harvard economist Martin Feldstein estimates that the tax
rate increase raised only one-third of the anticipated revenue. The
combined effect of the Bush and Clinton tax rate increases was
utter disaster.
Some
have argued that the Clinton tax increase must have succeeded since
the budget shifted from deficit to surplus in the late 1990s, but
the Clinton Administration's own budget figures dispel this myth.
In January 1995, almost 18 months after the tax increase was
enacted, President Clinton's Office of Management and Budget
projected that future budget deficits would remain above $200
billion--and climb in all subsequent years. Needless to say, if the
Clinton Administration admitted in 1995 that the tax increase would
not lead to a balanced budget, it would be groundless to make that
claim today.
What
really happened? As always, it is difficult to provide a precise
answer, but the fiscal restraint imposed by the newly elected
Republican Congress, combined with pro-growth capital gains tax
cuts and private-sector initiative, clearly were the main factors
in balancing the budget. In other words, the budget was balanced
because government policy shifted away from President Clinton's
original approach.
The 1997 Capital
Gains Tax Rate Reduction.
The 1997 capital gains tax cut is the most recent example of the
negative impact of static scoring. The Joint Committee on Taxation
estimated that reducing the capital gains tax from 28 percent to 20
percent would "cost" the government $21 billion over the next 10
years.
The JCT did estimate that revenues would increase in the first two
years because the lower rate would encourage more asset sales, but
there was no attempt to measure the higher revenues that would be
generated because of better economic performance.
In
reality, capital gains tax revenue skyrocketed, climbing from $62
billion in 1996 to more than $100 billion in 1999. But this
figure is only a partial measure of the JCT's failure to grasp
economic realities. In addition to mis-measuring the impact of a
capital gains tax cut on financial markets, the JCT failed to
estimate the impact of a lower capital gains tax cut on the overall
economy. In other words, the lower capital gains tax rate not only
boosted revenues from the capital gains tax, but also indirectly
increased personal income tax, corporate income tax, and payroll
tax revenues. None of these results were
incorporated in the JCT estimate.

REVENUE ESTIMATES AND THE FLAT TAX
The
perils and pitfalls of static forecasting are clearly evident in
the tax reform debate. House Majority Leader Richard Armey (R-TX)
resuscitated the idea of moving to a simple and fair one-rate tax
system in the mid-1990s. Almost immediately, the Clinton
Administration attacked the proposal. Shortly before the 1994
mid-term elections, the press reported a Treasury Department
estimate that the flat tax would require a rate of 25.8 percent to
be revenue neutral. Six months later, the
Administration criticized the flat tax yet again, but this time
charged that the rate would have to be 22.9 percent to avoid
increasing the deficit. In 1996, the Treasury
Department issued its third static estimate of the flat tax, this
time claiming that the revenue neutral rate would be 20.8
percent.
The
Clinton Administration's inability to settle on a single rate was
rather instructive. It demonstrated that even static revenue
estimates, which involve more simplistic calculations than dynamic
scoring, are far from exact. Not surprisingly, dynamic estimates,
using more sophisticated econometric and modeling techniques, find
that growth increases significantly with a flat tax. This
additional growth, as illustrated earlier, results in substantial
revenue increases.
An
important question, of course, is who benefits from the economy's
expansion. Representative Armey and Senate co-sponsor Richard
Shelby (R-AL) believe that taxpayers should reap the benefit of
faster growth. As a result, their plan would reduce the flat rate
to 17 percent in the third year.
Numerous studies support the contention
that the economy will expand dramatically if the existing tax code
is replaced by a single-rate flat tax. For example:
- Professor Dale Jorgenson, chairman of the
Economics Department at Harvard, testified before the National
Commission on Economic Growth and Tax Reform that a single-rate
system could boost the economy by 15 percent or more within a
decade.
- University of California professor Alan
Auerbach, formerly an economist with the Joint Committee on
Taxation, estimates that the economy would be 5.7 percent larger
within five years with a flat tax.
- In another study, Auerbach and four
colleagues concluded that the economy would be 7.5 percent larger
in the long run following tax reform.
- Stanford University economist Michael
Boskin, a former chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, has
testified that a flat tax would boost growth by 10 percent within
ten years.
- Even without growth effects, two former
Treasury Department economists estimate that a flat tax would be
revenue neutral at 17 percent.
- Boston University economist Laurence J.
Kotlikoff estimates that a move to a single-rate tax that does not
double-tax capital would raise living standards by between 7
percent and 14 percent.
- A study by two academic economists found
that a 17 percent flat tax would boost growth so much that tax
revenues would increase by 1.8 percentage points.
- Finally, the Joint Committee on Taxation
sponsored a symposium to examine the impact of tax reform. Every
economist/forecaster who participated in the conference estimated
that tax reform would increase investment and boost economic
growth.
Yet the JCT refuses to reflect this consensus in its revenue
estimates.
CONCLUSION
To
make America's economy more competitive and boost the economy's
performance, tax policy will have to change. In the short term,
immediate tax rate reductions are needed to boost growth; in the
long term, the entire tax code should be replaced by a simple, flat
tax. But these pro-growth changes will be harder to achieve if
revenue estimators continue to use outdated and inaccurate static
models.
Dynamic revenue estimates, by contrast,
would provide policymakers with more accurate information. Dynamic
forecasting is based on a proper understanding of how the economy
works, and history has shown this approach to be far more realistic
and accurate than static estimates.
Daniel J. Mitchell, Ph.
D., is McKenna Senior Fellow in Political Economy in the
Thomas A. Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies at The Heritage
Foundation.