HOW THE SPACE PROGRAM VEERED OFF
COURSE
For
many, the race for space, which began in earnest after the Soviet
Union successfully launched Sputnik in 1957, epitomizes the
conflict between democracy and communism. During the 1950s and
1960s, the United States was engaged in a serious ideological war
with a powerful enemy, and every scientific, economic, military,
and political success was interpreted as proof that one system was
superior to the other. Indeed, the Soviet Union touted Sputnik as a
triumph over capitalism.
The
United States, in turn, set out to beat the Soviet Union to the
moon and claim victory in a battle for ideological and
technological supremacy. Washington sought a partnership with the
private sector to facilitate the development and testing of
rocket-propulsion systems. NASA, created by President Dwight D.
Eisenhower in 1958 to oversee this effort, realized its role
in America's race against the Soviet Union with an exhilarating
success on July 20, 1969, when Apollo 11 became the first manned
spacecraft to reach the moon.
The
conquest of space encouraged American scientists and policymakers
to look to the moon for solutions to problems on Earth: for
example, what to do once resources like water and fossil fuels were
depleted and how to feed and house a burgeoning population. It is
no surprise that NASA's plans included permanently manned colonies
on the moon and on Mars, as well as space stations
orbiting Earth. Space exploration was now NASA's broad mission.
Space Exploration
To
facilitate space exploration, NASA began searching for cheaper and
less expendable methods of launching payloads into orbit and
returning them to Earth. The Saturn V rocket, designed by Wernher
von Braun for the Apollo missions, could be used only once, at a
cost of $3,800 per pound. The same was true
for NASA's entire launch infrastructure, a byproduct of the
military's throwaway ballistic missile technology. The space
program could not sustain such costs. As a low-cost, "partially
reusable" alternative to the expendable systems, NASA developed the
Space Shuttle. Since 1981, NASA's five orbiters--including the
Columbia, which blasted off on July 23 with America's first
female commander--have ventured into space 95 times. The Shuttle will
also be used to service the ISS.
The
cost of launching a payload aboard the Shuttle today, at nearly
$10,000 per pound, is almost three times higher than the cost of
launching a payload during the Apollo program. Unfortunately, the
Shuttle has not succeeded in reducing space launch costs. To cut
costs, the Nixon Administration nearly halved the Shuttle's budget,
forcing NASA engineers to abandon many of their planned
technological improvements that would have reduced launch costs.
In
the late 1970s, to bring down per-flight costs, NASA required all
payloads, including commercial ones, to be carried on the
Shuttle. This reduced the
market forces that could have driven down costs and stimulated the
development of new technologies. The Air Force soon realized,
however, that relying on one launch vehicle (the Shuttle) was
unwise from a national security perspective. Eventually, the
government rescinded this payload restriction to enable the
burgeoning U.S. commercial launch industry--using a privatized
version of the government's existing expendable launch systems--to
compete for commercial payloads. The end result was that the
commercial space industry and the military were forced to rely on
fully expendable rockets technologically similar to the rockets
that lifted Alan Shepard and John Glenn into space in the early
1960s. Many U.S. businesses now launch satellites from China or
Russia, at a cost between $12 million and $70 million per
launch--significantly less than the cost of launching payloads from
the United States.
Although NASA's fiscal year (FY) 2000
reauthorization bill proposes spending almost $3.2 billion on the
Shuttle, NASA is working on plans for its replacement, which could
involve a single-stage-to-orbit, fully reusable launch vehicle.
NASA budgeted $370 million in FY 1999 for its Advanced Space
Transportation program to develop the Shuttle's replacement. To work, however,
the proposed launch vehicle requires technology that as yet does
not exist.
The
ISS, first envisioned as an orbiting laboratory for studying, for
example, the effects of weightlessness on living organisms, is also
far more expensive than originally planned--or, for that matter,
than it should be. NASA spends almost $2.5 billion annually on the
Station. The reauthorization bill proposes spending $2.5 billion on
the Station in FY 2000, $2.4 billion in FY 2001, and almost $2.1
billion in FY 2002. Between 1999 and
2000, NASA plans to support Russia's participation on the Station
with $448 million, in addition to the
$60 million the United States has contributed since Russia began
falling behind on its obligations.
A
recently introduced bill now before Congress (H.R. 1883) would
withhold U.S. payments for the Space Station until the President
can certify that Russia is no longer selling technology for weapons
of mass destruction to Iran. But Russia's
participation in the ISS is causing other problems for the United
States.
Currently, the only emergency egress
(exit) vehicle for astronauts to use to vacate the station quickly
is the Russian Soyuz capsule. However, the safety,
reliability, and availability of the Soyuz capsule are all
in doubt. In 1969, a cosmonaut returning to Earth aboard the Soyuz
came close to death when a malfunction prevented the capsule from
correctly separating from its boosters; it nearly burned up in
Earth's atmosphere. In 1988, the separation procedure occurred
prematurely, almost stranding another cosmonaut in orbit. Although the
Russian Space Agency claims these problems have been fixed, Russia
tried to keep the incidents from NASA. Other safety problems with
the Soyuz may also exist. Moreover, if Russia withdraws from
the ISS project, no emergency exit vehicle would be available for
American astronauts. NASA is working on plans to build its own exit
vehicle, called a Crew Return Vehicle.
NASA
is also working on plans to send a manned expedition to Mars, as
well as several unmanned missions to study Mars' soil and
atmosphere, to bring back rock samples to analyze for toxicity and
to determine the suitability of long-term manned missions. Previous
missions include the Viking mission in 1976 and the Pathfinder
probe in 1997. NASA believes it could launch its first manned
mission to Mars by 2014, yet some
private-sector entrepreneurs are pushing to get there sooner. A
plan known as Mars Direct, for example, intends to initiate manned
missions for exploration and settlement in the first decade of the
21st century, depending on the availability of modified Shuttle
hardware for heavy lift capability.
Private companies are clearly ready to
invest in the race for space. Some have plans to send a robot
surveyor to the moon to look for water and provide imagery and
detailed maps of the moon's surface for companies that may be
interested in sending their own probes in the future. Other countries
have space exploration programs in the works as well. China, for
example, is planning to send an astronaut into orbit and, possibly,
to the moon. Japanese companies even have plans for space and moon
hotels.
As
demand for access to space increases, the need for domestic
commercial "spaceports" from which to launch payloads will
increase. Currently, there are no U.S. private-sector spaceports.
Several facilities built in the 1950s to test long-range ballistic
missiles and missile defense systems are being used to launch both
military and commercial payloads. Two of the largest, Vandenberg
Air Force Base and Patrick Air Force Base in Florida, suffer from
outdated infrastructure, including equipment dating back to World
War II. The Air Force, NASA, and the aerospace industry have
indicated their support for turning control of these sites over to
a quasi-private management firm like the U.S. Postal Service. Under one plan,
for example, the Air Force would relinquish control of Cape
Canaveral and Vandenberg over 10 years. Such partial privatization,
however, will be less effective than full privatization for
reducing launch costs and for modernizing facilities.
Military Access to Space
America's armed services rely heavily on
space-based assets, such as surveillance and communications
satellites, to protect national security. According to Air
Force General Howell M. Estes III, former commander in chief of the
North American Defense Command, "space is becoming a `vital
national interest,' and because it is a source of national power,
like oil today, it will be challenged by those who choose to do our
country harm." Indeed, the U.S.
military is facing many threats to its continued use of and access
to space:
-
Russia has admitted to developing an
anti-satellite weapons system capable of destroying U.S.
satellites. There are
indications that other countries have acquired or will soon acquire
this capability as well.
-
Many of America's low-orbiting satellites
are vulnerable to laser attacks, which could blind certain imagery
satellites. According to the
Defense Department, "Given China's current level of interest in
laser technology, it is reasonable to assume in the future Beijing
will develop a weapon that could destroy U.S. satellites."
-
Certain types of electronic equipment are
capable of jamming signals from U.S. satellites. According to Air
Force General Richard B. Myers, "We have already seen instances of
jamming satellites by Indonesia, Turkey, and Iran."
-
Although Russia's military suffers from
lack of pay and resources, it launches about 15 military satellites
a year, including reconnaissance and communications satellites. The United States
launches about 10 such satellites each year.
-
Not long after the Kosovo intervention
began, European leaders announced that their continued dependence
on the United States for space-based intelligence and
reconnaissance information would not be tolerated. Defense News
noted in May 1999 that Europeans have embarked on an ambitious
agenda to challenge the United States' use of space.
-
China's long-term goals include designing
advanced anti-satellite systems that can be deployed either in
space or on the ground, establishing permanent bases on the moon
and permanently manned stations in orbit.
The
U.S. military demonstrated its reliance on space-based assets
during the Persian Gulf War when it used precision munitions
supported by the Global Positioning System (GPS), tactical warning
systems, and satellites for communications, navigation, imagery,
and surveillance to conduct nightly televised raids on Baghdad. Perhaps because of
the success of those missions, the U.S. Navy incorporated the
environment of space in future naval operations in its Space
Operations Doctrine, which it issued on July 19, 1996. Dependence on
space-based assets likely will increase, thanks to the recent
enactment of H.R. 4, the National Missile Defense Act, establishing
as U.S. policy the deployment of a national missile defense system,
which many defense experts believe must include space-based sensors
and interceptors.
Specifically, the U.S. military relies on
access to space for:
- Communications.
During battle, uninterrupted communications are essential to
victory. Indeed, preventing the enemy from communicating is
a primary objective in warfare. Space-based communication assets
enable the military to operate more efficiently. Current systems
include the Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS), used by
the armed services and a number of government agencies; the Navy's
Fleet Satellite Communications (FLYSATCOM), Leased Satellite
(LEASAT), and Ultra-High Frequency Follow-On (UFO) systems; the Army's
Military Strategic/Tactical Relay (MILSTAR) satellites; and the Air
Force Satellite (AFSAT) system.
- Surveillance and
intelligence.
Monitoring the activities of other nations and assessing their
capabilities from space are far less risky than they otherwise
would be, because human lives are not put at risk, satellites are
always on duty, and the cost to deploy them decreases over time.
Moreover, satellites cannot defect. An array of U.S. military
surveillance satellites (in separate "constellations") provide
constantly updated information to force commanders. Imagery
intelligence (IMINT) satellites provide the Pentagon and commanders
in the field, or at sea, with detailed data on targets, troop and
fleet location and movement, armored units, airfields, air
defenses, mine fields, beachhead defenses, and other data. As
forward-deployed forces are being cut back, the military is
becoming increasingly dependent on this form of intelligence.
- Navigation and meteorology.
The Global Positioning System is a radio signal system of 24
satellites in six different orbits around the Earth that can
quickly locate any object on Earth equipped with a GPS receiver. It provides
precise coordinates, speed, and time-related data to any number of
military and civilian users. The Defense Department also fields a
fleet of weather satellites to assess or predict weather
conditions, vital information when planning military
operations.
However, these space-based military assets
are at risk, given Russia's claims that it possesses anti-satellite
systems, as well as the Defense Department's confirmation that U.S.
satellites have been subjected to jamming by foreign countries.
There are also concerns that the International Space Station may be
used to spy on the United States. The current agreement stipulates
that only "peaceful" projects can be conducted on the Station;
however, members do not agree on what qualifies as "peaceful." The
United States and Russia believe that experiments vital to national
security have "peaceful purposes," but Japan does not. And while
agreements between the members prevent them from conducting certain
experiments or activities in a particular country's space, no such
agreement exists to restrict members from using their own space for
reconnaissance and espionage activities. This loophole leaves wide
open the door for spying on America.
Another major issue facing the Air Force
and U.S. intelligence agencies is the exorbitant cost of building
and launching ultra-sophisticated electronic imaging satellites.
The Air Force is now investigating two stage systems to lower
launch costs.
Commercial Space Enterprise
Many
early space scientists believed America's investment in space would
lead beyond manned moon bases and exploration of the solar system
to a lucrative commercial space industry, just as the government's
involvement in the development of military aircraft during World
War I and World War II facilitated the rapid growth of the civil
aeronautics industry. In fact, as soon as Charles Lindbergh crossed
the Atlantic, the benefits of air transportation became clear. New
aviation-related industries took off, such as airplane
manufacturing, parts suppliers, travel agencies, and commercial air
services. By the 1940s, similar benefits from access to space were
the subjects of widespread speculation. In 1945, for example,
science fiction writer Arthur C. Clarke predicted that satellites
could be used for "wireless" communications. Four decades
later, wireless telecommunications is a multibillion-dollar
industry.
The
rapidly evolving and profitable telecommunications industry--which
includes broadcast and satellite television, cellular telephony,
and paging systems--has catapulted the demand for commercial access
to space. Globally, commercial space activity generated some $51
billion in revenues in 1997, including:
-
Over $19 billion from satellite
services;
-
Over $13 billion from manufacturing of
spacecraft;
-
Over $11 billion in manufacturing
ground-based equipment to launch, monitor, track, and manage
spacecraft; and
-
Over $7 billion from the space launch
industry.
Today, the market for global government
and private-sector space activities is believed to be as high as
$75 billion. By 2005, it is expected to reach more than $180
billion. And the U.S. space
industry is rapidly expanding, from generating more than $7 billion
in 1995 to more than $10 billion today. Commercial space
activity includes:
- Satellite remote sensing.
An imagery satellite system known as LANDSAT gathers
meteorological and reconnaissance data and supports consumer
services in the insurance, marketing, real estate, and farming
sectors. Even the U.S. government uses LANDSAT data. Advances in
technology allow private companies to launch and use their own
imagery satellites or to buy imagery services from other companies
with satellites already in orbit. By 2000, this industry should
produce over $2 billion in revenue.
- Space transportation.
Space transportation involves putting cargo (or people) into space
reliably at diminishing marginal costs. The vehicles used by the
private sector to put commercial satellites in orbit are also used
by the U.S. military to put advanced military satellites in
orbit.
- Positioning systems.
The GPS Industry Council projects that the greatest growth for GPS
services will be in consumer-based services, such as automobile
navigation, consumer/cellular telephone tracking, and mobile
computer access. GPS service is
available for cars, boats, hikers, and even bikers.
- Space-based manufacturing.
Manufacturing in space uses near-zero gravity to produce materials
for commercial purposes. A market is developing for products such
as metal alloys, plastics, glass, pharmaceuticals, and organic
crystals produced in space.
Despite the commercial interest in space,
many activities are limited or prohibited because of the costs
involved. For example, launch costs are so high that it is not
profitable, or even potentially profitable, to begin taking
tourists into space. And launching commercial payloads like direct
broadcast satellites (DBS) or telecommunications satellites is
restrained by liabilities that the government and private
enterprise could incur in a mishap. Finally, U.S. export
restrictions--aimed at protecting national security by preventing
technology transfers in joint ventures with other countries--may
needlessly restrict legitimate commercial activities and even fail
to prevent such transfers.
Indemnification.
Obtaining insurance to cover a company's substantial investment in
a space-related enterprise is problematic. Before 1988, few
insurance firms were able or willing to cover the commercial space
industry. Yet countries such as France were protecting their own
space industries against lawsuits and litigation. To enable U.S.
companies to compete with foreign space launch companies, such as
France's Arianespace, Congress created an indemnification authority
in 1988. It amended the Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984 to
protect U.S. commercial space companies from third-party liability.
Companies must be insured up to the "maximum probable loss" or $500
million, whichever is less. The government will cover liability
above that amount to $1.5 billion.
In
1992, Congress extended this indemnification authority, but it is
slated to expire at the end of 1999. The chairman of House
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, Representative Dana
Rohrabacher (R-CA), recently introduced H.R. 2607 to extend the
indemnification authority for another five years. Many policymakers
would like to see the private sector take over liability protection
for U.S. space launch companies. Until that happens,
indemnification authority should be extended to cover the current
contracts.
Export Restrictions. Foreign competition
threatens to overtake America's superiority in some space launch
activities. Now that NASA no longer prevents private launches of
payloads, other barriers to space commerce--such as quota
restrictions on foreign launches--limit cooperative ventures for
U.S. companies.
For
example, in 1992 Lockheed entered an agreement with Russian rocket
manufacturer Khrunichev-Energia to launch U.S. commercial
satellites on Russian rockets. However, out of
concern that Russia was proliferating nuclear weapons technology,
the Administration imposed a quota system restricting joint
launches to 15 per year. In July 1999, the Administration announced
that it would permit four additional launches. The quota is set to
expire by the end of 2000. After that, the joint space launch
activities between the United States and Russia are expected to
cease.
To
date, there is no evidence that this particular venture led to the
transfer of crucial U.S. technology to Russia. Moreover, such
ventures are helping both U.S. businesses and Russia, which could
use the income generated by these ventures to retool its space
industry away from weapons production and toward more lucrative
commercial activity. To be sure, Washington should ensure, through
prudent use of U.S. law, that national security is not compromised
in such ventures. But in the absence of any security violations, or
when U.S. security is unlikely to be compromised, commercial
ventures between U.S. companies and other countries should
proceed.
PLAYING CATCH-UP IN SPACE LAUNCH
TECHNOLOGY
NASA's cost of about $3,800 per pound to
launch a payload into space during the Apollo program was a direct
result of the fact that the Saturn V was designed to put a man on
the moon before the Soviets were able to do so. The Saturn V
rocket was big, quick, and fully expendable, but hardly
economical. Because costs were too high to maintain over the long
term, NASA was pressured to develop a replacement for the Saturn
rocket. Its replacement, the Space Shuttle, was conceived and
designed to be reused. However, a series of decisions at NASA and
the Department of Defense--along with congressionally imposed
budget restrictions and requests by the Nixon Administration to cut
costs--forced engineers to design a compromise vehicle that was
much larger and more expensive to operate than the vehicle in
NASA's original concept.
Forced to reduce front-end development
costs, and knowing that this would mean sacrificing long-term low
operating costs and evolutionary growth options, NASA engineers
abandoned one of the original Shuttle's most cost-saving design
features--reusable "fly-back" boosters. The Shuttle
currently uses an expendable external fuel tank and solid rocket
boosters that fall into the ocean and require expensive recovery
missions--sapping funds that could be spent on space exploration or
science.
When
Challenger exploded in 1986, NASA grounded the Shuttle
program; then it and the Department of Defense resorted to using
ballistic missile technology developed in the 1950s, with fully
expendable vehicles--perhaps the most expensive way to put
something into orbit--to launch their payloads. In fact, the
Department of Defense continues to use this as its only method of
launching payloads. When the improved Space Shuttle was returned to
use in 1988, it still failed to offer inexpensive or routine access
to space.
Alternative Launch Systems.
Alternatives to today's costly launch vehicles are currently under
development. These vehicles could use single-stage-to-orbit or
two-stage-to-orbit reusable rockets. The single-stage-to-orbit
platform is efficient and may hold the best promise for affordable
space launches over the long term.
NASA's plans to replace the Space Shuttle
with a single-stage-to-orbit vehicle involve an experimental
aircraft known as the X-33 and a commercial follow-on known as the
VentureStar. NASA's total budget for developing the system is some
$941 million. Private plans for a single-stage-to-orbit system
include the Roton, which will take
off vertically and carry two pilots and up to 7,000 pounds of
cargo. The Roton is projected to enter service in 2001 at a cost of
about $7 million per flight (about $1,000 per pound), significantly
less than the cost of similar launches on most expendable launch
vehicles today. The company developing the Roton has raised more
than $30 million of the expected development costs of $150
million.
Many
respected scientists and engineers, however, believe large-scale
production of heavy lift, single-stage-to-orbit vehicles is decades
away. Consequently, several companies are also working on
two-stage-to-orbit vehicles. Private plans include using existing
rockets like the Atlas III inside a winged vehicle to bring
the rocket safely back to Earth. Such a configuration, which relies
on existing technology, would lower space launch costs immediately.
Others include a first stage that takes off from a runway like an
airplane and travels to a high altitude before releasing a second
stage orbiter to deliver its payloads into orbit. Both stages would
return to Earth and land on a runway. Another would lift
off vertically like a conventional rocket; the first stage, powered
by three Russian kerosene-liquid oxygen engines, would deploy
parachutes and airbags to land near the launch site, after which the
second stage would put the payload into orbit. The manufacturer of
this vehicle has raised more than $450 million toward its $750
million development budget.
The
Air Force is designing a Space Maneuver Vehicle (SMV), a
two-stage-to-orbit vehicle that would be launched on an expendable
booster rocket or a larger winged space plane to deploy a satellite
into orbit. But this configuration would have no commercial
applications.
Unfortunately, private and
government-sponsored U.S. space launch programs face heavy
competition from foreign companies. Russia's Proton and
Soyuz heavy booster rockets deliver payloads into space more
cheaply than do their U.S. counterparts. In April 1999,
Ukraine successfully launched its Sea Launch system, the product of
a joint private venture with a U.S. aerospace company. France's Ariane
V, which just emerged from its test flight stage, could
outperform U.S. launch vehicles in the near future and recapture
the bulk of the heavy launch commercial satellite market. China
regularly launches U.S. satellites at much lower costs than can be
done stateside. Other countries
like Japan also have ambitious programs in the works.
Certainly, competition in any industry is
good. It leads to lower costs and greater innovation. But the U.S.
space launch industry is being forced to play catch-up in some
areas because of decisions made by NASA and the Department of
Defense in the past, such as maintaining a monopoly on space
launches and developing new fully expendable launch systems. U.S.
manufacturers are now building space launch vehicles with larger
lift capacities, but most of the plans involve larger, fully
expendable vehicles known as "evolved expendable launch vehicles"
(EELVs)--another type of "throwaway" rocket designed to deliver
payloads and then burn up in the atmosphere. This approach has been
criticized as extremely expensive to develop. It certainly goes
against the reason the Space Shuttle was funded in the first place:
to develop a fully reusable vehicle that would reduce space launch
costs.
The
EELVs are building on the technology of the current launch
vehicles, which recently have exhibited some problems:
-
On May 4, 1999, a $230 million
communications satellite ended up in the wrong orbit when the
second stage of a Delta III rocket misfired;
-
On April 30, 1999, a Titan IV
rocket misfired, sending an $800 million military communications
satellite into the wrong orbit;
-
On April 27, 1999, an Athena II
rocket failed to place a multibillion-dollar commercial remote
sensing satellite into orbit;
-
On April 9, 1999, a $250 million early
(missile) warning satellite was stranded in a useless orbit when a
$432 million Titan IV upper-stage booster misfired;
-
On August 26, 1998, a $255 million
Galaxy X payload on the maiden flight of the Delta III was
lost when a guidance computer failed, forcing the rocket to use all
of its hydraulic fluid for steering (the rocket broke apart from
wind shear); and
-
On August 12, 1998, a $700 million
reconnaissance satellite was destroyed when an electrical
malfunction scrambled the guidance system on the $344 million
Titan IV rocket.
These incidents led retired North American
Space commander General Estes to observe:
I
think this is probably one of the worst times in the launch history
of the country.... Not only is it a critical national security
issue, but it is critical for commercial space interests. If we
can't do the launches here, [those who wish to place satellites in
orbit] will go to foreign markets such as China and Russia.
European Union (EU) members, especially
France, have a significant lead in commercializing EELV-type
services. According to Aviation Week, "As it is now,
[France's] Araine 5 will have at least a 4 [to] 5- year lead on
commercial EELV spin-offs." Moreover, the EU
is working to develop reusable launch vehicles (RLVs) to lower
costs, thus helping to save the European space program.
A
Cost-Effective Alternative?
Perhaps the most promising short-term solution to the high cost of
U.S. space launches using fully expendable rockets will prove to be
a rocket that uses a liquid fly-back booster (LFBB). The LFBB (or, as
NASA calls it, a "reusable first stage") would lift a payload into
near space, release an upper stage with a payload bound for orbit,
return to Earth, and land, ready for another flight. According to
both major aerospace corporations, the LFBB technology is more
reliable and less expensive than the expendable system employed by
the Shuttle today. Boeing, on its Web site, states that LFBBs
"offer increased safety, higher reliability, lower-cost, and
improved performance, along with new growth options for America's
space program." As Lockheed Martin
explains on its Web site:
The
[LFBB] booster will burn liquid fuel, which will improve safety
over the solid rocket boosters currently used on the Shuttle. Also,
the proposed booster's fly-back capability and the efficiencies of
liquid booster design have the potential to save millions of
dollars in program costs annually.
However, both major aerospace companies
are currently under contract with NASA to upgrade the existing
expendable rocket rather than the LFBBs. NASA should promote the
development of the lowest cost-to-orbit system that is
technologically feasible and reliable. This would benefit the U.S.
military's access to space and help U.S. companies stay
competitive.