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947 June25'1993 INTRODUCTION The Clinton Administr ation wants
to use American foreign aid to spur economic growth in Africa. Yet
the over $1 billion of aid which Africa receives each year has not
done much to ad vance the continent's long-term economic
development. The average African has received four t i mes as much
foreign aid since World War II as the average Asian, yet Africa
remains the world's poorest region. It is about time that the
United States restructure its African aid program, making it more
effective and tuned to encouraging the growth of pr ivate
enterprise and free trade in Africa.
The bulk of U.S. aid to Africa is funneled through the
Development Fund for Africa DFA). Established in 1988 by an
amendment to the U.S. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 FAA the DFA
was intended to supply a steady s ource of development aid to
Africa. Essen tially a permanent foreign aid earmark, the DFA
received an $800 million congressional ap propriation for 1993 to
promote economic development in Africa. Some in Congress would like
to appropriate $1 billion for t he DFA in 19
94. Unfortunately, the approach to distributing DFA aid taken by
the Agency for International Development (AID) fails adequately to
pro mote free markets. Without further market development in Afric
a, that long-suffering conti nent will never develop the wealth
necessary to end poverty and raise the standard of living of all
Africans.
The timing is now right for the U.S. to use its foreign aid as a
means to press for a free mar ket agenda in Africa. With the end of
the Cold -War, most aid to Africa can now be used to promote
economic development, and not merely to support friendly regimes
against sum gates of the former Soviet Union. Moreover, many
African nations have begun to take steps toward fre e markets, and
they need encouragement from the U.S. To help these countries capi
talize on what are still very tentative steps away from statist
economies and authoritarian polit ical systems, and to make U.S.
aid to in Africa more effective, the U.S. sho u ld 1 The U.S. also
provides Africa with non-DFA aid. This includes humanitarian aid,
debt relief, food aid, a small amount of security assistance, and
the Economic Support Fund (ESF The U.S. also aids Africa by funding
the World Bank, the IMF, the African Development Bank and other
multilateral institutions. While calculating the exact amount of
total U.S aid given to Africa is problematic, it has been estimated
at slightly less than $1.1 billion dollars for 1992.
Sub-Saharan African Countries Receiving U. S. Foreign Aid: I 992
Note: U.S. aid to South Africa is directed toward disadvantaged
South Africans J Establish an Index of Economic Freedom as the
primary determinant of devel opment aid to African countries. The
Index would be a quantitative gauge of a countrys economic freedom.
It would take into account its economic policies, in cluding
taxation rates, regulation on business activity, and the size of
the state sec tor of the economy. Implementing an Index will ensure
that U.S. development aid is given only to those African countries
that pursue market-oriented economic poli cies, which are the only
proven means of achieving long-term economic growth and
development. The Index also would greatly focus U.S. African aid
programs.
The U.S. is not obligated to provide foreign aid to any other
country, whether it be Angola or Russia. Development aid, when
given, should be conditioned on prog ress toward the establishment
of free market economies, leading to the eventual ces sation of
dependence on foreign ai d . An Index of Economic Freedom would be
an ideal instrument for signaling that there is an endpoint for
U.S. development aid the establishment of a free market 2 J
Concentrate U.S. development aid in fewer African countries. There
is no need for an AID pr e sence in every African country.
Washington should concentrate its development aid on those African
countries that ate committed to developing free markets as
indicated by an Index of Economic Freedom. This would be mo.re eco
nomical than the current polic y of dispersing U.S. aid resources
in some 37 Afri can countries. The result should be fewer African
countries receiving AID funds ment. African states pursuing free
market reforms could benefit greatly from tech nical aid for
privatization and private sec t or development. For example, AID
could be providing more money for the establishment of banks to
lend money to poten tial African entrepreneurs. Yet the Clinton
Administration is deemphasizing AIDS private sector programs,
developed in the 1980s, in favor of other, less effective programs,
such as population control projects.
J Use development aid as leverage to encourage African aid
recipients to move toward democracy. The U.S. should use aid as a
means for pressuring repressive African governments, such as those
in Uganda and Cameroon, to adopt democratic reforms. The U.S. also
should continue its democracy-building programs in Africa.
By providing technical aid to political parties, legislative
assemblies, and other democratic institutions, Washington d raws on
a prime source of American strength in Africa: its democratic
tradition J .-Increase U.S. support for African privatization and
private sector develop AFRICAS ECONOMIC DECLINE Fifteen of the
worlds thirty poorest countries are African. This gloomy
predicament con trasts starkly with the optimism that prevailed
throughout the continent during its indepen dence era of the late
1950s and early 1960s. Standards of living have actually declined
since then. Today the approximate per capita ss national pr oduct
(GNP) of Mozambique is $77 Kenyas is $368; and Nigerias is $2
66. Throughout the 1980s, most African countries.rou tinely
registered GNP growth rates well below their rate of population
growth and a decline in international prices for its primary com
modities. The greatest enemy of Africas economic
development,however, has been the statist economic policies of
African governments. Young and ideologically inspired African
leaders, including Julius Nyerere in Tanzania, Kenneth Kaunda of
Zambia, and Ghan a s Kwame Nkrumah, proclaimed that Af rica could
best be developed under state-planned economic systems, even though
comprehens ive planning played no part in successful development
elsewhere. As a result, most African states established government
monopoli e s, price controls, and high taxes; nationalized foreign
investment; and excessively regulated foreign investors and even
their own business class 1 The result was a loss of productive
economic activity and foreign investment, a deteriorating
infrastructur e , declining economic competitiveness with other
developing regions, and perva 9l.O Africas economic misery is
caused by many factors, including civil wars, coups, droughts 3
sive corruption 2 3 The United Nations Development Programme and
the World Bank, Aftican Development Indicators (New York and
Washington, 1992), p. 32.
For an in-depth look at how donor-supported statist economic
policies destroyed theTanzanian economy see the 3 FREE MARKET
REFORM MOVEMENTS By the early 1980 it was obvious to most aid
donors and to some African leaders that stat ist economic policies
were destroying African economies. Donors, including the U.S conse
quently began using their enormous economic leverage to pressure
African states into adopt ing structural adjustment prog r ams SAPS
SAPs are country-specific reform programs de signed by the World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to liberalize the
econo mies of aid recipients. These programs typically attempt to
impose more fiscal responsibility and better debt m anagement,
privatize inefficient state enterprises, devalue currencies to en
courage exports, eliminate disincentives for the private sector and
streamline bloated govern ment bureaucracies A SAP often is backed
by a World Bank or IMF loan, often on conce s sional terms as well
as aid from donor countries to specific economic sectors. African
states that reject or fail to implement SAPs risk losing foreign
aid, as Kenya did in 1991 dergoing structural adjustment appear to
be performing better than the non-r e forming African countries!
For example, the west African country of Ghana often is cited as a
stqctural ad justment success by the World Bank, the IMF, and other
donors eager to justify their activi ties. After years of economic
decline, including a 6.5 d r op in gross domestic product in 1982
Ghana undertook a SAP in 1983 and has registered an approximately 6
percent GDP growth rate annually over the last several years! The
return of an estimated $200 million in flight capital each year is
testament to Ghan a 's improved economic climate6 rica in the early
1980s. This represented a dramatic change from AID'S earlier
policies which were either indifferent to a recipient country's
economic policies or outright hostile to free market economics.
Despite earlier en d orsements of AID'S approach in the DFA legisla
tion, though, Congress over the past couple of years has expressed
a concern that AID'S em phasis on supporting structural adjustment
will not alleviate poverty. Congressional critics have attacked AID
for de e mphasizing social programs in Africa in favor of what is
called non project assistance. This generally takes the form of
cash transfers to African governments to support economic reform,
as opposed to support for projects designed to aid the poor
majority of Africans directly, such as providing training for basic
health services.
Economic reforms imposed by SAPs, however, generally have not
hurt the poor in Africa.
Rather, it is the elite and the relatively prosperous urban
residents in Africa who typical ly bear the burden of structural
adjustment. It is they, for example, who suffer most from the re
moval of price controls on agricultural products, which is required
by SAPs. In fact, African farmers, the majority of whom are poor,
have seen their incomes rise as government monopo The evidence
suggests that SAPs have helped Africa. The 28 African countries
currently un AID began supportin the IMF and World Bank structural
adjustment approach toward Af 8 author's "Tanzania's Travail:
Lessons in Improving Am erican Aid to theThird World Heritage
Foundation Backgrounder No. 866, November 14,1991.
See Witney W. Schneidman Africa's Transition to Pluralism:
Economic and Investment Implications CSIS Afica Notes No. 142
(November 1992 p. 3.
African Development Indicators, p. 3 1.
Swiss Review of World Affairs, February 1993, p. 11.
Certain countries with poor economic reform records that were
considered important to U.S. strategic interests, including
Liberia, Somalia, and Zaire, continued to receive substantial
amounts of economic assistance throughout the '1980s. H. Rept.
102-108, Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs
Appropriations Bill, 1992, p. 74-81 4 5 6 7 8 4 9 lies, price
controls, and high rates of taxation have been eliminated by SAPs.
On the whole Africas poor certainly are better off under most SAPs
t han they would be without structural adjustment In fact, social
service spending in many reforming countries is increasing. In
Ghana, for example, education and health spending by the government
is up considerably.l0 DEVELOPMENT FUND FOR AFRICA Congress i n 1988
established the Development Fund for Africa, essentially a
permanent ear mark of economic development funds for sub-Saharan
Africa. The Agency for International Development will spend 800
million in DFA funds in 19
93. This money will be used to fund a variety of AID activities,
including development projects aimed at increasing agricultural
production and direct cash assistance to African governments, to
support imports, for example.
The legislation that created the DFA, a 1988 amendment to the
For eign Assistance Act FAA of 1961, prevents Congress from
earmarking DFA funds for specific sectors, such as health, or for
specific countries. l1 This amendment, now Chapter 10 of the FAA,
specifies three sectoral spending targets, each of which should be
a llocated 10 percent of total DFA funding: 1) renewable natural
resources, which are primarily agriculture-related, 2) health and
3) voluntary family planning. Moreover, DFA legislation includes
several instructions for AID. Aid, for example, should help t h e
poor majority of African men and women, encourage private sector
development by reducing the role of central governments, and
protect the poor from the side-effects of economic reform. AID also
is instructed to concentrate DFA funds on those countries i n
greatest need of outside aid and with potential for growth and
commitment to economic reform.
AID determines its allocation of DFA funds according to several
criteria on a weighted scale. These include a countrys need or
poverty level (as determined by i ts infant and child mortality
rate its commitment to economic reform and democracy, and its
quality of gover nance. AID considers a countrys need the most
important factor: it weighs in at approxi mately 50 percent on the
allocation formula. Economic poli cies are weighted at only some 25
percent BASIC HUMAN NEEDS PROGRAM STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT OR NOT?
Underlying much of AIDS policies is a fundamental premise: that
AIDS primary business should be providing for such basic human
needs as education, health, and nutrition. This should be done, it
is often suggested, regardless of whether or not a recipient
country is re forming. For example, Under Secretary of
State-designate for Economic and Agricultural Af fairs Joan E.
Spero stated that basic human needs aid s uch as public health and
primary educa tion should be given even in a dysfunctional policy
environment.12 9 Edward V.K. Jaycox, Structural Adjustment Spurs
African Development, Africa News, March 8-21,1993, p. 14 10 Afncan
Development Indicators, pp. 19 1 , 193 11 Eastern and Central
Europe are the only other regions free of congressional earmarks 12
Response to a question from Senator Jesse Helms, Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, March 24,1993 5 This notion of providing for
basic human needs abroad pred a tes the advent of structural ad
justment programs. In fact, it originated in the early 1970s, when
the economic policies of most African countries guaranteed that
they would be incapable of providing these fundamen tal social
services. Today, some in Cong r ess suggest that the commitment
made by African governments to alleviating poverty'or promoting
basic human needs should be one of the most important criteria used
in allocating DFA resources tive, delaying the implementation of
needed reforms. It only re l ieves popular pressures on government
to improve the economic environment. While Africa's economic
condition is dire, its development prospects are not entirely
bleak, largely because of the recent free mar ket economic reform
movement. The U.S. aid progr a m in Africa needs to be reformed as
well to support Africa's free market development 13 This viewpoint
is misguided. U.S. aid to non-reforming countries will be
counterproduc It is widely acknowledged that the U.S. foreign aid
program lacks focus or sense of pur pose. Nowhere is this more
obvious than in Africa. U.S. aid policy needs a new purpose: help
ing to build strong free market economies. Africa would be an ideal
place to highlight this pur pose because, with its diminished
strategic significance to the US Africa receives primarily
development aid To develop a vigorous free market-oriented
development aid policy toward Africa, the Clinton Administration
should J Establish an Index of Economic Freedom as the primary
determinant of development aid allo c ations to African countries
Congress has instructed AID to concentrate Development Fund for
Africa resources on those African countries that are making market
reforms. However, AID must follow the DFA's other guidelines as
well, particularly the one requi r ing that the most needy African
countries receive aid. Following these other guidelines means that
a recipient country's eco nomic policies are underemphasized in the
DFA allocation calculation. In fact, the heavy weight given to a
country's need or its p o verty level renders it almost inevitable
that African countries with little commitment to economic reform
will receive considerable DFA funds This unfortunate outcome, which
both wastes aid resources and delays the implementation of sorely
needed economic reforms, is all the more likely given that AID is
mandated by Con I 1 gress to spend $800 million in DFA money. I To
ensure that US: development aid is given only to those African
countries pursuing free market economic policies an Index of
Economic Freed o m should be established to make an African
country's economic policies the primary determinant of whether it
receives develop ment aid.14 Last year's President's Commission on
the Management of AID Programs: Re- I PROMOTING THE FREE MARKET
CENTERPIECE OF U .S. AID TO AFRICA 13 Evidence of congressional
support for a basic needs emphasis for U.S. development aid and a
general lack of enthusiasm I for structural adjustment is reflected
in a congressional study "The Investigation of the Agency for
Internationa l Development Administrators' Compliance with Ethical
Standards prepared by Michigan Democrat Representative John Conyers
during the last Congress. This study sympathetically cited concerns
expressed by AID career developmentalists that AID was losing sigh
t of its basic human needs approach in favor of an emphasis on
private sector development and structural adjustment 6 Largest
African Recipients of U.S. Foreign Aid FYI991 FYI992 FYI993 Actual
Estimated Requested Source: Congressional Research Service, Afr i
ca: U.S. Foreign Assistance Issues, updated February 4, 1992
He~itageDanchul port to the President-An Action Plan recommended
that AID concentrate its development ef forts on states promoting
private sector economic growth. The Commission also cites in In d
ex of Economic Freedom as an effective means of doing ~0 An Index
would quantify rates of taxation, the size of the public sector,
the extent of private banking, regulation and red tape, the extent
wages and prices are regulated, tariff levels, restrictio n s on
foreign invest ment, protection of property rights, and other
indices in order to assess the extent to which po tential aid
recipients have adopted and actually implemented pro-growth
economic policies An Index score would be established for each cou
ntry each year. African countries proceed ing with free market
economic reforms would be eligible to receive U.S. development aid
while those rejecting reforms would not be eligible, regardless of
their perceived need.
The extent to which a country's media are state-owned or
statecontrolled should be weighed heavily in an Index of Economic
Freedom. Free media are essential to economic lib erty. Business
and commercial activities need sound information on domestic and
global eco 16 nomic conditions in order to devise business plans,
market products, and attract investment 14 The Heritage Foundation
has long advocated an Index of Economic Freedom. See the author's
"Tanzania'sTravail 15 Chairman George M. Ferris, Jr. and
Commissioner Thomas Kemp urged AID to e s tablish an Index of
Economic Freedom, p. 20 16 This is a consistent theme throughout
the writings of Heritage Foundation Adjunct Scholar George B.N.
Ayittey. For example, see "The End of African Socialism Heritage
Lecture No. 250, January 24, 1990 7 Moreo v er, free media are
essential for mobilizing public support for the type of economic re
forms that are needed in many countries throughout the region.
Without them, Africans in all likelihood will fail to overcome the
dependency mindset instilled in them b y African leaders who
falsely claimed that the state could provide for all their needs
AID has the technical capabilities to develop an Index of Economic
Freedom. In fact, it al ready does much of this economic policy
analysis An Index of Economic Freedom m erely would require the
establishment of a formal coun try score to indicate the
willingness of each aid recipient to release the development
potential of the free market An Index also would provide Congress
with a gauge of what is an appropriate develop m ent aid funding
level for Africa. As the appropriations process currently stands,
it is possible that all appropriated DFA money could be spent in
countries moving away from free markets back toward their statist
pasts. DFA appropriation decisions should b e based on a
quantifiable understanding of which African countries genuinely are
undertaking free market economic re form An Index of Economic
Freedom could be used to determine a recipient countrys develop
ment assistance allocation independent of its re l ations with the
IMF and the World Bank. Afri can countries have a notoriously poor
compliance record with IMF and World Bank structural adjustment
programs, and program violations often are concealed by these
financial institu tions. Rather than allowing d eals struck by
bureaucrats from the World Bank, the IMF, and African governments
to be its guide in Africa, AIDS allocation decisions should be
deter mined by its own assessment of the extent of economic freedom
enjoyed by citizens in vari ous African nat ions dom would
encourage this trend and provide U.S. development aid to Africa
with a single focus 17 Free markets are starting to produce
positive results in Africa. An Index of Economic Free J Concentrate
U.S. development aid in fewer African countries.
A cutback in the number of African countries aided by the US now
some 37, would be economically sensible. The Presidents Commission
on the Management of AID report recog nized that AID funding is too
low in several countries to justify the numbers of staf f based in
Africa.18 For example, in the West African country of Burkino Faso
AIDS operating ex penses represent some 20 percent of the total
costs of its programs. Yet while it has been pressing AID to
sharpen its policy focus in Africa, Congress resists A IDS desire
to close country missions. The reluctance to withdraw AID missions
almost guarantees that DFA money will be squandered in countries
with little commitment to free market economic devel opment 17 In
its Development and the National Interest: U.S . Economic
Assistance into the 21st Century, AID reported that its economists
had devised a policy matrix, called an Economic Opportunity Index,
that compared the economic policies of 42 developing countries.
This matrix shows that a similar Index of Econo m ic Freedom is
feasible. It also shows what is widely known: that free markets
produce higher rates of economic growth 18 See page 5 of the report
19 U.S. General Accounting Office, Foreign Assistance: A Profile of
the Agency for International Development GAO/NSIAD-92-148 (April
1992 p.
32. I 8 U.S Bilateral Aid to Africa: Development Aid Increases
as Security Assistance Falls Billions of I992 Dollars 1.8 1.6 I .4
I .2 I .o 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 I l~.l Development Aid I982 I 984 I986
I988 I990 I992 Ne: ESF Econo mic Support Funds Source:
Congressional Research Service, AMs: U.S. Foreign Assistance Issues
updated February 4, 19
92. Heriqp DanChvt AID should concentrate its development
programs in no more than twenty African coun ries. These should be
determined by the Index of Economic Freedom. Concentrating U.S. de
ielopment dollars in this way would increase AIDS efficiency.
Moreover, the risk of losing ievelopment aid to other countries
with better economic reform records also would give Afri an
countries a gre ater incentive to proceed vigorously with free
market economic reforms J Increase U.S. Support for African
privatization and private sector develop ment.
African countries would benefit greatly from the more rapid
privatization of such state en erprises as oil refineries, mining
operations, and transportation. Enterprising African workers ould
make more productive use of their countrys economic resources,.such
as trucks, build ngs, and machinery, if they were owned by private
entrepreneurs. Turning over ec onomic en mprises owned and
mismanaged by the state to private citizens has proven to increase
eco iomic productivity throughout the world. Privatization even has
been credited with increasing rood production in formerly
famine-plagued Ethiopia.
Privatizat ion should be encouraged not only for economic
reasons but also for the potential political benefits for African
countries. A strong private sector would contribute to political
stability in Africa. Politics have degenerated into civil war so
often in Afr ican countries partly 20 20 Peasants onTop, The
Economist, March 13,1993, p. 53 9 because the stakes over who
controls state-owned enterprises have been exceptionally high.
Once in power, African political leaders have controlled the
national wealth for th eir own pur poses and not for the benefit of
the African people. Corrupt African leaders such as Mobuto Sese
Seko of Zaire have used their control over the national economy to
enrich themselves and their supporters. Fundamental economic
decisions have bee n made on the basis of politi cal, and often
tribal, calculations. African political struggles would prove far
less contentious if political power did not automatically bring
economic wealth.
Unfortunately, privatization is proceeding slowly in Africa. In
Ghana, a large recipient of U.S. aid the number of public
enterprises is actually increasing? This sluggish pace of re form
is due in part to Africas lack of technical expertise and knowledge
on how the free mar ket works AID advisors can help Africans bu i
ld a free market economy. They can train them on how to create
stock exchanges, banks, and other basic elements of a free market
economy. Unless these institutions are strengthened, structural
adjustment programs, which heavily emphasize privatization are
bound to fail. In South Africa, AIDS Bureau for Private Enterprise
(PRE which is charged with promoting the private sector in assisted
countries, has helped establish a credit program to enable black
entrepreneurs to receive credit from South African bank s This kind
of program should be recreated all over Africa.
There are numerous opportunities for AID to advance
privatization, but th ey are being missed. For example, PRE could
assist countries to set up their own stock exchanges, which play an
important role in privatization. Unfortunately, there are only a
few in all of sub Saharan Africa, and even they are not very
successful. The G h ana Stock Exchange, for exam ple, lacks
financial information on traded companies. Moreover, there are only
three accred ited stockbrokers in the entire country tries that
score high on the Index of Economic Freedom. For example, if the
Index were ap plie d to Kenya, that country would not qualify for
development aid. Kenya long has resisted meaningful economic
reforms. Most international aid to Kenya was cut off in 1991
because of its statist economic policies and its lack of political
pluralism. President Daniel arap Moi several months ago severed
relations with the World Bank and the IMF, bitterly attacking their
demands that his government dismiss thousands of civil servants,
move quickly on prom ised privatization, and further liberalize
agricultural pr i ces. Moi has since patched up relations with
these international financial institutions. Yet AIDS Bureau of
Private Enterprise boasts of its private sector development efforts
in Kenya, where it has worked with venture capital companies to
increase the av a ilability of capital to would-be Kenyan
entrepreneurs. This kind of program would not continue if the
criteria of the Index were applied. The reason: Mois re sistance to
meaningful economic reform and the consequent deterioration of the
Kenyan econ omy, a s well as Mois on-again, off-again relationship
with international donors. An Index of Economic Freedom would show
that current U.S. aid to Kenya is a waste of money To be
productive, AID should concentrate its privatization programs on
those African coun 2 1 Afican Development Indicators, p. 258 10 J
Use development aid as leverage to encourage African aid recipients
to move toward democracy Africa has experienced profound political
change in recent years. Over half of its 54 coun tries are moving,
however t entatively, from autocratic political systems to
ademocratic form of government. This movement toward democracy
merits U.S. support. This is particularly true today when
Washington has little strategic reason to ally with dictatorial
African leaders as wa s the case during the Cold War. U.S.
foreigqaid is a potent tool with which to press for democracy in
Africa Free market economic reforms require a certain measure of
sacrifice in the short term.
Some workers lose jobs as government bureaucracies are prune d,
for example. Consumers ini- tially suffer as prices rise when
subsidies on some goods are removed. It probably would be easier
for such changes to be accepted by Africans if they have had some
say in selecting the government instituting them 1991 elect ed a
new president, Frederick Chiluba, who promised tough reform
measures. By electing Chiluba, Zambians were rejecting long-time
president Kenneth Kaundas statist eco nomic policies and his
history of confrontation with Zambias reform-minded donors.
Chiluba has suffered several setbacks since his election, but he
has been successful in institut ing some of the most radical free
market economic reforms in Africa.
Moreover, dictatorial African regimes have more reason than
democratically elected gov ernment s to avoid free market reforms.
Most African regimes wield their control over the economy for
patronage and other political purposes. Democratic leaders,
however, who would face re-election, would be more likely to
experiment with free market reforms to i nvig orate the
economy.
If an African nation is eligible for development aid under an
Index of Economic Freedom the U.S. should use that aid as leverage
to push for continued progress toward democracy. De mocracies are
far less likely to sanction human rig hts abuses or to restrict
individual liberties including freedom of speech, freedom of
assembly, freedom of religion, and the establish ment of due
process. While the Index should determine whether or not an African
country is eligible for aid, Washington should feel free to
withhold development aid from an economi cally reforming country
that is footdragging on democratic reforms.
The U.S. also should continue to help consolidate young
democratic movements in Africa.
The National Endowment for Democracy, the International
Republican Institute, and the Na tional Democratic Institute have
been active in Africa, training political and civic leaders and
building the independent media. Though relatively modest, these
efforts are extremely worth while, playing on the strength of
Americas democratic tradition Indeed, politically empowered
Africans may even welcome economic reforms. Zambians in J Remember
that U.S. foreign aid is not an entitlement program.
Some suggest that the U.S. has a moral obligation to aid African
and other developing coun tries. The Washington-based Overseas
Development Council, in a recent report calling for more U.S.
development aid spending, declared that wide disparities in income
and human well-being between rich and poor people and c ountries
are immoral 922 The World Bank 22 Challenges and Priorities in the
1990s: An Alternative US. International Affairs Budget, FY 1993,
Overseas 11 .shares this view, calling an attack on poverty a moral
imperative. Most African leaders natu rally al so advance this
position, claiming a right to receive Western and U.S. aid.
Arguments that the U.S. and the developed world are morally
obligated to assist the devel oping world wrongly assume that the
developed countries became wealthy by causing the de v eloping
world to become poor. Yet Africa is not poor because it was
exploited, or because the West is rich. Africas poverty is the
results of African factors, including some three de cades of
statist economic policies. The notion that developed countries a re
morally obligated to invest in African countries is all the more
dubious given that Africans themselves routinely take their money
abroad. It is estimated that wealthy Nigerians, for example, have
enough money in foreign banks to eliminate the countrys more than
$36 billion foreign debt so as individuals. Indeed, Americans give
over $6 billion in voluntary contributions to pro mote development
overseas every ~ear.2~ This individual generosity is uniquely
American and is more than just a forced transfer of wealth
engineered by the US. government.
The developing worlds effort to stake a moral claim on American
tax dollars also over looks the fact that there have been virtually
no development successes that can be attributed to foreign aid. On
the contrary, nations like Chile and Taiwan have experienced
impressive economic growth with very little foreign aid. Foreign
aid has been unsuccessful partly be cause it retards the
development of social qualities essential for economic growth
anddevelop ment, such a s thrift, industry, and self-reliance.
The philosophy behind the Index of Economic Freedom challenges
the counterproductive presumption that it is a U.S. obligation to
give foreign aid to developing countries. By adopt ing an Index,
the U.S. would signal d eveloping African countries that it is they
who have the obligation to use U.S. aid constructively. For
example, an Index of Economic Freedom would repudiate Zimbabwe
President Robert Mugabes suggestion that aid for children be
delinked from the general d e mand for good governance and
democracy, a standard that some donors and activists, including
many in the U.S are pushing. An Index would invalidate Mugabes
demand by placing much of the responsibility for the suffering of
Zimbabwes children where it belon g s-on Mugabes statist economic
policies An Index of Economic Freedom would create a greater sense
of responsibility on the part of recipient countries in Africa. By
making an Index the centerpiece of development aid to Af rica, the
U.S. would be sending th e message that it will help African
countries overcome their statist past and develop free markets. It
will do this because free markets are the best known means of
achieving prosperity. Beyond that goal, however, African nations
must be prepared to rely u p on their own resources for their
long-term development. Any other foreign aid framework is bound to
raise expectations by Africans that will be unmet, or worse, lead
the US. to take on an open-ended obligation that leads to an
endless transfer of tax doll a rs from Americans to African nations
Americans who feel a moral obligation to aid people in Africa have
every opportunity to do Development Council, 1992, p. 23 23
Development and the National Interest, p. 61 12 CONCLUSION The road
to development in Afric a will be long and difficult. Fortunately,
many African states have enhanced their prospects for development
by accepting the need for free market economic policies. The U.S.
should encourage Africa's free market trend by establishing an
Index of Economic F reedom for allocating development aid to
Africa, and by directly aiding the emergent African private sector
An Index also would provide the diffuse and unfocused U.S. foreign
aid program with a coherent strategy for disburiing U.S. foreign
aid Free market s are valued by nations because they produce wealth
and raise the standard of living of all people. In this sense, free
markets are not an end in themselves. They should however, be the
goal of foreign aid donors. Otherwise, the aid recipient will
suffer a debilitat ing dependence and the donor will assume an
unending obligation. The U.S. should strive only to help African
countries-and indeed countries all over the world-overcome their
stat ist past so that they can provide for their own needs.
Anything el se is bound to be wasteful and counterproductive to
creating what all Americans want for Africa-a rising standard of
living for all Africans.
Thomas P. Sheehy Policy Analyst 13