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THE COSTS OF A GORBACHEV CRACKDOWN
The December 19 announcement by Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard,
A . Shevardnadze that he intends to resign bodes ill for a peaceful
evolution of the Soviet Union toward democracy and a free-market
economy. Shevardnadze was much more than a Foreign Minister. His
friendship with Gorbachev goes back 35 years, when they wer e Young
Communist Organization leaders in the neighboring areas of southern
Russia and Georgia. Shevardnadze went on to become the First
Secretary of the Georgian Communist Party, and he became GoTbacheVs
confidant and one of the architects ofperestroika. A part from
Gorbachev himself, no man in the Soviet leadership is as closely
associated with such monumental developments as the Soviet
withdrawal from Eastern Europe, the unification. of Germany, and
the Soviet support for the anti4raq coalition in the Per - sian
Gulf crisis. Several factors may have contributed to Shevardnadze's
decision, but the chief reason appears to be his desire to
dissociate himself from Gorbachev's impending betrayal of the
revolution he had started. Like other pro-democracy leaders,
Shevardnadze was likely dismayed by Gorbachev's in- creasingly hard
line - by his December 2 appointment of hardliner Boris Pugo as the
Minister of Internal Affairs, who is responsible for the police and
law enforcement; by the December I I television add r ess by KGB
chief Vladimir Kruchkov, who accused "radical nationalists" of
harbor- ing all sorts of murderous designs, supported by
unspecified "foreign sources"; and by Gorbachev's incessant attacks
on the pro-independence movements in the national republ i cs, his
threats to re- store "law and order" there, and his repeated praise
for the Communist Party, socialism, and the 66union." As an ethnic
Georgian, Shevardnadze must have found Gorbachev's inveighing
against 6rnationalist extremists" especially dista s teful.
Georgian leaders, including the now-ousted Com- munist Party,
repeatedly have declared that they would not sign a new "Union
Treaty," which Gor- bachev hopes will keep the Soviet Union
together. Shevardnadze may have concluded that he could not be a
part of a crackdown on the republic of his birth. Gorbachev
Double-Cross. Furthermore, Shevardnadze may have felt personally
betrayed by Gorbachev. Just a week before his resignation,
Shevardnadze Promised Secretary of State James Baker on December 12
in Houston that U.S. economic assistance to the Soviet Union would
be "a boost to Mr. Gorbachevs political and economic policies."
Based in part on these assurances, and ignoring the evidence of
Gorbachev's switch to the hard line, George Bush approved U.S.
credit guarantees for Soviet loans up to $1 billion for food aid.
Now both Shevardnadze and the Bush- Baker team seem to have been
double-crossed by Gorbachev.
Shovardnadz6's resignation shows how badly Bush and Baker
miscalculated with their single- min ded supportfOTGorbachev.
Bush's support for Gorbachev, at the expense of other, more
democratic reformers like Boris Yeltsin, was predicated on the
assumption that U.S. assistance would strengthen Gorbachev and the
reform process against the hardliners. T h e opposite has oc-
cuffed. Gorbachev has moved away from reform, instead promoting
so-called "law and order" and threatening a possible dictatorship,
and he has done so less than a week after Bush promised $1 bil-
lion in credits to the U.S.S.R. All suppo r t for Gorbachev has
done is give him still more breathing room to appease the communist
old guard because he and they do not fear any backlash from the
U.S. and the West if they crack down on democrats and independence
movements in the republics. A man of considerable personal courage
and integrity, Eduard ShevaTdnadze would not have abandoned the
Gorbachev ship if he saw any hope for Gorbachev and the
continuation of perestroika. Instead, in announcing his
resignation, he warned that "dictatorship is comi n g" to the
Soviet Union. Shevardnadze apparently did not want to be a party to
a hardline coup. From the point of view of the Soviet hardliners,
the most convenient timing for such a coup would be at the
beginning of a war in the Persian Gulf. Therefore, i t may come as
early as mid- January. Shevardnadze'S resignation thus sends an
urgent message that the Bush Administration can ignore only to the
detriment of U.S. interests. A crackdown in the Soviet Union
appears to be coming, and the Bush Administration n o longer can
assume that Gorbachev is the man who will stop it. Putting Moscow
on Notice. Ile Administration should immediately put Moscow on
notice that if Gorbachev or any other Soviet leadeTsuspends the
reform process and imposes martial law or direct p residential rule
on the republics and local governments, the U.S. will: * Cancel the
U.S.-Soviet summit in Moscow, scheduled for February 11 to February
13,1991; * Revoke immediately U.S. guarantees for up to $1 billion
in private:loans to the Soviet Unio n ; * Announce a broad rogram.
of assistance directly to democratic pro-independence movements,
provi ng them with printi% copying and communication equipment, and
money, as well as ct humanitarian aid, * Call for an emergency
session of the United Nations S ecurity Council to condemn Moscow;
* Delay negotiations on a Strategic Arms ReductionTreaty and refuse
to submit the signed Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty to
the Senate for ratification' 9 * Seek an allied agreement on using
NATO's monitoring a nd intelligence gathering capabilities to
monitor and publicize Soviet repressive measures. Shevardnadze's
announcement is a momentous event, the implications of which go far
beyond the usual intrigues of KremUnology. It is a cry of despair
over the direc t ion in which Soviet Presi- dent Gorbachev is
dragging the country. A serious blow to U.S. interests,
Shevardnadze's depar- ture might have been avoided if the Bush
Administration for the last twelve months had not pur- sued a
"Gorbachev-can-do-no-wrong" p o licy in the name of helping to
preserve "stability." It may be too late now to undo the damage,
but there still may be time to limit -it by telling Moscow, loud
and clear, that there will be a steep price to pay for denying the
yearning of the peoples of the fif- teen republics for democracy,
national dignity and a productive market economy. Edwin J. Feulner,
Ph.D. President
Dr. Feulner recently returned from his sixth trip to the Soviet
Uni6noverthe last twenty-rive years. d P i dini
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