The Heritage Foundation

Backgrounder #789 on Middle East

September 5, 1990

September 5, 1990 | Backgrounder on Middle East

Can the Embargo on Iraq Succeed?

(Archived document, may contain errors)

789 September 5,1990 INTRODUCIION George Bush boldly committed more than 100,000 American troops hundreds of warplanes, and more than 60 warships to defend United States another Western interests threatened by Iraqi dictator Saddam Husseins August 2 invasion of Kuwait. This rapid military buildup, the largest mobilization of American military might since theVietnam War, already has achieved its primary and most important objective: deterring an Iraqi invasion of Saudi Arabia, the worlds largest oil exporter.

Yet, while there is little doubt that the US. would use military force to protect the Saudi oil fields, on which many Western industrial democracies in creasingly depend, it is unclear that the Bush Administration is willing or able to use its military mu s cle to achieve its other stated objectives in the Iraq crisis: an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, restoration of the legitimate govern ment of Kuwait, and the Iraqi release of thousands of American and other hostages. Barring an Iraqi provocation, such as m i streatment of the hostages or military attack or sponsorship of terrorism, Washington is even less likely to use military force in pursuit of two other goals hinted by American offi cials: the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and the destruction of Iraqs weapo ns of mass destruction. Even if Bush should decide to lance the Iraqi boil with a militaxy attack, it will take the U.S. six to eight weeks to amass enough forces on the ground in Saudi Arabia to blunt an Iraqi counterattack on the Saudi oil fields.

Key Qu estions. As the military situation stabilizes, attention is likely to shift to the diplomatic and economic pressures that America and other countries are bringing to bear on Iraq. Foremost among these pressures are r the economic sanctions prohiiiting tra d e or financial that were imposed on August 6 by the United Nations Security Council in a 13-0 vote (with Yemen and Cuba abstainiug).The key questions thus are: Will the embargo inflict unbearable pain on the Iraqi economy? If so, how long will it take And , finally, will the embargo force Saddam to retreat from Kuwait will strangle the Iraqi economy. Iraq's oil exports and food, arms and in dustrial imports can be choked off by the multinational forces surrounding Iraq ons with Iraq The answer to the first question is: yes.The U.N.-backed embargo probably The answer to the second question is more problematic: It may take as long as a year before the embargo achieves its full economic impact, and this could be delayed further by extensive cheating.

The answer to the third question is that the embargo probably will not mm pel Saddam Hussein to back down and relinquish Kuwait and his hostages.

Ultimately, to succeed an embargo must break its target's willpower. This is more a matter of psychology than of economics. Saddam is unlikely to accept a humiliating defeat which will threaten his persod power and perhaps sur vival.

Saddam's Hostages. While an embargo eventually will generate powerful pressure on Saddam to compromise, it alone probably will not be enough to compl him to give up Kuwait on terms minimdly acceptable to Washingon total and unconditional Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait and freedom for all hostages. In addition to the 13,000 Westerners and 2 million Kuwaitis es timated to be held hostage in Iraq and Kuwait, Saddam essentially has taken the Iraqi people hostage. He is unlikely to yield to international economic pressures, given the high costs of defeat.

What this means for Washington is that the U.S. must continue to build up its militaq forces aro und Iraq. Saddam understands force. Ultimately, it will not be the embargo, but only the threat of force or its actual use that will force Saddam to give up the booty of his aggression and pull out of Kuwait ECONOMIC SANCIIONSTHE HISTORICAL RECORD Economi c sanctions have a poor historical record of success in compelling determined states to accede to the demands of the embargoing powers.The Central Powers of World War I, the Axis powers of World War XI, North Korea during the Korean War, and North,Vietnam during tbe various In dochinese Wars, all continued their aggression despite economic sanctions and blockades. Khomeini's Iran shrugged off Western economic sanctions while holding 52 American hostages for 444 days in 1979 to 19

81. According 2 to former I ranian President Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, Iran released its hostages in January 1981 primarily out of fey that the new American President Ronald Reagan, would attack Iran The West has a poor track record in sustaining concerted international economic sanctio n s. It did not do so against Cuba, Itan, hi Syria, or the Soviet Union. Most embargoes fail because they are not air-tight. Some states refuse to participate or violate the embargo that they have pledged to uphold. Even when a broad coalition of states dec lares an embargo, private entrepreneurs seeking black market profits inevitably relax the embargos pinch. The 1967 UN.-sponsored embargo.of Rhodesia, for example, was un dercut for years by sanctions busters.

One of the rare examples of a successfd economic sanctions, ironically was the Western oil boycott imposed against Iraqs neighbor and bitter rival Iran, from 1951 to 19

53. After Iran nationalized the oil interests of a British oil company in March 1951, Westem companies refused to purchase Iranian oi l, choosing instead to increase their purchases born Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia.The ensuing economic collapse of Iran led to popular disaffection with the anti-Western Iranian leader, Mohammed Mossadegh. After growing domestic turmoil, elements of the Iranian army staged a CIA-supported militaq coup that toppled Mossadegh in August 1953 IRAQS VULNERABILITYTO ECONOMIC SANCTIONS Like Mossadeghs Iran, Saddams Iraq is overwhelmingly dependent on oil exports to fuel its economy, and therefore would be hit h a rd by a successful oil boycott. More than 90 percent of Iraqs export revenues and roughly half of its ~ti~nal income have been derived from oil exports of roughly 2.7 mil lion barrels per day. Oil is a bulky commodity transported primarily through easily m onitored pipelines and oil tankers. Approximately 90 percent of Iraqs oil exports flowed through pipelines throughTurkey to the Mediter ranean Sea and through Saudi Arabia to the Red Sea Both pipelines were shut in compliance with the August 6 U.N. securi ty Council resolution prohibiting trade with Iraq.This forces Iraq to rely on the small quantities of oil that it can truck into Jordan or ship out through wardamaged oil ter minatn on its narrow Persian Gulf coastline.

Bleak Financial Future. American and Western naval forces, authorized by an August 25 US. Security Council resolution to enforce the economic embargo against Iraq, can easily interdict Iraqs remaining oil exports, which have been routed primarily toYemen. Deprived of oil revenues, the Iraqi economy gradually will grind to a halt. Iraq already has lost an estimated $1.5 1 See: Bani-Sa& iatervim, US Rdw, Winter 198l-l%2, p. 9 3 rbillion dollars in oil revenues since the onset of the crisis? Iraq now faces a bleak financial future. Although it h as gold and currency reserves worth about 65 billion, and may have looted $1 billion in gold and $2 billion in hard currency fro? Kuwaits Central Bank, Iraqs $4 billion in foreign assets have been frozen. It will be forced, moreover, to default on its hug e foreign debt, estimated at up to 80 billion; this, of course, discourages new loans even if Baghdad could find lenderswilling to violate the U.N. ban on finan cial transactions Offsetting Oil Losses. As during the 1951-1953 Iranian oil boycott, there are several sourcesof excess world oil production capacity that can be tapped to offset the loss to the world of roughly4 million barrels per day in Iraqi and Kuwaiti oil exports. Saudi Arabia announced on August 18 that it is ready to boost its oil productio n by 2 million barrels per day above its current produc tion of 5.38 million barrels per day. Venezuela is expected to raise production by 500,000 barrels per day, the United Arab Emirates can chip in another 5OO,OOO, Mexico and Nigeria may be able to cont ribute smaller amounts. All told, over 80 percent of the 4 million tarres per day shortfall in oil exports could be offset by other oil exporters.

The staying power of the embargo on Iraq also will be strengthened by the fact that the world was awash with oil supplies at the time of Iraqs invasion of Kuwait b cause OPEC was producing 2.7 million barrels per day over world demand. World stockpiles of oz were estimated to be 150 million to 200 mil lion barrels over normal levels. The industrial world, seared by past oil crises, had stockpiled just Over 1 billion barrels of emergency oil supplies (the equivalent of roughly 250 days of Iraqi and Kuwaiti oil orts including 590 million barrels in the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Resewe?Another 100 mil lion barrels of oil was estimated to be aboard oil tankers en route to oil-im porting countries. The relatively favorable world oil situation will muffle the embego-related oil price explosion and reduce the incentives that oil-import ing states would have to try to circ umvent the embargo.

Cutting Iraqs Imports Iraqs industry, military production, and food im ports are extremely vulnerable to a well-organkd embargo. Iraqi industry relies on imported machinery, spare parts and raw materials. If deprived of these foreign go ods, Iraqi factories will slow to a halt. Shortages soon will ap pear in essential areas as spare parts become scarce for electric power sta tions, water treatment plants, and telephone equipment f 2 Financial Ernes, August 28,1990, p. 2 3 The Economist, August 18,1990, p. 34 4 Financial Ernes, August 21 1990, p. 1 5 EstixnateofOPECcconamistscitcdin77uEconomrst August 4,1990, p. 51 6 NewYorkTi, August 3,1990, p. A9.

I ~incmeiol ri ugust a, 1990 4 Iraq developed its arms industry during its 198

1988 war with Iran and now produces many of its own infantry weapons, small artillery pieces, and tanks, including modem Sovietdesigned T-72 battle tanks. But it lacks the capacity to build warplanes and may be vulnerable to spare parts shortages Dependen t on Food Imports. Two decades of centralized economic plan ning by Iraqs socialist Baathist Party and the destruction of agriculture in Iraqs rebellious Kurdish tribal areas have left Iraq dependent on food im ports to fulfill roughly three-fourths of the countxys nutritional needs. Iraq spends up to $3 billion per year on food imports, mounting to about one fourth of total imports. Iraq must import 70 perce$ of food supplies in bad harvest years and 60 percent in good harvest years. Dates are Iraqs only c rop with an exportable surplus.

Bread makes up roughly one third of the Iraqi diet, which is one of the best in the Middle East, with an average daily intake of 3,000 calories. Iraqis consume roughly 3.5 million tons of wheat per year, but this years Iraq wheat harvest, large by Iraqi standards, is

mated at only 400,000 tons. A poor grain har vest last year forced Iraq to dip into its grain reserves last year.

The reserves were not replaced by imports because Baghdad was trying to reduce its foreign curr en cy expend.itures.l ne low level Imports as a Share of Total Iraqi Food Consumption Tea and Come 100 Sugar QQ Vegetable oll 99 Corn 00 Rice 04 Wheat 76 Meat 65 sollm: U.N. Food .nd -tun OrgubUon if dthg grain reserves and Saddams failure to anticipate i nternational reaction to his invasion of Kuwait by stockpiling food supplies beforehand have left Iraq vulnerable to a cutoff of food imports.

Iraq this year was projected to import 3 million tons of wheat and flour 600,OO tons of rice, 650,000 tons of mdu , 300,000 tons of corn and 300,000 tons of palm oil, among other items. Although it is not known how much of this was imported before the embargo, it is safe to conclude that Iraq will have a difficult time managing such a huge shortfall in its food requi rements.

Bread Lines in Baghdad. The embargo already has begun to hurt. Eggs sugar, cooking oil, fruits, and vegetables have disappeared from stores and 8 Financial Tunes August 21,1990, p. 2 10 Warhington Post, August 23 1990, p. A41 12 Financial T-, Augu st 21,1990, p. 3 9 ~w~onk T~U, AU~US~ m, 1990, p 8 11 NW ark T ugust m, 1990, p. AS 5bread lines have formed in Baghdad. Prices have skyrocketed for meat, rice cooking oil, sugar, and other commodities. Saddam Hussein on August 12 called on Iraqis to tigh t en their belts and cut meat consumption by 50 per cent. Iraq's Revolutionaxy Council sternlywamed the next day that hoarders and black market profiteers would be executed Although the embargo has begun to pinch Iraqi food supplies, its full bite will not b e felt for four to six months. American officials estimate that Iraq has enough supplies ogts two staple foods, wheat and rice, for four months of normal consumption' Rationing could stretcb this another month and Iraqi bakeries could switch to barley whe n wheat flour runs short, tapping into an estimated seven month supply of barley, which is usually fed to livestock. Iraq has seized Kuwaiti food supply warehouses, estimated to contain enough canned pds to feed Kuwait's population of two million for four t o six months. But this will not go fkr for Iraq's much larger populationof seven teen million Iraq could stretch its mpplies further by expelling the up to 2 million expatriate workers in Iraq and Kuwait, Unidentified U.S. officials es timate that it will ta!j,cj,c four months to a year before Iraq is racked by widespread hunger.

Little Chance of Cheating. Iraq has little chance of significantly cheating on the embargo. Unlike previous food embargoes, such as the unilateral U.S grain embargo imposed on the Soviet Union following its invasion of Af ghanistan, the U.N. sanctions enjoy broad international support. Iraq's chief sources of food imports- America, Australia, Canada, and Western Europe are united in supporting the embargo. Neighboring governments in Iran Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Turkey have pledged to uphold the US. sanctions.

Baghdad may hope that one or more of these governments allow cross-bor der smuggling but Iraq would have a difficult time paying for enough food or other supplies to improve appreciably its ability to hold out against the em bargo.

According to US. officials, Cuba, Lii North Korea, Mauritania, Sudan and Yemsn have agreed secretly to ship goods and food to Iraq, primarily by aircraft. But this air bridge could not transport enough food to feed Iraq.

Moreover, it could easily be severed by attacks by American warplanes, if Washington decides to shoot down aircraft that violate the embargo.

Cross-border smuggling; on the ground would be more difficult to halt, but Iraq will hav e difficulty financing extensive smuggling given its weak financial position and $80 billion foreign debt, At best, such smuggling only will postpone the suffocating economic impact of the embargo, not avert it entire- ly 6 Problems for Jordan. The bigges t hole in the embargo currently is Jordan.

It is economically dependent on Iraq, from which it gets 95 percent of its oil supplies and most of its foreign currency earnings. Jordans limping economy would be crippled if it imposed the U.N. sanctions on Iraq , its biggest foreign market. Jordans economic problems have encouraged the growth of Muslim fundamentalism and sparked riots in April 1989 among Jordans Bedouin population, the core of King Husseins popular support.The King also is wor ried that if he tu rns his back on Saddam Hussein, Jordans Palesthiam roughly 60 percent of the population, would rebel, incited by Iraqi agents and Saddams anti-Israel and pan-Arab rhetoric.

Jordan has equivocated on upholding the U.N. sanctions and has applied under a prov ision of the U.N. charter that permits states to appeal to the Security Council for relief if compliance with U.N. resolutions cause economic hardship.The Jordanian government estimates that imposing the sanctions will cost Jordan as much as $2 billion ov e r the next year, including 200 million in exports to Iraq, $200 don in transport fees for Iraqi trade over $300 million in remittances from the over l00,OOO Jgdanians in Kuwait and Iraq, and $295 million in debt repayments from Iraq. King Hussein also has sought aid from the West and oil from Saudi Arabia.

Until he is offered economic compensation to offset the economic and political costs of joining the embargo, King HusSein probably will continue to permit Jordan to remain Iraqs chief trade outlet. Approximately 500 trucks cross Jordans border W

I Iraq each day, loaded with fruit, vegetables and construction materials. But Jordan alone cannot rescue Iraq from its economic plight. And Iraqs access to the outside wor ld through Jordan easily can be blocked by the multinational fleet enforcing the U.N. embargo by ex panding the blockade to include Jordans port of Aqaba THE EFFECTIVENESS OFTHE EMBARGO Although the embargo imwd on Iraqwill succeed in slowly suffocating t h e tradedependent Iraqi economy, it may not succeed in accomplishing the U.N.s political goals of forcing an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait.he Iraqi government can funnel scarce food resources to the Iraqi army and already has announced its intention to do s o . Saddam ruthlessly may deprive Western hostages, Kuwaitis, foreign guest workers, and Iraqs restive Kuids of f6od to undermine international support for the embargo. As the food situation in side Iraqworsens, the stateantrolled Iraqi television network m a y furnisb 17 WoUSolaaJolunol,August ul, 1990,p.AK 18 New Y& Ti, A~pt 14,1990, p. A9 7graphic pictures of the stamtion of Western hostages to undermine the resolve of embargoing states.The plight of Iraqs population also is sure to in flame Muslim fundamen t alists and Arab nationalists throughout the Middle East, undermining Arab governments that support the embargo U.N. Loopbola Given his past use of poison gas against Iraqi Kurds and his regimes widespread use of torture against Iraqi dissidents and their c hildfen Saddam is unlikely to flinch from continuing his occupation of Kuwait due to concern for the welfare of the Iraqi people. He essentially has taken his own people hostage, along with the estimated l3,OOO Westerners trapped in Iraq and Kuwait. Sadda m is likely to defy the embargo indefinitely, knowing that his willingness to sacrifice the interests of his own people is greater than the U.N.s desire to starve innocent avilians. Saddam already knows that the U.N. fashioned a built-in constraint on its o wn embargo by exempting food and medical supplies from the embargo in humanitarian circumstance Saddam is motivated more by considerations about his own political sur vival than by the economic survival of his own people. He almost certainly will be adama n t in his refusal to withdraw from Kuwait on the U.N.s terms because such an unconditional withdrawal would be a humiliating defeat and an admission that his invasion was a gross miscalculatioIIThis would be par ticularly dangerous to Saddam in view of how little he has had to show for his ill-considered September 1980 invasion of Iran that mired Iraq in a bloody and costly eight-year war that imposed enormous hardship on his people. In fact, Saddam Wed Kuwait to help pay for the war with Iran and to broade n his narrow base of popular support by winning a trophy that would please Iraqi ~tionalists and answer the question of what Iraq had to show for its expensive military buildup Threatened Prestige. In a desperate attempt to forestall Iranian participa tion in the embargo against Iraq, Saddam on August 15 offered to meet al most all of Irans terms for a peace settlement, including Iraqi withdrawal from 700 square miles of Iranian territory and yielding to Iran control of part of the Shatt Al Arab estuary alo ng the border. If Saddams annexation of.

Kuwait should be reversed without lasting Iraqi benefits, then Saddam will be perceived to be the instigator and loser of two wars. Even Egypts Gamal Abdul Nassers prestige could not survive the loss of the 1967 Ara b-Israeli war. Saddams grip on Iraqs leadership thus would be weakened by such a foreign policy defeat. ominously, Saddam declared on -August 6, two-days after sanctions were imposed by the U.N that death is preferable to humiliation 19 Sec text of Unitcd Nations Scwity cwnCirRcdolutioa66l, August 6,l990, m AppendixI 8 UNDERMINING SADDAM'S POWER Although an embargo alone probably will not compel Saddam to disgorge Kuwait, it will weaken Iraq's military strength, sap Iraqi morale, and under mine Iraqi resol ve to support Saddam's unyielding policy of retaining Kuwait.

This eventually could weaken Saddam's grip on power and possibly pave the way for his ddd.The embargo drives home to all Iraqis the tremendous economic costs of Saddam's aggressive foreign polic y. It calls into question Saddam's judgment. Not only did Saddam underestimate the world's reaction to his adventure, but he failed to protect Iraq against that reaction by building up food reserves and by moving Iraq's $4 billion in foreign assets to pre vent them from being frozen.

To be sure, Saddam is feared by his own people and admired for his ruth lessness. But he does not enjoy wide public support. The core of his regime is made up of his family, relatives, and clan members from his home village of Tikrit, some 100 miles north of Baghdad.This "TMti.mafia as it is known in Baghdad's political circles, has helped Saddam erect an efficient police state whose relentless repression has driven up to one million Iraqis into exile. Internal opposition has b een crushed, leading Iraqis to live by the Arab proverb Kiss the hand you cannot bite."

Untested Endurance. Iraqis persevered through the eight-year war with Iran with minimal economic dislocation. Saddam could pursue a "guns and butter" policy because he was bankrolled by the Arab states of the Persian Gulf, including Kuwait. Hence Iraqis did not have to face economic privation.

Their staying power, therefore, has not yet been tested. Still, since Iraqis have been beaten down for so long, it is likely tha t while shortages of essential goods will produce grumbling and resentment, they probably will not lead to a Romania-type uprising against the dictatorship.

The Iraqi opposition is fragmented and weak. Because of the years of repression by Saddam's many s ecurity agencies, there is no effective opposi tion in Iraq. The opposition surviving leaders are in exile; even there they remain subject to assassination attempts by Iraqi secret agents.The opposi tion has no charismatic leader or unQing framework It is a loose collection of Kurds, Islamic fundamentalists ti~~dp, and leftists who are divided by ethnic, ideological, and religious cleavages.

A greater potential threat to the regime iS posed by the army, which in creasingly has chafed under Saddam's brutal leadership. Aware of this dis satisfaction with him, Saddam incessantly shuffles military commanders and infiltrates the officer corps with numerous spies to prevent coups. Neverthe less, since the beginning of this year there have been four credible repo r ts of 20 Wrrsirigtm Patr, August 27,1990, p. Al3 9coup or asasination atppts, and in July Saddam went so far as to close down the officers clubs. An effective embargo against Iraq could give rest less Iraqi officers even greater incentives to overthrow sa d dam Bush has ordered planning for a covert program to oust Saddam, according to an August 6 leak in the Wkshiqgton Past. An American-sponsored coup would be difficult to mount successfully, given limited U.S. access to Iraqs clod Society. Unlike Iran in 1 9 53, the CIA probably has no cohesive opposi tion elements with whom it can work to topple the regime. Waiting for an in dependent military coup, as the Bush Administration discarered in Panama maybewishfulthinking CONCLUSION The embargo is a powerful leve r but not a sure-fire means of pushing Iraqi forces out of Kuwait. Although the embargo eventually can devastate the Iraqi economy and weaken the Iraqi military machine, it will not necessarily compel Saddam to reverse his invasion and illegal annexation o f Kuwait. Sad dam HusSein responds better to force than he does to economics.The threat of force or its actual use probably will be necesary to oust Iraq from Kuwait.

Washington therefore should continue the ongoing military buildup in the Persian Gulf.

T he embargo nevertheless can make important contriiutions to the con tainment of Iraqi aggression. It gradually will undermine Iraqs capacity to at tack its neighbors or threaten U.S. forces in the region. Moreover, by driving home the costs of Saddams lea dership, it could encourage Iraqi army officers to turn against Saddam, remove him from power and liquidate his costly Kuwaiti adventure.

Helping Jordan and Turkey. The U.S. should strengthen the embargo by cutting Iraqs air links with countries such as Li i and Yemen, which have violated the embargo. Gaining Jordanian participation should be a high priority goal. Washington should press Japan, Western Euro- and Saudi Arabia to offset Jordanian economic losses with greatly increased foreign aid.

Saudi Arabi a and the United Arab Emirates should be asked to fulW Jordans oil needs at reduced cost. Washington should also ask Egypt to dis patch a milimy force to Jordan to guard against Iraqi encroachment or sub version.The Saudis also should be asked to fund thi s Egyptian insurance Policy.

More than any other U.S. ally save Britain,Turkey has stepped forward and made large sacrifices to support the U.S. during the Iraq crisis.The only Mus lim member of NAT0,Turkey has permitted American warplanes to operate fromTurkish airfields.Turkey has mobilized troops along its 2oo.mile border 21 Laurie Mylrok, Saddam Was in DeSpcrateTroub4 WoUSbmr Jtnunal, August la, 1990, p. Am 10with Iraq and shut an important Iraqi oil pipeline on its territoq d & te the fact that 60 percent of 'Itrrkefs oil imports have been provided by Iraq through that pipeline. By imposing economic sanctions againstlraq,'bkey stands to lose $25 billion per year, including $300 million in pipeline fees, a major blow to the Sbak y Turkish economy. Washingtoa should press Japan and West Germany to increase greatly their foreign aid toflvkey and press Saudi Arabia and other threatened Arab oillexporting states in the Persian Gulf to supply oil at reducedprices cow voted in suppott of the U.N backed embargo, the Soviet Union con tinues to aid Iraqwith 3,000 to 4,000 m&taq advisors. Washingon must demand that Moscow suspend this aid Sharing the Burden. Finally, Washingon should ask its allies to share more equitably the costs of enforci n g the embargo. Japan ad West Germany, two economic giants that have not contributed milimy units to the multinational forces that are enforcing the embargo in the Persian Gulf, should be asked to contribute several billion dollars in financial support for the operation of those forces. Saudi Arabia, whose oil revenues have been boosted consider ably (probably by more than $2 billion per month) by higher oil prices and in creased oil production, should be asked to channel these chisgenerated oil profits int o the support of the common effort against Iraq. Saudi cash should be slated for Egypt, Jordan, and Turkey, which will be hit hard by joining the embargo, and for the U.S. and other countries that have sent forces to defend Saudi ArabiaThe burden of contai ning Iraqi aggression should be shared equitably by all nations who have a stake in the free flow of Persian Gulf oil.

JameskPhilIips Deputy Director of Foreign Policy Studies The Soviet Union is Iraq's prime source of military support. Although Mos 22 See Jay KoddyandMichael Johns HcritagcFormdatioa ExantlveMemo~ndumNo 28QAugust30,1990 to Godmchac Qoosc Betwcen,CaAA"m andthe West 11 u APPENDIX1 Excerpts from theText of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 661 for Sanctions on Iraq August 6,1990 T he Security Council 1. DETERMINES that Iraq has failed to comply with operative paragraph legitimate Government of Kuwait 2 of Resolution 660 (1990) and has usurped the authority of the 2. D~B, as a consequence, to take the following measures. to secure t h e compliance of Iraq with operative paragraph 2 and to restore the authority of the legitimate Government of Kuwait The import into their territories of all commodities and products originating in Iraq or Kuwait exported there from after the date of this r esolution which would promote or are calculated to promote the export or transshipment of any commodities or products from Iraq or Kuwait; and any dealings by their nation modities or products originating in Iraq or Kuwait and exported therefrom after the date of this resolution, in cluding in particular any transfer of funds to Iraq or Kuwait for the purpose of such activities or dealings c.The sale or supply by their nationals or from their ter ritories or using their flag vessels or any commodities or p r oducts, including weapons or any other military equip ment, whether or not originating in their territories but not including supplies intended strictly for medical pur poses, and, in humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs to any person or body in Iraq or Kuwait or to any person or body for the purposes of any business carried on in or operated from Iraq or Kuwait, and any activities by their nationals or in their territories which promote or are cal culated to promote such sale, or supply or use of such c o mmodities or products 3. Dma that all states shall prevent b. Any activities by their nationals or in their territories als or their flag vessels or in their territories in any com 4. DECIDES that all states shall not make available to the Government of I r aq or to any commercial, industrial or public utility undertaking hi Iraq or Kuwait, any funds or any other financial or economic resources and shall prevent their nationals and any persons within their ter ritories from removing from their territories or otherwise making 12available to that government or to any such undertaking any such funds or resour- and 6rom remitting any other funds to persons or bodies within Iraq or Kuwait, except payments exclusively for strictly medical or humanitarian purposes, a nd, in humanitarian &cumstan foodstuffs 5. CALZS upon all states, including states nonmembers of the United Na tions, to act strictly in accordance with the provisions of this resolu tion, notwithstanding any contract entered into or license granted befor e the date of this resolution 6. D-ES to establish, in 8ccofd8I1ce with Rule 28 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, a Committee of the Security Council consisting of all members of the Council, to under take the following tasks a n d to report on its work to the Council with its observations and recommendations aTo examine the reports on the progress of the implemen tation of this resolution which will be submitted by the Secretary General b.To scck from all states further informati o n regarding the action taken by them concerning the effective im plementation of the provisions laid down in this resolu tiO 7. CAUs UPON all states to cooperate fully with the Committee in the fulfillment of its task, including supplying such information as may be sought by the Committee in pursuance of this resolution 8.REouEsrsthesecretaryGeneraltoprovideallnecessaryassistance to the Committee and to make necessary arrangements in the Secretariat for the purpose 9. D-B that, notwithstanding paragraphs 4 though 8, nothing in this resolution shall prohiiit assistance to the legitimate Government of Kuwait, and CALLS UPON all states a to take appropriate mt8sures to protect assets of the b. not to recogoize any regime set up by the occupying legitimate gove r nment of Kuwait and its agencies; and power 10. REouEsrs the Secretary General to report to the Council on the progress of the implementation of this resolution, the first report to be submittedwitbin3Odays 11. DECIDES to keep this item on its agenda and t o continue its efforts to put an early end to the invasion by Iraq. APPENDIXII Excerpts hm George Bushs televised address to the Nation, August 8,1990 Apuppet regime imposed from the outside is unacceptable.The acquisi- tion of territory by force is unacc eptable. No one, Mend or foe, should doubt our desire far peace, and no one should underestimate or determination to co&ont agpssioxi.

Four simple principles guide our policy.

First, we seek the immediate, unconditional, and complete withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait.

Second, Kuwaits legitimate government must be restored to replace the puppet regime tion, as has been the casiwith every President from President Roosevelt to President Reagan, is codtted to the security and stability of the Persian Gulf. my Fourth, I am determined to protect the lives of American citizeqs abroad.

Immediately after the Iraqi invasion, I ordered an embargo of all trade with Iraq and, together with maq other nations, announced sanctions that both frozeallIrtlqiassetsi nthiscoun~andprotcctedKuwaitsassetsThestakes are high. Iraq is already a rich and powerful country that possesses the worlds second largest reserves of oil and over a million men under arms. Its the fourth largest military in the world 14

About the Author

James Phillips Senior Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs
Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign and National Security Policy