The Heritage Foundation

Backgrounder #537 on Russia

September 29, 1986

September 29, 1986 | Backgrounder on Russia

Eight Steps for Fairer U.S. -Soviet People-to-People Exchanges


(Archived document, may contain errors)

I September 29,.1986 I I EIGHT STEPS FOR FAIRER UmSm-SOVIET PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE 'EXCHANGES I NTRODUCTION I MOSCOW'S imprisonment and harassment of American journalist Nicholas Daniloff casts a dark shadow over U.S.-Soviet people-to-people contacts. Such contacts have been high on the agenda of both nations, and since last November's summit meetin g, the number of contacts has increased dramatically. The Kremlin's mistreatment of Daniloff raises the very serious question of whether any American is safe in the USSR if he or she meets unauthorized Soviet citizens.

Indeed, the Soviet secret police, the XGB, has just threatened seven Latvian-American participants in the Chautauqua Institution conference in the USSR that it ''cannot guarantee their safety" if they persist in meeting unauthorized Soviets.

Soviet citizens, there is no point in arranging U. S.-Soviet people-to-people" contacts If Americans are not safe in meeting I Everr'before MOSCOW~S mistreatment of Daniloff, reasons existed for questioning the wisdom of rapidly expanding these contacts. The reason: Moscow gains great advantage because it s ability to influence U.S public and official opinion is vastly greater than Washington's ability to use exchanges to affect Soviet opinion. Equally troubling is the Kremlin's new strategy for the exchanges. Instead of focusing almost solely, as it did un t il recently, on influencing U.S. leftist organizations, Moscow now courts.groups in the mainstream of pmerican life. In so doing, Moscow is trying to gain islands of influence in American public opinion by creating modern day Potemkin villages false image s of the Soviet Union control issues from the larger political context of Soviet-U.S relations so that the Soviet political system and its implications for Soviet international conduct are not discussed in relation to arms control MOSCOW'S agenda seems to b e to isolate in the American mind arms Soviet methods in this campaign are o to convince members of various American social and professional groups that they have genuine counterparts in numerous Soviet organizations, which in reality are propaganda bases and have no autonomy from the Soviet government exchange programs o to engage American social and professional groups in formal o to convince members of such American groups that they can influence the Kremlin if they go along with Soviet policies; o to p revent discussion of any issue, such gs the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and violations of human rights, which the Soviets find embarrassing; and o to prevent contact between members of American groups and domestic critics of the Soviet regime.

The Reaga n Administration's policy rightly is to facilitate mutual understanding between Soviet and American individuals by encouraging various exchange programs. But this important goal cannot be reached if the exchanges are arranged in a way that serves the USSR but not the U.S achieved if American visitors to the Soviet Union are afraid to make casual and unofficial contact with Soviet citizens. If Americans meet only with authorized Soviets, then the Kremlin can control most of what Americans will learn about t h e USSR imprisonment of Daniloff, Americans understandably are going to shy away from meeting or even chatting with nonofficial Soviets. Scaring Americans in this way may be one of the reasons for the Soviet mistreatment of Daniloff The goal of mutual unde r standing also cannot' be In light of MOSCOW~~S To restore balance to U.S.-Soviet exchanges, the Reagan a Administration and the U.S. Congress should consider eight steps that could prevent increased U.S.-Soviet exchanges from advancing Soviet objectives a t the expense of the U.S establish a mechanism that automatically halts U.S.-Soviet exchanges so long as there is a chance that Americans in the Soviet Union would be harassed and endangered travelers to the Soviet Union about potential harassment and impr i sonment there for as long as Daniloff is kept hostage 3) The'U.S. Congress should establish a bipartisan Advisory Committee for Soviet-American Exchanges. This Committee, composed of They are 1) In the light of the case of'Nicholas Daniloff, Congress shou l d 2) The President should issue a '%ravel advisory'1 warning all 2- I representatives of the public and the private sectors, could advise professional and pocial groups about the best way to conduct exchanges with the Soviets 4) The Advisory Committee sho u ld establish a reference library on Soviet affairs, institutions, and personalities: proposed excpanges should be researched thoroughly to avoid later embarrassment 5) The Advisory Committee should publish information booklets to help those who want to en g age in Soviet-American exchanges 6) The U.S. Congress should set an example of a realistic approach to Soviet-American exchanges by refusing to engage in; any l1parliamentary'Iv exchanges with the rubber-stamp Supreme Soviet which is the Communist Party-c o ntrolled assembly that Fakes a mockery of the concept of representative institutions 7) Public and private groups should shift the emphasis from short-term group visits in the Soviet Union to visits of six months to a year by individual Americans, who cou l d practice their professions in the Soviet Union better chance to become acquainted with each other I I 8) Instead of organizing short-term visits in the framework of formal exchanges, the U.S. should insist on sending individua2 Americans, especially gre a t numbers of high school and college students, for long visits to the Soviet Union they& see the real life of the Soviet people, and not the Potemkin villages constructed especially for them by Soviet propaganda I turn, great numbers of Soviet high school and college students should come to the U.S. for extended visits This would give the'hericans and the Soviets a This would ensure that In I It is obvious that U.S.-Soviet exchanges can benefit the ,American public. It is also obvious that the Soviets will always try do take 1. For the role the Advisory Committee could play in protecting American national security in Soviet-American scientific exchanges, see Mikhail Tsypkin U.S.-Soviet Academic Exchanges No Longer Should Favor Moscow," Heritage Foundation B a ckarounder No. 478 January 9, 1986, p. 12 2. Rushing into formal exchanges can lead to implicit endorsement of Soviet human r?ghts violations. For instance, Senator Paul Simon (D-IL) recently praised the idea of establishing "sister university" programs b e tween American and Soviet universities including the University of Moscow. But the Admissions Board of Moscow University systematically practices racial discrimination against Jews, even going as far as demanding a genealogical tree from an applicant to p r ove absence of "Jewish blood see Senator Paul Simon An Agenda for U.S.-Soviet Exc hanee$ (Senate Chamber: May 21, 1986 p. 3;'"Discrimination against Jews Enrolling at Moscow University, 1979 Arkhiv Samizdath No. 4695, pp. 1-3 8 3advantage of such exchange s for manipulating American public opinion while preventing democratic ideas from reaching their people. "It is up to the U.S. public and government to ensure that exchanges are conducted in a way that minimizes Soviet manipulation and increases the opport unities for genuine contact between the two peoples.

NEW SOVIET TACTICS Since the days of the Communist International in the early 19208 the Kremlin has attempted to go over the heads of democraticalFy elected governments to influence public 0pinion.h the West to, advance Soviet interests the Soviets used the Ilpeace movementln in the West to weaken the response of democracies to the Soviet seizure of Eastern Europe and to Soviet-sponsored aggression in Korea 19808, Moscow used the same tactic to offset We s tern reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and to the buildup of the Soviet nuclear threat against Western Europe In the late 1940s and early 19508, for instance In the late 1970s and e,arly Today, Moscow apparently is trying to undercut the bela t ed American response to the two-decade-long explosive growth of Soviet military power, to slow the rebuilding of the U.S. arsenal and gain a breathing spell for retooling the Soviet defense industry, and to improve the image of the Soviet Union, badly tar n ished by their human rights violations and the invasion of Afghanistan achieving these policy goals is shaping public opinion in democratic nations. General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev told the 27th Communist Party Congress this February that his arms con t rol proposals were directed at :world public opinion,I8 and not just Western governments A crucial 'tool for I From the Soviet standpoint, the most important legacy of the mass Most of these 18unsophisticateds,81 Ilpeace movementll of the early 1980s has b een the involvehent of many 88politically unsophisticatedI8 people, as well as of Ilprominent political and public figures.18 particularly in the United States, are not Marxists. Thus they would not be susceptible to the traditional approach of such Kreml i n propaganda arms as the ItSoviet Peace Committee,lI which appeals overtly 3. Kommunist 1986, No. 4, p. 53 4. See the article by the leading Communist Party theoretician Pyotr Fedoseev,"Sovremennoe antivoennoe dvizhenie i perspektivy ego razvitiya Jvfirov a va eko nomika i mezhdunarodnve otnoshenivq 1985, No. 2, p. 11, and by the Chairman of the Soviet Peace Committee and commentator for the Communist Party daily Pravda Yuri Zhukov Sovremennaya mezhdunarodnaya obstanovka i dvizhenie storonnikov mira," Mezhdu n arodnava zhizn 1985 No. 6; p. 42 I I 4I to pro-Soviet sympathies for reaching the "politically uns~phisticated As such, the Soviets devised new mekhods SOVIET USE OF PSEUDO-ORGANIZATIONS There are no public and professional organizations (in the U.S sense in the Soviet Union because all political life. is strictly controlled by the Communist Party professional and social groups that they can improve Soviet-American relations by dealing with their %ounterpartsIt in the Soviet Union the Soviets create bogus groups with descriptions similar to those of U.S. groups and use existing Soviet bodies that have superficial similarities with American

groups But to convince American Soviet "Phvsicians For the Prevention of Nuclear Wartt Typical of the new style of Sovi et operations is MOSCOW~S use of the 135,000-member International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War. Its U.S. chapter contains 28,000 members. The parent group was established specifically in 1980 in cooperation with Soviet officials to publici z e the dangers of nuclear war. While this goal enjoys near universal backing, the International Physicians' pursuit of it serves Soviet purposes exclusively. The International Physicians, for instance, strongly supports such Soviet arms control tactics as a nuclear freeze, the ban on research and development of defenses against,ballistic missiles, and a moratorium on testing of nuclear weapons. Such a ban, if imposed, would restrict U.S activities but not MOSCOW~S because of difficulties in verifying compli a nce a Ostensibly, thee Soviet chapter of the International Physicians has 60,000 members. This figure, however, is meaningless. Even the Soviet press acknowledges that various kinds of "voluntary associationst1 in the Soviet Union, numbering thousands of m embers exist only on paper and are a form of Ilspiritual cheating.It7 The real membership of the Soviet chapter consists of a small group of trusted Soviet medical bureaucrats who have demonstrated propaganda skills in dealing with well-intentioned Wester n physicians.

The Co-chairman of International Physicians is Dr. Yevgeniy Chazov, Soviet Deputy Minister of Health As a member of the Central 5 6 7 Ye. Chazov Mediki govoryat 'net' yadernoy ugroze," Pravdq., October 1, 1985.

William Broad Two Doctors Who Fear the Bomb The New York Times, October 12, 1985.

Aleksandr Vasinskiy Ni sebe, ni potomkam," Izvestivk July 29, 1986 5- Committee of the Communist Party, he shares symbolic responsibility for all Soviet policies, including the atrocities committed by So viet troops in Afghanistan. As the Chief of the Fourth Directorate of the plinistry of Health, Dr. Chazov oversees, among other things, an institution that dramatically 'symbolizes the unbridgable gap between the Soviet people and the Communist Party elit e : the so-called Kremlin hospitals." These provide superior health care, complete with Western euuiment and medication. unavailable under anv conditions to o'rd'inary Soviet citizens In 1973, Dr. Chazov signed a letter to the government.newspaper As Deputy Minister of Health, Izvestiva denouncing Andrei Sakharov.

Dr. Chazov bears responsibility for the Ministry!.s longstanding indifference to the health of children in the Central Asian Soviet republic of Uzbekistan. There, according to official Soviet sourc es they permitted for more than twenty years, the use of ashighly toxic defoliant on cotton fields where children were working.

Another Soviet medical bureaucrat deeply involved with th,e International Physicians is Dr. Marat Vartanyan, a psychiatrist. He has served as the chief spokesman justifying Soviet use of har,sh psychiatric methods and chemicals to punish political dissenters.

Despite the mounting evidence of Soviet abuse of psychiatry, Dr.

Vartanyan has lied for a decade about the issue to the World I Psychiatrists' Association and hps tried to get Western psychiatrists to approve the Soviet practices.

Soviet Scientists: .ProBaaanda and Militam Connections The Soviets use the most 'lpolitic ally reliable" members of their scientific community to influence Western scientists. All contact with their Western colleagues by scientists working at the Soviet Academy of Sciences is controlled by the Academy's Directorate of Foreign Relations, which i s subordinate to the KGB, the Soviet secret police. Every Soviet scientist leaving for a trip to the West is obligated, by official Academy instructions, to adhere to Soviet policies inlotheir entirety in his private conversations with foreign colleagues 8 . Ann Sheehy Cotton at Any Price or a Fair Price?" Radio Libertv Research Bulletin 1986, No. 326 9 Sidney Bloch and Peter Reddaway, Russ ia's Political Hosoitals: the Abuse of Psvchiatrv in the Soviet Union (London:, Victor Gollancz, Ltd 1977 pp. 227, 299 , 300, 314-317 In 1983, the Soviets, rather than face expulsion as a result of accumulating evidence of their abuses of psychiatry, quit the World Psychiatrists' Association 10. "Taksar Tells How Soviets Control Profs Visiting U.S Camous Reoort, March 16 I 1983, pp. 1-2 I I 6Scientists representing the Soviet Union in I

peacelR discussions Soviet nuclear physicist V with their Western colleagues are frequently leading personalities in the Soviet military-industrial complex.

Yemel'yanov, the former chairman of the Academy's Commission on Scientific Problep of Disarmament, is a frequent participant in Pugwash meetings and was once a maAor opponent of the 1963 Limited Test BanTreaty on nuclear weapons He is prominent in the Soviet defense industry Today, a ke y contact in the Soviet science establishment for scientists of democratic countries is Academician Yevgeniy Velikhov.

Though a prominent Soviet opponent of the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative, he is a leader in the research and development of the Soviet strategic defense program. In a recent speech, Velikhov on behalf of Soviet scientists, promised the Communis& Party to develop the best possible weapons for the Soviet military The Academy of Sciences as a whole is heavily involved in weapons research a nd development scientists do work for the military.

Individua$,ly, the most influential 'Soviet Association of Soviet Lawvers In 1985, the American Bar Association concluded an exchange agreement with the Association of Soviet Lawyers. Despite its misleadi ng name, the Association of Soviet Lawyers is not an organization of working legal professionals spec,ifically created by the Soviet government for conducting disinfonnation and propaganda It is a group The Association of Soviet lawers 11. Pugwash confere n ces serve as a forum for regular meetings between scientists from democratic societies and government-appointed academics from communist countries primarily the Soviet Union, where issues of disarmament are discussed 12. Igor S. Glagolev The Soviet Decisi on-Making Process in Arms-Control Negotiations Orbig, Winter 1978, p. 770 13. Soviet Strateaic Defense Proaramg (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense and Department of State, October 1985 p. 22; "Rech' deputata Ye. P. Velikhova,"

Xzvestivh November 28, 1985 14. Arthur J. Alexander, Soviet Science and Weauons Acau isition (Santa Monica California: Rand, 1982 pp. vi, vii, 18; John R. Thomas Militarization of the Soviet Academy of Sciences," Survev, Spring 1985, pp. 33-39 I 7I publishes anti-Senitic tracts and attacks defenders of human rights in the .Soviet Union. I Think Tanks As part of their strategy to fool the West by depicting Soviet institutions in terms familiar to the West, the Soviets affixithe llthink-tankll label to such Soviet organizations as the IIInstitute of USA and Canada" and the Vnstitute of World Economy and International Relations.Il In reality, these institutes are subordinate to the International Department of the Central Committee of the Cgmunist Party and are engaged mainly in prop a ganda and intelligence activities I Rather than to influence Soviet policy making," says a former staff member of the Institute of USA and Canada, the main job of the Institute's llscholarstl is to llpersuade [Americans] in the right course of Soviet poli t ics.t1 As such, she continues, the Institute has become Ita real propagandistic tool aimed at the West.Il Georgiy Arbatov the Director of the Institute of USA and Canada, frequently presents a sophisticated and llreasonablelt image on American television a nd at many scholarly and political meetings with Americans. But back at home, Arbatov specializes in slandering American society. Example writing in the Communist Party daily Pravda earlier this month Arbatov charged that there is a %ecret policet1 in the United:States to which Americans write I1denunciationsm1 of each other. In the same arti,cle, Arbatov said that President Reagan used bogus quotes manufactured by Nazi propagandists from the writings of Lenin, in his August 1986 interview to Fortune magaz ine. In fact, the President did not quote Lenin at all in this interview, but rath8r stated his deskre for peaceful coexistence with the Soviet Union.

The Institute of World Economy and International Relations plays a similar role. Its director, Yevgeniy P rimakov, who made his name in the Soviet Union by publishing virulently anti-Israel tracts has been a fixture in Soviet delegations to international conferences of 15. For details on the Association of Soviet Lawyers, see Mikhail Tsypkin, "The American Ba r Association: Duped by the Soviets?" Heritage Foundation Backarounder No. 510, May 19, 1986 16. Arkady Shevchenko, Breaking with Moscow (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1985 p. 2!10 Barbara Dash, A Defector ReDorts: The Institute o f USA and Ca nada (Falls Church Virginia: Delphic Associates, Inc 1982 pp. 21 7-220 17. Dash, go.cit, pp. 222, 223 4 18. G. Arbatov, "Kto komu bol'she nuzhen Pravda, September .13, 1986 I I -8 I scientists. The Institute also provides Ilexpertsl' such as Sergei Plekhanov to' appear on A merican television.

Deputy Director, Radomir Bogdanov, is a high-ranking KGB officer. The Institute's research papers are used by the KGB in their disinformation campaign against the United States. The Institute's staffers help the KGB collect information on visiting Americans and use their Insthtute affiliation to visit the U.S., where they perform similar tasks The Institute of USA and Canada has close links with the KGB. Its The Church Speaking this February at the 27th Party Congress, Gorbachev noted t h e importance of foreign religious.organifations for the Soviet peace offensive terror, the Russian Orthodox Church now is completely controlled by the Soviet state. The price paid by its hierarchy for the Church's survival is slavish and vocal support for the Xremlin's foreign policy. Example: The Publishing Department of the Moscow Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church is going to produce film Ildocumentariesl' about the thriving Russian Church In' truth, :religious education of children is prohibit e d in the USSR. The films, a .kind of Potemkin Cinema, are to be sent to the West to blunt the accusations that the USSR represses religion. While the Russian Orthodox Church of course never criticizes Kremhin policies, it is used to denounce American anus control policies The Russian 0rthodox.Church is a key Soviet link I to foreign religious groups. Devastated by Lenin's and Stalin's i The affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church are run by the I government's Council of Religious Affairs, whose main task is to control and undermine religion in the Soviet Union this Council, smuggled to .the West, reveals that the Council runs a network of spies to collect derogatory information about Russian churchmen in the Soviet Union priests are those who are trusted "to contact foreigners and to rebut A secret report by The Council boasts about the declining number of priests And in the opinion of the Council, the best 19. Stanislav Levchenko, "Unmasking Moscow's 'Institute of the USA Heritage Foundation Backprounder No. 234, December 17, 1982, p. 5 20. Oxana Antic The Activities of the Russian Orthodox Church, 1983-1985 Radio Libertv Research Bulletin, 1986, No. 71, pp. 2-5; Pimen, Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia Otkrytoe Pis'mo Prezidentu Soedinennykh Shtatov Ameriki g-nu Ronal'du Reyganu,"

Izvestiva, June 14, 1986; Charlotte Astor The War against Religion,"

USIA Wireless File. Addendum #34, August 22, 1986, p. 1 9- Islanderous" questions from them, who show the minimum Anterest in their pastoral duties, and who are corrupt and immoral i THE GENUINE PEACE GROUP There is one genuine Soviet peace organization the Group to Establish Trust Between the U.S. and USSR. Established by private citizens in 1982, it seeks to promote contact between citizens of the two nations w i thout government interference. Unlike the offic,ial peace groups which blame all the world's troubles on the democracies, the Trust Group does not endorse Soviet policles,l although they do not criticize them publicly out of fear of even more KGB persecut i on to state their own opinions on important political matters. The latest action of this kind was a public appeal to the Soviet authorities to review all the Soviet nuclear power projects in the aftermath of Chernobyl. The Trust Group also serves as a con duit for informal meetings between visitors from democratic nations and Soviet citizens who have not been llclearedll by the KGB for such meetings.

The KGB has been trying to destroy the Trust Group. Many members of it have been imprisoned, confined to psy chiatric hospitals, or exiled from the Sov,iet Union. This April, Trust Group member'larisa Chukaeva was stripped of her parental rights; her three-year-old son was put into a state-run orphanage, whose location is kept secret from her The court made it c l ear to Chukaeva, who has been sentenced to two years in prison, that she would get her child back only if she stopped participating in the Trust Group peace movement I The Trust Group strives to provide an opportunity for individuals FALSE AMERICAN PRESUM P TIONS IN DEALING WITH SOVIETS In the past, Americans have held a number of false, and thus dangerous, assumptions when they have pursued contacts with the Soviets. Among them 21 Tserkovnye kadry i mery PO ogranicheniyu ikh deyatel'nosti .ramkami zakona," V estnik RSKhD, NO. 130, 1979, pp. 304-308 22. Several other unofficial peace groups already have been destroyed by the KGB 10 Inf 1uencincP the Kremlin I i I Often, Americans feel that they will be able to influence Kremlin policy by their contacts with So v iets assumption to attract prominent and prestigious American groups to the USSR. But such Soviet individuals as Dr. Chazov and Dr. Vartanyan whom the Americans meet have built their careers carefully and achieved high positions in Soviet society because o f their absolute conformism and their refusal to argue with the Communist Party leaders. They are not about to be a conduit for American views matters of peace or national security, moreover, are not sought by the Soviet leaders. Soviet decision making is strictly compartmentalized foreign and defense policies are the sole province of several Politburo members, the most powerful members of the Secretariat of the Central Committee and their immediate staff, and the top officials in the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs treatment. of political dissenters. Such issues are decided by the Fi'fth Chief Directorate of the KGB, the Department of the Administrative Organs of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and finally, by the Politburo. Soviet l e gal bureaucrats are only following orders Moscow encourages this Their opinions on Members of the Association of Soviet Lawyers have no say in the The leaders of Soviet science, in particular, with their deep involvement in defense work, will not advocate policies (to the very modest degree that even prominent personalities outside the Politburo can engage in national security debates) inimical to the growth of their main source of support, the Soviet defense establishment.

Vnf 1uencincP Soviet Vublic ODinionIl Another false American assumption is that the Soviets, to some degree are a mirror image of the U.S. Americans thus may bite at Soviet bait offered to Americans that they can llinfluencell Soviet llpublic opinion.1

E xample: Members of the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War have lectured to groups of Soviet physicians on the horrors of nuclear war and even appeared on a TI7 broadcast in the Soviet Union with the same message that U.S. backers o f the International Physicians are drawing on their experience of grassroots political activism in the United States when they assume that such programs will have impact in the USSR experience simply, is not applicable to the closed Soviet society which la cks a mechanism for translating the sentiments of the people The mistake is This I 11 -into political decisions engaged in any anti-nuclear activities at home.

In fact, the Soviet hhysicians have not Takina Soviet Statements at Face Value American groups v isiting the Soviet Union often are told something as if it were a solid fact, and they then transmit it widely on returning home. The trouble is that the Ilfactll is a lie. Example After a visit to the USSR this spring by an American Bar Association deleg a tion, its spokesman announced that, subsequent to his delegation's discussions with Soviet officials, Itthe Soviet government has. announced a relaxation in their current emigration policy. llZ4 The truth is that there was no such announcement.by the Sovi e t government, and the number of Jews allowed to leave the Soviet Union in July fell to 31 from 50 in June, the second lowest number in a year Example: The National Council of Churches reported, after, its delegation visited the Soviet Union this summer an d met with officials of the Council for Religious Affairs, that 'Ithe Jewish communifyll in the city of Tbilihi was going to llsupervise the restoration of the synagoguell there. But Jewish communities exist only on paper in the Soviet Union; Jews in that country have no power to protect their culture and religion from destruction carried out by the government.

PREVNTING REAL HUMAN CONTRACTS Gorbachevls leadership is determined to make Soviet-U.S exchanges a one-way street, where the Soviets, through the us e of their modern day Potemkin villages, play on public opinion in the United States, while Americans are denied effective access to Soviet society. Gorbachev is trying to use exchanges for stirring anti-defense sentiment in the United States, while moldi ng the new Soviet generation in the spirit of militarism and hostility to the United States.

The Soviets are not opening up their society to democratic ideas. KGB boss Viktor Chebrikov declared at the 27th Party Congress

23. Sergei Batovrin Dissidents De serve Dr. Chazov's Nobel The' New York Times December 31, 1985 24. ABA Officers Talk Human Riphts with Soviet Leaderg (Chicago, Illinois: American Bar Association, June 13, 1986 25 U.S. Christians Investigate Alleged Destruction of Soviet Synagogue Nation al Council Of Churches News July 9, 1986 12 that ideas not acceptable toJhe Communist Party should not and would not reach the Soviet people.

Soviet officialdom is interested not in understanding Americans and being understood by them, but only in winning a public relations battle. Thus, the Communist Party daily Pravda, commenting onaa TV link between audiences in Leningrad and Seattle, Washington, compared the Soviet audience to a Itnational team I) defending Vhe flag, w and emphasized Inthe readiness an d ability of every Soviet patriot to give a fight to those unfriendly to socialism.1127 The young Soviet generation is being brought up in the spirit of militarism and intolerance. The lvLessons of Peace," conducted annually in Soviet schools, take childre n to llmuseums of military glory1n and monuments to the Soviet Armed Forces victories. Soviet children are encouraged to establish memorials in their schools to Private Nikolai Chepik, a soldier in the Soviet.invasion army in Afghanistan, killed there by t he freedom fighters. All young Soviet men are drafted for two to three years of military servhce; there they have to take part in IILessons of Hatell toward the West.

CONCLUSION 4 I The Soviets seek to influence U.S. public opinion by engaging various Amer ican professional and social groups involved in exchange and cooperation programs with fake Soviet %o~nterparts The Soviets are trying in their contacts with these American groups to isolate the issues of arms control from political realities and to coax A mericans to ignore the critical differences between the Soviet and U.S political systems and foreign policies I The Soviets are trying to convince the Americans that l1exchangesI1 and lldialoguell can influence the Soviet leadership to be more llreasonabl elg and t

peacefulll--especially when handled on the Soviet terms that issues embarrassing the Soviets, such as Afghanistan or human rights, are not raised. Whenever they can,.the Soviets'use the exchanges to whitewash their violations of human rights 26. Pravda, March 1, 1986 27. N. Potapov Pri svete sovesti i pravdy," PravdL April 14, 1986 28 0. S. Kharkhardin, Sovetskava obs hchestvennost, v mirovom a ntivoennom dvizhenii Moscow: Nauka, 1985 p. 63; Norman Naimark and David Powell MOSCOW'S Cult.of Milita r ism The National Interest No. 4, Summer 1986 p. 63; Rear Admiral S. Rybak Vospitanie politicheskoy bditel'nosti v dal'nem pokhode," Morskov sbornik, 1986, No. 4 p. 13 13 At the same time, the Soviets use their contact with American groups 'to foster U.S. p ublic criticism of Reagan policies. Yet the Soviets are more committed than at any time since-Stalin to prevent criticism of their foreign policy by the Soviet public and to use all methods of intimidation to stop contact between Americans and unauthorize d Soviets.

The U.S. should.not allow MOSCOW~S strategy to succeed. While mutual exchanges can be unless Washington takes U.S.-Soviet exchanges mutually beneficial, they will not be so specific steps to restore the balance in Mikhail Tsypkin, Ph D Salvatori Fellow in Soviet Studies I I

About the Author

Related Issues: Russia