May 18, 1984

May 18, 1984 | Backgrounder on National Security and Defense

Keeping the All-Volunteer Force Healthy

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353 May 18, 1984 KEEPING THE ALL VOLUNTEER FORCE HEALTHY INTRODUCTION I The volunteer system has been the exclusive provider of man- I power for the U.S. armed forces since 1973 splotchy. In 1979, for example, the All-Volunteer Force (AVF produced only 93 percent of the military services' recruiting goal. In 1980, only 64 percent of first-term enlistees possessed high school diplomas. Yet things improved so much by last Nove m ber that Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger labeled the AVF-a huge success.111 To some extent the improvement is the result of better management, greater public interest in and concern for military affairs, and increased military budgets and pay. Maj o r credit, however, belongs to the 1979-1982 economic slump, which made a job in uniform look very appealing. If this were in fact the case, then the current economic recovery could renew the dif- ficulties in recruiting and retention. At least three suppl ements to the current AVF package are essential if the AVF is to be kept healthy, and provide for the nation's defense manpower needs--in good times as well as bad.

First, the AVF must be made less susceptible to fluctuations in the economy. This means fle xibility in the use of fiscal resources--such as banking extra funds during periods when recruiting is easy, for quick-response use when the job is more difficult. Second, the AVF must tap new sources, particularly tive to current high pay structures) wou l d serve well here tion, including Presidential authority to order limited inductions Its record has been I I I I the college-bound youth. A post-service ItGI bill" (as an alterna- I Finally, the AVF must be backed by a secure system of mobiliza- I I Army T imes, November 21, 1983, p. 10. 2 QUANTITY AND QUALIW IN THE ACTIVE FORCE In general, the services achieved therr active duty recruit ing objectives between 1973 and 1983, with the help of a reduction in overall authorized end strength of about 200,000 19 78, the services achieved or came very close to achieving their quantitative accession goals. The success of the AVF can be only partly measured on this basis, however.

The picture is less rosy in terms of quality, as measured by educational level and ment al aptitude by whether or not recruits received high school diplomas Those with diplomas HSDG) have proved more likely to complete an en listment Training aptitude is measured for various military occupations and assignments. Based on uniform tests admini s tered by all the services, applicants are ranked into five-categories superior I above average (I1 average (I11 below average IV), and unacceptable (V I I Except for I I i Education level is measured I Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT Test Categories and Distribution of 1980 Youth Population AFQT Category 1980 Youth Population Distribution (Percent I 4 I11 32 IV 24 v 7 11 33 Source: National Youth Survey The services are prohibited from enlisting Category V youths and they attempt to enlist as many fr o m Categories I through I11 as possible. Since 1982, Category IV enlistees have been limited by,law to those possessing high school diplomas. Further, by law no more than 20 percent of new recruits in any service may be in test category IV sions has fluctu a ted widely, but with the exception of the Army the services have not done badly with respect to quality enlist ments.2 Moreover, in the last three years even the Army has been Over the last ten years the quality of active force acces All DoD mental aptitu de test scores for 1976-1980 were found to be invalid due to errors in the system used to convert raw test scores to AFQT per centiles.

Category I11 and IV recruits than normally would have been enlisted.

As a result of this "misnorming" the services acce pted more 3 attracting a very large number of qua ty recru ts. This does not necessarily signal a new trend. over the past ten years have suggested that recruit quality is influenced by the economy.3 tionship exists between the economy and peacetime enlis t ments can be found as far in the past as the 1830s, and during the nation's last sustained experience with an all-volunteer force, the period between the World Wars, a clear link between unemployment levels and voluntary enlistment has been dernon~trated I ndeed, a number of studies Historical evidence that such a rela But there is more to the economic factor and the decision to enlist than 'the mere availability (or nonavailability) of jobs. Indeed, surveys conducted for the Army suggest that perceived opp o rtunities for self-improvement attract more'recruits than the simple desire for employment. interviewed listed money for a college education as their most .important reason for enlisting. Lower test category recruits indicated they joined to receive skill training. the recruits saw the Army as a vehicle for self-improvement. This behavior is consistent with historical experience over a wide variety of economic condition Higher test category recruits In both cases QUALITY AND QUANTITY IN THE RESERVES The qu a ntity and quality of personnel in the reserve compo nents are equally important. and often overlooked indicators of the health and vitality of the AVF. sidering the growing requirement for the early use of the selected reserves in even a partial mobilizat ion.

This is particularly so con The Reserve Components consist of two major groupings, the 'Selected Reserves and the Individual Ready Reserves (IRR). The The strong link found between the economy and recruiting in an Army study by Charles Dale and Curtis Gilroy ("The.Economic Detriment of Military Enlistment Rates," USARI technical Report 587, September 1983) has been questioned these results have traditionally been able to rely on volunteers--is less clear, and may not be not as strong as it seems to be in the Army.

The pre-World War I1 all-volunteer Army was.wel1 aware of the economic influences on enlistments in the Army," unpublished, Morale Branch of the War Plans Divisions General Staff, September 15, 19

20. The title of Woodbury's study is misleading It examines the factors influencing enlistment, reenlistment and desertion from 1830 to 19

20. For the interwar period see the author's Men Wanted for U.S. Army: America's Experience with an All-Volunteer Army Between the World Wars (Westport, Connect icut: Greenwood, 1982 Education Lures Recruits, Studies Show," Army Times, August 1, 1983, p 4; General Maxwell Thurnon, "Sustaining the All-Volunteer Force, 1983-1992 The Second Decade," paper presented at the USNA/OASD CMRAU Conference on the AVF, Novem b er 2-4, 1983, p. 12 Critics point out other factors also played a role in This linkage in other services--particularly those which See Major E. N. Woodbury A Study of Desertion 5 4 strength of the Selected Reserves, which are organized into equipped units and train on a regular basis, declined from 919,000 at the beginning of the AVF to a low of 788 00 in fiscal 1978.

Some of the decline was a deliberate reduction dictated by policy changes, but much of the drop resulted from Department of Defense DoD) and Service neglect of Reserve Component recruiting/retention problems In the early years of the AVF, attention focused on the ac tive forces. By 1977, however, the plight of the Reserve Com ponents could no longer be ignored. Since then recruiting has been r eemphasized, incentives-such as educational benefits, and enlistment and reenlistment bonuses--added, and Selected Reserve strength has increased to 1,004,500;the highest since 1961 and only 2,200 short of the 1959 all-time high. Moreover, the per centage of high school diploma graduates in the Selected Reserves which had declined significantly following the end of the draft has mounted sharply in recent years. By the end of fiscal year 1983, 92 percent of nonprior service volunteers for the Selected Reser v es scored in Categories 1-111 RETENTION IN THF, ACTIVE FORCES AND SELECTED RESERVES Just as there is some link between the economy and enlistment there is a relationship between the economy and retention-the ability to keep people in the force there was a > major entry-level pay increase. The pay of a newly enlisted member E-1) went from $143 (plus room, board, medical care, uniforms) to $268/month immediately and is now almost $600 nearly a 420 percent increase since 1971 Raises for career personnel were he l d back by budget caps and between 1971 and 1980 averaged about 186 percent, while inflation (Consumer Price Index rose more than 200 percent. With relatively high employment potential and declining military purchasing power, many career personnel left the service. The double-digit inflation of 1979 and 1980 left the career force even further behind. Pay raises of 11.1 and 14.3 percent in fiscal 1981 and 1982 helped restore some of what had been lost and improved retention and reenlist ment rates. The curre n t high reenlistment rates in all the services (85.6 percent in fiscal 1983 as compared with 68.2 percent in fiscal 1979) would seem to ratify the wisdom of the Itcatch-uplt raises, but'the high unemployment of the last two years may have played a part Whe n the AVF was instituted Similar forces operated during the period to influence the decision to enlist in the Reserves. Retention problems also plagued the Reserve Components, especially the Selected Reserves in the 1970s. Indeed the decrease in the Select e d Reserves fol lowing the end of the draft-from 933,000 in 1974 to 799,000 in 1978-was due as much to the decline in reenlistment (among re servists whose initial services may have been motivated by draft avoidance) as it was to poor recruiting. In.1977, Reserve Compo nent manpower issues began to get attention and total strength 5 figures have improved. Still, retention in the Selected Reserve has remained problematical.

Interviews with enlisted reservists indicate that, for younger, lower-ranking members of the Selected Reserves, the attraction of the duty is more a function of job skill training than supplementary income.?

Selected Reserves was the promise of acquiring a skill, such as mechanic or heavy equipment operator, transferable to the civilian world. These persons usually drop out after one enlistment.

Although the findings of one survey cannot be considered definit ive its implications cannot be ignored As the job market improves fewer men will be attracted by the promise of marketable skills The up side of this, of course, is that those who join will be more highly motivated toward service and will be more likely t o stay The primary reason for entering the THE AVF: COSTS OF RECRUITING Willingness of the services and Congress to direct resources at manpower problems seems to be the key to the success or failure of the AVF. It is no secret that the All-Volunteer Force costs somewhat more than its early proponents forecast, although return ing to conscription may be even more costly. What is less well understood is how dependent the AVF actually is on funds for re cruiting activities. Chart I, which relates recruiting e x pendi tures to the quality of active duty Army enlistments, shows a clear pattern. When recruiting money falls off, so do enlist ments. It also suggests that the relationship between resources and recruiting success may be even stronger than the relations h ip between the economy and recruiting. Moreover, it reveals a lag in the effort of expenditures of at least a couple of years This should raise a warning flag. In the 1980 and 1981 recession, increased recruiting budgets, substantial pay raises and a chan g e in the public attitude toward the military all com bined to promote the recruiting effort recruiting has been so easy that all the services have had the luxury of selecting the b.est of an array of candidates could breed overconfidence at the Pentagon a n d in Congress growing pressure to reduce deficits and make defense cuts, the In the three years since With This Military Compensation Background Paper, 2d. Ed. (Washington, D.C Department of Defense, 1982 Statement of Dr. Lawrence Korb, Assistant Secretar y of Defense MR&L) before the Military Personnel-Compensation Subcommittee of the House Armed Services,Committee, March 8, 1982, updated with data furnished by DoD.

William J. Taylor, Jr U. S Army Selected Reserves centives to Join/Remain," Defense Manpowe r Planning 1980s (New York: Pergamon Press, 1981 Incentives/Disin Issues for the I 6 A 0 0 a 0'0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 lnlnm o.aD v v Io v q q O m m.m Y u 4 Y m LI 0 Pi 2 Lf a cr a 0 c U 4 3 5 H H I H r 0 m 0 4J U m I A R q a r Err Y R a 0 bl a g 2 I i 0 I 7 t emptation to reduce recruiting costs is strong. However, a con traction in recruiting resources or a failure to address military compensation issues adequately, especially in a period of economic recovery, could push the AVF back into a recruiting crisis s imilar to the one it faced in the late 1970s THE INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE: ACHILLES HEEL OF THE AVF Reserve Component requirements are based on mobilization needs-particularly for full mobilization. In such an event both the Active and Selected Reserves w o uld be built to wartime strength through an infusion of individuals from the Pretrained Individual Manpower pool. Members of this pool have served in the military in one capacity or another and remain on inactive status subject to recall in an emergency. T he largest such group is the Indi vidual Ready Reserve (IRR Its members have served less than six years on active duty or in the Selected Reserves and are completing the remaining period of their service obligation in inactive status to bring existing uni t s to wartime strength, constitute new units and replace casualties until the Selective Service System and training base began to deliver volunteers and draftees to fill these requirements declined between 1973 and 1978-from 1.2 million to 342,000 Part of t he decline was deliberate; defense manpower analysts concluded that the numbers could safely be reduced. Nonetheless the major reason for the decline was the loss of the draftees who would serve a portion of their six-year military service obliga tion in the IRR. Since 1978 the strength of the IRR has risen I but at the end of FY 1983 still stood only at 417,0

00. The Army's slice of the IRR dropped from 759,000 in 1973 to 240,000 ten years later. Under current worst-case mobilization assumptions, virtu I ally the entire Army IRR would be required to bring the active forces and Selected Reserves to wartime strength. Most assump tions about any war in Europe indicate that U.S. forces would run out of IRFt casualty replacements well before the first trained draftee or volunteer could reach the theater, and this assumes that all IRR personnel are interchangeable. In fact, a serious mismatch between available and required skills exists in the IRR.

Assumptions governing the use of IRR personnel do not provide time for retraining.

The Pentagon recognizes the IRR problems and has begun a series of low-cost/no-cost solutions that are expected to reduce the deficiencies by 19

90. For example, this year the service obligation for new recruits will be lengthened from six to eight years gation And ultimately it should eliminate the most serious shortages in mobilization manpower In an emergency IRR would provide the personnel The strength of the IRR, like that of the Selected Reserves, I I The extra two years will be added to their reserve obliThe Army's requirement for pretrained individuals in the early stages of a conflict is critical. For example, the Army projects a need for over 1.9 million personnel for mobilization by 19

85. Drawing on all of its manpower sources (active, Selected Reserves, IRR) the Army projects a shortfall of 2.1 percent.

While this may appear manageable, the aggregate numbers mask two serious problems. First, the system the.Defense Department uses to determine mobilization manpower requireme nts contains many untested assumptions. Second, while the aggregate shortage may be low, shortages in combat skills are acute. Indeed, the Penta gon admits, "In addition to shortages in total Fanpower; the Army also has in FY 1985 a chronic shortage of co mbat arms.enlisted personnel ninety days after mobilization, a situation that is projected to worsen through FY 1989.

MOBILIZATION ASSUMPTIONS The Defense Department bases its estimate of the manpower shortfall on several critical assumptions the number of trained service members present for duty on M-Day when mobilization begins (essentially the services' present-for duty strength It then assumes a 95 percent responsiveness rate from the Selected Reserves and 70 percent IRR responsiveness.

These rates are crucial, for they represent the number of re servists, individually or in units, who will show up when called.

Implicit in the responsiveness figures are assumptions concerning the physical fitness and state of training of those answering the mobilizatio n order. Initially, existing units are brought up to strength, but once hostilities begin, casualties will also have to be replaced by individuals from the IRR. The shortage is calculated by figuring the gap between the rate at which the IRR becomes avail a ble and the rate at which casualties occur It begins by computing Under assumptions concerning a war in Europe today, U.S forces would be short of trained manpower by as much as 179,000 troops before the first volunteers and newly trained draftees began t o arrive responsiveness, casualties, and casualties capable of returning to active duty are correct. If the current assumption that 70 percent of the IRR would respond is high, even greater shortages would result--and they would result early on percent sho w rate assumption does hold, there are likely to be greater shortages than the Army is willing to co,ncede. Some 75 percent of the Army's anticipated casualties in a European war will be among the combat arms personnel, yet only 25 percent of Army IRR pers onnel have these skills been adequately addressed.

Leatherneck is an infantryman, the Army cannot And this supposes that initial assumptions about Even if the 70 This problem has never The Marines can assume that every FY 1985 DoD Manpower Requirement Repo rt, February 1984, pp. viiii-7-8 24-25 I 9 The U.S. has not mobilized a significant number of Selected Reserve units or individual reservists for more than 20 years.

During the Vietnam era, very few reserve units or personnel were called up. Experience, however, suggests that DoD's current assumptions about reserve responsiveness and deployability are optimistic, to say the leas^. The .best data may be from the Berlin crisis in 19

61. During that crisis a total of 113,254 reservists and National Guardsmen were called to active duty in the Army, either as members of units or as individual replacements In the two divisions activated nearly one-quarter of the men called u p for'duty applied for deferments or delays. Three weeks were required for administrative shakedown and processing before inten sive combat training could begin. Army plans assumed that three to five months would be sufficient to bring such units to satis factory levels of operational readiness, but many needed five or six months of additional training.9 Only 37,000 reservists were called to active duty during the Vietnam war. Of these, 17 percent were totally unqualified to serve in their assigned positio n , and nearly 50 percent had deficiencies that affected their availability for mobilization or assignment according to their skill.1 Experience teaches that planners always encounter unantici Today's mobilization blueprints pated problems havoc with the be s t laid plans assume responsiveness rates unprecedented in American mobilization history. Even if the anticipated numbers arrive at the mobiliza tion sites on time, there is ample historical evidence to suggest that reorganization, retraining, and addition a l preparation for deployment take longer than currently assumed mobilization schemes flow more smoothly than ever before, the Reserve Components will-not arrive in time to fulfill their vital roles as part of the total force The friction of war and Murphy 's Law can raise Unless present THE ROLE OF SELECTIVE SERVICE IN MOBILIZATION Although the Selective Service System was allowed to atrophy during the mid- and late-l970s, it has been revitalized since draft registration resumed in 19

80. Current DoD plans for mobili zation call for the Selective Service to deliver the first inductee to the Army's training base on M+13 (thirteen days after mobiliza tion is ordered) and to deliver 86,000 by M+

30. Selective Service can probably meet this requirement, but tra ining raw recruits and conscripts takes time and is dependent on the capabilities of the training base. Shortfalls are almost a certainty under the current 9 "U.S. Army Expansion, 1961-62," Office of the Chief of Military History Department of the Army, W a shington, D.C., 1963; Herman Boland, "The Re serves," in studies prepared for the President's Commission on an All Volunteer Armed Force, Vol. I1 (November 1970 Improving the Readiness of the Army Reserve and National Guard Framework for Debate," Congress i onal Budget Office, February 1979 lo A 10 worst-case scheme, and if ground forces ran out of reserve re placements.before post-mobilization trainees arrived in the combat theater, the United States would be faced with unacceptable al ternatives: using unt rained levies. as combat replacements; drawing from existing units; escalation to tactical nuclear war; or sur- render.

ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND THE AVF How will the economic recovery affect the All-Volunteer Force? History suggests that quality enlistments w ill fall off and reenlistments, especially among highly skilled personnel will also decline. Already the Army reports a 22 percent decline in test category I-IIIA male applicants for enlistment during the first quarter of fiscal 1984'compared to a year ag o.

But the future of the AVF need not be bleak. Intangibles such as the positive portrayal of soldiers in television adver tising and the revival of the '#war toy1# market, suggest that negative attitudes related to Vietnam have softened. Popular satisfact ion with the Grenada operation boosted the military's stock, and Marine Corps applicant testing rose briefly after the bombing of the peacekeeping force barracks in Lebanon. Whether this improved image will sustain recruiting and retention of highly quali f ied people in prosperous times is hard to tell Furthermore, if the United States again finds itself in a hostile ties among volunteer servicemen, the acceptability of a military enlistment among those who view service as a vehicle for self improvement cou l d decline. environment that results in small but sustained numbers of casual It would seem that, under the present system, the only way to alter the current patterns and trends in enlistments is with money. private sector, and special incentives will be n e cessary to attract high quality personnel with special skills. Intensified recruiting will also be necessary--and expensive. If Congress is unwilling to provide the resources necessary to allow the AVF to compete when the economy is healthy, then the Amer i can people may be forced to consider alternative systems of manpower procurement and retention. its present strength in the aggregate, it is obvious that the present system lacks flexibility 'and is highly resource dependent.ll Pay will have to keep up wi t h prevailing wages in the While the AVF has.proved capable of sustaining l1 Opponents charge that the AVF is too expensive, inflexible, draws dis proportionately from the poor and minorities, and does not attract or retain enough quality personnel: The su c cessful recruiting and reten tion of recent years silenced most of the critics, but some are returning to the debate. Most see little hope for the existing system and prefer radical change to reform argue for a return to selective service, but numerous st u dies by public Some suggest a form of national service, others continued) .11 PROPOSALS The AVF should be improved in three areas 1. The AVF must tap the college-bound market of high quality youths on a regular basis. This cohort has been largely ignored b y recruiters. It is a program in which the enlisted soldier participates with the Army to build an individual college education fund, which could amount to $20,000 in three years to a nonparticipatory IfGI bill options. First-term volunteers could choose e ither a) a short period of service at low pay and reduced benefits but with sig nificant post-service education benefits (typically, such enlistees would receive no benefits for dependents and would be required to leave them behind); or (b) service at cur rent pay and allowances with no special after service education benefits. The former would appeal to the college-bound youth; the latter to the en listee seeking to acquire skill training while supporting a family.

Enlistees considering a career in the ser vice should be offered the option of transfering their accrued educational benefits (then or later) to their dependents the high quality recruits brought in under option (a), who later choose-to make a career in the military The Army's College Fund was on e such effort.

The services also should return with the following two enlistment This option would be important to 2. Ways must be found to make the AVF less vulnerable to fluc tuations in the economy.' Annual pay raises, enlistment and reen listment bonus es, and generous deferred compensation packages to volunteers for hard-to-fill specialties have become the' accepted norm for the AVF. There is, however, a built-in lag in fulfilling military pay and recruiting resource requests. It takes months and somet i mes years to bring them on line. Appropriations for recruiting incentives should be retained through good recruiting and retention times, but the Services should be allowed to bank these monies if not needed immediately. In this way a recruiting fund c'ou l d be built up for use when recruiting production and retention drops-such as in periods of economic recovery needs to be more sensitive to the relationship between recruiting retention, and the economy and must avoid the temptation to slash recruiting res ources just because they are not currently needed Congress continued and private groups show that these alternatives would neither eliminate all the problems nor be more cost effective.

Programs and their effects on Military Manpower and Civilian Youth Pro b lems," Congressional Budget Office, January 1978; Charles Moskos, "Making the All-Volunteer Force Work Affairs, Vol. 60, No. 1, 1980; Kenneth J. Coffey If the Draft is Restored: Uncertainties, Not Solutions," and A. John Simmons, "The Obligations of Cit i zens and the Justification of Conscription," in See "National Service A National Service.Approach," Foreign Conscription and Volunteers the All-Volunteer Force, Robert K. Fullinwider, ed. (Totowa, New Jersey Roman Allanheld, 1983 Military Requirements, So c ial Justice, and 12 3 The system is being improved piecemeal by the Defense Department's recent receipt of authority to increase the Individual Ready Reserve through a collection of no.=cost/low-cost methods. These programs may eliminate the aggregate IRR shortage by 1990, but will not eliminate the skill shortages. At least two additional steps are needed a) Preclassification, whereby all youths would be tested and classified upon registration to eliminate immedi ately those who are unfit for active servi c e, and ease the burden on military induction centers in event of mobilization; and b) limited emergency induction authority. Currently, the President cannot order inductions into the military without con gressional approval. As it now stands, in any emerg e ncy requir ing an immediate build-up of the active forces short of full mobilization, the National Command Authority has to mobilize elements of the Selected Reserves and hold them until draft legis lation is approved. The President should be.given author i ty to induct 100,000 draftees for six to twelve months training and service without prior .consent from Congress. Such authority would not increase the President's power to use forces--only to call them-but it would greatly improve the flexibility of the All-Volunteer Total Force The AVF must be backed up by a more secure mobilization system.

CONCLUSION These changes, shifting to a two-tiered enlisted corps, cre ating a recruiting resources revolving fund, preclassification and a limited standby induction authority require legislation and structural changes in the AVF and Department of Defense. None however, would add significantly to personnel costs. Indeed, the shift to a two-tiered enlisted corps should help hold future costs down. Preclassification wou ld add only $8 to $10 million annually to the Selective Service System's modest $28 million budget pro posed for FY 1985.

Current plans to resort to conscription only in the event of maxi mum danger are unrealistic. In the lesser contingencies, which are m ore likely to confront the U.S., full mobilization is an unrealistic and possibly provocative response. The use of a rapid deployment force pulled together from elements of the stra tegic reserve would be more likely, but would strip the U.S. of conventio nal active reserve units. A limited call-up of Selected Reserve units in conjunction with a limited peacetime draft similar to the system used during the Berlin crisis, would serve to reconstitute the strategic reserve with the least disruption.

These refo rms of the AVF could be accomplished now with little additional expenditure. The current interest in military reform means that the timing is right to address unresolved per sonnel issues and consider new approaches to their solution. What is more, the is s ues should be attended to while recruiting and retention are healthy, or at least before they become critical The requirement for limited standby draft authority is crucial. 13 again. If the nation waits for another manpower crisis like that of the late 1 970s, the rush to find solutions could cloud judg ments and result in little more than ad hoc policy.

Prepared for The Heritage Foundation by Lt.Co

1. Robert K. Griffith, U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel Griffith is a historian at the U.S. A rmy Center for Military History where he is preparing a volume on the Army's transition from the draft to the AVF 1968-1974 the U.S. Army the World Wars (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1982 The views and conclusions expressed here are his and not necessarily the policy or position of the U.S. Army, Department of Defense, or any other govern mental agency He is the author of Men Wanted for America's Experience with an All Volunteer Army between 14 SUGGESTED READINGS In addition to the sources cited in the text of this report, the following recent studies of the manpower issue are recommended I I Anderson, Martin, ed., The Military Draft (Stanford University Hoover Institution Press, 1982).

Goodpaster, Andrew J., et al., eds., Toward a Consensus on Mili tary Service: Report of the Atlantic Council's Workinq Group on Military Service (New York: Pergamon Press, 1982).

Margiotta, Franklin D et al eds Changinq U.S. Military Manpower Realities (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1983).

Military Manpower Task Force A Report to the President on the Status and Prospects of the All-Volunteer Force, revised edition (Washington, D.C.: GPO, November 1982).

Scowcroft, Brent, ed., Military Service in the United States Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1982).

Sherraden, Michael W and Donald J. Eberly, eds., National Service: Social, Economic and Military Impacts(Newrk Pergamon Press, 1982 I I I

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