April 28, 1980 | Backgrounder on National Security and Defense

The Defense Debate: Prospects and Alternatives

(Archived document, may contain errors)

117 April 28, 1980 THE DEFENSE DEBA.TE PROSPECTS AND .ALTER'NATlVES INTRODUCTION The Carter Admini stration's FY 1981 defense budget and five-year defense program have undergone intense scrutiny during the first two months of the current congressional session.

Secretary of Defense Harold Brown defended the Carter Administra tion's FY 1981 budget in tes timony before the Senate Armed Services Committee in late January, declaring that it was Ilwell-thought outIt and a determined response to expansionist Soviet ambitions in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf.

However, during recent weeks, statements made by senior military officials and others have contradicted many of the underlying premises of Brownts testimony, and also the official defense policy of DOD Annual Report credence to the pr the Administration as-outlined in the FY 1981 and other publicati o ns oposition that the FY 1981 defense budget and five-year defense program may not be adequate relative to basic U.S. strategic and military requirements posed by the growing Soviet military threat. However, they should serve as a catalyst from which Cong r ess can consider defense program alternatives for FY 1981 other than those submitted for.congressiona1 consideration by the Administration This discrepancy gives The presentation of an alternative defense program for FY 1981 will serve a number of purpose s ., First, it will provide a focal point from which Administration defense planning can be debated; for the Administrationts revised EY 1981 budget (which has been adjusted due to inflation) represents a retreat from the 5.4 percent real growth commitment m ade in January, although Administration spokesmen contend that the real'growth for defense in J?Y 1981 will be Itat least 3 percent That 3 percent pledge is a dubious one at best, for it has been achieved by an $82 million reduction in EY 1980 defense out l ays, as an April 8 memorandum 2 for the Secretary of Defense by Pentagon Deputy Comptroller John R. Quetsch indicated. This change in commitment should caution the Congress as to the willingness of the Administration to adhere to the 4.6 percent real.grow t h commitment made in the I1out-yearslf of the five-year program. Secondly, it can help Congress decide where additional procurement should be directed since it approaches the defense budget problem from primarily a requirements perspective. And thirdly, i t will show how much additional military funding would be needed to move toward an optional defense posture: one geared toward correcting the deficiencies in military strength adverted to by high-ranking U. S. mil4tary leaders.

CONFLICTING SIGNALS Perhaps the .most significant statement made in opposition to the premises upon'which the Administration based its strategic programs was that of Strategic Air Commander-in-Chief Richard B.

Ellis in testimony before the House Armed Services Committee on January

25. It contrasts sharply with the inherent strategic assumptions of the Administration as stated in the FY 1981 DOD Annual Report Strategic Equivalence DOD ANNUAL REPORT At present there are excellent grounds for confidence in the U.S. strategic deterrent It can also be said with some confidence that a state of mutual strategic deterrence is currently -in effect. It follows that nuclear stability would probably prevail in a crisis as well. 'I GEN. RICHARD B. ELLIS At the present time, how ever I can only state that by today's measurements, an adverse strategic imbalance has developed, and will continue to for several years to come.

This imbalance exists not only when our forces are in a day to-day alert posture (the worst case) but also when fuliy gene rat ed (the best case I1 So also, recent comments by senior U.S. naval commanders seem to indicate that the U.S. shipbuilding program is inadequate relative to U.S. naval requirements. A comparison of the following statements indicates that a large gap exists between U.S. declara tory objectives and actual capabilities for executing naval policy 1. FY 1981 DOD Annual Report, p. 85. 2 U.S. 1980s SAC Plans, B-1," Defense and Foreign Affairs Daily, January 30, 1980. 3 Naval Balance ADMINISTRATION The Navy will co n tinue to beg the most powerful on the Seas A strong and balanced Navy is essential to our national defense The planned Navy program will enhance current readiness and fund a program of modernization that will ensure the effectiveness of our forces in the f uture NAVAL OFFICIALS We are trying to meet three ocean requirements with4 a one-and-a-half-ocean navy If Admiral Thomas B. Hayward Chief of Naval Operations Vice Admiral M.S. Holcomb Director of Navy Program Plan ning, testified before the Seapower Subco m mittee that the United States would have to spend 10 to $15 billion more than the Carter Administration has recommended for the 5-year period fiscal years 1981-85. in order go achieve a 550-ship fleet It Representative Paul Trible Another area'in which a d ecidedly large gap exists between Administration rhetoric and actual U.S. capabilities is the rapid deployment area. Compare the statements by President Carter with the answers Secretary of Defense Brown gave to Congress in testi fying on the adequacy of U .S. rapid deployment capabilities Rapid Deployment PRESIDENT CARTER SECRETARY BROWN lrAn attempt by :any outside force to gain control' of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of 'the United States of America and s u ch an assault will be repelled by any means necessay, including military force On U.S. ability to quickly deploy a 4500-man brigade to non-NATO areas If it would have to be light armed. To move a mechanized or an armored brigade an equiva- lent distance w ould tie up most of our airlift capa$ility for a considerable time 3 4. Richard Halloran Capability of Ships for Navy Debated New York Times U.S January 31, 1980.

February 10, 1980, p. 21 Brown Sets Budget Context Defense and Foreign Affairs Daily 5 6. Con gressional Record, March 3, 1980, pp. H1493-1494 7. State of the Union Address, January 23, 1980 FY 1981-DOD-Annual Report, p. 167 8. John Fialka Brown Says U:S. May Face-'Turning Point' in History Washington Star, January 29, 1980, p. A6. 4 The rapid dep l oyment forces ve !lour existing mobility foxes are assembling will be extra- cannot meet the deployment ordinarily flexible Our objectives we have set for forces will be prepared for FY 1982 for NATO or f% some rapid deployment to any regiog of strategic s ignificance non-NATO contingencies II ANALYSIS The sharp contrast between the declared defense objectives of the Administration and the actual military capabilities the U.S. possesses to achieve them poses two serious questions that Congress must address as it considers the FY 1981 defense budget.

If, indeed, the current state of U.S. military readiness is insufficient, then it must be asked: 1) What defense planning decisions contributed to this condition; and, 2) What would Congress have.to do, in terms of additional military weapons procurement, to begin to reverse the adverse military trends that currently exist The decade-long neglect of U.S. military force modernization Asia, escalating personnel costs and rampant inflation. However over the past thr e e years in particular, the problem of moderniz ing U.S. military forces to meet increased requirements has been exacerbated due to unwise program stretchouts (Trident MX cruise missile programs) and unilateral weapons cancellations B-1, CVN veto) by the A d ministration. These decisions have directly contributed to both additional cost growth in weaponsll procurement and an overall decline in U.S. military readiness. is attributable to a number of factors: the war in Southeast I 18 I Last October, former Sec retary of Defense Rumsfeld estimated that the three-year shortfall in defense budget authority that has collected from the projected budgets of the Fo

Administration is $38.6 billion well over $10 billion per year.

Former President Ford stated in a major defense policy address in January that the Carter Administration reduced the 1979-1983 proposed defense budgets of the Ford Administration by 26.9 percent in strategic programs; 7.3 percent in general purpose forces ; 12.6 percefs in research and development and 41 percent for Navy programs decline in overall U.S military readiness, and have reduced the ability of the U.S. to contest the Soviet drive toward across-the board military superiority. This year, as the defe n se budget is being debated in Congress, it is just becoming apparent how I These cutbacks have contributed to the I 9. White House Message to the Congress of the United States, January 21 1980 10. FY 1981 DOD Annual Report, p. 208 11. See Lawrence J. Korb , "The FY 1980-1984 Defense Program: Issues and Trends MI Foreign Policy and Defense Review, Vol. I, No. 4 (1979 pp. 11-14 12. Congressional Record, October 11, 1979, p. S14407 13. Congressional Record, January 28, 1980, p. E143. 5 difficult it will be for Lle U.S. to begin to make up for these shortfalls and procure additional weapons systems, given the competition of the non-defense sectors of the budget.

The "real growth1' in the original FY 1981 budget amounts to 8 billion (in constant FY 1981 dollars T he addition of another 3.0 billion for higher fuel costs (the Administration has had to raise the cost estimate for military fuel from $24 to $42 per barrel) and $5.2 billion overall does not do anything to make'up for these shortfalls it merely reflects a n underestimation of the impact of inflation which is evident throughout the entire FY 1981 defense budget. The remaining "real growth clearly does not even begin to make up for the shortfalls in defense budget authority that have accrued over the past th ree years.

Moreover, current studies by defense analyst Lawrence J.

Korb (presented to an American Enterprise Institute press briefing on February 4) indicate that the.current FY 1981-85 defense program is underpriced by at least $75 billion. Therefore, t he Carter Administration's EY 1981 defense budget and five-year defense program will not only fail to make up for previous budget shortfalls, but it will also compound the shortfall problem over the next five-years a period of acknowledged U.S. strategic vulnerability .

Critics have been urging since last fall that significant additions be made to the defense program of the Carter Administra tion to redress the growing imbalance in U.S.-Soviet military capabilities. In September. 1979, during the floor deb ate on the Second Concurrent Budget Resolution, Senator Ernest Hollings D4.C noted that even if the Senate accepted the Hollings Resolution, calling for five percent real growth in FY 1981 and FY 1982, "five percent only gives us half ($40 billion) of wha t the Pentagon has asked fp$l in the out-years of the five-year plan some $80 billion. Hollings and his Democratic colleagues Senators Henry Jackson and Sam Nunn, thereupon presented a list of suggested additions to the Carter Administration's defense prog ram, primarily in the readiness and generf5 purpose force category, that totaled well over $20 billion.

And Former Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld also alluded to the need to substantially increase U.S. defense expenditure. in October when in testifying on S ALT I1 before the Senate Armed Services Committee, he stated that if Congress decided to make up for the 38.6 billion shortfall of the past three years, it would have had either to: 1) increase real growth in the EY 1980 defense budget by $40 billion; or 2 do so over two fifgal years (1980 and 1981) at 'roughly 20 billion per year 15 Ibid p. S12833-12834 16. Congressional Record, October 11, 1979, p. S14407. 6 Most recently, John Lehman, Chairman of the defense panel of the Republican National Committee, u rged a real growth of 20 percent in defense spending for E'Y 1981, as a first stepl$oward correcting the shortfall problem of the previous decade.

Lehman testified before the Senate Budget Committee that an add-on of 30 billion is needed in FY 1981 "if we are to move to close defense gaps. Therefore, significant bi-partisan agreement exists on the need to redress the deterioration of the Soviet-U.S military balance through increased defense expenditure.

However, due to the current economic crisis and the n eed to restrain the growth in federal spending and balance the budget it is unlikely that major increases in defense will be made this year. Defense has already become a prime presidential target for budgetary restraint.

President Carter stated in his March 14 message to the Congress that the Defense Department will not be immune from budget austerity. In particular I will require that department to makp8savings that do not affect adversely our military prepared ness.

All the President has promised is tha t he will not cut U.S defense spending programs any further: he has not committed himself to redressing the impending U.S.-Soviet military imbalance through additional military procurement. Moreover, the recent actions taken by the congressional budget co m mittees, unless corrected, make it unlikely that any attempt will be made up for this year to begin to compensate for the shortfalls that collected in previous years Budget Committee Action The House Budget Committee,has marked up the EY 1981 First Concur r ent Budget Resolution, which is some $1 billion lower in budget authority than the Administration's revised $161.8 billion budget request. According to budgetary procedure, the House Armed Services Committee submitted a recommendation to the House Budget Committee that defgnse budget authority for EY 1981 be raised by $13.5 billion The Armed Services Committee's recom mendations were presented based upon what it considered would be minimally acceptable to meet U.S. national security requirements.

However, the House Budget Committee rejected efforts to increase the budget authority for EY 1981 to that level (see Table One and also defeated two other relatively modest amendments to increase FY 1981 defense budget authority. Indeed, Budget Commit tee Chairman Giaimo's proposed defense mark-up was passed intact 17. William Kucewicz How 'Real' Is the Defense Increase Wall Street Journal 18 19. Charles Corddrey 13.5 Billion Boost Urged in Defense Budget Baltimore January 29, 1980 Text of President Carter's Statem e nt on the Nation's Economy New York Times, March 15, 1980, p.34 Sun, March 8, 1980, p. 6. 7 as efforts by liberal Democrats to decrease the mark-up stage were also defeated TABLE I House Budget Committee Votes March.20 Amendments to Raise/Lower Defense Ce i ling in billions FY 1981 $1 Increase, Increase Author Budget Authority Outlays Holt Simon Rudd Obey Obey Obey Obey Hol tzman Holt 13.000 465 1.500 300 300 220 075 150 7.650 4.500 325 500 150 050 150 075 150 7.050 Note: before number means reduction was pr o posed Vote defeated, defeated, defeated, defeated, defeated defeated, defeated defeated defeated voice 10-15 voice 8-17 8-17 voice 7-16 voice 8-17 On April 1, the Senate Budget Committee marked-up the defense function of the FY 1981 First Concurrent Budge t Resolution. By a 10-8 vote, the committee surprisingly passed the ceiling proposed by Senator Ernest Hollings (D-S.C which called for a $174.0 billion ceiling for defense budget authority and.a $156.3 billion ceiling in defense outlays. Earlier the commi t tee defeated a ceiling proposed by Senator Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) that would have accepted the defense budget ceilings recommended by the Senate Armed Services Committee 176.5 billion in budget authority and 157.0 billion in outlays). It also resoundingly x e jected the ceiling proposed by Senator Joseph Biden (D-Del which would accept the revised defense budget ceiling proposed by the Admini stration of $164.2 billion in budget authority and $151.1 billion in outlays Author Hatch Chiles/Johnston Riegle Biden H o 11 ing s Senate Budget Committee Votes-April 1 Defense Marks for FY 1981 in order of vote Billions of Budget Authority Out lays 176.5 $157.0 169.0 154.0 163.1 $150.2 164.2 $151.1 174.0 $156.3 Vote defeated, 6-12 defeated, 4-14 defeated, 2-16 defeated, 3 - 15 approved, 10-8 8 Comparative Marks Body House Senate Difference Budget Authority 160.8 173.4 12.6 Outlays 147.9 155.7 7.6 less $600 millionin committee reductions made by decreasing operating and administrative expenses in the Department of Defense Ana l ysis The implications of the budget committees actions are twofold. First, both committees did not accept the defense budget ceilings recommended by the Armed Services Committees although the Hollings numbers come close) as necessary to meet U.S. national security requirements. In particular, the House mark is some 13.5 billion short of what the House Armed Services Committee recommended. Secondly, the wide discrepancy between the House and Senate Budget Committee ceilings for defense creates the distinct p ossibility that, unless the House defense budget ceiling is significantly increased during floor debate on the First Concurrent Budget Resolution, the House-Senate conference report that must be adopted by May 15 will have defense budget ceilings substant i ally lower than the Hollings ceilings approved by the Senate Budget Committee In point of fact, the House-Senate conference report may more closely resemble the defense budget ceiling proposed by the Administration (and offered by Senator Biden if this do es occur one that the Senate Budget Committee defeated by a 15-3 vote, and is deemed inadequate by both Armed Services committees in this Congress.

If such a scenario, or a similar one does come into being it could set the stage for another Senate floor fi ght over the binding defense ceilings in the Second Concurrent Budget Resolu tion similar to what happened last fall, when Senator Hollings proposed an amendment to raise the defense budget ceiling to provide for 3 percent real growth in FY 1980 and 5 per cent real growth in FY 1981 and 19

82. With the inevitable political infight ing and horse-trading that certainly would accompany such a debate, Congress may lose sight of the important issue before it how to gauge what is needed to correct deficiencies in the U.S. military posture and reverse the adverse military trends that have accrued in recent years, and may instead focus primarily on the numbers themselves, without relating them to our overall defense posture. For these reasons it is appropriate that an outside assessment of how much additional defense spending is required to achieve these objectives be presented to Congress.

While such an assessment may be n either politically feasible or acceptable at this time, it nonetheless will serve to educate Congress and the public as to the extent to which the U.S. mili tary posture has eroded. 9 AN ALTERNATIVE DEFENSE PROGRAM In the past two years, and more particul a rly in the past two months, numerous groups and individuals have focused attention on precisely what kind of alternative defense program is necessary to cope adequately with 95 growing military imbalance between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. They have covered a variety of military areas: strategic programs, naval programs and personnel problems. This alternative defense program is presented in an effort to bring together many of the specific programs that have been recommended over this period into a single co ncise format.

The alternative programs recommended here for Fy 1981 are suggested based upon an assumption that if Congress is serious about redressing the military imbalance, this is what it would have to consider in terms of additional defense programs t o reverse current adverse military trends. Therefore, this program reflects an optimal defense posture one geared toward reversing adverse military trends caused by the chronic neglect of U.S military force modernization.

However, many in Congress will undoubtedly point to the need to maintain current levels of social spending as justification for refusing to adopt an optimal defense posture at this time.

Politically, this appears to be the most likely outcome of the defense budget debate this year progra ms calling for major increases in defense investment have surfaced this session of Congress, it is unlikely given presiden tial opposition that increases of much more than those recom mended by the Armed Services committees could be obtained this year, ba r ring unforeseen international circumstances For although alternative defense However, Congress should be alerted as to the potential consequences that such actions will have on the U.S. military posture that will have to be made concerning the need to mak e up for past budget shortfalls, it cannot delay that decision indefinitely.

The uneasy choice of substantially increasing U.S. defense invest ment (as opposed to the marginal increases that may be granted in FY 1981 and all that that implies for the struc ture of the non-defense portion of.the federal budget, and perhaps even the condition of the economy, in years to come must be consciously weighed against the very real possibility that without the For while Congress. can choose to delay the hard decision s 19. See "Defense Program Alternatives Record, March 1980, pp. 1-3; Senator Gordon Humphrey Minimum Acceptable American Defense Program Congressional Record, January 23, 1980, p.

S290; Hollings statement of September 18, 1980 in Congressional Record Septe mber 19, 1979, pp. S12833-S12834; William R. Van Cleave and W. Scott FY 1981 and Beyond National Security Thompson eds.) Strategic Options for the Early Eighties Done New York: National Strategy Information Center, 1979 This What Can Be paper incorporates many of the recommendations outlined in these proposals. 10 adoption of marq of the strategic ani! conventional military modernization programs to be recommecded here, the U.S. may slide into a position of irrevocable military inferiority relative to the S oviet Union by the latter half of the 1980s will continue to face the United States in the early 1980s: it cannot be avoided, but only postponed This decision The imperative need to restrain federal spending and balance the budget must be addressed in its proper context one in which U.S. defense investment has been cut back from 8.5 percent of the GNP in 1970 to a little over 5.0 percent in 1980 and the decreas ing share that defense has on total federal expenditure. Congress is faced with a crucial decisi on this year. The defense program alternatives presented here are meant to alert Congress to the military problems facing the nation, and provide an added perspec tive from which to analyze the FY 1981 budget, and make these decisions.

PROGRAM RECOMMENDATI ONS Strategic President Carter's strategic program planning has greatly contributed to the impending strategic "window of vulnerabilityt1 that the U.S. will experience in the early-to-mid 1980s. As the following table indicates, the Carter Administration' s program planning in the strategic and theater nuclear area has both delayed the time at which essential strategic programs were due to come on-line, and also abandoned programs deemed necessary to maintain essential strategic equivalence TABLE I1 Compari s on Ford v. Carter Administration Strategic Program Planning Dates of Initial Operating Capability (IOC Carter Program Ford Mx late FY 1983 B- 1 FY 1979 Trident Submarine September 1979 ALCM 1981 GLCM FY 1980 SLCM FY 1980 July 1986 Cancelled August 1981 De c ember 1982 December 1983 1982 Sources: DOD Annual Report, N 1978, pp. 131, 134-136; Congressional Record October-11, 1979 p. S14406; DOD Annual Report, FY 1981, pp. 130-131 133, 147 11 The continuing modernization of Soviet strategic forces, and their thr e at to U.S. strategic retaliatory.capabilities is well known. Therefore, only new strategic programs initiated now could possibly close the strategic window of vulnerability. The programs recommended here are formulated to contribute to that end 1 2 3 4 5 6 They would include Proqram Redeployment of up to 200 Minuteman I11 missiles in a multiple vertical protective structure (MVPS) mode.

Objective Reduce U.S. ICBM vulnerability before the MX becomes operational.

Cost 1.5 billion for FY 1981.

Program Acceleration of the initial operating capability of the MX missile.from 1986 to 1985; 1984 if feasible.

Redeploy at existing M.inuteman fields in the 200 MVPS silos constructed earlier.

Objective Reduce U.S. strategic ltwindow of vulnerability.It Cost 200 million for EY 1981.

Program Production of a penetrating bomber; either FB 111 Ifstretchtf or preferably modified subsonic B-1 for use in a variety of roles (bomber, ALCM-carrier, etc Objective General Richard Ellis has stated that such a follow-on strategic penetrator to the B-52 would Ithelp to correct the serious decline in U.S. retaliatory capability between now and 1985 Cost 1..0 billion.

Program Inland rebasing of U.S. bombers.

Objective Improve U.S. bomber survivability from Soviet depressed trajectory SLBM attack Cost 200 million.

Program Increase alert rates of bomber crews.

Objective Improve U.S. bomber survivability Cost 600 million.

Program Conversion of five Polaris SSBNs to sea-launched cruise missiles with missiles.

Objective Extend lifetime of Polaris force (scheduled for phase-out after EY 1981); provide for increased theater nuclear capability.

Cost 300 million. 12 7. Program Acceleration of initial operating capability of entire SLCM force by two to three months.

Objective Early deployment of Polaris and U.S. surface ships as a response against Soviet theater nuclear threat in Europe.

Cost 200 million additional funding for hard-site (LOADS) low altitude air defense and homing-overlay interception 8. Proqram Ballistic Missile Defense Program, including Objective Obtain an ABM breakout capability.

Cost 1.0 billion 9. Program Hiqh Energy Laser Programs Objective Provide production infrastructure for the high energy laser program for ballistic missile defense.

Cost 200 million 10 Program Space Defense Programs Objective Eventual testing and development of an anti satellite (ASAT) capability.

Cost 500 million 11. Proqram Civil Defense Program Objective Pass Skelton Civil Defense Bill providing for enhanced civil defense program for FY 1981-1985 Cost 180 million in FY 1981 12. Program Trident Programs Procure another Trident SSBN and another 24 Trident I missiles, and increase Trident I1 missile R and D; and maintain through FY 1982 Objective Prevent drawdown in U .S. SLBM force levels as Polaris force is being phased out as SSBNs Cost Trident SSBN 1.25 billion; 24 Trident I missiles 300 million; increase in Trident I1 missile R & D by $250 million. Total 1.8 billion 13. Program Command, Communications and Control M odernization Improvements Objective Improve U.S. early warning systems: procure additional TACAMO aircraft for SSBN communications; go to 13 full-scale development of extremely low frequency ELF/Seafarer system to prevent SSBN force from having to rise Sl ose to water surface to communicate. Increase present C budget to 1.5 billion; incorporate Hollings program presented during FY 1980 Second Concurrent Budget Resolution floor debate cost 1.0 billion.

Specific Funding ECX TACAMO ai rcraft R&D 50-$100 million ELF/Seafarer 40 million in FY 1981 400 million through FY 1986 TABLE I11 I1 New Strategic Programs Estimated cost In billions Minuteman III/MVPS MX-IOC Acceleration Penetrating Bomber Bomber Rebasing Bomber Alert Rates SLCM Conv e rsion-5 Polaris SLCM IOC Acceleration BMD Programs Space Defense Civil Defense HEL-LASER ABM System 1.5 2 1.0 2 6 3 2 1.0 5 .2 2 T ident Programs 1.8 1.0 C -warning/TACAMO/ELF-Seafarer Estimated Additional Cost 8.7 5 GENERAL PURPOSE/THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES Table IV contrasts the procurement program of the Carter Administration for selected, major general purpose and theater budget See p. 17) .The approximate cost differential is $14 forces, naval aircraft, air force aircraft, airlift and NATO conventional a n d theater nuclear forces nuclear forces with that of the optimal alternative defense billion. The five areas to be discussed here include naval NAVY The U.S. should base future naval planning upon the objective of eventually obtaining a 600-700 ship navy. In EY 1981, the U.S. should procure 1. One Nimitz class (CVN) nuclear aircraft carrier.

Objective Provide for Indian Ocean deployment: U.S currently has only 12 active carriers; large-deck carrier 14 2 3 4 1 2 also needed for increased power projection capability in high-intensity areas.

Cost 2.1 billion.

CVN Task Force Objective Provide close-in defense of CVN carriers.

Cost 2 CG-47 cruisers $1.6 billion 2 DDG-963 destroyers .7 billion 2 FFG- Frigates .5 billion Tota'l $2.8 billion 3 more SSN-688 Attack Submarines Objective 3 to 5 needed yearly to protect sea lanes and sea-based nuclear deterrent; only one in budget.

Cost 1.5 billion 2 more LSD-41 Landing Craft (from 1 to 3 Objective Increase amphibious landing capabilities; U.S capability to successfully launch an amphibious assault has been badly eroded.

Cost 680 million AIRCRAFT The naval and air force fighter aircraft procurement programs need to be increased. The slowdown in fighter procurement will delay the modernization of U.S. fighter aircraft and also increase costs. The Navy Department needs 160-200 new fighter/attack aircraft just to make up for peacetime attrition only 72 are requested in the FY 1981 budget.

NAVAL AIRCRAFT F-14 Increase procurement from 24 to 48 Objective = Administration slowed rate from 3 to 2 per month in FY 1980; cost savings with higher production rate are approximately $1.5 million per aircraft.

Cost 700 million F-18 Increase procurement from 48 to 72.

Objective Restore to original level; reduction adds $4.5 million in aircraft cost.

Cost 850 million.' 15 3 1 2 3 4 AV-8B Begin R and D funding and advanced procurement.

Objective USMC needs high-performance fighters. Begin major AV-8B procurement program in FY 19

82. GAO says AV-8B cost growth is Ifattributable to.inflation resulting delays in the AV-8B program.

Cost 333 million 243 million in R and D 90 million in advanced procurement.

AIR FORCE AIRCRAFT F-15 Increase procurement from 30 to 60.

Objective Faster replacement of 1950s vintage F-101s and F-106s. Keep production line open beyond 1982; add to Reserve units. Administration cut quantity originally projected to be procured Cost 870 million.

F-16s Increase procurement from 180 to 240 Objective Faster replacement of F-101s and F-106s Cost 640 million.

A-10 Increase procurement from 60 to 144.

Objective Maintain procurement level of past two fiscal years Cost 700 million.

E-3A (AWACS Increase Objective Five needed capabilities procurement from 2 to 5 to improve U.S. warning and control Cost 400 million.

AIRLIFT Programs Uplift existing military transport aircraft and tankers.

Objective Rapidly improve U.S. strategic cargo airlift capability for both NATO and non-NATO areas over the next few years; eliminate the proposed five- year, $6 billion CX program from the FY 1981-85 plan cost 1) Procure 8 C-130 transports (none in FY 1981 budget 80 million. 16 2) Procure another 7 CRAF (Civilian Reserve Air Fleet) transports 80 million 3) Re-engine current CS-As suggested initial cost - $200 million; accelerate throughout five-year plan 4) Increase KC-10 tankers procurement from 6 to 20 800 million 5) Increase procurement re-engined KC-135 tankers from 1 to 3 90 million.

Reduction 1) Eliminate $80 million in R and D for the CX transport; CX will.not be operational until 1985 1 the U.S. military mobility problem is near-term. House Armed Services Committee has voted 22-17 not to fund CX.

Added Cost 1.150 billion Less $80 million CX R&D 80 million NATO: CONVENTIONAL AND THEATER NUCLEAR FORC ES The military balance in central Europe has deteriorated so rapidly that many military experts believe that the Warsaw Pact could overrun NATO defenses within a few days. Across-the-board increases in procurement of additional tracked combat vehicles an ti-tank weapons, air defense missiles and theater nuclear forces are needed to restore some semblance of a military balance in 1 1 2 3 4 central Europe.

Tracked Combat Vehicles Program Add 800-1,000 additional tracked combat vechicles to U.S. inventory.

Objective Increase U.S. firepower and cross-country mobility in central Europe; U.S. currently outgunned by 4-5:l in tanks and over 2:l in armored fighting vehicles by U.S.S.R Estimated Cost 1.0 billion.

Major Systems XM-1 tank: increase from 569 to 900; cost: $550 million FVS fighting vehicle system: increase from 400 to 600 cost: $262 million.

Other Systems M548 ammo/logistics carrier: increase from 272 to 408 cost: $18 million M113A2 armored personnel carrier cost: $4.7 million increase from 42 to 84 17 I 5 6 7 M109 mi 1 1 M728 A2/A3 howitzer: increase from 36 to 108; cost 40 on. 136 were procured in FY 79; 96 in FY 1980 Combat Engineer Vehicle: increase from 0 to FY 1980 level of 56; cost 60 million.

M88A1 Medium Recovery Vehicle (only vehicle capable of limited, on-site battlefield repair increase from 175 to 260; cost 65 million.

Anti-Tank Missiles Proqram TOW (BGM=71A, BTM-71A) anti-tank missile. Increase from 12,000 to 24,000.

Objective Procurement amount for TOW severely underfunded compared to Soviet T-72 threat. It should be doubled.

Cost 100 million.

Air Defense Missiles Programs 1) Patriot Increase from 183 to 240 2) Roland Increase from 600 to 800.

Objective One of NATO's most acknowledge d weaknesses is rear area missile defense. Need to increase procurement of both Patriot and Roland to obtain a credible, high-low altitude, all-weather air defense for NATO Cost Patriot 180 million; Roland 140 million; Total 300-320 million.

Theater Nuclear Forces Programs 1) Ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM); Accele rate procurement from 11 to 60.

Objective Improve U.S. SALT negotiating position hedge against failure of SALT for early deployment in Western Europe.

Cost 800 million 2) Pershing I1 Research and Development Increase R&D funding from $146 to $300 million.

Objective Accelerate program for possible early deployment of Pershing I1 IRBM in Western Europe as part of U.S. theater nuclear force modernization program.

Cost si54 million. I 18 TA BLE IV MAJOR PROGRAMS ESTIMATED ITEMIZED COST COMPARISON CARTER v. ALTERNATIVE FISCAL 1981 BUDGET In billions of FY 1981 I1 GPF (General Purpose Forces) and Carter M 1981 Alternative N 1981 Estimated TNF (Theater Nuclear Forces Line Item Quantity Cost* Qu a ntity cost NAVY Nimitz Class CVN CG-47 Aegis DDG-963 Destroyer FFG Frigates LSD-41 SSN-688 NAVAL AIRCRAFT F-14 F-18 AV-8B (Marines RDTsrE advanced procurement AIR FORCE AIRCRAFT F- 15 F-16 E-3A A- 10 AIRLIFT CRAF Conversions KC-10 CX R&D re-engined KC-135 re-engine C5-A C-130 NATO XM-1 Tank FVS armored vehicle M 548 ammo carrier M 113A2 armored personnel carrier M 109 A2/A3 howitzer M 728 Combat Engineer Vehicle M 88A1 Medium Recovery Vehicle TOW anti-tank missile Roland Air. Def.

Patriot Air Def. Msl 1 1.630 4 2 1.100 6 342 3 .602 4 804 48 1.752 72 870 60 1.920 240 326 5 .507 144 1.150 538 .036 .005 020 130 .loo .424 .541 900 600 408 84 108 56 260 24,000 800 240 2.100 3.200 700 1.600 1.020 2.100 1.500 2.600 333 1.740 2.560 726 1.2 0 0 160 1.100 150 loo 080 1.700 800 054 010 060 .060 .200 200 560 720 19 GLCM procurement 11 .188 60 1.000 300 Pershing I1 RsrD Total 14.659 28.633 146 Estimated Cost Differential 14-15 billion includes procurement, spares, RDT&E and costs of military const r uction Other Cateqories Table V charts the projected additional costs of the procure ment add-ons recommended here plus additions in five other areas 1. Pay and Personnel Costs: If Congress is likely to restrain budget growth in any one area of the defens e budget, it is likely to be personnel compensation. However, as former Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird noted, the present compensa tion for the All-Volunteer Force is nothing less than Itdeplor able Laird has recommended ten military pay initiatives 120 designed to provide U.S. military personnel "with a quality of life commensurate with the sacrifices we demand of them.

Unless Congress is serious about reconsidering the all volunteer concept at this time, the Laird recommendations should be given keen c onsideration. It should also seriously consider reforms of the all-voluntary army, including longer terms of enlistment and multi-year training, to prevent many of the current AVF compensation and retention problems from occurring again. Ideally, most of t he Laird recommendations should be one-time investments. The following four Laird recommendations are suggested here cost Restoration of Compensation Comparability 5 billion Objective: Restore military pay to real income 1972 levels. Military pay has decl ined in real terms by 14 percent since 1972.

Indexing military pay to CPI 500 Objective: Protect purchasing power of $750 million active duty personnel Laird gives 750 million as 100 percent figure some might prefer adjustment to 85 percent of CPI Special Skill Pay 2 billion Objective: Retain enlisted and officers 20. Melvin Laird People, Not Hardware: The Highest Defense Priority,"

American Enterprise Institute Special Analysis, No. 80-1, 1980, pp 16-19. 20 ratings where "severe shortfallsll are experienced D) Variable Housing Allowance; Moving Expense 2 billion Increase.

Objective: Key housing allowances to local area prices; reimburse military families for full cost of moving expenses.

Approximate Total $9.75 billion 2. Ammunition Increase Objective: Provide additional war stock to improve U.S ability to fight 1% war strategy.

Cost: $5.0 billion 3. Family Housing: Increase for repair and construction costs.

Objective: No new funds for housing construction were appropriated in FY 1980; earmark majority of increase for new housing construction cost 300 million 4. Other Military Construction Objective: Reduce DOD backlog in property construction and repair work of some $2 billion. Failure to increase above current level will cause continued deterioration of work not repaired. Increase could be held down by repealing prevail ing wage requirements of Davis-Bacon Act for military con struction and repair work. Actual decrease military con struction from FY 1979 to 1980 of over $200 million.

Cost 500 million 5. Operations and Maintenance Objective: Administration has already raised FY 1981 OM account by $3.0 billion, due to higher fuel costs. Another 2.0-3.0 billion should be added for additional costs of material maintenance and spare parts Cost 2.0 3.0 bill i on TABLE V PROJECTED ADDITIONAL COST DEFENSE FUNDING FOR FY1981 in billions FY1981 Category cost Strategic Programs General Purpose 8.75 14.00-15.00 21 Pay and Personnel Ammunition, Spare Parts Housing Other Military Construction 9.75 5.00 30 50 Operation s and Maintenance 2.00-3.00 Estimated Range of Add-ons 40.00-42.00 SUMMARY Redressing the U.S.-Soviet military imbalance, alleviating the military compensation problem, replenishing U.S. war stocks and providing for increases in U.S. operational readiness w ill be an expensive undertaking. If Congress is serious about turning this untenable military situation around, it must take cognizance of the fact that unless a major modernization of U.S. military forces is made now, only two grim prospects exist: the t i me will come when national securi,ty will require that many of the additions recommended here will have to be made, at which time the cost of such military force modernization will be even higher; or the U.S. is prepared to accept this situation as is, an d thereby risk the possibility of being the military inferior across-the-board of the Soviet Union for the remainder of the 1980s and suffer the adverse political and military consequences that inevitably will emerge from such a position.

Near-term politic al realities, based as they often are on what is feasible from a narrow domestic political perspective should not obscure from congressional view the potential implica tions that failing to reverse current adverse military trends will have on the long-ter m U.S. posture in the world. Clearly it does not now appear that this Congress or Administration will allow for the necessary defense investment required to accomplish this overhaul this year. That is not the sole.important question however. What is also i m portant is that the effort be made to begin the process and an analysis of the Administration's program and the probable outcome of the defense budget debate in Congress this year indicates that the prospects for initiating such action does not appear to be promising.

If Congress refuses to devote additional budgetary resources to defense this year and also fails to make up for the large spending shortfalls that have accrued over the past in future years it must accept the implications that such a decision will entail for the U.S. for the rest of the decade.

The responsibility for the current military procurement problem is shared by Democrats and Republicans alike. It can begin to be solved by them too, if a decision is made to base the U.S. defense progr am upon military requirements, rather than arbitrary budget ceilings. These are unusual times; this program is a response to these times. In ten short years, the U.S strategic retaliatory force has become highly vulnerable, the U.S. Navy has been cut in h a lf, the conventional balance has 22 significantly deteriorated in central Europe, and mobility forces that are severely constrained in their capabilities. The U.S should heed the warnings of senior military officials referred to earlier in this exercise. For these reasons, the Congress should closely consider this, and all alternative defense programs, that it has before it this fiscal year.

Wayne A. Schroeder Editor, National Security Record

About the Author