August 9, 1978 | Backgrounder on Africa
62 August 9, 1978 RHODESIA IN TRA MSI TION i INTRODUCTION On March 3, 1978, the Rhodesian government, represented by Prime Minister Ian Smith, reached an agreement with.three nation alist leaders for a transition to constitutional majority rule.
This agreement, which has since become known as the Internal Set tlement, included Bishop Abel Mu zorewa, the Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole, and Chief Jeremiah Chirau, representing respectively the United African National Council, the African National Council and the Zimbabwe United Peoples Organization (ZUPO The tribal blocs represented by these leader s , plus the white minority led by Smith, represent together about 80 percent of the population of Rhodesia. The leaders of the Patriotic Front (PF Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo, did not support the Internal Settlement on the grounds that it perpetuated wh i te minority control. The Internal Settlement did not exclude the guerrillas of the Patriotic Front but the signatories insisted that they lay down their arms before participating. On July 26, 1978, the Rhodesian government announced that elections would b e held on December 4 through the 6th.
Nor did the governments of the United States and Great Bri tain accept the Internal Settlement, on the grounds that a set tlement that did not include the forces of the PF could not work.
Furthermore, as State Department spokesman John Trattner stated after the conclusion of the Internal Settlement The Salisbury regime is an illegal regime.
Therefore administrative arrangements it makes of that kind we are talking about 2 are also illegal Quoted in Con ressional Recor d, June 28, 1978, p. s9 The policy of the Carter Administration, vigorously defended by Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Richard Moose and by U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Andrew Young, has become the center of controversy to enfor c e economic sanctions against Rhodesia and does not recog nize its government, but continues at the same time to give eco nomic aid and external recognition to African states that are actively engaged in support of the guerrillas and terrorists oper ating a gainst the Rhodesian government. At the same time, these states are themselves ruled by one-party, often pro-Marxist regimes and are far less motivated to establish democratic pro cedures or to protect human rights than the cosigners of the Internal Settl e ment appear to be, though the Carter Administra tion continues to assert the importance of human rights to its foreign policy. The apparently contradictory policies of the Administration have stimulated the controversy over Rhodesia, as have other factors . The economic and strategic importance of Rhodesia not only to the U.S.,but also to the rest of Africa the threat of intensified Soviet and Cuban involvement in Rhodesia as ,in Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia in the recent past), the escalation of terror i st violence since the Internal Settlement and the hope at last of a peaceful transition to majority rule with a consensus of both blacks and whites: 'all these have caused the policies of the Administration to come under serious scrutiny from those who se e k a peaceful resolution of the Rho desian crisis A review of these policies, the prospects of the Internal Settlement itself, and of the alternatives now before Rhodesia.and the United States are examined in the following pages The Administration 'continu e s WHAT IS AT STAKE'IN RHODESIA The protracted controversy over the future government of Rhodesia derives from a growing awareness in the West of the importance of southern Africa in the future of mankind. Not only questions of human rights and the future o f democracy are at stake, but also very material issues relating to international security and vital economic resources A brief discussion of some of these issues and their relationship to US policies is aFpropriate 1) Human Rights and Democracy: The emer g ence of national ist movements and of profound interest in combatting racialist policies underlie much of the concern for the future of Rhodesia in the US. It seems to be primarily the desire to see racial equality and majority rule in Rhodesia that anima t es the Carter Administration and the policies of British Foreign Secretary David Owen. Comparisons are frequently made between the struggles 3 for racial equality in Africa and the civil rights movement in the US, and Andrew Young has stated that he has a p plied lessons he learned in the civil rights movement to his diplomacy in Africa. Others, no less concerned to bring about a reduction of racial injustice and the promotion of democracy, argue that this analogy is not entirely valid: that whereas US black s have tended to act as a bloc for progress in civil rights, Afrikan blacks axe more split up into tribal, national, and ideological categories and do not always exhibit concern for civil liber ties. To think of African movements as similar in aspirations o r composition to American black movements is therefore mis leading and potentially dangerous 2) International Complications Africa: The neighbors of Rhodesia have lons had an important stake in the outcome of its internal arrangements terest in seeing a b l ack government come to power there, if only because their own nationalist ideologies and propaganda demand this. The five Front-Line states (Zambia, Angola, Mozam bique, Botswana, and Tanzania however, have more material interests in Rhodesia. The install a tion of a black government in Salisbury friendly to Zambia or Mozambique (the two princi pal African supporters of the Patriotic Front) could result in economic or.territoria1 concessions-'to those states The pros pects of such rewards could lead to Rhode s ia being .turned into a war zone in which competing states support rival guerrilla factions in a violent scramble for Rhodesian resources. South Africa, on the.other hand, as the only other white-ruled nation in southern Africa, has a clear interest in pr e venting this development and in assuring an orderly transition to majority rule. It is for this reason that Prime Minister Vorster has thus far tacitly supported the March Settlement and has refused to endorse the Anglo-American Plan previously put forwar d by Mr. Owen and Ambassador Young. Furthermore, the South African right-wing critics of Vorster, who oppase any compromise leading to a share of power with the blacks, can point to the Carter Administration's policy as a justification of their view that t h e US opposes a moderate settlement. There is thus an extrem ist element in South Africa that rejects the Internal Settlement and applauds the US policies as much as the black states on Rhodesia's borders. The failure to establish a moderate multi from mov i ng further away from apartheid The- black-ruled states have an in- racial government in Salisbury would discourage South Africa 3) International Complications The Great Powers: Both the US and the USSR have interests in Rhodesia and in southern Africa in general. As former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger stated recently, the US undertook a role in Rhodesia precisely because of the concern over a great power confrontation. Dr.
Kissinger told the Hearst Newspapers that, with the collapse of the Portuguese empire in Africa the entire strategic situationc. 5 A 4 in' Southern Africa changed. I' Rhodesia bec'ame vulnerable to guerrilla attacks from neighboring Mozambique. When the US Congress failed to give arms for the pro-western factions in Angola, the Sov iet Union found an open field for'its own opera tions and the Cuban troops it sponsored.
Since 1975, the Soviets have increased their aid and'rela tions enormously to a number of African states, most notably to Angola, Moz'ambique, Ethiopia and to SWAP0 in Southwest Africa Namibia). Cuba now has over 45,000 troops in 13 African countries and East Germans have also been reported to be present. The guer rillas of Nkomo's Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) and Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union (ZAN U ) are openly trained by Cubans in Zambia and Mozambique and receive Soviet weaponry and assistance. In an interview with Newsweek (March 13, 1978, p. 451 Joshua Nkomo stated that "We have been receiving all necessary help from the socialist countries, the Soviet Union as well as Cuba It is arms, ammunition and things like that." When asked if there was a danger of war in Rhodesia similar to ,the."savage war in the Horn of Africa Nkomo replied I am afraid so, yes.
Things are taking a very dangerous turn."
It has. been the direct aid of the Soviets and Cubans that has enabled the guerrillas to continue and esca1ate.thei.r war fare, but the United States and Great Britain give no aid economic or military, to Rhodesia-and continue to.enforce the UN sanctions against trade with Rhodesia. At the same time, the US is actually providing assistance to the front-line states that sponsor the guerrillas and terrorists in Rhodesia.
A dilemria to which the policy of the Carter Administration leads is that, at the same t ime it is protesting Soviet and Cuban intervention in other parts of Africa, its policy toward Rhodesia is promoting conditions that encourage Soviet and Cuban intervention there also. The Administration is currently in sisting on the position that the Pa t riotic Front must be in volved in a settlement, but it is not insisting that the Frat lay down its arms, support the Internal Settlement of March 3 or renounce the assistance of the Soviets and Cubans. If the Rhodesian government were to support the Admin i stration posi tion and admit the guerrillas to either a share of power or as the Front itself demands) total power, it would find itself faced with an armed force supplied and supported by the Soviet Union and its surrogates 4) The Econoqic Resources of R h odesia: Still another reason why the future of Rhodesia is of vital concern is its large supply of economic and natural resources can be grouped into three categories: (a) the .economic base developed in Rhodesia b) the natural resources of Rhodesia, and T hese resources 5 c) the technical and managera1 infrastructure of the economy The following table gives some idea of the economic importance of Rhodesia's natural. resources to Africa and the world Production of Selected Minerals in Rhodesia As of Copper G old Chromite Nickel Asbestos Tungsten Antimony Corundum Free World Production 1973 1.0 1.5 10.0 2.5 Source: Walter F. Hahn and 3.0 Alvin J. Cottrell, Soviet 1.0 Shadow over Africa (Washington 05 DC: Center for Advanced Inter 79.0 national Studies, 19771, p . 36 It should also be pointed out that Rhodesia has 67.3 percent of the world supply,of metallurgical grade chromite, essential to the production of high grade steel in the US, Western Europe, and Japan has been imported duct increased from RhS682.9 mill ion in 1965 to RhS2680.8 million in 19
74. Its exports (principally tobacco, asbestos, copper, cloth ing meat, chromite, sugar, pig iron, and coal) increase d from RhS91.7 million in 1968 to RhS328.5 million in 1972 The present official exchange rate values RhS.71 at US$l It is clear that a protracted war (foreign or internal) or rigorously enforced sanctions could rapidly debilitate the Rho desian economy. A l though this would no doubt undermine the white minority, its direct effects would also be felt (and probably far more seriously) by the black majority. As employment fell, pro duction ceased, and the services provided declined, it would be the lower incom e and less well educated sectors of society that would bear the burden. Thewhites could relocate (although at great cost) in Britain, Eurppe, America, ot South Africa, but it is doubtful that the blacks could make such a transition as easily or as successf u lly. The indirect costs of economic regress would also be high, as these could involve polifical destabilization inflation, and migration. Ian Smith has publicly stated that the economic threats to' Rhodesia are of much greater concern to him than the mil i tary threats One hundred percent of the chromite According to the World Bank, Rhodesia's gross domestic pro The importance of Rhodesia to the world economy is not limited to the interests of the Western developed nations, however. Because of its superior t echnical and managerial infrastructure, and because many.states in Africa have been unsuccessful in dealing with their own economic development (e.g.8 Zaire, which owes Western banks $3 billion Rhodesia is crucial for the further development of southern A f rica 1 I THE EVOLUTION OF THE INTERNAL SETTLEMENT The agreement reached in Salisbury on March 3 reflects a 13 year process of conflict and negotiation among the Rhodesian gov ernment, the black nationalists, and the external powers of Africa and the West A lthough Rhodesia declared its independence on No vember 11, 1965, the policies of Great Britain, the United States and the United Nations have persistently refused to accept its white minority government as legitimate. UN sanctions have esca lated from a s elective ban on economic relations in 1966 to a to tal embargo in 1968, and an attempted resolution of the Security Council in 1970 to invoke the war-making powers of the UN against Rhodesia This resolution was vetoed by the United States, the first time i n history it exercised the veto power in the Security Council The United States has fluctuated in its support for the economic sanctions. President Johnson issued Executive Orders sup porting the sanctions and prohibiting US imports of Rhodesian goods and products in 1967 and 1968, but in 1971 these were reversed by the Byrd Amendment to the United Nations Participation Act of 1945, which permitted the importation of Rhodesian chrome into the US. The Byrd Amendment was itself repealed by Congress in 1977 a nd the sanctions are now being enforced.
These sanctions did not, in the event, seriously retard Rhodesia's economic growth or threaten its political stability'.
A far more serious threat to it derived from the independence of Portugue.se col-onies in southern Africa in 19
75. In Angola and Mozambique, Marxist one-party regimes came to power with the aid of Soviet and Cuban materials and personnel. The dominance of these factors was a direct threat to Rhodesia. Mozambique shares a border with Rhodesia and controls Rhodesia's closest access to the sea. It was in fact through Portuguese Mozambique that oil shipments had reached Rhodesia despite the UN sanctions Faced with these new hostile regimes, which now harbored and Smith aided Rhodesian nationalist an d revolutionary forces, the Smith government was obliged to seek compromises with the demands of its opponents within and the Western powers without its borders himself began talks with black nationalists, represented by Joshua Nkomo, in December, 1975, bu t in March,1976, Nkomo withdrew from these negotiations. US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger then sought to bring pressure on Rhodesia to accept a plan for a gradual transition to majority rule. This effort succeeded in forging a plan called the Kissinge r -Smith Plan, released on September 24 1976 In October, 1976, a Conference at Geneva between British UN Ambassador Ivor Richard, Ian Smith, and four Rhodesian nationalists convened to work out nationalist acceptance of the transition peri od of two years. T he nationalists (Nkomo, Mugabe, Muzorewa, and Sithole) rejected this concept and insisted on a transition period of twelve months. On this basis the talks at Geneva failed X 1 7 New efforts were made LIY the governments of the US and Great Britain to desi g n a plan acceptable to the nationalists, and ano ther plan was submitted in Salisbury on September 1, 1977, by British Foreign Secretary Owen and Ambassador Young. This, known as the "Anglo-American Plan," also called for a transitional gov ernment (of si x months) and provided outlines of the proposed constitutional settlement. The reaction to this plan from the na tionalists. as well as from the white minority was at best subdued.
Smith felt that the Anglo-American Plan (AAP) did not adequately protect th e white minority. He objected to giving a UN force re sponsibility for Rhodesian security and to the immense power for the Commissioner. He submitted a memorandum to the British gov ernment discussing the plan, but received no reply.
But the death blow to the AAP was actually dealt by Nkomo and Mugabe of the Patriotic Front. Meeting with Lord Carver, the proposed British Resident Commissioner, in Dar es Salaam on October 31, 1977, the two guerrilla leaders insisted that substantial power be handed over to them directly. They rejected the ideas of giving sole authority to the British Commissioner and of allowing security to be in the hands of the Rhodesian police and a UN Security Force.
They proposed the postponement of elections for three years, during wh ich time the leaders of.the Patriotic Front would try to bring other black leaders into the political structure. Originally intended to consist of two days of talks on reaching a ceasefire Lord Carver's meeting with Nkomo and Mugabe last d little more tha n an hour, and the ceasefire question never arose The Patriotic Front's demands were unacceptable to either Smith or black moderates who realized that Nkomo and Mugabe knew they lacked popular support among Rhodesian blacks and were there meeting, Smith fi n ally rejected the Anglo-American Plan and pro mised, on November 24, that he would begin discussions with black leaders within Rhodesia in order to reach an agreement on "majority rule based on adult suffrage,I' with safeguards for the white minor ity. Re p resentatives of all parties were invited to participate but Nkomo and Mugabe refused to attend After several months of discussion and bargaining, the nego tiators announced their agreement on March 3, 1978, but despite the consensus which Smith, Muzorewa, 4 itholer and Chirau reached, the reaction to the Internal Settlement was not favorable. Despite initial attempts of both the US and Great Britain to induce Mugabe and Nkomo to take part in further discussions, both leaders of the Front refused to do so. Th e y denounced the signatories as traitors and described the Settlement as a perpetuation of apartheid. On March 9, President Carter urged another meeting of all factions to fore opposed to elections. Three weeks after the Dar es Salaam try to settle their d ifferences, and on March il, Secretary Vance sought 1. The Economist, November 5, 1977, p. 91 2 Ibid November 26, 1977, p. 75.
I 8 to bring these factions to a conference. Nkomo and Mugabe, who had earlier rejected the Anglo-American Plan,.now stated that it was the only plan on which they were willing to hold discussions and remained firm in .their denunciation. of the Internal Settle ment.3 It is to be noted that the US did not try to persuade Nkomo and Mugabe to join.the Internal Settlement tary of Stat e Moose stated Assistant Secre They are concerned that we're trying to press them to join the internal settlement. We ex plained that we're simply frying to get all the parties together to find a formula involv ing all of them Washington Post, March 12 197 8 , p Al9 Bishop Muzorewa made a special trip to the United States to address the United Nations on the Internal Settlement, but was not allowed to speak before it. On March 14, the Security Council adopted a resolution that declared any settlement reached b y the illegal Rhodesian regime" to be itself "illegal and unacceptable and urged all nations to reject the settlement all-party conference. The Reverend Sithole and Bishop Muzorewa felt that such a meeting would be an act of weakness and would undermine c o nfidence in the Internal Settlement. They pointed out that it would make little sense for them to ask the guerrillas of the Patriotic Front to lay down arms at the same time that they would be meeting with the leaders of the guerrillas. Following the refu sal, Secretaries Vance and Owen told the signatories that there was no chance for recognition of the Internal Settlement until free elections were held with substantial black turnouts.
This statement gave further incentive to the Patriotic Front to resist the Internal Settlement and to escalate the war in order to undermine the electoral process and to prevent black partici pation in the elections To counteract this incentive, and in keeping with the terms of the Internal Settlement, the Rhodesian governme n t on May 2 offered unconditional amnesty to all guerrilas. The government declared The moderate black leaders in Rhodesia themselves refused an We stress once again that nobody is barred or excluded from the process. Those outside the country are free to r eturn and play their part under the amnesty, provided only that they come in peace Washington Post, May 3, 1978, p. Al 3. Washington Post, March 12, 1978, p. A19. 9 Meeting again in Dar es Salaam in April, Secretaries Vance and Owen were unable to promote any contpromise on the part of Nkomo and Mugabe. Although the leaders of the PF and the interim government tentatively agreed to further discussion, Nkomo and Mugabe insisted on a dominant role for themselves in a transition under the AAP,and the Rhodesia n government refused to renegotiate the Internal Settlement. What did emerge from these talks was the absolutely intransigent position of Nkomo and Mugabe insisted that they have a ma.jority in the transitional government that their guerrillas take over po l ice functions in Rhodesia and that heir forces should share military authority with any Mugabe was asked if he considered himself a Marxist They UN force.hi Interviewed in -yewsweek (March 20, 1978, p. 52 He replied Yes, I do. And this is because we hold t hat the best way in which you can organize your socio economic order is by taking the people and their interests into account the people as a people, and not as individuals. The resources that are in a country do not belong to indivi duals, to profiteers a nd to other fortune seeking individuals Asked if he would allow a multi-party system in Rhodesia after coming to power, Mugabekaid If our people opt for a one-party state, fine that will be it and I think that will be the order of the day If our people op t for a one-party state, fine that will be it and I think that will be the order of the day.
In a further interview with a Swedish reporter on April 16, Mugabe said he rejected the AAP's plan for a Commissioner with "absolute power" and that the PF "propos ed that it have eight representa tives in the ruling council" and that "the Smith regime's forces must be disarmed and our forces take their place."5 Ambassador Young later stated that he believed the Patriotic Front, the inclusion of which he was still s u pporting, was aiming at "personal power I Meanwhile the guerilla war in Rhodesia escalated. Prior to the March 3 Settlement the war cost an average of 8 lives per day; afterwards, it escalated to 15 per day. The Rhodesian government was spending Rh$1 mill ion per day on the war, but reported 5 or 6 guerrillas killed for every Rhodesian soldier.
By the beginning of April, 1,100 persons had been killed in the war since January 1; 600 of them were guerrillas and 114 were guerrilla collaborators. The security forces had lost 83 men.
There had been.24-,white civilian casualties. As of July 1, soon 4. .The Economist, April'22, 1978, p. 80 5. Foreign Broadcast Information Service: Sub-Saharan Africa, Daily.Report Annex, April 21, 1978, pp. E4 and E5. .e lo after t he massacre of 13 missionaries near Umtali by MugabeIs forces, the total number of whites killed throughout the war over 3,500; and 31 missionaries had been killed 4 was 172 and the total number of black civilians killed was These statistics, of course, d o not reflect the brutality of the guerrilla tactics As Rhodesian Defense Minister Roger Hawkins has stated, "nice people merely kill by shooting."
Reliable reports, including photographic evidence, show that conventional tactics of the guerrillas include beating to death mutilation of the face and sexual organs, forcible rape burning alive, and forced cannibalism. Mugabe, however, denies that his forces are responsible for these atrocities, and blames them on the Rhodesian security forces, an accusation w h ich recently had some tentative support from Andrew Young. However the evidence that anti-government forces are responsible is overwhelming and includes not only ballistic evidence but also the eye witness reports of the survivors in innumerable inci dent s . Furthermore, it is difficult to see what possible motive the Rhodesian Government would have to murder its own mission aries and supporters. The government has thus far closed down schools for 200,000 black children (15 of 62 primary schools and 12 of i t s secondary schools), three of its 40 hospitals six of its 149 missions, and one of its two teacher-training colleges. The closings affect the ability of the government to control the countryside, and the costs involved far outweigh whatever putative adva n tages the government might gain by the slaughter of its own supporters and missionaries. 6 ANALYSIS OF THE THREE PLANS The three plans thus far proposed for majority rule in Rhodesia are complicated and bear close scrutiny A common fea ture of all three i s that each one provides for a transitional government to usher in the era of majority rule, a plan for the post-transition constitution, and some measure of safeguards, either internal or international, for the protection of the white minor ity and the se c urity of the constitutional regime It will be useful to view these plans in terms of these categories A The Kissinger Smith Plan (KSP) (September 24, 1976 1. Transition: The KSP proposes a transition period of two years, as opposed to the Anglo-American P l an's AAP) six months and the Internal Settlement's IS) nine months (from March 3 to December 31, 1978 The KSP proposes that during these years 6. For the statistics on the war, see the following: To the Point International July 14, 1978, p. 8ff; Intellige nce Digest, April 26, 1978; The Economist April 1 and July 1, 1978, p. 54 and p. 58; Newsweek, July 3, 1978, p.
43. For a report on the terrorist atrocities with photographic evidence, see Robin Moore, "Tactics of Terrorism," Con servative Digest, May, 1978, p. 16ff. f 11 Rhodesia would be governed by a two-tier apparatus consisting of a Council of State and a Council of Ministers The former would consist of half black and half white members with a white chair man who would not ha v e a special vote. Its function would be to initiate legislation and to supervise the government and the drafting of the constitution. The Council of Ministers would consist of a majority of blacks and a black first minister and a white minority. The minis ters of Law and Defense (who control the police and security forces) would be white.
Ministers would have delegated legislative authority and executive responsibility,and would make decisions by a 2/3 majority The Council of The transition would be facilit ated by enabling legislation passed by the Rhodesian and British Parliaments. Once the interim government was established, sanctions would be lifted and all acts of war would cease, including guerrilla war. The Salisbury government's acceptance of the pla n was contingent upon these two conditions 2. Safe ards: The KSP proposed as safeguards an interna tional trust und established outside Rhodesia and intended to promote economic development and security in the country. This fund would insure that internati o nal contributors would have a vested interest in maintaining Rhodesian stability, and the fund would also underwrite pension rights, home and farm investments and overseas 'remittances of 3. Constitution: The no detailed proposals for a there. would be on e and that B The Anglo-American Plan individual resources.
KSP, unlike the AAP and the IS, made constitution other than to state that it would be based on majority rule AAP September 1, 1977 1. Transition: The AAP proposed a much simpler transition than th e other two plans. Quite simply, all power was to be vested in a Resident Commissioner appointed by and responsible to the British Government. The Commissioner, in whom "will be vested responsibility for all executive and legislative functions of the Gove r nment of Southern Rhodesia will himself be the legislature," will be commander in chief of all armed forces and the police forces, and will "exercise supervision and control over all Ministries and departments of government The Smith Government, as an ill e gal and rebellious regime, would have no legal existence or standing, though the Resident Commissioner would provide for the continuity of most members of the civil service and judiciary. A justiciable Bill of Rights, modelled on similar American, British and UN documents, would be proclaimed by the interim government and a Bill of Rights "on the lines" of this one would be retained in the constitution. However, the Resident Commissioner would have the authority to suspend the Bill of Rights during the tra n sition by declaring a public emergency begun and terminated sole on his own discretion. In sho.rt, the AAP proposed to establish a dictatorship as a transition government r A I 12 2. Safeguards: The AAP proposed safequards as cons sting of (a) a justiciab l e Bill of Rights and the constitutional struc ture with some reserved seats in the National Assembly; (b) a Zimbabwe Development Fund" to insure Rhodesian economic devel opment and security, to be managed by the World Bank and under written by internation a l contributors; (c) a UN security force during the transition which would supervise the ceasefire,.support the government, and conduct liaison with existing Rhodesian and guerrilla forces, and (d) a UN: special representative, appointed by the Secretary G e neral of the UN to observe the transitional administration of the Resident Commissioner and to certify the fairness of the elections 3. Constitution: Unlike the KSP, the AAP proposes a detailed constitution to be adopted by Rhodesia. Precisely who is to d r aft it or vote on it is not made clear, and the Plan notes that "It is impossible at this stage to lay down an exact timetable The AAP's constitution calls for a president as head of state and a presidentally appointed cabinet. The president will be elect e d by the endorsement of at least half the successful candidates as Elected Members of the National Assembly. The ministers of the cabinet will be drawn from the National Assembly and will be re sponsible to it. The president will be elected at the same ti me as the .National Assembly.
The National Assembly will be the legislature of Rhodesia it will be unicameral and elected by one-man, one vote (adult suffrage over 21) from single member constituencies. It will be able to override presidential veto by simp le majority vote and to force the resignation of the president by a vote of. no con fidence. The president however, may dissolve the National Assembly at any time and must do so if he refuses his assent to a bill twice submitted to him by Parliament. Ther e must be a general election at least once every five years and a session of the Assembly at least every year, and no more than six months between sessions.
The National Assembly will consist of two-kinds of members Elected Members and Specially Elected Members. Elected Members will be elected by the method described above and they will themselves elect 1/5 of their number as Specially Elected Members.
The purpose of these extra members is to represent "minority coinmunities How they will represent them is specifically left to further discussion, but whatever method is decided upon, it may not be altered until at least eight years after the adoption of the constitution Even though the Specially Elected Members are to represent minority communities, there i s no requirement that they be members of the minority groups themselves. I 13 i Under the AAP the constitut-on may de amended by different methods: some clauses by simple majority vote of the National Assembly; most provisions by a 2/3 majority vote of a31 members some, pertaining to citizenship and the Bill of Rights, by a 2/3 majority in two successive Parliaments; and some, pertaining to the Specially Elected Members, may not be amended at all until after the specified period.
C The Internal Settlement ( IS March 3, 1978 Y 1. Transition: The IS proposes a transition period of'nine months, and the interim government, which was established soon after the Agreement, consists of an Executive Council (EC) of all party leaders (Smith, Muzurewa, Sithole, and Chi r au) with a rotating Chir~nanShip, and a Ministerial Council (MC) of equal numbers of white and black ministers nominated by the heads of the negotiating parties. The EC, making decisions by consensus will supervise the government and the process of drafti n g the constitution. The chairmanship of the MC will also be rotating between black and white ministers, and black and white ministers will have coequal authority over their departments. The MC will make decisions by majority vote and will initiate legisla tion.
The Rhodesian Parliament will continue to exist but will meet only when summoned by the EC and only for specified purposes necessary to bas-ic government functions and to ratify the consti tution 2. Safeguards: Unlike the KSP and the AAP the safeguar ds of r j the IS are purely internal. These consist of the entrenched clauses of the constitution, the justiciable Bill of Rights, and tile independent judiciary and civil service 3. Constitution: The proposed constitution calls for "major ity rule on the basis of universal adult LEver 187 suffrage."
It establishes a Legislative Assembly of 100 meders, with 72 black members and 28 reserved seats for white members. A decla ration of rights, an independent judiciary and civil service, and continuity of pensi on rights and dual citizenship are all guaranteed 78 members, though on all other matters the legislative assembly will vote by simple majority rule An important and controversial part of the IS constitution is the arrangement for election of the members of the Assembly.
There will be, for the specified period, two voting rolls, the common roll and the preferential roll. All black and white voters will be on the common roll and only whites will be on the preferential roll. The common roll will elect the 72 black members of the assembly and the preferential roll will elect 20 of the 28 white members. The camon roll will also elect the other 8 white members from a list of 16 candidates nominated (for These provisions can be amended only by a vote of 14 the f i rst election) by the white members of the existing Parliament and, for later elections,'by the 28 white members of the existing At the end of a specified period of ten years or two parlia ments, whichever'is longer, a specially appointed commission will r e view these arrangements and, on its recommendations, they will be altered. An amendment altering these'arrangements may be passed by only 51 percent of the Legislative Assembly, but if such an al teration is enacted, the 72 seats formerly reserved for bla c ks will be open to all, regardless of color, and the 28 white members will be prohibited from forming a coalition government with another minority party Legislative Assembly COMPARISON OF THE PLANS The Internal Settlement may be described in some ways as a compromise between the Kissinger-Smith Plan and the Anglo-American Plan. The IS and the KSP have similar provisions for the transi tional government, but the constitution proposed by the IS re sembles that of the AAP much more than the vague provisions o f the KSP. Unlike either plan, however, the IS contains no assur ances of an international fund as an additional safeguard is now virtually defunct, since it has been replaced by the AAB with the support of the US and the UK,and by the IS, with the sup por t of the Salishury government and the chief leaders of the moderate nationalists of Rhodesia The 'KSP DISCUSSION OF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN PLAN The primary benefit of the AAP is that it'offers a fairly pre cise structure of the government and of the constituti on. However it has been criticized by both black and white leaders in Rhodesia.
First, it gi.ves dictatorial power to the Resident Commissioner dur ing the transition. There is no assurance that the Commissioner would allow any significant input of any par ticular group into either the administration or the constitution. The fact that the British government demands the surrender of the "illegal" Smith government indicates that the latter would not have an official vo.ice during the transition. Dr. Chester A . Crocker, Director of African Studies at the Georgetown Center for Strategic and Inter national Studies, has written in a recent study of the AAP that it is "doomed to fail" because it tries to do too much.
The presumed goal of the current Anglo-American plan is not just to stop the fighting but also to pre-empt an eventual victory by revolutionary guerillas that would overturn completely the existing polit,ical, administra tive, economic, and security apparatus.7 7. Quoted in Intelligence Digest, April 1 , 1978 p 5 i 1 15 Despite the precision of the AAP on the powers of the Commis sioner and the nature of the constitution, it is vague on the pro cess of dra-fting &e-constitution and the ratification process.
The constitution itself, which differs radicall y from previous Rhodesian constitutions, has already been drafted in large part and is apparently simply to be imposed on Rhodesia by the British government. Only the most routine matters are left to further ne gotiation among the Rhodesian parties. The S m ith government also objected to the inadequacy of the safeguards for the white minority in the AAP. The whites have no assured representation in Parlia ment at all, and, except for the verbal assurances of a Bill of Rights and the dubious goodwill of a fo r eign UN representative have no safeguards at all voters will have in' electing the regularly elected members of the Assembly, they will have no role at all in the election of the president under the AAP. Nor does the AAP constitution give any details as t o how the Specially Elected Members will be chosen except that again the whites will have only an indirect role) or how they will represent the minorities when they themselves need not be members of the minorities. There are no "blocking mecha nisms" where by the minority can diffuse the will of the majority.
The radical majoritarianism and authoritarianism of the proposed constitution and the transition contrast sharply with three hun ed years .of Anglo-American political tradition Except for the indirect role all white DISCUSSION OF THE INTERNAL SETTLEMENT: F OREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE REPORT The Internal Settlement itself has come under fire from critics including not only the Patriotic Front, but also the British and US governments. The primary objection to it within the US comes from a Staff report of the S enate Foreign Relations Committee.
This report, cited by Congressional proponents of continuing en forcement of sanctions, argues that the IS does not really allow for majority rule but only continues white minority control. The J report A Rhodesian Settle ment?" June, 1978) states that the IS offers a formula for at least 10 years of qualified multi racial rule in which there would exist a black majority in parliament, but a central white power block with the ability to prevent fundamental change altering t he poli tical and economic structure of the Rhodesian society Quoted by Sen. McGOvern, Congressional Record, June 28 1978 p. S9983; Report, p. 8 The objection, then, to the Internal Settlement seems not to be that if does not provide for black majority ru l e but that it gives the white minority too much power. What many critics of the IS seem to want is not simply a representative government in Rhodesia 4 c 7 I I I J- c r A '5 16 'c: b that would reflect the needs of all citizens, but a gover ment able to e ffect "fundamental change," a transformation of Rhodesian society.
The Senate Report also raises objections to the entrenched safeguards in the IS on the grounds that these effectively prevent majority rule. It points to the structure of the transitional g overnment as ambiguous and potentially unstable. However, the Report fails to point out that similar, but weaker safeguards were present in the AAP as well as in the constitution of Kenya, Tan zania, and Zambia when those states became independent. It mis takenly states that the Executive Council has a one-man veto, when in fact the IS specifically states that the Executive Council oper ates by consensus. It is also mistaken in stating that the Rho- desian Parliament as it now exists will be able to "enact any legis lation or deal with any other matter brought forward by the transi tional government," when it is specifically stated in the IS that the existing Parliament "will meet...as and when the executive council considers it should be summoned" and has no initiative in legislation other than what the four-man executive council allows it.
Throughout the Report there is an underlying assumption that the white and black signatories of the IS are really at daggers drawn and are both eager to weasel out of th e agreement or to be tray their colleagues. The Report seems to be at pains to dis cover hypothetical difficulties that might face the transitional government. Although published in June--three months after the signing of the IS--it makes no attempt to sh o w that the "what if situationsdescribed are either likely in practice or that they have in fact occurred. Such critical passages of the transitional government as the dismissal of Minister Hove or the shooting inci dents involving the curfew breakers migh t have been discussed to observe how the transitiona1.government actually works, what its real problems have been,and.how they have been resolved, but there is no mention of these affairs. Although the signatories of the IS have had their difficulties and problems, they have thus far been able to surmount them peacefully and legally, and there is simply no evidence to show that they are the victims of insurrnount able problems or tensions DISCUSSION OF THE INTERNAL SETTLEMENT: IS IT MAJORITY RULE?
The "entr enched safeguards" proposed in the Internal Settle ment for the new Rhodesian constitution--which are intended to pro tect the rights and achievements of the white minority against the encroachments of the majority--are by no means new or unique in the co n stitutional development -of modern Africa. Other African states--specifically Kenya, Tanzania (Tanganyika and Zambia--had similar arrangements when they achieved independence C 1 17 In the Kenyan Consti.tukionof 1963, Chapter 111, Part I, sec tion 28 prov i ded for 'Specially Elected Members" of the House of Representatives. By section 30 (1) and (2) 8 it was provided that The number of Specially Elected Members of the,House of Representatives shall be the number which results from dividing the number of sea t s of Elected Members of that House by ten or, if that result is not a whole number the whole number next greater than that result and The Specially Elected Members...shall be elected by the Elected Members of that House. in accordance with the provisions of Schedule 3 of this Constitution.
In the Constitution of Tanganyika (Tanzania) of 1961, Chapter III Part I, section 15, establishes. "elected members" and, Iruntil Parliament otherwise provides, nominated members Section 16 states The nominated members o f the National Assembly shall con sist of such members (whose number shall not exceed ten as may be appointed by the Governor-General, acting in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister, from among persons who are qualified for elections as member s of the National Assembly.
In the Zambian Independence Order of 1964, as in the proposed constitution of Rhodesia, separate voting rolls were established for the interim government he separate rolls were called the main rolls" and the "reserved rolls," an d by section 9, para graph (e), a person registering to vote shall if he is an Afxican, be registered as a main roll voter if he is a European, be registered as.a reserved roll voter In the Zambian Constitution of 1964, Chapter V, Part I, sec tion 60, sta t es that The President may appoint as nominated members of the National Assembly such persons, not exceeding five in number, as he considers desirable in,the public interest in order to enhance the representative character of the Assembly or to obtain the s ervice as a member of the Assembly of any person who, by reason of his special qualifications, would be of special value as such a member 18 Thus, three of the leading African states at the beginning of their national history. had constitutional arrangeme n ts designed to protect the rights of minorities, give them special protection againt the will of the majority, and avail themselves of the special skills and achievements of these minorities. It should also be noted that in the Kenyan and Tanganyikan (Tan z anian) Con stitutions, 1i.teracy requirements in English were specified as necessary qualifications for membership in.the legislative bodies Kenyan Constitution, Chapter 1.11, Part 'I, section 31 (b Tangan yikan Constitution, Chapter 111, Part I, section 1 8(c). The language of these provisions in the two constitutions was virtually identical legislative bodies who were only those were to be elected to membership in the able to speak and, unless incapacitated by blindness or other physical cause, to read th e English language well enough to take an active part in the proceedings of the.
National Assembly. (Kenyan. Constitution, loc. cit Thus, while there were no specifically racial reservations in these Constitutions, reservations on the basis of English lite racy re stricted to a large extent the number of blacks who could stand for election but did not apply to the much better educated white minority sent in the.proposed constitution of the Internal Settlement or in the transitional government tions were wea k er than those of the Internal Settlement, they were perhaps not strong enough to ensure a.transition to independent democracy. As The Statesman's Year-Book 1977/1978, notes It is to be noted that such literacy tests are not pre While the safeguards for mi n orities in these earlier constitu On 10 Nov. 1964 /less than one year after indepen dence on Dec 12,-19637 Kenya became a one-party state I (p. 409 The country Tanzania7 is a one-party state p. 504 On 13 Dec. 1972 President Kaunda /of Zambia7 signed a new Constitution based on one-paFty rule p. 531 In any case, it is evident that the IS does provide for major ity rule in that (a) Article A of the Settlement states that "a constitution will be drafted and enacted which will provide for majority rule on the. basis of universa1,adult suffrage b) the franchise, previously restricted to about 2 percent of the popula tion, will be extended to all adults over the age of 18; (c) the Legislative Assembly, a unicameral body of 100 with full legisla tive authority, wi l l have a majority of blacks (72 percent) for at least ten years and will conduct almost all legislative business by majority v0t.e d t-he only restrictions on majority rule are A SA e i c r; F y a r c 1.9 within the Legisla-ive Assembly and pertain o the p rocedures for amending the constitution and to the entrenched safeguards. These restrictions consist of 1) the reservation of 28 percent of the seats to the whites for at least ten years and (2) the stipulation that amendments to the constitution be appro v ed by at least 78 per cent of the members. The amendment process proposed here may be compared to that of the US Constitution, in which a two-thirds majority of both chambers must approve an amendment and three-fourths of the state legisltures must ratify it. Given that the legisla ture of Rhodesia is to be unicameral and that there are no states whose assent is necessary, the proposed amendment process in the IS may well be more democratic than that of the US Constitution.
If a situation developed in the future in which a proposed amendment obtained the support of 72 black members, only 6 of the 28 white members would be necessary to ratify it. Black representatives of the transition-government have stated that they do not antici- pate unanimous or intran s igent voting by the white members and that they expect at least one-third of the white members to vote with the black members In regard to the charge that the Internal Settlement does not allow for "fundamental change," as the Staff Report states, it can b e said that it is not appropriate for Rhodesia at the present time to consider this kind of fundamental change. .Changes that would affect what the Report calls "the essential institutions the ownership of land, and control of the judiciary, civil service policeand military--would go far beyond the scope of institution alizing majority rule in any conventional sense The white minority of Rhodesia, comprising the bulk of middle class technical and managerial workers, is concerned already over the prospect o f black majority rule. In 1977, prior to the Inter nal Settlement, there was an exodus of 900 whites per month. In the early months of 1978, however, as the prospects for a peace ful transition to majority rule with adequate safeguards opened through the I n ternal Settlement, white migration fell to only 500 per month, despite the escalation of the war. The agreement of Smith,in other words,reassured the whites and has Played an im portant role in preventing a mass exodus of professionally skilled Rhodesians It is of the highest importance that a post-transition Rho desia retain a strong white minority committed to the government.
Sen. Dick Clark (D-Iowa) has called attention to the fact that of all of Britain's former colonies in Africa, Southern Rhodesia pr obably could have sustained parliamentary democracy better than most African countries because it had a burgeoning middle class, 'a good infrastructure,r r 20 a large educa.ted population, good economic resources, and a-multiracial society Congressional R e cord, March 15 1977, p. S4210 Both Ambassador Young and Joshua Nkomo have denied that they want the white population to leave or suffer. However, the exodus of the whites would resume, with disastrous consequences for the political and economic future of Rhodesia, if they feel that there are inadequate safeguards for their own future. In 1975 Rhodesian whites paid 98.9 percent of the income taxes of the Rhodesian govenment and were responsible for 75.6 percent of Rhodesian. agricultural production in 19
74 . Dr. Chester A. Crocker whose study of the -'was cited above, has written that the whites in Rhodesia are not only a privileged minority--they are also pivotal to the nation's economy. Wages and salaries paid to whites account for nearly 60% of the total earnings of the Rhodesian labour force: individual earnings of whites, when combined with corporate profits of largely white-owned firms, account for about 70% of gross na tional income. Roughly 50% of African wage earners are employed on.white farms or i n white households. If Africans are understandably ambivalent about the future of the whites, they have reasons of their own for wish- ing them to remain 8 A mass exodus of the whites would literally destroy Rhodesia, and the black moderates know this. Tha t is.why they agreed to the safeguards: they do not want to see Rhodesia become another Mozam bique, Angola, or Zaire US POLICY TOWARD RHODESIA: RATIONALE AND ALTERNATIVES i Y The policy of the Carter Administration, in concert with the Callaghan governmen t of Great Britain, toward Rhodesia is to en force theUN sanctions, to continue to regard the Salisbury govern ment as illegal, and to insist on the Anglo-American Plan as the only basis for further discussion. The support for the AAP is based on two belie f s. First, the Administration argues that be cause the Patriotic Front will'not support the Internal 'Settlement that Settlement does not represent all the forces and parties of Rhodesia and hence cannot be an adequate basis for a peaceful transition to ma j ority rule Secondly, the Administration argues 8. Quoted in Intelligence Digest, April 1, 1978 s e 2.1 that US support for the Internal Settlement would push the Patriotic Front further into the hands of the Communists and thus escalate the possibility of direct intervention by the Soviets and Cubans in Rhodesia. The Administration also notes that no other African government has thus far supported the Internal Settlement and that US support of it would alienate these other African states.
Nevertheless, the Administration's policy has provoked serious controversy and criticism. The critics have been dismayed to find the US government in effect on the same side as the terrorists and one-party states of Africa and aligned against an agreement arrived at peace f ully by moderate nationalists within Rhodesia argue that the PF cannot conceivably claim to represent even a sig nificant minority, let alone a majority, of Rhodesians, black or white, and that the PF has repeatedly disavowed a commitment to peace or majo r ity rule anyway. They also argue that the US and British enforcement of sanctions against Rhodesia and their de facto support of the guerrillas only give assistance to the Patriotic Front and discourage and hamper the transitional government in its war ag a inst the guerrillas- Finally, they point out that the Pa triotic Front is already deeply involved with the Communist powers and that if it came to power in Rhodesia in the future, these ex ternal powers would already have allies within the country and the government, that the inclusion of the Patriotic Front in the Rho desian government would open the door to further war and terrorist atrocities and to eventual domination by anti-democratic forces whether Communist or not.
As an alternative to present poli cy, the critics have pro posed to lift sanctions onRhodesia inorder to give the transitional government an opportunity to implement its commitments. This policy would encourage the transition by (1) giving moral support to the Internal Settlement, (2) pro m ote the pacification of the country side by allowing the moderate nationalists to point to a measure of international support and to persuade guerrillas in the bush to take advantage of the amnesty, (3) encourage'the recognition and support of the Interna l Settlement by other African states, and 4) give needed resources to Rhodesia through trade The critics On June 28, 1978, the Senate voted on the Helms Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act, which would have prevented the enforce ment of the sanctions o n. Rhodesia until December 31, 19
78. A motion to table th-amendment prevailed by a narrow six vote mar gin (48-42 This led to adoption one month later of an amendment to the International Security Assistance Act offered by Senator Clifford Case, which proposed a compromise between the po l icies of Senator Jesse Helms and the Administration. The Case Amendment which was passed in the Senate on July 26, 1978 by a vote of 57 39, proposed that authority be given to the President to lift sanctions if the Rhodesian sovernment makes a-"aood faith " commitment 22 to r ?gotiate with all parties at a conference under international auspices and if a freely elected government comes to power in Rhodesia through free elections observed by internationally recog nized observers.
Critics of the Case Amendmen t argued that the President already has authority to lift sanctions under section 2 of the law repealing the Byrd Amendment in 1977 and, further, that the conditions it established were not meaningful. The Amendment does not make clear how the President i s to determine or evaluate the actions of the transitional government It does not seem to recognize that the transitional government desires a peaceful settlement and free elections, that it has repeatedly sought to negotiate with the Patriotic Front, and that it would be in its interest to negotiate further if negotiations did not mean the reversal of the progress toward majority rule that has already been made.
Proponents of the Case Amendment argued that its passage would correct the present policy of th e Administration while still preserving the even-handedness of the United States. As Senator Jacob Javits, a cosponsor of the Case Amendment, stated From the declarations of the various officials of our toward the guerrillas I would not sponsor this amend ment unless I were confident--and I am--that this tilt is corrected by the amendment and that the United States Government including Andrew Young I felt, a "tilt is truly put in the position to be the honest mediator the honest broker Consressional Record , July 26 1978, p. S11792).
On August 2, 1978, the House of Representatives debated amend ments to the International Security Assistance Authorization Bill which would have further modified the Administration policy.
While Congressman Zablocki introduced an amendment identical to the Case Amendment, and Congressmen Bauman and Findley sponsored even stronger amendments, Congressman Ichord proposed a compromise amendment. The Ichord Amendment, passed by a substantial 229 to 180 margin, authorized the liftin g of sanctions after December 31, 1978 unless the President shall determine that a government has not been installed, chosen by free elections in which all political groups have been allowed to participate freely." Though similar to the Case Amendment, the Ichord Amendment differs from it in impor tant details. While Case's measure places the burden of proof on the Rhodesians by requiring them to show that free elections have occurred, the Ichord measure places the burden on the President by requiring him t o determine that they have not occurred. Further more, unlike the Case Amendment, the Ichord Amendment contains no insistence on further "good faith" efforts to negotiate with the Patriotic Front, but instead only that "all political groups have been allow e d to participate freely" in the elections. The final language of these amendments will have to be worked out by the House and Senate conferees 23 The House debate on the sanctions reveals several key assump tions among those who opposed lifting them. Firs t , the advocates of sanctions tend to.assume that the enforcement of sanctions was responsible for the progress towards majority rule thus far. Thus Mrs. Burke of California stated: the U.N. observed sanctions...were probably the '15 greatest force for cha nge from minority rule. (p. H7727 However, sanctions from 1967 to 1971 did little to promote com promise on the part of Smith,and. he agreed to negotiate with Secretary Kissinger while-the U.S. was not enforcing sanctions.
Ironically, other advocates of sa nctions argue that while they have been responsible for the progress toward majority rule to date, there has not really been any such progress. Thus, Mr. Steers of Maryland argued Presently under the internal settlement, there has been no change in the wh i te-dominated police, army, or judiciary as well as no major change in discriminatory statutes p. H7719 And a similar statement was made by Mr. Solarz of New York. (p.H7724 This argument however is similar to that of the Senate Report cited and discussed a b ove, which advocates fundamental transformations of Rhodesian society rather than conventional majority rule. It also ignores the fact that continuity of the judiciary and civil service is guaranteed in the AAP, the currently approved alternative to the I S, that 68 percent of the Rhodesian amy and the predominance of the police forces are black, and that, unlike the KSP, the coministers of the Interior and Defense are black.
Finally, other advocates of sanctions seem to assume (again like the Senate Report ) that only the international pressure of sanctions from the US keeps the Smith government from reneging on the IS. Thus Mr. Bonker of Washington stated: r The sanctions have forced the Smith regime to recognize the hard realities of establishing a minori t y government in a majority society. If we were to lift those-sanctions now, we would certainly disrupt that process. (p. H7725 Again,this argument assumes that the Smith government (or regime if that term is preferred) is not sincere in its commitments an d that it ha& been the sanctions that have forced it to compromise.
This ignores the history of the negotiations, the role of the black moderates, the importance of the "liberation movements" in formerly Portuguese Africa, and the clear self-interest of th e Smith government in achieving a workable settlement of majority rule.
I While the UN sanctions have not had a critical impact upon the Rhodesian economy--indeed they have even helped Rhodesia to become self-sufficient agriculturally--their long-term eff ect has been to undermine certain key sectors of the economy. They have been particularly harmful in regard to black employment and to the importation of consumer goods. However, the principal argu ment for repealing the sanctions at the present time is n o t eco nomic or related to the military needs of the government. It is proposed to repeal the sanctions only until December 31, 1978 and that short time-range would probably not affect the perform ance of the economy. The principal argument (one that is es p oused by Bishop Muzorewa himself, who has previously been a strong ad vocate of sanctions against the Smith government) is that repeal by the US would give the black leaders of the Internal Settlement much greater credibility with the guerrilla forces. Mu z orewa and his colleagues point out that in many cases Mugabe and Nkomo have only token control of the guerrilla forces, that these forces are often acting independently, and could be persuaded to lay down their arms if they believed that foreign powers wo u ld assist the leaders to make the transition, and would stop giving their sup port to the guerrilla forces and leaders. Furthermore US repeal of the sanctions would encourage other African states to endorse the Internal Settlement. The Organization of Afr i can Unity, for example, though it has not supported the IS, has rebuffed the Patriotic Front at its meeting in Khartoum in July, 1978, where it passed a resolution that the people of Rhodesia have "the right to choose their own leaders" and refused to acc e pt the Front's demands that it receive recognition as "the sole represent r ative of the people of Zimbabwe CONCLUSION The transition of Rhodesia from a government by a racial min ority with dubious legality to one by a majority with full status in the in ternational community is a delicate and complicated one.
Democracy has not enjoyed appreciable success in Africa since the decolonization movement in the 1960's, and its failures have ranged from the regimes of terror in Uganda and Ethiopia to simple one p arty dictatorships in most other states. Although Rhodesia has not had a democratic government in the Western sense it has had at least a stable, regular, and prosperous government that has been more respectful of human rights than its neighbors. Rhodesia now has the opportunity to create a democratic system that could serve as a model for other African states, whether they are the black one-party states or the white oligarchy in South Africa, and it has indeed come far in designing arrangements acceptable to the most influential parties of the country. Rhodesia has come this 1 25 far without the help of outside states or the compulsion of ex ternal force or internal revolution and often with the opposition. f external powers. Whether its experiment can be successful in Y the -3 future will now depend less on its own efforts than on the good will and cooperation of its neighbors and its friends in the wor Id.
Samuel T. Francis Policy Analyst