For most of the 20th
century, counterterrorism and technology coexisted in a one-sided
relationship. In large part, law enforcement and the military
adapted the technologies that were commercially available to their
needs.
That relationship may
simply be inadequate for addressing the challenges of the 21st
century. Meeting the test of terrorism will likely require a more
proactive approach to technological innovation-betting on the
future: formulating clear requirements, prioritizing needs,
establishing cooperative means to foster the development of
technologies, and building the human and financial capital programs
necessary to transition and sustain them as effective
anti-terrorism tools.
In my remarks today, I
want to list my "big bets" for the future-six technologies that I
believe offer the greatest promise for providing significant
advantages in combating terrorism-and address as well the
challenge to turning the potential of technology into
concrete capabilities.
Why Worry?
Traditional means of
developing law enforcement technologies are simply inadequate to
deal with today's strategic realities, and the war on global
terrorism should top our list of concerns.
While every country
may not agree on a definition of terrorism, that does not mean that
it does not exist and does not represent a terrible threat to world
peace. Nor do terrorists seem concerned about definitional
nuances. They have decided they are most certainly at war with
us, and they think they are in a war they can win.
We are at war. In
fact, the global war on terrorism will be like most wars. It will
have casualties and sacrifices, victories, defeats, advances, and
setbacks. Progress will not be determined by the outcome
of individual battles or campaigns. It will, to a remarkable
degree, look much like the Cold War. Like the Cold War, it will be
a long, protracted conflict because, despite the preponderance
of power held by the nations united in their commitment to combat
terrorism, we will not be able to come directly to grips with the
enemy-then because it risked nuclear war and annihilation, now
because the enemy is too disparate and diffuse to be defeated
in climactic battle. We are in another long war.
It is, however, a war
of a different kind. There are no frontiers in 21st century
national security. Distinguishing clear lines of
responsibility between foreign and domestic security is a thing of
the past.
Additionally, the age
when only great powers can bring great powers to their knees is
over. The specter of catastrophic terrorism that could
threaten tens of thousands of lives and hundreds of billions of
dollars in destruction will be an enduring concern. And if
catastrophic terrorism is a threat to great countries, the
prospects for smaller nations is even more daunting to
imagine.
Making Big
Bets
Technology is, of
course, not the only answer to addressing the specter of
transnational terrorism, but the technological answers we have
today are inadequate to deal with the scope and potential severity
of the threat. Rather than adapting technologies to stay apace
of evolving dangers and changing tactics, we need to get ahead
of the terrorists and develop "overmatching" security systems that
protect the public, safeguard their liberties, and leave travel and
commerce unencumbered.
Developing
technologies that leap ahead of the terrorists requires vision and
strategy, and a good strategy requires hard choices. It begins by
establishing criteria for selecting the most crucial
technological investments. In my mind, there should be
three:
-
Seeking
out technologies
that can contribute to building a true national system that
addresses all the challenges of terrorism from intelligence and
early warning to domestic counterterrorism and response. It is
unlikely that any country will have the resources it needs to
address every security shortfall or law enforcement need. Thus, the
first priority of a sound strategy should be to invest in
technologies that best leverage all the existing
capabilities that are available by integrating them into a
cohesive system.
-
Adopting
technologies
that get the "biggest bang for the buck." Spending a little
research, development, and procurement resources on many things may
not buy much of anything. Husbanding and targeting investments on
the technologies that can provide the most security for the
resources invested, ones that are the most flexible, ones that
contribute to addressing a wide range of threats from
kidnapping to catastrophic, is a better approach for stealing a
march on the terrorists.
-
Reaching
for
"breakthrough" technologies. Terrorist groups have limited
resources and limited means; thus, they are quick to refine their
methods, improving on time-tested techniques, or improvise,
seeking out new ways to strike or new targets to attack. In
response, law enforcement officials update their investigatory
techniques or implement new security measures. Breaking the
cycle of innovation and countermeasures between terrorism and
counterterrorism calls for unprecedented innovation with
which terrorists can simply not compete.
I want to suggest six
candidates that meet these standards. They are (1) system
integration technologies; (2) biometrics; (3) non-lethal
weapons; (4) data mining and link analysis technologies; (5)
nanotechnology; and (6) directed-energy weapons.
In some cases, these
technologies are fairly mature but are just finding their
counterterrorism niche. Others show great potential but will still
require many years of research and development before they are
ready to become operational. Yet all share a common characteristic:
They offer significant potential solutions to addressing the
most pressing counterterrorism concerns.
"National"
Technologies
My first two
candidates clearly fit the first criterion for a
counterterrorism technology strategy. They represent a family of
capabilities that are essential for building national
capabilities.
System Integration
Technologies. One of the highest
priorities for technological innovation ought to be simply getting
the most out of the resources that are already available. That
means adopting a new approach to counterterrorism operations
as well as the enabling technologies to support it. This
approach is often called "network-centric" operations.
Network-centric
operations generate increased operational effectiveness by
networking sensors, decision makers, law enforcement officials, and
emergency responders to achieve shared awareness, increased speed
of command, higher tempo of operations, greater efficiency,
increased security and safety, reduced vulnerability to
potential hostile action, and a degree of self-synchronization. In
essence, this means linking knowledgeable entities from the local
to the national levels in an integrated network that addresses
counterterrorism missions ranging from intelligence and early
warning to response and post-strike investigations and forensic
analysis.
Systems integration
technologies might produce significant efficiencies in terms of
sharing skills, knowledge, and scarce high-value assets, building
capacity and redundancy in a national counterterrorism system
as well as gaining the synergy of providing a common operating
picture to all law enforcement and emergency responders and being
able to readily share information.[1]
Many of the
technologies required to facilitate network-centric
counterterrorism operations are already widely commercially
available, including information technologies that facilitate
passing high volumes of secure digital data, create ad hoc
networks, integrate disparate databases, and link various
communication systems over cable, fiber-optic, wireless, and
satellite networks.
Biometrics.
Identity is the
linchpin of virtually all security and investigatory systems. Since
September 11, 2001, there has been increased interest in using
biometrics for identity verification, especially in the areas
of visa and immigration documentation and government-issued
identification card programs.[2]
Biometrics are
recorded measures of a unique physical or behavioral characteristic
of individuals. They are thought to be more reliable and more
difficult to forget, lose, have stolen, falsified, or guessed
since they are part of a person rather than an ID card, a personal
identification number, or a password.
Biometrics can be used
for verification or for identification. When a biometric is used to
verify whether a person is who he or she claims to be, that
verification is frequently referred to as "one-to-one" matching.
Identification, by contrast, is known as "one-to-many" matching. In
identification, a person's presented biometric is compared
with all of the biometric templates within a database.
There are five major
types of mature biometric technologies. They include iris
recognition, hand geometry, fingerprint recognition, face
recognition, and voice recognition.
-
Iris
recognition technology relies on
the distinctly colored ring that surrounds the pupil of the
eye.
-
Hand
geometry relies on measurements
of the width, height, and length of the fingers; distances
between joints; and the shape of knuckles.
-
Fingerprint
recognition technology is probably
the most widely used and well-known biometric. Fingerprint
recognition relies on features found in the impressions made by
distinct ridges on the fingertips.
-
Face
recognition technology identifies
individuals by analyzing certain facial features such as the
upper outlines of the eye sockets or sides of the
mouth.
-
Voice
recognition technology identifies
people based on the differences in the voice resulting from
physiological differences and learned speaking habits.
Researchers are also
looking for other useful biometrics. Some of these emerging
technologies include vein scans, facial thermography, DNA matching,
odor sensing, blood pulse measurements, skin pattern recognition,
nailbed identification, gait recognition, and ear shape
recognition. Biometrics like vein scanning are just becoming
commercially available, while others, such as ear shape
recognition, are recently started research
projects.
"Biggest Bang for the
Buck" Technologies
The next two
categories of candidate technologies that I want to mention
fall under the second criterion for an aggressive counterterrorism
technology strategy: getting the "biggest bang for the
buck."
Non-lethal
Weapons. One of the most
significant challenges in the war on terrorism is that its
battlefields are often the everyday world, where civilians and
terrorists often stand side-by-side, where as much attention must
be given to safeguarding lives and property as to disrupting,
apprehending, or incapacitating terrorists. Non-lethal weapons
may offer the military and law enforcement a new range of
options for taking the battle to the terrorist without endangering
others.
Non-lethal weapons are
discriminate, explicitly designed and employed to incapacitate
personnel or materiel while minimizing fatalities and
undesired damage to property and environment. These weapons
are actually a set of capabilities which have approximately three
functions:
-
Counterpersonnel,
which involves
controlling crowds, incapacitating people, preventing access to
specific areas, and removing people from facilities, buildings, or
areas of operation;
-
Countermaterial,
which may
involve preventing vehicles, vessels, or aircraft from entering an
area or disabling or neutralizing these means of transportation;
and
-
Countercapabilities,
which focuses on
disabling or neutralizing facilities and systems, including those
for weapons of mass destruction.
Today, non-lethal
weapons technologies cover a broad spectrum, including areas
related to the development of acoustics systems; chemicals (e.g.,
antitraction materials, dyes, markers, and malodorants);
communications systems; electromagnetic and electrical systems;
entanglement and other mechanical systems; information
technologies; optical devices; non-penetrating projectiles and
munitions; and many others.[3] It is also possible to combine non-lethal
weapons with lethal ones or with electronic, psychological, and/or
information warfare, making these other anti-terrorism tools more
effective and discriminate.
Research by the U.S.
military suggests four areas of non-lethal weapons development that
show particular promise. They are:
-
Calmatives and
malodorants for controlling crowds and clearing facilities,
developed and applied in accordance with U.S. treaty
obligations in the Chemical Weapons Convention;
-
Directed-energy
systems beyond the vehicle-mounted active denial system (VMADS):
high-power microwave (HPM) for stopping vehicles or vessels and
solid-state lasers for advanced non-lethal weapons
applications;
-
Novel and rapidly
deployable marine barrier systems; and
-
Adaptation of unmanned
or remotely piloted platforms and other sensors for non-lethal
weapons applications, including intelligence collection and
assessments.[4]
Data Mining and Link
Analysis Technologies. We live in a world
that is becoming increasingly awash in commercial and government
information. The trail of the terrorist, however, is often
indistinguishable from a mass of bills, license applications, visa
forms, census records, and telephone lists. Traditional law
enforcement investigation techniques often begin with the
identification of a suspected individual, followed by the
laborious process of seeking out information related to that
individual. As more and more information becomes available, this
task becomes more and more problematic.
Technology, however,
now has the potential to turn this challenge into an advantage.
Rather than trying to narrow the scope of information that has to
be looked at, data mining and link analysis technologies work
best by exploiting larger and larger amounts of
information.
Data mining is a
"technology for analyzing historical and current online data
to support informed decision making."[5] It involves identifying
patterns and anomalies from the observation of vast datasets. The
primary goals of data mining are prediction and description.
Prediction involves using some variables or fields in the
database to predict unknown or future values of other variables of
interest, and description focuses on finding human-interpretable
patterns describing the data. Description concerns increasing
knowledge about a variable or dataset by finding related
information.[6]
This second
characteristic of data mining- description-is often referred to as
link analysis. Whereas data mining attempts to identify anomalies
in vast amounts of information, link analysis technologies
sift through databases to find commonalties.
Link analysis is a
slightly different twist on data mining. In preventing a terrorist
attack, it is critical that one understands the relationships among
individuals, organizations, and other entities which could be
security threats. Link analysis is the process of analyzing
the data surrounding the suspect relationships to determine how
they are connected-what links them together.
While the technology
to conduct data mining is rapidly maturing, it is currently limited
by its capacity to handle non-structured formats; i.e., those that
are a mix of text, image, video, and sensor information. In
addition, future algorithms will also need to incorporate the
knowledge of human experts into their derivation of
patterns.
"Breakthrough"
Technologies
My final two candidate
technologies definitely fit into the last category of an aggressive
technology acquisition program. They offer two potential
breakthroughs which could significantly reshape the nature of
competition between terrorism and counterterrorism.
Nanotechnology.
As a
counterterrorism tool, nanotechnologies are in their infancies.
Nanotechnology involves developing or working with
materials and complete systems at the atomic, molecular, or
macromolecular levels where at least one dimension falls with the
range of 1-100 nanometers.[7] Working at such a small scale offers unique
capabilities, such as being able to control how nanodevices
interact with other systems at the atomic or molecular
level.
Current research areas
include materials, sensors, biomedical nanostructures, electronics,
optics, and fabrication. Materials which have been modified at the
nanoscale can have specific properties incorporated into them.
For instance, materials can have coatings that make them
water-repellant or stain-resistant. According to a study by Daniel
Ratner and Mark A. Ratner:
Nanoscale sensors are
generally designed to form a weak chemical bond to the substance of
whatever is to be sensed, and then to change their properties in
response (that might be a color change or a change in conductivity,
fluorescence, or weight).[8]
Biomedical
nanostructures, by design, interact with people at the molecular
level, allowing for targeted drug delivery, adhesive materials
for skin grafts or bandages, etc. Nanoscale electronics can help to
shrink computer circuits even further and to make them more
efficient. Nanoscale optics allow once again for materials that
fluoresce to be tuned at the nanoscale to change specific
properties under certain conditions. Fabrication at the nanoscale
offers the potential of creating devices from the atom up, as
opposed to having to shrink materials down to the needed
size.
According to a RAND
report, there are numerous future applications for nanotechnology,
though most face at least some technical hurdles. They include
nanofabricated computational devices like nanoscale semiconductor
chips, biomolecular devices, and molecular electronics.[9] If one
includes integrated microsystems and micro-electrical-mechanical
systems (MEMS) in the discussion, and one probably should, there
are additional uses for nanotechnology, including smart
systems-on-a-chip and micro- and nanoscale instrumentation and
measurement technologies.[10]
While there are
counterterrorism applications for all of the research areas,
sensors are the most promising. Nanodevices offer the opportunity
for fast, cheap, and accurate sensors and detectors, and markers
that can be used for a wide range of forensic
activities.
Directed-Energy
Weapons. Active defenses such
as directed-energy weapons could provide counterterrorism
protection for critical infrastructure.[11] Directed-energy weapons
include a host of technologies, including lasers and microwave
radiation emitters. These weapons can inflict casualties and damage
equipment by depositing energy on their intended target.
Compared with
conventional weapons, which rely on the kinetic or chemical energy
of a projectile, directed-energy weapons can hit a target with
subatomic particles or electromagnetic waves that travel
at speeds at or near the speed of light. They generate very high
power beams and typically use a single optical system both to track
a target and to focus the beam on the target in order to destroy
it.[12]
Lasers-the most mature
form of directed-energy weapon that can counter airborne
threats-form intense beams of light that can be precisely aimed
across many kilometers to disable a wide range of targets, from
satellites to missiles and aircraft to ground vehicles.[13]
Additionally, the laser beam can be redirected by mirrors to hit
targets not visible from the source, all without compromising much
of the beam's initial power.
Such systems could
evolve to provide active defenses against a wide array of potential
threats from artillery, rockets, mortars, missiles, and low-flying
unmanned aerial vehicles to improvised explosive devices. For
example, these weapons could be deployed at airports to defend
planes from attacks by shoulder-fired missiles (and by
makeshift rockets and missiles) during takeoff and
landing-the times when aircraft are most
vulnerable.
With most airports
located in or near major urban centers, directed-energy weapons
could help to address the near impossibility of providing
adequate, credible security zones around airports.
Furthermore, they could defend coastal airports from attacks
launched from a commercial or private ship loitering offshore-a
potentially ideal platform for launching precision strikes. Several
countries, including the United States, already have these
systems under development.[14]
Challenges
Ahead
It remains to be seen
how governments and the private sector apply their energy and
imagination to turning these technologies into potent
anti-terrorism tools. There are several serious obstacles to
be overcome.
Research and
Development Trends. The September 11,
2001, attacks on New York and Washington seem only somewhat to
have affected research and development trends in the United States,
and, indeed, it appears that the same trend is holding true for
other nations as well. American research and development efforts
have been affected only "on the margins."[15] For example, the
newly created Department of Homeland Security has a science and
technology directorate with a research budget of about $800
million. While that seems like a great deal of money, it is a small
fraction of the $90 billion the U.S. government spends on
research.
In turn, government
research represents an increasingly less significant portion of the
total research and development effort. In the 1960s, about
two-thirds of U.S. research was federally funded. Today, two-thirds
of research-about $180 billion-is funded by the private sector. For
example, American software and semiconductor companies
spend about $10 billion, which is about the same amount as the
entire research budget for the U.S. space program.[16]
The balance of
investments for research and development does not bode well for
counterterrorism technologies. Most of the cutting-edge
research in related areas, particularly with regard to information
technology and biotechnology, is in the private sector where
development programs are largely driven by potential markets
and the profits to be made in the security sector seem to pale in
comparison with other commercial opportunities.
In part, this
challenge can be addressed by making the counterterrorism
community a more attractive customer for the private sector.
Legal incentives such as indemnification for products may help-as
would broadly accepted international standards for the
application of technologies, particularly in the areas of
biometrics. Moving to open and non-proprietary information
architectures that make it far easier to adapt commercial
technologies to law enforcement needs would also be of great
benefit.
A significant next
step would be initiating a serious dialogue to determine what a
future international counterterrorism security technology
development regime might look like. It would require, among other
things, a technology clearinghouse so that partners know what
technologies are available for transfer; a method of setting
standards so that technologies are understandable;
interoperable and transferable means for industry-to-industry
dialogue; predictable export control requirements; and
acquisition mechanisms such as joint development programs,
licensing agreements, and something comparable to the foreign
military sales program.
Any of these or other
initiatives that serve to create a more uniform and dependable
market for counterterrorism technologies would serve to make it a
more attractive target for the private sector and, in turn,
stimulate the responsiveness of private research and development in
support of key law enforcement needs.
Barriers to
Innovation. Even if private
research and development can be better teamed with government
efforts and focused on the terrorism challenges of the 21st
century, the traditional barriers to innovation in law enforcement
technologies will remain. These challenges include four areas.[17]
-
Cost. The expense of new
technologies includes both the cost of procuring a technology
and the opportunity cost of adopting that technology as compared to
other uses to which resources might be put.
-
Technology
Risk. This includes the
ever-present risk that "big bets" will fail. The technology
may not perform as expected or adequately address the tasks
for which it was adopted.
-
Human
Factors. New counterterrorism
technologies can face a plethora of obstacles that have
nothing to do with fiscal costs or technical specifications. For
example, data mining and biometrics have raised an array of
concerns about the protection of civil liberties and
safeguarding of proprietary commercial information.
Non-lethal weapons face legal barriers.
Additionally,
institutional cultures may have difficulty adapting to new
technologies, and new systems may present significant training and
leader development challenges. Systems integration, for
example, can enable law enforcement agencies to share
information with others, but a number of concerns might make them
reluctant to do so.
-
Unanticipated
Costs. Any new technology
will bring unintended consequences. The introduction of
nanotechnologies, for example, has raised concerns about the
potential consequences of unintentionally introducing new
compounds into the environment. New technologies can also
bring unexpected liabilities and adverse public
reactions.
Perhaps the best means
to satisfy these concerns is to address potential policy
issues that may serve as barriers to the adoption of new
technologies before new capabilities are introduced. Policy
development that anticipates technological development
represents a largely unprecedented challenge to law
enforcement. More often than not, law enforcement's approach has
been to take years to develop the procedures that govern the
implementation of new technologies, largely waiting for
commercial technologies to mature, threats to evolve, and legal
precedents to be established. This process will not serve for the
challenges of the 21st century, where policy innovation must match,
or indeed exceed, the speed of technological
progress.
Conclusion
The terrorist threat
against the free world is serious and enduring. We need to
jointly develop the means and the technologies needed to meet this
threat.
The obstacles to
creating an arsenal of counter-terrorism technologies that are
practical and affordable and overmatch the threat of 21st
century terrorism are daunting. Creating a vision of these
future technologies, implementing initiatives that broaden the
market and make it more predictable and dependable, and developing
policies that will help to overcome the barriers to innovation are
essential steps to harnessing technology to the future needs of law
enforcement.
James Jay Carafano,
Ph.D., is Senior Research Fellow for National
Security and Homeland Security in the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom
Davis Institute for International Studies at The Heritage
Foundation. These remarks were prepared for delivery at a Middle
East Police Exhibition Conference held at the Dubai World Trade
Center.
[1]Army Science and
Technology for Homeland Security, Vol. II (Washington,
D.C.: National Research Council, 2004), Chapter 4.
[2]Paul Rosenzweig, Alane
Kochems, and Ari Schwartz, "Biometric Technologies: Security,
Legal, and Policy Implications," Heritage Foundation Legal
Memorandum No. 12, June 21, 2004, at
www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/lm12.cfm (November
16, 2004).
[3]Naval Studies Board,
An Assessment of Non-Lethal Weapons Science and Technology
(Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 2003), executive
summary, at www.nap.edu/execsumm/0309082889.html (November
16, 2004).
[5]Committee on the Role
of Information Technology in Responding to Terrorism, Computer
Science and Telecommunication Board, Information Technology for
Counterterrorism: Immediate Actions and Future Possibilities,
eds. John L. Hennessy, David A. Patterson, and Herbert S. Lin
(Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 2003), p.
68.
[6]Usama Fayyad, Gregory
Piatetsky-Shapiro, and Padhraic Smyth, "From Data Mining to
Knowledge Discovery in Databases," Artificial
Intelligence, Fall 1996, p. 44, at
www.kdnuggets.com/gpspubs/aimag-kdd-overview-1996-Fayyad.pdf
(November 16, 2004).
[7]Daniel Ratner and Mark
A. Ratner, Nanotechnology and Homeland Security (Upper
Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall Professional and Technical
Reference, 2004), p. 13.
[9]Philip S. Anton,
Richard Silberglitt, and James Schneider, The Global Technology
Revolution: Bio/Nano/Materials Trends and Their Synergies with
Information Technology by 2015, Prepared for the National
Intelligence Council (Santa Monica, Cal.: RAND, 2001), pp.
25-28.
[11]Jack Spencer and James
Jay Carafano, "The Use of Directed-Energy Weapons to Protect
Critical Infrastructure," Heritage Foundation Backgrounder
No. 1783, August 2, 2004, at
www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/bg1783.cfm.
[12]Loren B. Thompson,
Ph.D., "The Emerging Promise (and Danger) of Directed-Energy
Weapons," Lexington Institute Capitol Hill Forum on Directed
Energy, July 11, 2002, at
www.lexingtoninstitute.org/defense/energyforum_thompson.htm
(July 23, 2004).
[14]Josef Schwartz et
al., "Tactical High Energy Laser," presented at the SPIE
Proceedings on Laser and Beam Control Technologies, January
21, 2002, pp. 1-6. TRW developed a fixed-site THEL under an $89
million contract. In tests, the system has successfully shot down
25 rockets. It is, however, not currently capable of being deployed
for operational use. The U.S. Army is developing a mobile version
and has requested additional funding for the program. In February
2004, the Army's tactical laser project was formally converted into
an acquisition program. The first prototype of the mobile laser is
due to appear in 2008. See Loren B. Thompson, Ph.D., and Daniel
Gouré, Ph.D., "Directed Energy Weapons: Technologies,
Applications, and Implications," Lexington Institute White
Paper, February 2003, pp. 11-12 and 24-25, at
www.lexingtoninstitute. org/docs/321.pdf.
[15]G. Pascal Zachary,
"Technology Is Destiny," The Milkin Institute Review, Vol.
6, No. 3 (Third Quarter 2004), p. 6.
[17]William Schwabe, Lois
M. Davis, and Brian A. Jackson, Challenges and Choices for
Crime-Fighting Technology: Federal Support of State and Local Law
Enforcement (Santa Monica, Cal.: RAND, 2001), p.
xxi.