The United States has
demonstrated considerable dedication to promoting economic
development in sub-Saharan Africa. America has provided about $48
billion (in 2003 dollars) in bilateral official development
assistance to sub-Saharan Africa since 1960.[1]
Under President George
W. Bush, America has doubled its development assistance to $19
billion in 2004, including tripling its assistance to sub-Saharan
Africa since 2000. It has expanded access to the U.S. market
through the African Growth and Opportunities Act. The U.S. is
the world's largest humanitarian aid donor, providing $3.3 billion
in 2003. The U.S. is the world's largest source of bilateral and
multilateral support to combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other
infectious diseases, including $2.4 billion in international
HIV/AIDS programs.[2]
Yet the U.S. is often
criticized for not providing enough resources for development. The
basis for this criticism is the theory that if only aid flows
increased, developing countries would achieve economic growth and
development. Economic analysis and the historical record do
not support this reasoning.
The United States and
other donor nations have spent over $2.2 trillion on bilateral and
multilateral development assistance (in 2003 dollars) since 1960 to
help poor countries attain economic growth and
prosperity-about a fourth of it in sub-Saharan Africa.[3] Few
recipients have achieved substantial improvements in per
capita income, and in no case has a development success story been
clearly attributable to economic assistance. The evidence provided
by numerous studies indicates that this failure is due not to
insufficient funds, but to the poor policies of recipient
countries.
Taking lessons from
this experience, in 2002, the Bush Administration proposed a new
development assistance program-the Millennium Challenge Account
(MCA)-for countries "ruling justly, investing in their people, and
encouraging economic freedom."[4] The MCA is different from
previous aid programs because recipients earn eligibility by
surpassing minimum criteria based on simple, transparent, and
publicly available performance indicators. These indicators have
been selected based on evidence that they contribute or are
complementary to long-term growth and prosperity, rather than
on subjective, political motivations unrelated to
development.
This approach to
development emphasizes that a successful strategy requires
commitment to good policy by developing countries. Aid cannot
overcome anti-market economic policies, bad governance,
and a weak rule of law. By focusing MCA resources on countries that
have demonstrated commitment to reform in these areas, the U.S. is
encouraging policy change among recipients and increasing the
likelihood of improved economic growth and development.
The Disappointing
History of Development Assistance
Sub-Saharan Africa is
the only region of the world that is not on track to meet a single
target of the U.N. Secretariat's indicators for achieving the
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), including reducing
poverty, hunger, and infant mortality; improving secondary school
enrollment for girls; increasing immunization; and increasing
access to potable water.[5]
Meeting the development
goals-and, more important, creating the ability for countries to
continue progress already made toward these goals- depends in
great part on increasing economic growth. Indeed, the World Bank
estimated that halving severe poverty in sub-Saharan Africa by
2015 would require annual growth of at least 7 percent. Focusing on
improving particular indicators may offer paths for foreign
assistance to provide short-term relief of suffering in specific
areas, but it will do little to help poor countries achieve the
economic growth necessary for them to develop and graduate from the
need for assistance in the first place.[6]
For decades, the United
States and other donor nations have tried to catalyze economic
growth in poor countries through bilateral and multilateral
development assistance. The record is one of failure. Between
1960 and 2003, the U.S. and other developed nations spent over $2.2
trillion (in 2003 dollars)[7] in bilateral and multilateral aid on
development projects in low-income and lower-middle-income
countries.[8]
Of the 111 countries
for which data are available, 35 (about one-third) actually
saw their per capita income shrink (in 2000 dollars) despite over
four decades of development assistance. In other words, their
populations became poorer than they were in 1960. Another 26
countries experienced slight compound annual growth in per capita
gross domestic product (GDP) of less than 1 percent, and a further
25 saw slightly better compound annual growth in per capita GDP
between 1 percent and 2 percent. Just 25 experienced annual
compound growth of more than 2 percent in per capita GDP, and only
11 of the 25 experienced the level of growth necessary (over 4
percent annual growth) to noticeably close the gap with rich
nations.
The record is
particularly poor in sub-Saharan Africa. Despite $543 billion (in
2003 dollars; see Table 2) in assistance between 1960 and 2003,
including $47.7 billion from the U.S., sub-Saharan Africa's per
capita income increased from $416 to only $514 (in 2000 dollars).[9] Some
have argued that this lack of growth is due to a paucity of aid and
call for a "Marshall Plan" for Africa modeled after the effort to
rebuild post-World War II Europe.
But an objective look
at the Marshall Plan reveals that, in terms of aid to GDP,
sub-Saharan Africa has received a Marshall Plan several times over.
As shown in Table 1, the United Kingdom was the largest single
recipient of Marshall Plan assistance, receiving the equivalent of
20 percent of its 1950 GDP in assistance between 1946 and 1952 (in
constant 1950 dollars). The largest single annual
disbursement in 1947 was equivalent to 11.5 percent of its GDP
in 1950.[10] In 2003, 21 countries in sub-Saharan
Africa received more assistance in relation to their GDP than the
U.K. did in 1947. Only South Africa and Nigeria received less aid
between 1960 and 2003 as a percent of its 2003 GDP than the U.K.
did under the Marshall Plan. Most received aid equivalent to
several times their 2003 GDP.


Despite this
assistance, sub-Saharan Africa has been treading water, with
one-third of countries experiencing a net decline in their per
capita GDP since 1960. To put this in perspective, if all of the
aid spent over those four decades were gathered together in today's
dollars and simply handed out to the 719 million people of
sub-Saharan Africa, per capita GDP would increase by over $756-
more than doubling its current per capita GDP. If just the $23.7
billion (in current dollars) in aid provided to the region in
2003 were handed out, per capita income would increase by
$33.
Clearly, aid has not
been invested in a manner that results in greater economic growth.
Chart 1 illustrates the provision of economic assistance to
sub-Saharan Africa and the region's erratic growth
record.

Over the past decade,
economic studies have concluded that economic freedom, good
governance, and the rule of law are key drivers in
promoting economic growth and reducing poverty. A 1997 World
Bank analysis of foreign aid found that, while assistance
positively affects growth in countries with good economic policies
(free markets, fiscal discipline, and the rule of law),
countries with poor economic policies did not experience
sustained economic growth regardless of the amount of foreign
assistance received.[11]
Other studies have
reached similar conclusions, maintaining that aid can increase
economic growth in certain circumstances.[12] These studies conclude
that aid may help the poor to cope temporarily with some of the
consequences of poverty, but that countries beset by a weak rule of
law, corruption, heavy state intervention, and other policies that
retard growth will not experience increased economic growth
even with greater amounts of economic assistance. Subsequent
studies question whether aid could spur growth even in good policy
environments.[13]
Yet many advocates of
aid ignore this research and evidence. The U.N. Millennium Project,
commissioned by U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan in 2002 to
assess what is necessary to meet the MDGs, advocated "a big push of
basic investments between now and 2015 in public administration,
human capital (nutrition, health, education), and key
infrastructure (roads, electricity, ports, water and
sanitation, accessible land for affordable housing, environmental
management)."[14] Jeffrey Sachs, special adviser to
the U.N. Secretary-General on global poverty, reaches similar
conclusions in The End of Poverty, which asserts that
developed countries must transfer "about $100 [billion] to $180
billion per year for the period 2005 to 2015" to meet the MDGs and
that "Africa needs around $30 billion per year in aid in order to
escape from poverty."[15]
Two recent economic
studies, however, dismantle the arguments used by Sachs and
the U.N. for increased aid. Former World Bank economist
William Easterly specifically analyzed the evidence on whether
increased aid or investment can spur growth:
The classic
narrative-poor countries caught in poverty traps, out of which they
need a Big Push involving increased aid and investment, leading to
a takeoff in per capita income-has been very influential in
development economics. This was the original justification for
foreign aid…. Evidence to support the narrative is
scarce…. Takeoffs are rare in the data, most plausibly
limited to the Asian success stories. Even then, the takeoffs do
not seem strongly associated with aid or investment in the way the
standard Big Push narrative would imply.[16]
A 2005 study by two
economists at the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
corroborates this conclusion. Their research found "no
evidence that aid works better in better policy or geographical
environments, or that certain forms of aid work better than
others."[17] The same authors published a
subsequent study that concluded:
We examine one of the
most important and intriguing puzzles in economics: why it is so
hard to find a robust effect of aid on the long-term growth of poor
countries, even those with good policies…. We find that aid
inflows have systematic adverse effects on a country's
competitiveness, as reflected in a decline in the share of labor
intensive and tradable industries in the manufacturing sector. We
find evidence suggesting that these effects stem from the real
exchange rate overvaluation caused by aid inflows. By contrast,
private-to-private flows like remittances do not seem to create
these adverse effects.…[18]
A Better Strategy for
Development. This does not mean that
development is an unreachable goal. A World Bank study found that
increased integration into the world economy from the late
1970s to the late 1990s led to higher growth in income. The more
integrated countries achieved 5 percent average annual growth
in per capita income during the 1990s.[19] In contrast, the
non-globalizing nations experienced average growth of only 1.4
percent during the 1990s, and many experienced negative growth
rates.
A related World Bank
study found that increased growth resulting from expanded trade
"leads to proportionate increases in incomes of the poor" and that
"globalization leads to faster growth and poverty reduction in poor
countries."[20] Easterly concurs in his 2005 study,
finding "support for democratic institutions and economic freedom
as determinants of growth that explain the occasions under which
poor countries grow more slowly than rich countries."[21]
These studies support
research at The Heritage Foundation. Analysis of 11 years of
Index of Economic Freedom data[22] indicates that
the best way for countries to increase economic growth is to adopt
policies that promote economic freedom and the rule of law. The
Index analyzes 50 economic indicators in 10 independent
factors: trade policy, fiscal burden of government, government
intervention in the economy, monetary policy, capital flows and
foreign investment, banking and finance, wages and prices, property
rights, regulation, and informal market activity. These 10
factors are graded from 1 to 5, with 1 being the best score
and 5 being the worst. The scores are then averaged to give an
overall score for economic freedom. Countries are designated
"free," "mostly free," "mostly unfree," or "repressed" based on
their overall scores.
As shown in the
Index, "free" countries have an average per capita income
twice that of "mostly free" countries. "Mostly free" countries have
a per capita income more than three times that of "mostly unfree"
and "repressed" countries. This relationship exists because
countries that maintain policies that promote economic freedom
provide an environment that facilitates trade and encourages
entrepreneurial activity, which in turn generates economic growth.
Not only is a higher level of economic freedom clearly associated
with a higher level of per capita GDP, but higher GDP growth rates
are associated with improvements in a country's economic freedom
score.[23]
Charts 2 and 3
illustrate that this relationship holds for sub-Saharan Africa.[24]


Origins of the
MCA
The evident inadequacy
of development assistance in catalyzing economic growth and
development led the Bush Administration to propose the
Millennium Challenge Account. The MCA is an attempt to learn from
the development failures of the past by targeting assistance toward
low-income and lower-middle-income countries with a
demonstrable record of embracing policies linked to stronger
growth. As noted by Ambassador John Bolton:
In Monterrey, Mexico in
2002, we all made commitments to fight poverty through development.
We agreed that we had to change the models of the past, which
focused primarily on resource transfers, to solutions premised on
the proven methods of good governance, sound policies, the rule of
law, and mobilization of both public and private resources.[25]
The MCA is designed to
show countries how to enhance their prospects for economic growth
and development with the overarching goal of helping countries
graduate from the need for foreign assistance.
How Does the MCA
Work? While disagreement
remains over the effectiveness of aid, there is general agreement
that aid is far less effective in bad policy environments and can
prove counterproductive. The Millennium Challenge Corporation
(MCC), which runs the MCA, seeks to maximize chances that aid will
be used positively by focusing resources on countries with
good policies. Under the MCA, nations are eligible to receive
assistance only if they adopt policies associated with
improved economic growth.
To capitalize on this
evidence, the Administration identified three policy
areas-good governance, investment in health and education, and
promoting economic freedom-and 16 performance indicators that
measure these areas. (See text box, "MCA Criteria.")
To qualify for the MCA,
a country must score above the median[26] for half of the indicators
in each policy area-that is, it must be above the median in at
least three of the six performance indicators that measure
good governance, two of the four that measure investment in people,
and three of the six that measure economic freedom. It must also be
within specified income levels.[27] The Bush Administration
also has determined that countries must pass the "control of
corruption" indicator to qualify.[28] In addition, the MCC has
identified "threshold" countries that do not meet MCA criteria
but are eligible for MCA assistance in a limited manner based on
their commitment to "the reforms necessary to improve policy
performance and eventually qualify for MCA assistance."[29]
The MCA is a departure
from traditional development assistance. Recipient countries
possess an unusual degree of influence over the proposals and are
primarily responsible for implementation. The countries qualify
themselves through their policies and then initiate negotiations,
once deemed eligible, by proposing a comprehensive development
strategy to be funded by MCA grants and demonstrate how that
strategy would improve economic growth and reduce long-term
poverty. The MCC requires eligible countries to submit proposals
because these countries know the weaknesses in their economies and
their needs far better than do aid donors. While the MCC will
monitor implementation, progress toward targets, and fiscal
accountability measures, the hands-off approach requires careful
analysis in the initial stages to ensure that the proposals are
correctly implemented, are designed to facilitate economic
development, and possess adequate oversight.
Because the MCC is not
required to disburse appropriated funds annually, there is less
pressure to agree to questionable projects. The MCC evaluates
country proposals and offers advice or requests additional
information necessary to meet legislative requirements. Only when
both parties are satisfied with the development plan is an
agreement to disburse funds entered into. This negotiated
agreement is called a "compact" by the MCC.
Compacts totaling
$905.3 million with Cape Verde, Georgia, Honduras, Madagascar, and
Nicaragua are complete, and funds are being disbursed.[30]
Compacts are being negotiated with the 12 other countries eligible
for MCA funds.

What Is the MCA's
Relationship with Africa? As discussed, MCA
grants are awarded based on how a country performs against the
average in 16 different indicators. There are no regional quotas,
and political considerations are minimal. Even with this objective
determination, sub-Saharan Africa does quite well with Benin, Cape
Verde, Ghana, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique, and Senegal
deemed eligible for MCA grants from that region-nearly 50 percent
of the 17 countries eligible for MCA grants in 2004 and 2005.
Similarly, sub-Saharan Africa claims over half of the 13
countries selected as MCA threshold countries (Burkina Faso,
Kenya, Malawi, Sao Tome and Principe, Tanzania, Uganda, and
Zambia).
As would be expected
based on this ratio, two of the five countries that signed compacts
with the MCA as of October 15, 2005, are from sub-Saharan Africa.
Both Cape Verde and Madagascar signed compacts for $110 million in
2005. Furthermore, the MCC reports, "On July 22, 2005, Burkina Faso
became the first Threshold Country to be approved for MCA funding.
$12.9 million has been awarded to Burkina Faso for their Plan
designed to improve girls' primary education."[31]
The first steps of
developing the MCA compact process were slow. As a new approach to
aid emphasizing country ownership, both the MCC and the eligible
governments were uncertain as to how to proceed. After lengthy
negotiations, however, the process did achieve a development
program targeting country priorities. Two examples from sub-Saharan
Africa:
-
Cape Verde settled on a
compact addressing four impediments to economic growth: severe
water scarcity, lack of adequate infrastructure, weak institutional
support for the private sector, and an insufficiently trained
work force. MCA grants focus on increasing agricultural
productivity by improving water management, improving agribusiness
development services, and increasing access to credit and capacity
of financial institutions; integrating internal markets and
reducing transportation costs by improving road infrastructure and
upgrading the Port of Praia; and developing the private sector by
improving the investment climate and reforming the financial
sector.[32]
-
Madagascar requested
support to address its poorly functioning financial system that
does not serve the rural poor and a weak land-titling system that
impedes investment in poor rural areas and access to credit. MCA
grants will support formalizing the titling and surveying
systems, modernizing the national land registry, and decentralizing
services to rural citizens; expand financial services to rural
areas, improve credit skills training, and streamline a national
payments system; and assist farmers and entrepreneurs in
identifying new markets and improve their production and marketing
practices.[33]
Compact negotiations
with other countries continue. While the slow speed of
negotiations was a universal disappointment, experience and a more
regularized process should speed future compacts. Indeed, the speed
of negotiations has reportedly improved since the first compact was
signed, and the MCC is using its funds to facilitate ongoing
negotiations. For example, the MCC approved a $3.275 million grant
in August 2005 to assist Ghana in developing its MCA compact.
According to the MCA, Ghana wants to use MCA funds to enhance its
position as an exporter of high-value fruit and vegetables by
improving the investment climate, roads, irrigation, training, and
access to finance.[34]
Hopefully, Ghana will
sign its compact soon and benefit from that assistance. However,
the real benefit from the MCA for Ghana and other nations lies
in its ability to support and encourage policy change among
candidate countries competing for MCA grants. It is progress toward
economic freedom and the rule of law that will ultimately
determine the economic fate of sub-Saharan Africa and
represents the true potential for the MCA to help bolster economic
growth and development.
The evidence thus far
indicates that such an influence exists. Even before the MCA
approved its first grant, it spurred reform among candidate
countries. For instance, one of the economic indicators used by the
MCA to determine eligibility is the number of days it takes to open
a business. It chose this indicator as a measure of the
regulatory burden on entrepreneurship and business
investment.
According to the World
Bank, which is the source for this indicator, establishing a
business in sub-Saharan Africa took 74 days on average in 2004 (the
MCA's first year). In 2006, the average had fallen to 63 days and,
out of the 31 countries measured in both 2004 and 2006, 17
countries reduced the number of days required versus only five
that increased the number of days required.[35] Moreover, six
countries not measured in Doing Business in 2004
provided the World Bank the data necessary to conduct their
measurement in the 2006 edition. Thus, the opportunity to
receive MCA grants is both providing an incentive for countries to
improve their business environment and encouraging
transparency.
Another example is the
interest MCA candidate countries have expressed in how the Index
of Economic Freedom measures trade policy (another MCA
measure) and how they could improve their score. This interest has
arisen among MCA-eligible countries and those hoping to qualify in
the future.
Conclusion
The lessons from nearly
five decades of development efforts indicate that sub-Saharan
Africa needs policy change far more than increased aid. Indeed,
recent studies question whether aid benefits development at
all. While there may be a role for assistance and donor
nations, the key to development lies in the hands of governments in
developing countries.
For development to
occur, governments must remove obstacles preventing their people
from seizing opportunities to benefit them, their families,
and their communities. This is best done by adopting the policies
that bolster economic freedom, good governance, and the rule
of law-policies that are the key to economic growth and
development with or without foreign assistance. As noted by
President Bush in 2002,
When nations close
their markets and opportunity is hoarded by a privileged few, no
amount of development aid is ever enough. When nations respect
their people, open markets, invest in better health and education,
every dollar of aid, every dollar of trade revenue and domestic
capital is used more effectively.[36]
By focusing assistance
on countries that are committed to policies conducive to
economic growth and development, the MCA sends the right
message that developing countries cannot be passive in
development, relying on aid, but must undertake reform to make it
possible. The MCA captures the nature of this partnership by
creating incentives for poor nations to adopt economic freedom, the
rule of law, and good governance. As noted in The Road to
Prosperity:
In technical terms it
is not the level of poverty that is most vicious, but rather the
absence of change or opportunity to escape that poverty. Where the
20th century approach produced a vicious cycle of aid, default, and
dependency on foreign governments, the IMF, or the World Bank, the
21st century holds out the prospect that countries can generate
growth and prosperity themselves, without foreign interference.[37]
Brett D.
Schaefer is Jay Kingham Fellow in International
Regulatory Affairs in the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, a
division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for
International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation. Anthony Kim, a
Research Associate in the Center for International Trade and
Economics, and intern Mark Williams also contributed to the
research for this paper, which was submitted to a conference on
economic freedom hosted by the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA),
in collaboration with the Friedrich Naumann Foundation, and held in
Accra, Ghana, on November 6-8, 2005.
[1]Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development, International Development
Statistics.
[2]U.S. Department of
State, "The U.S. Approach to International Development: Building on
the Monterrey Consensus," September 12, 2005, at
www.state.gov/r/pa/scp/2005/53037.htm.
[3]Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development, International Development
Statistics.
[4]"President Proposes
$5 Billion Plan to Help Developing Nations," Remarks by President
George W. Bush on Global Development, White House, Office of the
Press Secretary, March 14, 2002, at
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/03/20020314-7.html.
[5]"Ends Without
Means," The Economist, September 11, 2004, p. 72.
[6]Indeed, nearly
every country in sub-Saharan Africa improved in life expectancy,
literacy, maternal mortality, and infant mortality (all of which
are MDG indicators) from 1970 to 1990. Yet few countries
experienced increased economic growth and development. World Bank,
World Development Indicators 2005.
[7]Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development, International Development
Statistics, at www.oecd.org/dataoecd/50/17/ 5037721.htm
(September 14, 2005), and World Bank, World Development
Indicators 2005, at www.worldbank.org/data/onlinedatabases/
onlinedatabases.html (September 14, 2005; subscription
required).
[8]This figure
actually understates external contributions to development by
ignoring private-sector contributions to development. This
oversight not only dramatically underestimates development
resources, but also ignores the most effective resources. As
observed in the U.S. Institute of Peace's American Interests and
UN Reform, "Most resources for economic development and
sustainable poverty reduction come through trade, private financial
flows, international charitable organizations and expatriate
remittances. The 0.7 percent of GDP target would be more
meaningful if other contributions relevant to development were
incorporated into this calculation, including private charitable
donations." Using such a calculation, the U.S. Agency for
International Development estimates that total U.S. assistance to
developing countries may have been five times its official
development assistance in 2000. Other efforts to measure
contributions to development, such as the Commitment to
Development Index, which ranks the U.S. twelfth out of 21 nations,
similarly portray U.S. contributions more positively than a
simple measure of government assistance as a percentage of GNP. See
U.S. Institute of Peace, American Interests and UN Reform:
Report of the Task Force on the United Nations (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2005), p. 107, at
www.usip.org/un/report/usip_un_report.pdf (September 14,
2005); U.S. Agency for International Development, Foreign Aid
and the National Interest: Promoting Freedom, Security, and
Opportunity (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Agency for International
Development, 2002), p. 131, Table 6.1, at
www.usaid.gov/fani/Full_Report--Foreign_Aid_in_the_National_Interest.pdf
(September 14, 2005); and Center for Global Development,
Commitment to Development Index, at
www.cgdev.org/section/initiatives/_active/cdi (September 14,
2005).
[9]Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development, International Development
Statistics, at www.oecd.org/dataoecd/50/17/ 5037721.htm
(September 14, 2005), and World Bank, World Development
Indicators 2005, at www.worldbank.org/data/onlinedatabases/
onlinedatabases.html (September 14, 2005; subscription
required).
[10]GDP data before
1950 were not available or were subject to question. GDP data for
the other Marshall Plan recipients were not available. This is
unlikely to change the overall picture, however, as France,
Germany, and the U.K. were by far the largest recipients of
Marshall Plan funds.
[11]Craig Burnside and
David Dollar, "Aid, Policies, and Growth," World Bank, Policy
Research Department, Macroeconomic and Growth Division, June 1997,
and World Bank, Assessing Aid: What Works, What Doesn't, and
Why (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1998).
[12]Other studies
arrive at similar conclusions. For example, economists Richard Roll
and John Talbott support this conclusion with evidence that the
economic, legal, and political institutions of a country explain
more than 80 percent of the international variation in real per
capita income between 1995 and 1999 in more than 130 countries.
Richard Roll and John Talbott, "Developing Countries That Aren't,"
unpublished manuscript, University of California at Los
Angeles, November 13, 2001, p. 3. Other comparable studies include
Paul Collier and Jan Willem Gunning, "Why Has Africa Grown Slowly?"
Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 13, No. 3 (September
1999), pp. 3-22; Robert J. Barro and Xavier Sala-i-Martin,
Economic Growth (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1995); Jeffrey D.
Sachs and Andrew Warner, "Economic Reform and the Process of Global
Integration," in William C. Brainard and George L. Perry,
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1995 (Washington,
D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1995), pp. 1-118; and David
Dollar, "Outward-Oriented Developing Economies Really Do Grow More
Rapidly: Evidence from 95 LDCs, 1976-1985," Economic Development
and Cultural Change, Vol. 40, No. 3 (April 1992), pp.
523-544.
[13]William Easterly,
"Can Foreign Aid Buy Growth?" Journal of Economic
Perspectives, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Summer 2003), pp. 23-48, at
www.nyu.edu/fas/institute/dri/Easterly/File/EasterlyJEP03.pdf
(September 21, 2005).
[14]U.N. Millennium
Project, Overview Report, 2005, p. 19, at
www.unmillenniumproject.org/reports/index_overview.htm
(September 21, 2005).
[15]Jeffery D. Sachs,
The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for Our Time (New
York: Penguin Press, 2005), pp. 298-300 and 309.
[16]William Easterly,
"Reliving the 50s: The Big Push, Poverty Traps, and Takeoffs in
Economic Development," Northwestern University, Kellogg School of
Management seminar, June 1, 2005, at
www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/finance/faculty/seminars/easterly_william.pdf
(September 21, 2005). Emphasis added.
[17]Raghuram G. Rajan
and Arvind Subramanian, "Aid and Growth: What Does the
Cross-Country Evidence Really Show?" National Bureau of Economic
Research Working Paper No. 11513, abstract, July 2005, at
papers.nber.org/papers/w11513 (September 14,
2005).
[18]Raghuram G. Rajan
and Arvind Subramanian, "What Undermines Aid's Impact on Growth?"
National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No.
11657, abstract, October 2005, at
www.nber.org/papers/w11657.
[19]Paul Collier and
David Dollar, Globalization, Growth, and Poverty: Building an
Inclusive World Economy (Washington, D.C.: World Bank and
Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 5.
[20]David Dollar and
Aart Kraay, "Trade, Growth, and Poverty," World Bank, Development
Research Group, abstract of draft, March 2001, at
www.worldbank.org/research/growth/pdfiles/Trade5.pdf
(September 14, 2005).
[21]Easterly,
"Reliving the 50s," p. 29.
[22]See Marc A. Miles,
Edwin J. Feulner, and Mary Anastasia O'Grady, 2005 Index of
Economic Freedom (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage
Foundation and Dow Jones & Company, Inc., 2005), at
www.heritage.org/index (September 21, 2005).
[23]Marc A. Miles,
"Introduction," in Marc A. Miles, Edwin J. Feulner, and Mary
Anastasia O'Grady, 2004 Index of Economic Freedom
(Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation and Dow Jones &
Company, Inc., 2004), p. 21.
[24]There are no
"free" economies in sub-Saharan Africa, although Botswana ranks
among the 40 freest economies and continues to improve
steadily.
[25]John Bolton, U.S.
Ambassador to the U.N., open letter on the draft outcome document,
August 30, 2005, at www.un.int/usa/
reform-un-jrb-ltr-dev-8-05.pdf (September 14, 2005).
[26]The median for
each indicator is calculated from the indicator values for all
countries in the same per capita income group.
[27]For fiscal year
2006, low-income countries with a per capita gross national income
of $1,575 or less and lower-middle-income countries with a per
capita GNI between $1,575 and $3,255 or less are eligible for MCA
assistance. In previous years, only low-income countries were
considered. The median scores for each income group will be
computed separately. For FY 2006 there were 69 low-income countries
and 29 lower-middle-income countries identified as candidates for
MCA grants. Millennium Challenge Corporation, "Report on
Countries That Are Candidates for Millennium Challenge Account
Eligibility in Fiscal Year 2006 and Countries That Would Be
Candidates But For Legal Prohibitions," at
www.mca.gov/countries/candidate/FY06_candidate_report.pdf.
[28]On May 6, 2004,
the board of directors announced 16 eligible countries for 2004
(Armenia, Benin, Bolivia, Cape Verde, Georgia, Ghana, Honduras,
Lesotho, Madagascar, Mali, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nicaragua,
Senegal, Sri Lanka, and Vanuatu) and dispatched teams to educate
these countries about the MCA and the proposal process. On November
8, 2004, the MCC identified 16 eligible countries for 2005.
(Morocco was added for 2005, and Cape Verde was dropped because its
per capita income exceeded the legislated threshold, although in
2006 it should be eligible for MCA grants as a lower-middle-income
country.)
[29]Thirteen countries
have been identified as threshold countries-seven countries for
2004 Threshold funding (Albania, East Timor, Kenya, Sao Tome and
Principe, Tanzania, Uganda, and Yemen) and six countries for 2005
(Burkina Faso, Guyana, Malawi, Paraguay, Philippines, and Zambia).
Millennium Challenge Corporation, "Threshold Program," at
www.mca.gov/countries/threshold/threshold_guidance_en_FY05.shtml.
[30]Millennium
Challenge Corporation, "Report on Countries That Are Candidates for
Millennium Challenge Account Eligibility in Fiscal Year 2006 and
Countries That Would Be Candidates But For Legal
Prohibitions."
[31]Millennium
Challenge Corporation, "Threshold Countries," at
www.mca.gov/countries/threshold/index.shtml.
[32]Millennium
Challenge Corporation, "Summary of the Millennium Challenge Compact
with the Republic of Cape Verde," at www.mca.gov/
about_us/congressional_notifications/071205-cn_CapeVerde.pdf.
[33]Millennium
Challenge Corporation, "Summary of the Millennium Challenge Compact
with the Republic of Madagascar," at www.mca.gov/
about_us/congressional_notifications/042605-cn_Madgascar_compact.pdf.
[35]World Bank,
Doing Business in 2006: Creating Jobs (Washington, D.C.:
World Bank, 2006), pp. 95-97, and Doing Business in 2004:
Understanding Regulation (Washington, D.C.: World Bank,
2004), pp. 118-120.
[36]George W. Bush, "A
New Compact for Development in the Battle Against World Poverty,"
March 22, 2002, at http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/
itgic/0402/ijge/gj01.htm.
[37]Marc A. Miles,
ed., The Road to Prosperity: The 21st Century Approach to
Economic Development (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage
Foundation, 2004), p. 8.