If the U.S. has good, actionable intelligence against Al Qaeda
leaders in the tribal areas, it should certainly act on it - in
coordination with the Pakistani leadership. In fact, we have
already seen at least two targeted attacks against suspected
hide-outs of Al Qaeda deputy Ayman Zawahiri in Bajaur, one in
January 2006 and another in October 2006. These attacks demonstrate
that when actionable intelligence is available, it will be acted
on.
While I agree that eliminating the burgeoning terrorist haven in
Pakistan's borderlands should be Washington's No. 1
counter-terrorism goal in 2008, I disagree, Brian, on the best way
to achieve this goal. Taking precipitous U.S. unilateral military
action on Pakistani territory could backfire and worsen the global
terrorist threat emanating from South Asia. Such action could lead
to a revolt within the Pakistani military, thereby destabilizing
the Pakistani government and tipping the balance in favor of
Islamist extremists. It could be just the sort of destabilizing
event Al Qaeda needs to make a run at controlling Pakistan and its
nuclear assets.
Barack Obama overlooks the fact that the Pakistanis are already
cooperating with the U.S. against Al Qaeda targets, having captured
and handed over several senior Al Qaeda leaders, including 9/11
mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed. Obama also fails to take account
of the close coordination that exists between U.S. and Pakistani
forces in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border areas. Although there may
not be U.S. forces stationed on Pakistani soil, they operate just
over the border in Afghanistan and communicate regularly with their
Pakistani counterparts. Pakistan has about 100,000 troops stationed
near the border with Afghanistan.
One problem with statements like Obama's is that they come across
as direct threats to the Pakistani public and create a sense of
insecurity about the U.S. role in the region. Instead of making
threatening statements, we should focus on convincing Pakistanis
that these terrorists pose a direct threat to their own national
security interests and on developing a joint strategic approach to
addressing the problem. CIA Director Michael V. Hayden recently
made this point when he commented that the turmoil in Pakistan over
the last few weeks has deepened U.S.-Pakistan cooperation and
highlighted our mutual interests.
Besides getting Pakistan onboard with a strategy that pools our
intelligence and brings U.S. military resources to bear on the
situation in the tribal areas, Washington also needs to persuade
Pakistan to proactively undermine the Taliban/Al Qaeda ideology and
break entirely with Islamist militancy. Remaining sympathies and
links between elements of the Pakistani security establishment and
Islamist militant groups that previously fought in Kashmir or with
the Taliban in Afghanistan hamper Pakistan's ability to gain the
upper hand against the extremist threat.
Last July's showdown at the Red Mosque was a turning point in
Pakistan's battle with extremism. Most of the suicide bombings over
the last six months, which have targeted Pakistani security forces,
are retaliation for the military operation at the mosque. The
situation in Pakistan is fluid and delicate and requires strategic
diplomacy, not provocative statements.
I disagree with the idea that publicly conditioning U.S.
assistance on "performance and outcomes" will serve U.S.
counter-terrorism objectives in Pakistan. It will only feed the
perception that the U.S. is using Pakistan to achieve its own
goals, rather than demonstrate that the U.S. and Pakistan are
partners in the battle against extremism.
Lisa Curtis is a
senior research fellow in the Asian Studies Center at the Heritage
Foundation.
First appeared in the LA Times Online