

# The Balkans Emerge as America's Energy Security Partner in Europe

*Max Primorac*

## KEY TAKEAWAYS

Affordable U.S. energy can help Europe to revive its economy, pay for its military build-up, and end its reliance on Russian gas.

At the 2026 Three Seas Initiative summit, the United States advanced gas, nuclear, and data center deals that make the Balkans a gateway for U.S. energy to Europe.

The Trump Administration correctly views the Balkans not as a social re-engineering project, but as a serious energy security partner.

The topic of American energy security, especially as it relates to Europe, is timely. The current fast pace of energy integration is such that in the years to come we may look back at 2026 as the inflection point of a new and powerful transatlantic energy security condominium.

Today, we face two major regional conflicts—the one in Ukraine and the one with Iran and its regional proxies. Both wars are significantly impacting Europe's energy security, exposing its economic vulnerability to external shocks. This is happening while Europe is making radical policy shifts away from energy dependence on cheap Russian oil and gas while it scales up its NATO defense spending. And there is, of course, the broader multifaceted threat posed by communist China that takes advantage of Europe's high energy costs to displace Europe as a global manufacturing hub.

---

This paper, in its entirety, can be found at <http://report.heritage.org/hl1351>

The Heritage Foundation | 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE | Washington, DC 20002 | (202) 546-4400 | [heritage.org](http://heritage.org)

Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reflecting the views of The Heritage Foundation or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress.

The result has been the loss of thousands of well-paying jobs. From a U.S. national security angle, especially as America prepares for a possible conflict with China, we need a stronger and wealthier Europe able to defend itself in a war with Russia. Energy security is central to achieving that goal.

The past year has seen the Administration of President Donald Trump engage in an aggressive commercial diplomatic campaign to press Europe to look to the United States as its main energy partner. In particular, the Administration has focused on the Western Balkans as a region ripe for providing strategic entry points for U.S. liquefied natural gas (LNG) to power Europe.

## America Poised to Power Europe

Before discussing U.S. energy intensification in the Western Balkans, allow me to talk about the larger transatlantic context within which this opportunity has emerged.

Last year's mega trade agreement struck between the United States and the European Union in Turnberry, Scotland, saw the EU make a historic commitment of \$750 billion in future U.S. energy purchases.<sup>1</sup> Already, the U.S. is Europe's largest provider of LNG—constituting 58 percent of total LNG imports, which is 25 percent of Europe's total gas consumption.<sup>2</sup> We are inundated by the media with so much negative noise about the U.S. and Europe drifting apart, but this data point alone shows the organic deepening rather than drifting apart of the transatlantic alliance.

That said, we cannot ignore that there are deep philosophical differences across the Atlantic Ocean over the proper role of the state in directing energy policy and what that policy posture should look like. Those deep differences have been an obstacle to accelerating stronger transatlantic energy ties.<sup>3</sup>

Yet strengthening those energy ties is of the utmost importance, as cheap energy is foundational to a credible NATO defense upgrade. Neither can we ensure the economic vitality needed to generate tax revenues to finance increased defense budgets and to respond to growing socioeconomic populist frustration with low economic growth rates and high unemployment throughout Europe, especially among youth, without it.<sup>4</sup>

So, at a time when strategic threats call for greater transatlantic alignment in our respective energy security approaches, the reality is that there remains substantial room for bettering the transatlantic energy security relationship. Recent events in the Western Balkans, I believe, indicate that this alignment is inevitable, and sooner rather than later.

## Diverging Energy Policies and Results

What are those differences? Only two years ago, President Joe Biden's radical climate agenda echoed that of Europe, with massive multibillion-dollar subsidies for green transition, severe restrictions on oil and gas permitting (no new drilling), and the pursuit of aggressive climate regulations designed to end manufacturing reliance on oil, gas, and coal. The climate agenda even permeated every aspect of the U.S. foreign aid portfolio.<sup>5</sup> The result of those policies is like what Europe is experiencing today: Americans suffered from high energy costs and high inflation. We lost many private-sector jobs—especially to China. Our automobile sector was collapsing as few Americans wanted to buy electric vehicles, even with generous tax subsidies. Under President Biden's energy policies, the U.S. was aligned with Europe's decarbonization agenda and causing widespread economic suffering across America.

Geopolitically, the Western Balkans found itself vulnerable to external manipulation and exploitation, whether from Russian active measures campaigns or communist China's unfair practices to win public infrastructure tenders through bribes, under-cost bidding, and poor labor, environmental, and safety standards.<sup>6</sup>

Those days are gone!

The re-election of Donald Trump in November 2024 saw U.S. government energy policy do a 180-degree turn<sup>7</sup> that included withdrawing from the Paris climate accord, canceling billions in green-energy government subsidies, terminating government mandates forcing the automobile sector to produce electric vehicles, lifting regulatory constraints on fossil fuels, and ending climate-related foreign aid programs. The White House launched an aggressive campaign to promote U.S. oil and gas exports<sup>8</sup> as the core of its national security strategy<sup>9</sup>—seeking global energy dominance—as well as being the foundation for economic growth and expanding the middle class.

Here we are, 18 months after President Trump took office. So, what are the results?

1. The United States has become the world's largest producer of oil. We produce almost 23 million barrels of oil equivalents per day—20 percent of the world's total production.<sup>10</sup> That compares to Russia's 10 million barrels and more than double that of Saudi Arabia. We are also the largest producer of natural gas with over 107 billion cubic feet per day,<sup>11</sup> about double Russia's production and four times more than China. We are 26 percent of global LNG exports. If you include

allies Australia and Qatar, that grows to over 60 percent of global LNG exports. That is energy dominance, and it will only get stronger.<sup>12</sup>

2. U.S. energy expansion has led to widening disparities in the cost of energy between EU countries and the U.S. with major implications for our respective economies. Electricity in the U.S. costs 25 euros per megawatt hour vs. 80 euros in Germany and 100 euros in the United Kingdom.<sup>13</sup> The impact of the cost of energy on global economic competitiveness cannot be overstated.
3. Let's look at America's economic growth. Consider that the Trump Administration has cut over 350,000 public-sector jobs—nearly 12 percent of the federal workforce.<sup>14</sup> The cost of government therefore has plummeted, especially if you include billions of dollars in climate subsidies and grants to nonprofits that have been terminated by the Administration.<sup>15</sup> Second, more than three million illegal immigrants have left the United States, either through deportation or by self-deporting.<sup>16</sup> Some would expect that these events together would substantially drive down domestic consumption and drag down overall economic growth. That has not happened. In fact, economic growth in the United States has been above 2 percent since President Trump took office in January 2025. Employment levels remain steady with strong private-sector job growth and no public-sector hiring. This is wealth generation, not wealth redistribution, driving economic growth, and it is on a massive scale for a \$32 trillion economy.<sup>17</sup>
4. In contrast, Europe is undergoing rapid deindustrialization. In Germany, high energy costs and suffocating regulations are causing much economic damage. Last year, Germany, the engine of Europe's economy, lost 177,000 manufacturing jobs and is losing 10,000 such jobs per month.<sup>18</sup> Volkswagen recently announced it will cut another 50,000 jobs.<sup>19</sup> Germany cannot compete with China, and it is losing substantial global capital export market share.
5. High energy costs prevent Europe from keeping pace with communist China and the United States on the artificial intelligence revolution, which requires massive energy-sucking data centers.<sup>20</sup> Europe could find itself falling far behind technologically and economically compared to other parts of the world. The impact on its future economic growth would be substantial.

6. All that said, Europe deserves high praise for ending its dependence on Russian gas, which has been financing Putin's war machine, despite the economic pain. Brussels has imposed a legally binding phase-out of Russian gas purchases by the end of next year.<sup>21</sup> In January, EU-based companies will be prohibited from selling Russian natural gas to third parties.<sup>22</sup> Finding alternative energy resources is inexorably driving closer U.S.–Europe energy ties.

## The Three Seas Initiative Energy Nexus

Now that we have looked at the global transatlantic energy landscape, let us assess the impact of last April's Three Seas Initiative (3SI) summit in Dubrovnik, Croatia. I believe this summit was quite significant as it was meant to be an inflection point not only for the Balkans but for Europe as a whole. A few months prior, U.S. Energy Secretary Chris Wright and the Chair of President Trump's National Energy Dominance Council, U.S. Interior Secretary Doug Burgum, hosted a Transatlantic Gas Security summit for energy ministers from Central Europe and the Balkans.<sup>23</sup> In Dubrovnik the U.S. government presented its thesis of "energy security as national security," in which the U.S. government offers Europe a choice to consider America as its primary source of external energy.<sup>24</sup>

The initiative's first summit was held in 2016 in direct response to an uncomfortable recognition of the poor north-south linkages among the former Warsaw Pact countries.<sup>25</sup> Instead of being integrated regionally, each country's rail, road, energy, and other infrastructure during the Cold War was deliberately connected to and under the control of Moscow. That legacy has left behind an estimated \$1 trillion infrastructure gap.

Only two years before the initial 3SI summit in Dubrovnik, Russia had invaded Ukraine for the first time in 2014. Central Europe faced serious logistical vulnerabilities to defend itself against a larger Russian invasion. Hence the 3SI's focus on developing the region's north-south transportation, energy, and digital interconnectivity. The 3SI was specifically created to break its member countries' energy dependence on Russia. That mission is more salient today as Russia continues to attack Ukraine and still poses an existential threat to Europe.

The 13-member organization is composed of countries located between the Adriatic, Baltic, and Black Seas (hence, three seas) with a combined population of 120 million people. Poland, a key member, is now the 20th-largest economy in the world.<sup>26</sup> In fact, the initiative is the brainchild of Poland and Croatia. The United States, Germany, and the European Union are strategic partners, and Japan and Turkey are also closely involved.

It is important to note that President Trump spoke at the second 3SI summit that was held here in Warsaw in 2017. President Trump considers the speech he gave here as the defining philosophy of his Administration in which he posits that liberal democracy in the West can only survive with values based on the Christian faith and the stability of families.<sup>27</sup> The Warsaw speech was a tribute to the resilience of the Polish people—mentioning John Paul the Great and Lech Walesa as heroes—to overcome centuries of foreign occupation and terror. So, it is no surprise that in a second Trump Administration the White House would pay close attention to the 3SI. Trump is a fan. I strongly recommend reading the speech. It will give you a perspective about President Trump’s worldview that you will never get from a biased media.

## Dubrovnik Summit Wins

Let me now talk about the details of the Dubrovnik summit. The U.S. government focused on its energy security agenda, describing it as a national security agenda.<sup>28</sup> The summit was held just weeks before the 36th NATO summit in Ankara, Turkey—in July 2026—in which NATO members again pledged to spend 1.5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) on civilian-military dual-use infrastructure. Energy security took center stage. Also in July, NATO approved 27 billion euros to upgrade its fuel supply-chain infrastructure over the next five years.<sup>29</sup>

For Washington, these many events are directly tied to a strategic desire for Europe to grow faster economically and become financially able to execute its ambitious military build-up. In Dubrovnik, U.S. Secretary of Energy Wright described the region as “where the prosperous, long-term, energized, future of Europe is coming from.” That was not rhetorical flair. Poland, as I mentioned, is now the world’s 20th-largest economy and recently announced it will build a third LNG terminal to feed gas to Slovakia and Ukraine,<sup>30</sup> making Poland a major regional gas hub that further marginalizes Russia, and by extension China.

The Dubrovnik summit itself saw major deals signed, including:

- A \$1.5 billion Southern Interconnection Gas Pipeline<sup>31</sup> that will extend the LNG terminal in northern Croatia down the Dalmatian Coast to Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina. Sarajevo imports 96 percent of its natural gas needs from Russia but must terminate those imports by 2028. This pipeline project will be America’s largest single investment in the region and could eventually pull Serbia out of Russia’s orbit. As

I testified before Congress last December,<sup>32</sup> Serbia must be integrated into the West for the Balkans to achieve long-term stability. The deal includes construction of two power plants in Bosnia and Herzegovina that will be a boon to the country's languishing economy.

- The U.S. government also signed agreements with Croatia and Slovenia on upgrading and building new nuclear energy facilities, especially small modular reactors. So have Poland, Bulgaria, and Romania. Poland calls nuclear-based energy “the foundation block of new security.”<sup>33</sup>
- A surprise at the summit was the announcement of a U.S.-based investment to develop a next-generation data center in Croatia, worth tens of billions of dollars.<sup>34</sup> The project would enhance regional digital infrastructure. The deal depends on access to cheap energy. Croatia's good mix of LNG, hydroelectric power, and nuclear energy makes that expectation realistic.

## Greece as a Major U.S. Energy Ally

Greece joined the 3SI as a full member only three years ago, and its membership represents a boost to the U.S.-led energy transformation of Central Europe. Greece recently became a key gas importer connecting the Aegean to the Balkans and beyond. Last November at the Sixth Partnership for Transatlantic Energy Cooperation (P-TEC) gathering, the Greek government signed an offshore drilling deal with ExxonMobil.<sup>35</sup> Over 70 percent of Greece's LNG imports come from America and totaled over \$1 billion last year.

Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis explained that “in 2020 we were merely a destination for gas...and in 2024 we witnessed a completely different picture.”<sup>36</sup> Then, Greece imported six billion cubic meters of gas for internal use, and now it imports three times as much. Greece is now a key entry point for American LNG flowing through the Balkan Vertical Gas Corridor.

During the 3SI summit in Dubrovnik, the U.S., Greece, and Albania agreed to purchase another \$6 billion of U.S. LNG.<sup>37</sup> Montenegro has engaged in a series of talks with the U.S. leading to last month's agreement to partner on infrastructure projects including pipeline extensions to connect into the larger Albanian and Croatian natural gas networks.<sup>38</sup>

In July, the U.S. and Serbia initiated the first strategic dialogue between the two countries, highlighting greater energy cooperation.<sup>39</sup> As Serbia

remains a key Russian energy partner, heightened economic collaboration would be a positive step in moving the country westward. Europe should encourage it.

## Conclusion

The point of providing these examples is to highlight the fast and intensive pace with which the U.S. seeks to help Europe minimize its current energy vulnerabilities by providing it with cheap and secure energy sources to fuel its economic expansion. I also wanted to show you how the Balkan region has become central to achieving that strategic goal.

My final point: The Trump Administration has appointed political ambassadors to the region where traditionally these top posts were reserved for career diplomats. Political ambassadors naturally enjoy better access to the White House, and all have been instructed to aggressively pursue commercial diplomacy to advance U.S. interests and business opportunities and displace the presence of Russia and China. Balkan officials that are in contact with The Heritage Foundation are excited about what they see as a strong signal from the White House that America looks at the Balkans no longer through the prism of a social re-engineering project (nation-building) but as serious strategic energy partners.

That is very good news for the United States and its transatlantic partners and very bad news for Russia and China.

Thank you.

**Max Primorac** is Senior Research Fellow in the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom at The Heritage Foundation. This *Lecture* is adapted from a special address delivered to the European Democrat Students, the youth organization of the European People's Party, in Warsaw, Poland, on August 1, 2026.

## Endnotes

1. The White House, "The United States and European Union Reach Massive Trade Deal," Fact Sheet, July 28, 2025, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/07/fact-sheet-the-united-states-and-european-union-reach-massive-trade-deal/> (accessed September 22, 2026).
2. Kate Abnett, "EU's Rising Reliance on U.S. Gas Brings Risks, Regulators Warn," Reuters, May 13, 2026, <https://www.reuters.com/sustainability/boards-policy-regulation/europes-reliance-us-gas-set-rise-research-report-says-2026-05-13/> (accessed September 22, 2026).
3. International Democracy Union, "Resolution on Transatlantic Energy Security and LNG Cooperation," December 5, 2025, <https://idu.org/resolution-on-transatlantic-energy-security-and-lng-cooperation/> (accessed September 22, 2026).
4. Youth unemployment in the EU stands at 15.5 percent. European Commission, "Unemployment Statistics," Eurostat, June 2026, [https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Unemployment\\_statistics#Youth\\_unemployment](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Unemployment_statistics#Youth_unemployment) (accessed September 22, 2026).
5. Scott Waldman and Sara Schonhardt, "USAID Might Stop Climate Aid, Boost Fossil Fuels Under Trump," *E&E News*, March 27, 2024, <https://www.eenews.net/articles/usaids-might-stop-climate-aid-boost-fossil-fuels-under-trump/> (accessed September 22, 2026).
6. Max Primorac, "Flashpoint: A Path Toward Stability in the Western Balkans," testimony before the Subcommittee on Europe, Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, December 2, 2025, <https://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA14/20251202/118682/HHRG-119-FA14-Wstate-PrimoracM-20251202.pdf> (accessed September 22, 2026).
7. The White House, "Putting America First in International Environmental Agreements," Presidential Actions, January 20, 2025, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/putting-america-first-in-international-environmental-agreements/> (accessed September 22, 2026).
8. The White House, "Unleashing American Energy," Executive Order, January 20, 2025, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/unleashing-american-energy/> (accessed September 22, 2026).
9. The White House, "National Security Strategy of the United States of America," November 2025, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf> (accessed September 22, 2026).
10. Georgia Williams, "10 Top Oil-producing Countries," Investing News Network, March 26, 2026, <https://investingnews.com/daily/resource-investing/energy-investing/oil-and-gas-investing/top-oil-producing-countries/> (accessed September 23, 2026).
11. News release, U.S. Energy Information Administration, "EIA Releases the Annual Energy Outlook 2026," April 8, 2026, <https://www.eia.gov/pressroom/releases/press587.php> (accessed September 23, 2026).
12. U.S. Energy Information Administration, "Today in Energy," In-Brief Analysis, July 14, 2026, <https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=67864> (accessed September 23, 2026).
13. William Rampe, "Europe's Electricity Prices Are Far Higher than Prices in the United States," Institute for Energy Research, December 9, 2025, <https://www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/the-grid/europes-electricity-prices-are-far-higher-than-prices-in-the-united-states/> (accessed September 23, 2026).
14. Opinion, "Paring the Government Payroll," *The Wall Street Journal*, April 3, 2026, <http://www.wsj.com/opinion/jobs-report-government-payroll-trump-administration-df2bec90> (accessed September 23, 2026).
15. United States Environmental Protection Agency, "Greenhouse Gas Reduction Fund," September 30, 2025, <https://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/greenhouse-gas-reduction-fund> (accessed September 23, 2026).
16. Brittany Miller, "DHS Touts Millions of Illegal Immigrant Departures as Border Crossings Drop 94% Under Trump," Fox News, May 21, 2026, <https://www.foxnews.com/politics/dhs-touts-millions-illegal-immigrant-departures-border-crossings-drop-94-under-trump> (accessed September 23, 2026).
17. United States Congress Joint Economic Committee, "GDP Update: Q2 2026, Advance Estimate," July 30, 2026, <https://www.jec.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/republicans/gdp-update> (accessed September 23, 2026).
18. "Germany's Slow Industrial Suicide," *The Wall Street Journal*, May 20, 2026, <https://www.wsj.com/opinion/german-autos-climate-mandates-regulations-abdc041d> (accessed September 23, 2026).
19. Stephen Wilmot, "Volkswagen Warns It May Need to Cut 50,000 More Jobs," *The Wall Street Journal*, July 13, 2026, <https://www.wsj.com/business/autos/volkswagen-layoffs-job-cuts-fl689b6c> (accessed September 23, 2026).
20. M. Ciani, "Running into a Debacle: The Mismatch Between the EU's AI Ambition and Its Energy Planning," Kiel Institute *Policy Brief* No. 208, April 2026, <https://www.kielinstitut.de/publications/running-into-a-debacle-the-mismatch-between-the-eus-ai-ambition-and-its-energy-planning-19644/> (accessed September 23, 2026).
21. European Commission, "EU Agrees to Permanently Stop Russian Gas Imports and Phase Out Russian Oil," December 2, 2025, [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip\\_25\\_2860](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_2860) (accessed September 23, 2026).
22. America Hernandez, "EU Commission Clarifies All Russian LNG Trade Is Banned from 2027 for EU Operators, Letter Shows," Reuters, updated June 19, 2026, <https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/eu-commission-clarifies-all-russian-lng-trade-is-banned-2027-eu-operators-letter-2026-06-18/> (accessed September 23, 2026).

23. Lauren Simmons, "Croatia Is Part of the Solution to European Energy Security," *Total Croatia News*, February 26, 2026, <https://total-croatia-news.com/news/croatia-european-energy/> (accessed September 23, 2026).
24. U.S. Department of State Office of the Spokesperson, "New Era of Strategic Partnership: United States Advances Key Investments and Cooperation at the Three Seas Initiative Summit," Media Note, April 29, 2026, <https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2026/04/new-era-of-strategic-partnership-united-states-advances-key-investments-and-cooperation-at-the-three-seas-initiative-summit> (accessed September 23, 2026).
25. 3 Seas Initiative Summit, "About," <http://three-seas.eu/about/> (accessed September 23, 2026).
26. "Poland Is Now Among the World's 20 Largest Economies. How Did It Happen?" Associated Press, March 16, 2026, <https://www.nbcnews.com/business/economy/poland-now-worlds-20-largest-economies-happen-rcna263694> (accessed September 23, 2026).
27. President Donald J. Trump, "Remarks by President Trump to the People of Poland," White House, July 6, 2017, <https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-people-poland/> (accessed September 23, 2026).
28. News release, "The Golden Age of U.S.–Croatia Relations: Advancing Investment and Cooperation at the Three Seas Initiative Summit," U.S. Embassy in Croatia, April 28, 2026, <https://hr.usembassy.gov/the-golden-age-of-u-s-croatia-relations-advancing-investment-and-cooperation-at-the-three-seas-initiative-summit/> (accessed September 23, 2026).
29. Mikael Berg, "NATO Approves 27 Billion Euros for Fuel Infrastructure," *Nordic Defence Sector*, July 24, 2026, <https://nordicdefencesector.com/en/article/nato-approves-27-billion-euros-for-fuel-infrastructure> (accessed September 23, 2026).
30. Notes From Poland, "Poland to Build Third LNG Terminal in Bid to Become Regional Gas Hub," June 24, 2026, <https://notesfrompoland.com/2026/06/24/poland-to-build-third-lng-terminal-in-bid-to-become-regional-gas-hub/> (accessed September 23, 2026).
31. Rikard Jozwiak, "Washington Steps into Europe's Energy Gap in the Balkans," *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, May 4, 2026, <https://www.rferl.org/a/bosnia-trump-balkans-energy-investment-trade/33748191.html> (accessed September 23, 2026).
32. Primorac, "Flashpoint: A Path Toward Stability in the Western Balkans."
33. Emma Nix and Ian Brzezinski, "Looking to a Decade of Delivery: The Three Seas Initiative Charts Its Course Forward," *Atlantic Council Issue Brief*, June 30, 2026, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/looking-to-a-decade-of-delivery-the-three-seas-initiative-charts-its-course-forward/> (accessed September 23, 2026).
34. "Transatlantic Investment Group Announces 50 Billion Euro AI Data Center and Innovation Campus in Croatia—the Largest Investment in Croatian History and Among the Largest Private U.S. Investments in Europe," *Business Wire*, April 28, 2026, <https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20260427904479/en/Transatlantic-Investment-Group-Announces-€50-Billion-AI-Data-Center-and-Innovation-Campus-in-Croatia-the-Largest-Investment-in-Croatian-History-and-Among-the-Largest-Private-U.S.-Investments-in-Europe> (accessed September 23, 2026).
35. Edward McAllister and Lefteris Papadimas, "Exxon Enters Greece with Gas Deal that Expands U.S. Footprint in Eastern Med," *Reuters*, November 6, 2025, <https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/exxonmobil-joins-gas-exploration-project-off-greece-2025-11-06/> (accessed September 23, 2026).
36. Office of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Greece, "Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis' Speech at the 6th Ministerial Meeting of the Partnership for Transatlantic Energy Cooperation (P-TEC), at the Zappeion Megaron," November 7, 2025, <https://www.primeminister.gr/en/2025/11/07/37305> (accessed September 23, 2026).
37. "U.S. Signs Energy and AI Deals with Balkan Countries as Its Influence Widens," *Reuters*, April 28, 2026, <https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/business/artificial-intelligence/2026/04/28/us-signs-energy-and-ai-deals-with-balkan-countries-as-its-influence-widens/> (accessed September 23, 2026).
38. U.S. Embassy in Montenegro, "United States and Montenegro Sign Landmark Intergovernmental Agreement," July 25, 2026, <https://me.usembassy.gov/united-states-and-montenegro-sign-landmark-intergovernmental-agreement/> (accessed September 23, 2026).
39. U.S. Department of State Office, "Joint Statement on the U.S.–Serbia Strategic Dialogue," Media Note, July 17, 2026, <https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2026/07/joint-statement-on-the-u-s-serbia-strategic-dialogue> (accessed September 23, 2026).