The Heritage Foundation

BACKGROUNDER

No. 3906 | MAY 13, 2025

DOUGLAS AND SARAH ALLISON CENTER FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

North American Security: U.S.–Canadian Defense Priorities

Wilson Beaver and Robert Peters

KEY TAKEAWAYS

The defense of the Arctic and the North American continent are national security priorities for both the United States and Canada.

Canadian military procurement should focus on the air, naval, and missile defense systems necessary for Arctic security and continental defense.

Canada's national defense strategy is insufficiently funded, and Canadian defense spending is one of the lowest in NATO.

The United States and Canada, long-standing allies and neighbors, share the North American continent and have a shared interest in securing it against threats from potential adversaries. For too long, the American and Canadian governments have failed to prioritize missile defense and Arctic security—both key components of the great power competition that is likely to dominate the international security landscape for the foreseeable future.

The United States, faced with the prospect of a rising China in the Indo–Pacific, is now moving to reposition itself, moving troops and funding out of Europe and other regions and shifting them into the Indo–Pacific.[1] The Trump Administration and Republican Congress are likely to significantly increase funding for U.S. Indo–Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) and to refocus defense spending on air and naval assets relevant to deterrence in the Indo–Pacific,

moving away from prioritizing spending more relevant to counterinsurgency operations in the Middle East or deterring Russia in Eastern Europe. To facilitate this pivot, the United States has been pushing its European NATO allies to increase their defense spending, with a particular focus on nations like the Baltic states, Germany, Poland, and Scandinavian countries purchasing weapons systems that will enable the deterrence of a Russian attack on the Baltic states. The Heritage Foundation has also called for Southern European NATO states to play a larger role in Mediterranean and Red Sea security.[2] For European NATO, these priorities make sense.

Canada, however, is the only member of NATO other than the United States that is in North America, not Europe. Canada also has the largest Arctic coastline within the NATO alliance. For these reasons, Canada requires special consideration in NATO strategic defense planning separate from the regional prioritization planning efforts currently underway among European NATO member states.

Like the United States, Canada has focused on counterinsurgency and peacekeeping operations in the Middle East and Africa since the end of the Cold War, and more recently has maintained a Canadian Armed Forces brigade in Latvia as part of NATO operations to deter Russian aggression in the Baltic region. As the United States focuses on deterring Chinese aggression and as European NATO members increase their spending and reposture forces eastward to deter Russia, it only makes sense for Canada to rethink its priorities within the alliance network as well. Just as Germany and Poland increasingly focus on Baltic security and Italy and France increasingly focus on Mediterranean security (given their force makeup and proximity to various regions within the European theater, as well as their respective militaries' competitive advantages), Canada should focus on Arctic security, given its proximity to the Arctic and the increasing threat posed by China and Russia within this region.[3] Canada can and should play a crucial role in great power competition with adversaries like China and Russia in full-spectrum Arctic security: missile defense, air defense, and maritime operations.

North American Continental Defense and Arctic Security

The Arctic became a strategic priority for the United States early in the Cold War, with the foundation of North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), sensors along the Distance Early Warning line, and the stationing of U.S. forces, including an air base designed to detect and, if necessary, defeat Soviet air forces over the Arctic, in Greenland.[4] Starting in the 1950s, Canada was also instrumental in the operation of the Sound

Surveillance System, with which American and Canadian naval officers tracked Soviet submarines in the North Atlantic.[5]

Still today, in deterring aggression by adversaries like China and Russia or rogue nations like North Korea, the United States must ensure that North America's northern flank is secure. As the Canadian think tank the Macdonald-Laurier Institute puts it:

> [T]he Canadian Arctic is an exposed flank of North America—an obvious path for cruise and hypersonic missiles to pass through on their way to targets in the United States. For this reason, the Arctic has been a military theater since the advent of nuclear weapons and the beginning of the Cold War.[6]

Russia and, increasingly, China are active in the Arctic, with both maritime and air assets increasingly operating in the High North. In 2024, Russian Tu-95MS Bear bombers and Chinese Xian H-6K bombers operated jointly within Alaska's Air Defense Identification Zone for the first time.[7] In addition, Russian bombers capable of launching the Kodiak cruise missile, an air-launched nuclear-capable cruise missile with a range of 2,500–2,800 kilometers, are increasingly operating over the Arctic.[8] If launched over the Arctic Circle, such weapons could strike targets in most of Canada and much of the United States with a nuclear warhead and little tactical warning. This is just one of the many nuclear-capable systems that can target much of North America that Russia is developing.

During the Cold War, the United States and Canada relied upon the American nuclear arsenal to deter Soviet bombers coming over the Arctic, and both nations had a robust line of radar and sensor stations, as well as air bases designed to intercept and, if necessary, destroy such bombers.[9] Today, that capability has atrophied, with many bases closing, and the American and Canadian air forces significantly smaller than what they were at the height of the Cold War.[10]

That must change. The United States and Canada must reconstitute the capability to identify, engage, and, deter adversaries from using the Arctic as a means to threaten North America through the High North. And the reason for that is simple—not only may Canada itself be a target for such an attack should there be a general war between NATO and either one of the autocracies in Beijing or Moscow, but because any attack vector that targets the continental United States through the Artic would have to overfly Canada. In such a scenario, Chinese or Russian missiles—potentially nuclear-armed—would spend hours violating Canadian air space on their way to targets in the American homeland. Indeed, virtually any American

conflict with China or Russia would put Canada at risk if the High North were not secured from missile attack. It is for this reason that Canada—with significant material, technological, and manpower support from the United States—should take the lead on re-establishing a robust and credible air defense perimeter along its Arctic coastline.

Such a defensive perimeter would include the aforementioned early warning sensors, radar installations, and expanded air interceptor presence. It would likely also include an increased number of ground-based missile-integrated air and missile defenses, such as the Patriot or Terminal High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) systems, capable of engaging and destroying a variety of airborne threats. Such a presence also would include a greater number of Canadian or American fighter aircraft at existing bases—and, potentially, a reopening of shuttered Cold War air bases in the Canadian High North.

Such bases could house Canadian or American service personnel operating the early warning stations, missile defense batteries, or air bases. Such a distributed series of bases would not only give greater coverage across the Arctic—which would increase chances of successful early detection and interception of adversary threats—but also increased redundancy, meaning that if one base was destroyed, holes within the defensive architecture would not materialize.[11] That is, if large swaths of the Canadian High North were defended or covered by only single installations, the loss of a single station, if destroyed, would create gaps in the North American defensive posture that adversaries could exploit and thereby increase the chances of a successful attack.[12]

Beyond air defenses, it is critical that Canada and the United States have a more robust maritime presence in the Arctic. Increasingly, Chinese and Russian surface ships and submarines operate in the Arctic. Such surface ships can perform a number of functions, to include surveillance and reconnaissance operations, as well as a means to generate long-range fires. Indeed, the sea-launched Kalibr long-range nuclear-capable cruise missile has been employed with success in Syria and in Ukraine.[13]

Without question, should war between NATO and Beijing or Moscow erupt, the autocrats would be tempted to secure maritime dominance in the Arctic, particularly if they see it as an undefended vulnerability that they could exploit. For this reason, a strengthened Canadian naval presence in the Arctic, in the form of icebreakers, destroyers, submarines, and ground- and air-launched anti-ship missiles are needed to deter and, if necessary, destroy Chinese or Russian naval assets operating in the Arctic Ocean.

Canadian National Security Strategy. Canada's current national defense strategy is mostly aligned with this vision, and Canadian national security experts tend to agree with this focus as well. In 2024, the Canadian Ministry

of National Defense published *Our North, Strong and Free: A Renewed Vision for Canada's Defense*, which correctly identifies the Arctic and the defense of North America as Canada's two biggest security priorities, saying:

> We must place particular focus on defending the Arctic and North and its approaches against new and accelerating threats through credible deterrence. We will secure our Arctic and North by increasing the presence, reach, mobility and responsiveness of the Canadian Armed Forces in the region, and along our coasts and maritime approaches. We will also develop greater striking power to deter adversaries and keep threats farther from our shores.[14]

In terms of realizing this vision, the strategy calls for expanding Canada's aging submarine fleet, acquiring specialized maritime sensors that can be rapidly deployed on Canadian Arctic and offshore patrol vessels for ocean surveillance in the High North, the construction of a new satellite ground station, and the procurement of new tactical helicopters, ground-based air defenses, and long-range missile capabilities. These are all good measures and steps in the right direction.

The issue, however, is that Canadian national security strategy is insufficiently funded and that it attempts to pursue other, secondary priorities that will only serve as strategic distractions to Canada's biggest priorities.

Defense Spending. Canada's national defense strategy is not funded sufficiently to realize its goals. The current Canadian government has projected Canada's defense-spending-to-GDP ratio to only hit 1.76 percent by 2029–2030 and 2 percent by 2032–2033.[15] In comparison with the increases across the rest of the alliance, this does not display any sense of urgency from the current Canadian government. Canada is already one of the lowest spenders in NATO, and the 2 percent conversation is not going away, with Canada coming under increased scrutiny as the majority of NATO now meets the 2 percent spending target that all member states have agreed to.[16] Increasingly, calls for hitting the 2 percent minimum come not just from the United States, but from other NATO members that far exceed the target, like Estonia and Poland, or from previously delinquent members that have in recent years finally hit the 2 percent minimum, like Germany.

Canada can reach this target through investments in its own security and infrastructure, with spending that helps Canadian sovereignty and also provides jobs to Canadians. It is important to note that this is not just about spending money as a political or face-saving measure to appease allies: It is about spending money to make the Canadian military more capable—and therefore more effective—in dealing with threats to North America and as a vital member of NATO.

Focusing on What Is Primary. The Canadian Armed Forces are already operating under a limited budget and will struggle to achieve their primary goals of securing the Arctic and North America if they allocate too much funding and effort to other priorities.

For example, Canada's main international effort at present is Operation Reassurance, under which Canada acts as the Framework nation for the NATO Multinational Brigade in Latvia, deterring Russian aggression.[17] Canada's efforts there have been appreciated, but if Canada is to focus in a meaningful way on Arctic security and continental defense, it may need to scale back its troop presence and operational activity in Latvia. Germany is moving to permanently station an armored brigade next door in Lithuania, and another Western European country should be acting as Framework nation in Latvia or working with Riga to permanently station troops there to deter the Russians from an attack on the Baltics. It is unlikely to make sense for Canada to continue in this role indefinitely.

Likewise, equipment or units intended for ground operations, like peacekeeping and counterinsurgency, should take a back seat to funding for air and naval capabilities.

Procurement. Canadian procurement of weapon systems for the foreseeable future should focus on naval and air capabilities relevant to its mission to defend the Arctic and North America. This will mark a noticeable shift from recent years during which Canadian ground forces have received much of the funding priority as a result of Canada's main efforts being counterinsurgency or peacekeeping operations in the Middle East and the deployment of a ground combat brigade to Latvia.

As noted earlier, more interceptor aircraft are needed to cover down on threats coming from the Arctic. In 2023, Canada decided to purchase 88 F-35As. These state-of-the-art aircraft are increasingly becoming the "NATO standard" aircraft and are almost certainly better than any aircraft flown by Chinese or Russian air forces—and will remain a top-of-the-line aircraft for decades to come. Canada will have to invest in training new pilots, expanding or updating infrastructure at key air bases, and training pilots and crew members needed to ensure that the United States and Canada can field a credible air defense over the Arctic.[18] Recent disagreements over tariffs have led some to question whether Canada should move ahead with the F-35 deal, but there simply is no viable alternative for the Canadian military, with other options from European suppliers inferior to the fifth-generation F-35 in capability. Additionally, these options are still subject to the broader U.S. and NATO supply chain, just like the F-35.[19]

Canada should furthermore work with the United States to procure additional early warning radar and sensors to identify inbound threats, as well as the Patriot and THAAD systems. It should also modernize and expand its fleet of submarines and destroyers, such that it is capable of credibly deterring and, if necessary, defeating adversary threats within the Arctic. Given the needs of operating for long periods in the Arctic environment, Canadian submarines need to be long-range diesel-electric submarines with the ability to patrol for significant lengths of time without refueling.[20] Purchasing nuclear submarines from the United States, unfortunately, is not a viable option due to the prohibitively high costs involved and the serious problems the United States has had in keeping *Virginia*-class nuclear submarines on time and under budget. Canada has a number of options for the procurement of diesel submarines, with the South Korean option being one of the most likely.[21] The Korean option makes the most sense in many ways, as the design is already complete and Korean shipbuilding consistently avoids cost overruns and delivery delays.[22]

Finally, Canada should make a serious investment in acquiring the *River*-class destroyers. The *River*-class is a guided-missile, helicopter-capable destroyer with significant anti-submarine warfare and air defense capabilities that will replace Canada's already retired *Iroquois*-class destroyers and its aging *Halifax*-class frigates.[23] Though there has been debate about what the eventual cost of the program will be, the official estimate is that the 15 ships will cost an estimated 56 billion to 60 billion Canadian dollars. In American procurement debates, it is rare to discuss the cost of an entire program over its life cycle (instead, the cost is discussed in terms of a per-unit cost for a single ship or the annual cost in the budget cycle), but many in Canada have focused on this total cost instead of the cost of a single ship or the annual cost of the program which, spread out over decades, appears far more reasonable.

Not only are the above-mentioned vessels necessary for security, but it is also good for Canadian workers and industry to build the *River*-class destroyers in Canada, bringing thousands of direct and indirect jobs and millions of dollars into government coffers. Construction on the first of the ships began in Halifax, Nova Scotia, in 2024, and the first three ships will be the HMCS *Fraser*, *Saint-Laurent*, and *Mackenzie*.[24]

Infrastructure. The Canadian government's 2024 Evaluation of Arctic Operations found:

> The CAF's [Canadian Air Force] northern infrastructure is located far apart and can only provide limited support for large or sustained deployments. To further complicate the issue…the condition of Arctic infrastructure is well below the CAF average and, without intervention, will soon move to the 'rust out' stage.[25]

Investment in Arctic infrastructure will be a necessary aspect of Canadian efforts to reassert Ottawa's sovereignty in the Canadian Arctic. Airfields need to be expanded to accommodate Canada's new F-35s and P-8 Poseidon aircraft, and port facilities would need to be added to facilitate maritime surveillance and icebreaking by Canadian ships.

From the perspective of Canadian policymakers and citizens, a positive side effect of this need will be improved infrastructure for Canadian residents of Arctic provinces like Nunavut. For logistical reasons, it makes the most sense to collocate improved airfields and port facilities with major population centers, which will both employ locals in construction and maintenance and improve economic links with major population centers in the rest of Canada. Such investments are necessary to not only secure North America's northern flank but would also provide much-needed jobs and investments for the peoples living in Canada's High North in remote areas that struggle to attract economic investment.

Indeed, such an investment and reopening of shuttered Cold War–era bases could bring economic prosperity to a number of otherwise isolated communities. Such prosperity would be augmented by increased services in the region, to include medical, education, and energy resources. In particular, infrastructure investment in airfields and ports in Canadian Arctic provinces like Nunavut, the Northwest Territories, and the Yukon would facilitate easier travel and increased trade for residents, while also providing for the agile employment of Canadian air and maritime assets throughout the region.

Arctic Collaboration with Scandinavia and the United States. Sweden and Finland's accession to NATO, along with the efforts of longtime NATO members Denmark and Norway, presents an opportunity for a dramatic expansion of NATO Arctic collaboration among the United States, Canada, and Scandinavian NATO members. An October 2024 joint statement put out by the defense ministers of Canada, the Scandinavian nations, and the United States reaffirmed the leading role these countries play in ensuring stability in the Arctic and discussed opportunities to enhance information- and intelligence-sharing to create a common operating picture, as well as ways to increase collaboration to address common challenges in the region.[26] The Canadian focus on Arctic security will not separate it from NATO and will not isolate it, but will instead allow it to act as a regional anchor state with strong bilateral and multilateral military ties to the other NATO Arctic states.

One clear capability that Canada has maintained is its icebreaker fleet, and the 2024 deal with Canada, Finland, and the United States on producing

icebreakers demonstrates an area in which Canada can act as a force multiplier. President Donald Trump has repeatedly expressed a serious interest in expanding icebreaker capabilities both for the U.S. and across the U.S. alliance network. This represents a real opportunity for Canada to be forward-leaning in security engagement with the U.S. It may be possible for Canada to repurpose or reclassify existing icebreakers to give them a more explicitly defense role, adding to Canadian national security efforts in the Arctic and signaling intent to do more.

Canadian efforts to expand their own icebreaker fleet will be welcomed by all. A Heritage Foundation *Special Report*, "A Strategy to Revitalize the Defense Industrial Base for the 21st Century," singled out icebreakers as one of the most promising sectors for defense industrial base collaboration between the United States and Canada.[27]

Beyond maritime operations in the Arctic, Canada has for decades played a pivotal role in continental security through NORAD. Long serving as the sentinel of the Arctic, Canadian military personnel have patrolled the skies and manned the radar and sensor areas along its high north, watching for missile or air threats traversing the Arctic to North America. Its military personnel have served in key leadership positions within NORAD, and the United States and Canada have engaged in joint strategic research stretching back to the days of the Manhattan project. Canada can once again demonstrate its leadership in continental defense by championing and building a new generation of sensor and radar arrays optimized to detect air and missile threats bound for North America.[28] This is critical, as the emerging hypersonic missile threat posed by China and Russia—coupled with their existing ballistic missile and air threats—will become an ever growing challenge to North American security.[29]

Supply-Chain Integration. Defense Production Act Title III allows the U.S. government to "create, maintain, protect, expand, or restore" industrial base activities.[30] Canada's relationship with the U.S. Department of Defense through the Defense Production Act is unique, in that Canadian companies can be considered part of the U.S. industrial base and are thus eligible for U.S. government investment. This unique arrangement presents an opportunity for both Ottawa and Washington.[31]

The Department of Defense will continue to divest itself from Chinese-controlled critical mineral supply chains, an effort that presents opportunities for Canada. During the first Trump Administration, the U.S.–Canadian Joint Action Plan on Critical Minerals was announced. The plan outlined bilateral financial investments in the production of critical

minerals in North America and has made some serious progress in the years since it began. In 2024, the U.S. Department of Defense announced awards of $6.4 million and $8.3 million, respectively, to Canadian companies Fortune Minerals Limited and Lomiko Metals, Inc., as part of the Defense Production Act Investment program to support production of cobalt and graphite.[32] The Canadian government announced similar investments in these companies.

China. It would make no sense for the United States to ask Canada to prepare for conflict in the South China Sea, and nobody is doing so. Canada's military posture and defense spending should focus on defending its own sovereignty in North America and the Arctic both against China and Russia—but there are still things Canada can do to contribute to deterring China from launching a war of aggression in the Indo–Pacific. Canada can play an important role diplomatically and in terms of economic security and research security to send the right messages on China, and, to a lesser extent, also engage in partner-building exercises and training with nations like the Philippines.

Canada has a vested interest in pushing back against China, as Beijing has repeatedly targeted Canada in recent years with cyberattacks, election interference, and the execution of Canadian citizens.[33] Passing laws to prevent malign foreign influence from China, hardening Canadian government systems against cyberattack, condemning Chinese aggression against countries like the Philippines and Vietnam, and preventing the transfer of defense-related technology are all proactive steps Canada can take to push back against China—while not distracting Canadian military spending and planning from the core mission of securing the Arctic and North America.

Additionally, Canada's development of pipelines and export facilities on its Pacific coast present both an opportunity for economic growth for Canada and a strategic benefit to the Indo–Pacific, with Canada offering an alternative to the Middle Eastern–sourced imports on which Japan and South Korea rely that would be under threat in the event of a conflict.[34]

Cross-Border Security. In recent months, the most pressing U.S. security issue that has been identified is the cross-border trafficking of drugs and people. The Trump Administration is working to undo years of open-border policies by the Biden Administration, correctly identifying these open-border policies as being the root cause of drug deaths and rising crime in the United States, as well an opportunity for foreign terrorist groups to smuggle terrorists into the United States.

Canada's government will need to do a lot more to address this issue both for the security of the United States and for the security and well-being

of Canadian citizens. The presence of large numbers of unvetted foreign nationals and expired visa-holders is a security threat to Canadian citizens, and the cross-border trafficking of drugs hurts both American and Canadian citizens. The U.S.–Canadian border is the longest undefended border in the world, a situation that has long benefitted the United States and Canada, but that is only possible if both countries collaborate to prevent cross-border criminal activities.

Recommendations

There are a number of actions Canada and the United States can take to secure the Arctic and the North American continent, deter adversary aggression, and provide better infrastructure to its citizens living in the most remote areas of Canada. These include:

- **Focus on primary concerns.** Operating from an already limited budget, Canada cannot afford to spread itself thin. Diverting funds to secondary concerns is a strategic distraction Canada cannot afford. Arctic security and continental defense must be prioritized.

- **Upgrade existing bases and build new bases in the High North.** These bases will serve to enable air interceptor missions, support expanded early-warning sensor and radar packages, and serve as missile interceptor sites, securing North America against expanding missile threats from China and Russia.

- **Work together on missile defense.** U.S. lawmakers need to support funding for Golden Dome and other missile defense projects and work closely with their Canadian counterparts to secure North America.

- **Fully fund the *River*-class destroyer program.** These destroyers are necessary to patrol the Arctic Ocean and, if required, engage and destroy adversary combatants. They provide the added benefit of supporting the Canadian shipbuilding industry.

- **Explore icebreaker opportunities with the United States.** The U.S. is purchasing icebreakers from Finland, and last year Canada, Finland, and the U.S. agreed to jointly strengthen their icebreaker fleets. President Trump is keenly interested in icebreakers, and this presents an opportunity for Canada.

- **Purchase a new fleet of submarines.** Canada will need to purchase new attack submarines to defend the approaches to its waterways in the High North.

- **Push back against China diplomatically and economically.** The United States and Canada both need to push back against Chinese malign foreign influence, research theft, and cyberattacks.

- **Enhance border-security measures.** To prevent the illegal trafficking of drugs and people across the border, Canada should invest more in border security, in terms of both preventing illegal crossings and of keeping illegal migrants or those committing visa fraud out of Canada altogether. This is to protect the lives and prosperity of both Canadians and Americans.

- **Embrace critical mineral efforts.** The United States should see Canada as integral to efforts to diversify defense supply chains away from those controlled by China. Canadian efforts to engage the U.S. on the production of critical minerals as an alternative to Chinese-controlled supply chains would be welcomed.

Summary

Canadian defense spending is not some favor Ottawa should feel compelled to do for the United States or for NATO. To the contrary, Canadian defense spending is first and foremost about the interests of the Canadian people. Canada has a national self-interest in maintaining a military capable of defending the Canadian homeland.

The United States and Canada share the North American continent and have a joint interest in preventing adversarial powers from encroaching on Canadian and American sovereignty in North America and the Arctic.

Moving forward, it will be critical for the United States and Canada to work together to establish their joint security interests and identify the best ways to cooperate on securing North America and the Arctic.

Wilson Beaver is Senior Policy Advisor for Defense Budgeting in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for National Security at The Heritage Foundation. **Robert Peters** is Senior Research Fellow for Strategic Deterrence in the Allison Center.

Endnotes

1. Alex Velez-Green and Robert Peters, "The Prioritization Imperative: A Strategy to Defend America's Interests in a More Dangerous World," Heritage Foundation *Special Report* No. 288, August 1, 2024, https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/the-prioritization-imperative-strategy-defend-americas-interests-more-dangerous.
2. Wilson Beaver and Jordan Embree, "Look to the Seas: Why a Regional Focus in the North and South Strengthens NATO Deterrence," Heritage Foundation *Backgrounder* No. 3893, March 4, 2025, https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/look-the-seas-why-regional-focus-the-north-and-south-strengthens-nato-deterrence.
3. Robert Peters, "NATO in 2024—Can Its European Members Deter Further Russian Aggression?," Heritage Foundation *Special Report* No. 285, July 2, 2024, https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/report/nato-2024-can-its-european-members-deter-further-russian-aggression.
4. Maya Tekeli and Jeffrey Gettleman, "What's the American Base on Greenland? Here's What to Know," *New York Times*, March 25, 2025, https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/25/world/europe/greenland-us-space-base.html (accessed April 2, 2025).
5. Brian Taddiken and Kirsten Krock, "66 Years of Undersea Surveillance," *Naval History*, Vol. 35, No. 1 (February 2021), https://www.usni.org/magazines/naval-history-magazine/2021/february/66-years-undersea-surveillance (accessed April 22, 2025).
6. Daniel Dorman, "America's Exposed Northern Flank? Trump Should Push Canada on Arctic Defense," Macdonald-Laurier Institute, December 18, 2024, https://macdonaldlaurier.ca/americas-exposed-northern-flank-trump-should-push-canada-on-arctic-defense-daniel-dorman-for-must-read-alaska/ (accessed April 22, 2025).
7. Heather Williams, Kari A. Bingen, and Lachlan MacKenzie, "Why Did China and Russia Stage a Joint Bomber Exercise Near Alaska?" Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 30, 2024, https://www.csis.org/analysis/why-did-china-and-russia-stage-joint-bomber-exercise-near-alaska (accessed April 22, 2025).
8. Center for Strategic and International Studies, Missile Defense Project, "Kh-101 / Kh-102," April 23, 2024, https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/kh-101-kh-102/ (accessed April 2, 2025).
9. David Lavallee, "NORAD: Canada's Role in the Most Integrated Defence Partnership of the Modern Age," Royal Canadian Air Force, October 14, 2014, https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/maple-leaf/rcaf/migration/2014/norad-canada-s-role-in-the-most-integrated-defence-partnership-of-the-modern-age.html (accessed April 22, 2025).
10. Tim Kane, "Global U.S. Troop Deployment, 1950–2003," Heritage Foundation *Center for Data Analysis Report* No. 04–11, October 27, 2004, https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/global-us-troop-deployment-1950-2003.
11. Caroline Mroz, "Eyes on the High North," Northrop Grumman, August 11, 2024, https://www.northropgrumman.com/space/arctic-satellite-broadband-mission/eyes-on-the-high-north (accessed April 22, 2025).
12. Dorman, "America's Exposed Northern Flank? Trump Should Push Canada on Arctic Defense."
13. Joshua Menks and Michael B. Petersen, "The 'Kalibrization' of the Russian Fleet," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, Vol. 148, No. 5 (May 2022), p. 1431, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2022/may/kalibrization-russian-fleet (accessed April 22, 2025).
14. Department of National Defence, "II. Our Vision for Defence," Government of Canada, last updated April 17, 2024, https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/reports-publications/north-strong-free-2024/our-vision-defence.html (accessed April 22, 2025).
15. Christopher Penney, "The Fiscal Implications of Meeting the NATO Military Spending Target," Office of the Parliamentary Budget Officer, Government of Canada, October 30, 2024, https://www.pbo-dpb.ca/en/publications/RP-2425-020-S--fiscal-implications-meeting-nato-military-spending-target--repercussions-financieres-atteinte-cible-depenses-militaires-fixee-otan (accessed April 2, 2025).
16. Wilson Beaver and Elizabeth Tarr, "NATO Has a Canada Problem," Heritage Foundation *Commentary*, October 24, 2024, https://www.heritage.org/defense/commentary/nato-has-canada-problem.
17. Department of National Defence, "Operation REASSURANCE," Government of Canada, December 18, 2024, https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/operations/military-operations/current-operations/operation-reassurance.html (accessed April 22, 2025).
18. Olivia Gibson, "Arctic Challenge 2023: Nordic Defense Requires the F-35's Advanced Capabilities," U.S. Air Force, June 14, 2023, https://www.af.mil/News/Features/Article/3428150/arctic-challenge-2023-nordic-defense-requires-the-f-35s-advanced-capabilities/ (accessed April 22, 2025).
19. Peter Suciu, "Could Trump's Tariffs Doom Canada's F-35 Acquisition?" National Interest, March 15, 2025, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/could-trumps-tariffs-doom-canadas-f-35-acquisition/ (accessed April 2, 2025), and Rebecca Rommen, "Canada Weighs Its Purchase of F-35 Fighter Jets Amid U.S. Tensions," *Business Insider*, February 4, 2025, https://www.businessinsider.com/canada-weighs-purchase-f-35-fighter-jets-amid-us-portugal-2025-3 (accessed April 22, 2025).
20. Richard Shimooka, "A Significant Boost to Security: Inside Canada's Plans to Replace Its Submarines," Macdonald-Laurier Institute, April 17, 2023, https://macdonaldlaurier.ca/a-significant-boost-to-security-inside-canadas-plans-to-replace-its-submarines-richard-shimooka-in-the-hub/ (accessed April 22, 2025).
21. Justin Katz, "Canada Commits to Buying 12 New Conventionally-Powered, Under-the-Ice Submarines," *Breaking Defense*, July 10, 2024, https://breakingdefense.com/2024/07/canada-commits-to-buying-12-new-conventionally-powered-under-the-ice-submarines/ (accessed April 22, 2025).

22. Abhishek Sharma, "South Korean Shipbuilding: Capabilities, Competition, and Constraints," Observer Research Foundation, September 11, 2024, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/south-korean-shipbuilding-capabilities-competition-and-constraints (accessed April 22, 2025).
23. "A Guide to the Future Canadian Surface Combatant—The River-Class Destroyers," Navy Lookout, July 5, 2024, https://www.navylookout.com/a-guide-to-the-future-canadian-surface-combatant-the-river-class-destroyers/ (accessed April 22, 2025).
24. Department of National Defence, "Construction Begins for Canada's New Warship Fleet—The River-Class Destroyers," Government of Canada, June 28, 2024, https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2024/06/construction-begins-for-canadas-new-warship-fleet--the-river-class-destroyers.html (accessed April 22, 2025).
25. Ibid.
26. Department of National Defence, "Joint Statement on Arctic Security and Defence," Government of Canada, October 17, 2024, https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2024/10/joint-statement-on-arctic-security-and-defence.html (accessed April 22, 2025).
27. Robert Greenway et al., "A Strategy to Revitalize the Defense Industrial Base for the 21st Century," Heritage Foundation *Special Report* No. 314, April 7, 2025, https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/strategy-revitalize-the-defense-industrial-base-the-21st-century.
28. Lee Carson and Patrick Duxbury, "Canada's NORAD Modernization Plan Hinges on the North's Expertise and Innovation," Inside Policy, MacDonald-Laurier Institute, October 24, 2024, https://macdonaldlaurier.ca/canadas-norad-modernization-plan-hinges-on-the-norths-expertise-and-innovation-lee-carson-and-patrick-duxbury-for-inside-policy/ (accessed April 22, 2025).
29. David Vergun, "General Says Countering Hypersonic Weapons Is Imperative," U.S. Department of Defense, May 10, 2023, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3391322/general-says-countering-hypersonic-weapons-is-imperative/ (accessed April 22, 2025).
30. Christopher Hernandez-Roy and Henry Ziemer, "Mining for Defense: Unlocking the Potential for U.S.–Canada Collaboration on Critical Minerals," Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 18, 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/mining-defense (accessed April 22, 2025).
31. Government of Canada, "Critical Minerals," Connect2Canada, January 2025, https://connect2canada.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/critical-minerals.pdf (accessed April 22, 2025).
32. U.S. Department of Defense, "Department of Defense Awards $14.7 Million to Enhance North American Cobalt and Graphite Supply Chain," May 16, 2024, https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3777044/department-of-defense-awards-147-million-to-enhance-north-american-cobalt-and-g/ (accessed April 22, 2025).
33. CBC News, "Cyberespionage: China-Linked Hackers Target Canadian Organizations," CBC News, last updated March 28, 2025, https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/cyberespionage-china-hack-canada-targetted-1.7155482 (accessed April 22, 2025), and Chris Buckley, "China Executes Four Canadians for Drug Crimes, Drawing Condemnation," *New York Times*, March 19, 2025, https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/19/world/asia/china-canada-drug-executions.html (accessed April 2, 2025).
34. Canada Energy Regulator, "Market Snapshot: Exploring Canada's Future in LNG Exports," Government of Canada, last updated September 6, 2024, https://www.cer-rec.gc.ca/en/data-analysis/energy-markets/market-snapshots/2024/market-snapshot-exploring-canadas-future-in-lng-exports.html (accessed April 2, 2025).