[{"command":"add_css","data":[{"rel":"stylesheet","media":"all","href":"\/sites\/default\/files\/css\/css_veuEhhb1658wti0_ZAig66JOyixENU-N9zhjLQSLfOQ.css?delta=0\u0026language=en\u0026theme=heritage_theme\u0026include=eJwrTi1LzdNPzkksLq7Uy8tPSQUAPMsGtA"}]},{"command":"invoke","selector":null,"method":"openEssay","args":["18027613","\n\n\u003Carticle about=\u0022\/constitution\/amendments\/8\/essays\/204\/excessive-bail\u0022 class=\u0022node node--type-constitution-essay node--promoted node--view-mode-embedded clearfix\u0022\u003E\n  \u003Ch1 class=\u0022title\u0022\u003E\u003Cspan\u003EExcessive Bail\u003C\/span\u003E\n\u003C\/h1\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-location\u0022\u003E\n      Amendment VIII\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-context\u0022\u003E\n      \n            \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EExcessive bail shall not be required...\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n  \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-body\u0022\u003E\n    \n            \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EThe text of the Eighth Amendment Excessive Bail Clause derives from the 1689 English Bill of Rights, redacted in the Virginia Declaration of Rights and recommended by the Virginia ratifying convention. The English version used the words \u201cexcessive bail ought not to be required\u201d as opposed to the amendment\u2019s \u201cexcessive bail shall not be required,\u201d the latter reflecting James Madison\u2019s insistence that the amendments be legally enforceable and not merely hortatory. When considering the amendment, one member of Congress stated that he thought the wording unclear. Nevertheless, Congress approved the language by a strong majority, perhaps because its phrasing had such a solid pedigree.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe excessive bail clause of the 1689 English Bill of Rights had been a response to the judicial practice of setting bails high in particular instances to avoid having to release defendants on writs of habeas corpus (see Article I, Section 9, Clause 2), an abuse, like the Parliamentary bill of attainder, that targeted certain defendants because of their political leanings.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EIn both English and American practice, the level of bail is determined on a case-by-case basis. The court often takes into account the character of the charged offense and the previous behavior of the defendant. The Supreme Court has declared that a bail amount would be \u201cexcessive\u201d under the Eighth Amendment if it were \u201ca figure higher than is reasonably calculated\u201d to ensure the defendant\u2019s appearance at trial. \u003Cem\u003EStack v. Boyle\u003C\/em\u003E (1951); \u003Cem\u003Esee also United States v. Salerno\u003C\/em\u003E (1987). Procedurally,\u0026nbsp;the defendant must file a motion for reduction in order to contest a bail as excessive.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe wording of the Excessive Bail Clause seems to point to a preexisting right to bail. In fact, absent weighty circumstances, American courts have generally presumed that each defendant has a right to liberty pending trial by payment of bail. But that right turns out not to be particularly fundamental as the courts have been deferential to legislative exceptions. \u003Cem\u003ECarlson v. Landon \u003C\/em\u003E(1952). In British practice, most serious crimes were in fact nonbailable. See \u003Cem\u003EHunt v. Roth \u003C\/em\u003E(1981). In America, many colonial charters and state constitutions, as well as the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 and the Judiciary Act of 1789, guaranteed a right to bail but made exception for capital offenses. More recently, the Supreme Court has approved a state statute allowing pre-trial detention of some juveniles.\u003Cem\u003E Schall v. Martin\u003C\/em\u003E (1984). In \u003Cem\u003ESalerno\u003C\/em\u003E, the Court upheld the pretrial detention provisions in the Bail Reform Act of 1984 that applied to persons who were arrested for serious crimes and who might pose a danger to the community, allowing for a more personalized judgment of who is entitled to bail that is arguably contrary to the original understanding of the Excessive Bail Clause. Based on the Bail Reform Act, a federal district court has upheld detention without bail of persons with alleged terrorist connections. \u003Cem\u003EUnited States v. Goba \u003C\/em\u003E(2003).\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EScholars have debated the extent to which the clause restricts Congress as well as the judiciary. In \u003Cem\u003ESalerno\u003C\/em\u003E, the Court declared that the government may pursue particular \u201ccompelling interests through regulation of pre-trial release,\u201d but it expressly left open the question of \u201cwhether the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause speaks at all to Congress\u2019s power to define the classes of criminal arrestees who shall be admitted to bail.\u201d\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EUp until the case of \u003Cem\u003EMcDonald v. City of Chicago\u003C\/em\u003E (2010), the Supreme Court had not authoritatively applied the prohibitions on excessive bail to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, although in \u003Cem\u003ESchilb v. Kuebel\u003C\/em\u003E (1971), Justice Harry Blackmun for the majority noted that the Court has \u201cassumed\u201d that the prohibition has been incorporated. In McDonald, Justice Samuel Alito left no doubt. After finding that \u201calmost all of the provisions of the Bill of Rights\u201d have been incorporated, Justice Alito, who delivered the opinion of the Court, included the Eighth Amendment\u2019s prohibition against excessive bail in a list of those rights that have been affirmed as judicially enforceable against the states. Perhaps because there may have been uncertainty whether the Excessive Fines Clause had been fully incorporated, earlier federal courts found that a state judge had imposed an excessive fine only if it had been arbitrary, a standard that would have been applicable in any event under the Fourteenth Amendment\u2019s Due Process Clause. \u003Cem\u003ESee, e.g., United States ex rel. Savitz v. Gallagher\u003C\/em\u003E (1992). Other federal courts, on the assumption of incorporation, have limited the right against excessive bail to pretrial situations. Thus, the denial of bail pending appeal, for example, would not be in violation of the Excessive Bail Clause. See \u003Cem\u003EGarson v. Perlman \u003C\/em\u003E(2008).\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n  \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author\u0022\u003E\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--media\u0022\u003E\n            \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--info\u0022\u003E\n              \u003Ch4 class=\u0022con-essay-author--name\u0022\u003E\n                      David F. Forte\n                  \u003C\/h4\u003E\n                  \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--job\u0022\u003E\n         Professor, Cleveland Marshall School of Law\n      \u003C\/div\u003E\n            \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-tabs\u0022\u003E\n      \u003Cul data-tabs class=\u0022tabs\u0022\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-18027613-taba\u0022\u003EFurther Reading\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-18027613-tabb\u0022\u003ECase Law\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-18027613-tabc\u0022\u003ERelated Essays\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n      \u003C\/ul\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv data-tabs-content\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-18027613-taba\u0022\u003E\n          \n      \u003Cdiv\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EWilliam F. Duker,\u0026nbsp;\u003Cem\u003EThe Right to Bail: A Historical Inquiry\u003C\/em\u003E, 42 Ala. L. Rev. 33 (1977)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EJoseph L. Lester,\u0026nbsp;\u003Cem\u003EPresumed Innocent, Feared Dangerous: The Eighth Amendment\u0027s Right to Bail\u003C\/em\u003E, 32 N. Ky. L. Rev. 1 (2005)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EHermine Herta Meyer,\u0026nbsp;\u003Cem\u003EConstitutionality of Pretrial Detention\u003C\/em\u003E, 60 Geo. L.J. 1139 (1972)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ESamuel Wiseman,\u0026nbsp;\u003Cem\u003EDiscrimination, Coercion, and the Bail Reform Act of 1984: The Loss of Core Constitutional Protections of the Excessive Bail Clause,\u003C\/em\u003E 36 Fordham Urb. L.J. 121 (2009)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n          \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n        \u003C\/div\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-18027613-tabb\u0022\u003E\n          \n      \u003Cdiv\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EStack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ECarlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ESchilb v. K\u00fcbel, 404 U.S. 357 (1971)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EHunt v. Roth, 648 F.2d 1148 (8th Cir. 1981)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ESchall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EUnited States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EUnited States\u0026nbsp;\u003Cem\u003Eex rel.\u003C\/em\u003E Savitz v. Gallagher, 800 F. Supp. 228 (E.D. Pa. 1992)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EUnited States v. Goba, 340 F. Supp. 2d 242 (W.D.N.Y. 2003)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EGarson v. Perlman, 541 F. Supp. 2d 515 (E.D.N.Y. 2008)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EMcDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n          \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n        \u003C\/div\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-18027613-tabc\u0022\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000060\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003ESuspension of Habeas Corpus\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000169\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EDue Process Clause\u003C\/a\u003E\n                  \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n\u003C\/article\u003E\n"]}]