[{"command":"add_css","data":[{"rel":"stylesheet","media":"all","href":"\/sites\/default\/files\/css\/css_veuEhhb1658wti0_ZAig66JOyixENU-N9zhjLQSLfOQ.css?delta=0\u0026language=en\u0026theme=heritage_theme\u0026include=eJwrTi1LzdNPzkksLq7Uy8tPSQUAPMsGtA"}]},{"command":"invoke","selector":null,"method":"openEssay","args":["18007589","\n\n\u003Carticle about=\u0022\/constitution\/articles\/5\/essays\/203\/convention-for-proposing-amendments\u0022 class=\u0022node node--type-constitution-essay node--promoted node--view-mode-embedded clearfix\u0022\u003E\n  \u003Ch1 class=\u0022title\u0022\u003E\u003Cspan\u003EConvention for Proposing Amendments\u003C\/span\u003E\n\u003C\/h1\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-location\u0022\u003E\n      Article V\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-context\u0022\u003E\n      \n            \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EThe Congress,...on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments,...\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n  \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-body\u0022\u003E\n    \n            \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EAfter the Virginia Plan introduced at the\u0026nbsp;start of the Constitutional Convention called\u0026nbsp;in a general way for an amendment process that\u0026nbsp;would allow but not require amendment by the\u0026nbsp;national legislature \u201cwhensoever it shall seem\u0026nbsp;necessary,\u201d the Committee of Detail proposed\u0026nbsp;a process whereby Congress would call for an\u0026nbsp;amendments convention on the request of two-thirds\u0026nbsp;of the state legislatures. George Mason\u0026nbsp;feared this method was insufficient to protect\u0026nbsp;the states, while Alexander Hamilton thought\u0026nbsp;that Congress should be able to propose amendments\u0026nbsp;independent of the states. Madison (as\u0026nbsp;recorded in his \u003Cem\u003ENotes of Debates in the Federal\u0026nbsp;Convention of 1787\u003C\/em\u003E) thought the vagueness of an\u0026nbsp;amendments convention sufficiently problematic\u0026nbsp;to reject the provision: \u201cHow was a Convention\u0026nbsp;to be formed? By what rule decide? What\u0026nbsp;the force of its acts?\u201d After further debate, the\u0026nbsp;delegates passed language proposed by Madison\u0026nbsp;(and seconded by Alexander Hamilton)\u0026nbsp;that combined the two ideas without an amendments\u0026nbsp;convention: the national legislature would\u0026nbsp;propose amendments when two-thirds of each\u0026nbsp;house of Congress deemed it necessary, or on\u0026nbsp;the application of two-thirds of the state legislatures.\u0026nbsp;Proposed amendments were to be ratified\u0026nbsp;by three-fourths of the states in their legislatures\u0026nbsp;or by state convention.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EJust before the end of the convention, George\u0026nbsp;Mason objected that the amendment proposal\u0026nbsp;would allow Congress to block as well as propose\u0026nbsp;amendments, and the method was changed once\u0026nbsp;again to require Congress to call a convention to\u0026nbsp;propose amendments on the application of two-thirds\u0026nbsp;of the states. Madison did not see why Congress\u0026nbsp;would not be equally bound by two-thirds\u0026nbsp;of the states\u2019 directly proposing amendments\u0026nbsp;(his original proposal for the states\u2019 initiation of\u0026nbsp;amendments) as opposed to the same number\u0026nbsp;calling for an amendments convention, especially\u0026nbsp;when the proposed Article V convention process\u0026nbsp;left so many unresolved questions. In the end,\u0026nbsp;Madison accepted the compromise to include an\u0026nbsp;amendments convention but consistent with his\u0026nbsp;earlier comments warned \u201cthat difficulties might\u0026nbsp;arise as to the form, the quorum etc. which in\u0026nbsp;constitutional regulations ought to be as much\u0026nbsp;as possible avoided.\u201d\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EAs Madison predicted, the numerous\u0026nbsp;unanswered questions inherent in the Article V\u0026nbsp;amendments convention process have prevented\u0026nbsp;its use. A first set of questions concerns calling\u0026nbsp;the convention. The language here is \u201cperemptory\u0022\u0026nbsp;according to Alexander Hamilton in \u003Cem\u003EThe\u0026nbsp;Federalist No. 85\u003C\/em\u003E: \u201cThe Congress \u2018\u003Cem\u003Eshall \u003C\/em\u003Ecall a convention.\u2019\u0026nbsp;Nothing in this particular is left to the\u0026nbsp;discretion of that body.\u201d Nevertheless, there is\u0026nbsp;dispute about the tabulation of applications in\u0026nbsp;triggering that call. There have been hundreds\u0026nbsp;of applications for an amending convention over\u0026nbsp;the years from virtually every state; some argue\u0026nbsp;that there are currently more than enough applications\u0026nbsp;to require Congress to call a convention.\u0026nbsp;While various organizations have tabulated state\u0026nbsp;applications, Congress has never officially tabulated\u0026nbsp;or listed applications and has established no\u0026nbsp;process for doing so. It is unclear, despite Hamilton\u2019s\u0026nbsp;confidence, whether Congress could be\u0026nbsp;compelled to call an Article V convention if it\u0026nbsp;chose not to.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EA second set of questions concerns whether\u0026nbsp;such a convention can be limited in scope, either\u0026nbsp;to a particular proposal or within a particular\u0026nbsp;subject. While most calls for amendments conventions\u0026nbsp;in the nineteenth century were general,\u0026nbsp;the modern trend is to call (and thus count\u0026nbsp;applications) for conventions limited to considering\u0026nbsp;a single amendment. There seems to be a\u0026nbsp;consensus that a convention cannot be limited\u0026nbsp;to considering a specific amendment, as merely\u0026nbsp;confirming a particular amendment already\u0026nbsp;written, approved, and proposed by state legislatures\u0026nbsp;would effectively turn the convention\u0026nbsp;for \u003Cem\u003Eproposing\u003C\/em\u003E amendments into a \u003Cem\u003Eratifying\u003C\/em\u003E convention.\u0026nbsp;The debate focuses rather on whether a\u0026nbsp;convention must be general and without limits\u0026nbsp;or whether the convention can or even must be\u0026nbsp;limited to a subject or subject areas based on state\u0026nbsp;applications.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EStill, some scholars, such as Michael Rappaport,\u0026nbsp;do suggest that a \u201cratifying convention\u201d\u0026nbsp;is not outside the scope of Article V. As evidence,\u0026nbsp;they cite James Madison\u2019s initial suggestion (that\u0026nbsp;two-thirds of the states should be able to propose\u0026nbsp;amendments directly) and argue that the\u0026nbsp;addition of a convention was merely to facilitate\u0026nbsp;communication amongst the states in order to\u0026nbsp;develop proposed amendments. If, however, two-thirds\u0026nbsp;of the states were able to agree on the text\u0026nbsp;of an amendment beforehand, then restricting\u0026nbsp;the convention to an affirmation of that amendment\u0026nbsp;would be appropriate.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EMichael Stokes Paulsen makes an originalist\u0026nbsp;argument that a convention properly understood\u0026nbsp;holds broad powers as a deliberative political body.\u0026nbsp;Other scholars argue from an originalist view that\u0026nbsp;the states determine through their applications\u0026nbsp;whether a convention is general or limited, and that\u0026nbsp;an Article V convention is an agent of and responsible\u0026nbsp;to the states. Robert G. Natelson has made a\u0026nbsp;case for this view based on the history of interstate\u0026nbsp;meetings prior to the Constitutional Convention.\u0026nbsp;Nevertheless, it is not at all clear as a matter\u0026nbsp;of constitutional construction that the power of\u0026nbsp;two-thirds of the states to make applications for a\u0026nbsp;convention restricts, supersedes, or overrides the\u0026nbsp;power of all the states assembled in that convention\u0026nbsp;to propose amendments to the Constitution. \u003Cem\u003EThe\u0026nbsp;Federalist Papers\u003C\/em\u003E, unfortunately, offer little guidance\u0026nbsp;on this matter. Madison refers to amendments\u0026nbsp;conventions in \u003Cem\u003EThe Federalist \u003C\/em\u003ENo. 43 only in general\u0026nbsp;terms, noting that Article V \u201cequally enables the\u0026nbsp;general and the State governments to originate the\u0026nbsp;amendment of errors.\u201d And in \u003Cem\u003EThe Federalist\u003C\/em\u003E No.\u0026nbsp;85, while discussing how Congress cannot limit the\u0026nbsp;scope of an Article V convention, Hamilton says\u0026nbsp;nothing as to whether states can or cannot do so.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EA third set of questions concerns the many\u0026nbsp;practical aspects of how an amendments convention\u0026nbsp;would operate (time, place, duration, voting\u0026nbsp;procedure, etc.) and whether authority over some\u0026nbsp;or all of these questions belongs to the states or is\u0026nbsp;implied in Congress\u2019s power to call the convention.\u0026nbsp;Congress has historically understood its authority\u0026nbsp;to \u201ccall\u201d a convention as a broad mandate to\u0026nbsp;establish procedures for such a convention, and in\u0026nbsp;the last forty years has considered (but not passed)\u0026nbsp;numerous bills to that effect. These procedural\u0026nbsp;issues (along with limiting the subject matter of the\u0026nbsp;convention) raise a further question as to whether\u0026nbsp;Congress can refuse to forward amendments for\u0026nbsp;ratification if those amendments are deemed to be\u0026nbsp;beyond the scope of the convention.\u0026nbsp;Lastly, there is the general question whether\u0026nbsp;and to what extent aspects of such a convention\u0026nbsp;(including going beyond its instructions) would\u0026nbsp;be subject to judicial review. A suit asserting that\u0026nbsp;existing applications require Congress to call an\u0026nbsp;Article V convention, for instance, was denied at\u0026nbsp;the district court level (and later denied certiorari)\u0026nbsp;as without standing and because it raised political\u0026nbsp;questions more properly the province of Congress.\u0026nbsp;\u003Cem\u003EWalker v. United States\u003C\/em\u003E (2001).\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EWhile a valid method created and available\u0026nbsp;under the Constitution, \u201ca Convention for proposing\u0026nbsp;Amendments\u201d has never been viewed as a tool\u0026nbsp;for reform as much as an option to be deployed in\u0026nbsp;extremis for the sake of maintaining the Constitution.\u0026nbsp;Hence, the only time Madison proposed an\u0026nbsp;amendments convention was during the Nullification\u0026nbsp;Crisis of 1832, seeing it as a last ditch effort to\u0026nbsp;prevent the unconstitutional alternatives of nullification\u0026nbsp;and secession that then threatened the\u0026nbsp;continued existence of the United States. Likewise,\u0026nbsp;when Abraham Lincoln looked to constitutional\u0026nbsp;reforms to resolve disputed questions in the midst\u0026nbsp;of the Civil War, he noted that \u201cunder existing circumstances\u201d\u0026nbsp;the convention mode \u201cseems preferable\u201d\u0026nbsp;precisely because it \u201callows amendments to\u0026nbsp;originate with the people themselves, instead of\u0026nbsp;only permitting them to take or reject propositions\u0026nbsp;originated by others, not especially chosen\u0026nbsp;for the purpose.\u201d Yet when the immediate crisis\u0026nbsp;was over, Lincoln strongly advocated what became\u0026nbsp;the Thirteenth Amendment by congressional proposal\u0026nbsp;and did not pursue an amendments convention,\u0026nbsp;despite the amendment\u2019s initial failure in the\u0026nbsp;House of Representatives. It should be noted that in\u0026nbsp;both cases an amendments convention was understood\u0026nbsp;to be free to propose whatever amendments\u0026nbsp;thought necessary to address the problems at issue.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe requirement that amendments proposed\u0026nbsp;by such a convention must be ratified by\u0026nbsp;three-fourths of the states is a significant limit on\u0026nbsp;the process and likely prevents a true \u201crunaway\u201d\u0026nbsp;convention from fundamentally altering the Constitution.\u0026nbsp;It is worth noting, however, that of the\u0026nbsp;amendments that have been proposed to the states\u0026nbsp;the vast majority (twenty-seven out of thirty-three)\u0026nbsp;have been ratified. Because of the lack of clear\u0026nbsp;intentions or constitutional precedent, scholars\u0026nbsp;will undoubtedly continue to debate the historical\u0026nbsp;record and speculate about the possibility of an\u0026nbsp;amendments convention under Article V.\u0026nbsp;\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EPrecisely because of the potential chaos of\u0026nbsp;the process, the very threat of an amendments\u0026nbsp;convention can be used to pressure Congress to\u0026nbsp;act rather than risk an amendments convention.\u0026nbsp;The movement favoring direct election of senators\u0026nbsp;was just one state away from an amending\u0026nbsp;convention when Congress proposed the Seventeenth\u0026nbsp;Amendment in 1911. There was also\u0026nbsp;an effort to overturn the Supreme Court\u2019s 1964\u0026nbsp;one man, one vote decisions (\u003Cem\u003EWesberry v. Sanders\u0026nbsp;\u003C\/em\u003Eand \u003Cem\u003EReynolds v. Sims\u003C\/em\u003E). By 1969, the proponents\u0026nbsp;obtained thirty-three state applications for a\u0026nbsp;convention to consider amendments regarding\u0026nbsp;legislative apportionment in the states; one vote\u0026nbsp;short of the two-thirds necessary for Congress to\u0026nbsp;call an amendments convention. Most recently,\u0026nbsp;in the 1980s, state applications for a convention\u0026nbsp;to propose a balanced budget amendment\u0026nbsp;led Congress to vote on such an amendment\u0026nbsp;and pass the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act\u0026nbsp;(later declared unconstitutional in part by the\u0026nbsp;Supreme Court) requiring the federal budget\u0026nbsp;to be balanced.\u0026nbsp;\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EFollowing the 2010 elections, renewed efforts\u0026nbsp;on both sides of the political spectrum have\u0026nbsp;looked to an Article V amendments convention\u0026nbsp;as a way for the states to circumvent Congress\u0026nbsp;in order to achieve various policy outcomes, in\u0026nbsp;particular to propose a balanced budget amendment.\u0026nbsp;More recently, some scholars, recognizing\u0026nbsp;the many unknowns of an Article V amendments\u0026nbsp;convention, have suggested that an agreement\u0026nbsp;among two-thirds of the states under the Compact\u0026nbsp;Clause (Article I, Section 10, Clause 3) could\u0026nbsp;be used to address many of the procedural questions\u0026nbsp;involved in that process.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n  \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author\u0022\u003E\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--media\u0022\u003E\n            \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--info\u0022\u003E\n              \u003Ch4 class=\u0022con-essay-author--name\u0022\u003E\n                      Matthew Spalding \n                  \u003C\/h4\u003E\n                  \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--job\u0022\u003E\n         Associate Vice President and Dean of Educational Programs, Hillsdale College\n      \u003C\/div\u003E\n            \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-tabs\u0022\u003E\n      \u003Cul data-tabs class=\u0022tabs\u0022\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-18007589-taba\u0022\u003EFurther Reading\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-18007589-tabb\u0022\u003ECase Law\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-18007589-tabc\u0022\u003ERelated Essays\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n      \u003C\/ul\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv data-tabs-content\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-18007589-taba\u0022\u003E\n          \n      \u003Cdiv\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ERussell L. Caplan, Constitutional Brinksmanship: Amending the Constitution by National Convention (1988)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EJohn O. McGinnis \u0026amp; Michael B. Rappaport,\u0026nbsp;\u003Cem\u003EOur Supermajoritarian Constitution\u003C\/em\u003E, 80 Tex. L. Rev. 703 (2002)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EHenry P. Monaghan,\u0026nbsp;\u003Cem\u003EWe the People[s], Original Understanding, and Constitutional Amendment,\u003C\/em\u003E 96 Colum. L. Rev. 121 (1996)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ERobert G. Natelson,\u0026nbsp;\u003Cem\u003EProposing Constitutional Amendments by Convention: Rules Governing the Process\u003C\/em\u003E, 78 Tenn. L. Rev. 693 (2011)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EMichael Stokes Paulsen,\u0026nbsp;\u003Cem\u003EHow to Count to Thirty-Four: The Constitutional Case for a Constitutional Convention\u003C\/em\u003E, 34 Harv. J.L. \u0026amp; Pub. Pol\u0027y 837 (2011)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EMichael B. Rappaport, \u003Ci\u003EThe Constitutionality of a Limited Convention: An Originalist Analysis\u0026nbsp;\u003C\/i\u003E28 Const. Comment. 53 (2012)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EMichael B. Rappaport,\u0026nbsp;\u003Cem\u003EReforming Article V: The Problems Created by the National Convention Amendment Method and How to Fix Them\u003C\/em\u003E, 96 Va. L. Rev. 1511 (2010)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EJames Kenneth Rogers,\u003Cem\u003E\u0026nbsp;The Other Way to Amend the Constitution: The Article V Constitutional Convention Amendment Process\u003C\/em\u003E, 30 Harv. J.L. \u0026amp; Pub. Pol\u0027y 1005 (2007)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n          \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n        \u003C\/div\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-18007589-tabb\u0022\u003E\n          \n      \u003Cdiv\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EWesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EReynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EWalker v. United States (W.D. Wash., C00-2125C, March 21, 2001)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n          \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n        \u003C\/div\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-18007589-tabc\u0022\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000128\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EAmendments\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000129\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EProhibition on Amendment: Migration or Importation\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000130\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EProhibition on Amendment: Equal Suffrage in the Senate\u003C\/a\u003E\n                  \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n\u003C\/article\u003E\n"]}]