[{"command":"add_css","data":[{"rel":"stylesheet","media":"all","href":"\/sites\/default\/files\/css\/css_veuEhhb1658wti0_ZAig66JOyixENU-N9zhjLQSLfOQ.css?delta=0\u0026language=en\u0026theme=heritage_theme\u0026include=eJwrTi1LzdNPzkksLq7Uy8tPSQUAPMsGtA"}]},{"command":"invoke","selector":null,"method":"openEssay","args":["18003181","\n\n\u003Carticle about=\u0022\/constitution\/articles\/3\/essays\/202\/note-on-the-foreign-affairs-power\u0022 class=\u0022node node--type-constitution-essay node--promoted node--view-mode-embedded clearfix\u0022\u003E\n  \u003Ch1 class=\u0022title\u0022\u003E\u003Cspan\u003EA Note on the Foreign Affairs Power\u003C\/span\u003E\n\u003C\/h1\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-location\u0022\u003E\n      Article III\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-context\u0022\u003E\n      \n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n  \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-body\u0022\u003E\n    \n            \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EThe Constitution\u2019s text does not mention a general power over foreign affairs. Nonetheless, some courts and commentators have suggested a foreign affairs power of the federal government arising either from a combination of the text\u2019s specific foreign affairs\u2013related powers, from the structural implications of the federal system, or from the inherent powers of sovereignty all nations possess under international law.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe foreign affairs power might have three distinct implications. First, it might give Congress foreign affairs powers beyond those listed in Article I, Section 8, or elsewhere in the text. Second, it might mean that the president has foreign affairs powers that do not arise from Article II or from grants of power from Congress. Third, it might preclude the states from acting in ways that interfere with the federal government\u2019s exercise of the foreign affairs power (in addition to the express or implied preclusions in the Constitution\u2019s text or in preemptive treaties or statutes).\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EAs to the first category, consider for example the power to restrict immigration. To many people, this seems an obvious power of Congress. However, no clause of the text grants it directly, and while it might be implied from Congress\u2019s express power over naturalization, that does not seem an obvious conclusion. Another possibility is that it arises outside the text. In \u003Cem\u003EChae Chan Ping v. United States\u003C\/em\u003E (1889), the Supreme Court found that Congress\u2019s immigration power arose from the federal government\u2019s possession of external sovereignty, being a power that all sovereign governments necessarily have. As recently as 2012, Justice Antonin Scalia in a dissenting opinion in \u003Cem\u003EArizona v. United States\u003C\/em\u003E, referred to the immigration power as an inherent power of the national government.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EAnother nineteenth-century example of Congress\u2019s foreign affairs power is the power to acquire territory. Though he signed the treaty by which the United States obtained the Louisiana Territory, Thomas Jefferson had serious misgivings about its constitutionality. He would have preferred a constitutional amendment allowing the United States to acquire territory. That right could, nonetheless, be derived from the Treaty Clause (Article II, Section 2, Clause 2) or the Property Clause (Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2). But in \u003Cem\u003EJones v. United States\u003C\/em\u003E (1890), the Court found acquisition of territory to be an inherent power of sovereignty derived from international law that Congress could exercise without tying it to a specific constitutional power. An example nearer the framing might be the 1799 Logan Act, which prohibited private persons from conducting diplomacy; it is not obvious what enumerated power might support Congress\u2019s action. The distinguished commentator Louis Henkin described a \u201cForeign Affairs Power\u201d exercised by Congress in cases such as \u003Cem\u003EJones\u003C\/em\u003E and \u003Cem\u003EChae Chan Ping\u003C\/em\u003E and resting on \u201cthe powers of the United States inherent in its sovereignty and nationhood.\u201d Henkin thought that, in addition, it would support, for example, Congress\u2019s power to enact the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (regulating when a foreign government may be sued in United States courts), to regulate conduct of U.S. citizens that occurred abroad or otherwise affected foreign relations, and indeed to regulate any activity with international implications.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe president\u2019s non-textual foreign affairs power is most strongly associated with Justice George Sutherland\u2019s opinion for the Court in \u003Cem\u003EUnited States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.\u003C\/em\u003E (1936). According to Sutherland, powers of \u201cexternal sovereignty\u201d (foreign affairs powers) vested inherently in the national government at the moment of independence; thus they were never possessed by the states and so are not subject to the delegated powers rule of the Tenth Amendment. Further, according to Sutherland\u2019s opinion, the president is the \u201csole organ\u201d of the United States in foreign affairs (Sutherland did\u0026nbsp;not say on what basis) and therefore the president alone exercises many of the federal government\u2019s foreign affairs powers. Sutherland concluded on this basis that Congress can make very broad delegations to the president in foreign affairs without implicating the doctrine that Congress may not delegate or give away its law-making powers to the president. However, the case has been interpreted\u2014especially by the executive branch\u2014to mean that the president can exercise broad independent authority in foreign affairs without tracing it to a statutory or constitutional delegation. For example, \u003Cem\u003ECurtiss-Wright\u003C\/em\u003E might be the basis of the President\u2019s independent power to conduct diplomacy, to make international executive agreements, and to terminate treaties. In addition, the foreign affairs power might be invoked to assert that Congress acts unconstitutionally when it attempts to restrict or interfere with the president\u2019s role as the nation\u2019s \u201csole organ\u201d in foreign affairs.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe third implication of the foreign affairs power is that states may be constitutionally prevented from participating in foreign affairs. Of course, states are precluded from certain foreign affairs\u2013related activities by the prohibitions in Article I, Section 10, by the negative implication of other specific clauses, and often by statutes or treaties. But in \u003Cem\u003EZschernig v. Miller \u003C\/em\u003E(1968), the Supreme Court found a state law relating to foreign affairs invalid even absent a statute, treaty, or specific constitutional provision. In that case, decided against the backdrop of the Cold War, Oregon law prohibited citizens of communist countries from inheriting property from Oregon estates on the ground that such inheritances aided enemy nations. This rule (and similar ones in other states) had provoked diplomatic protests to the U.S. government. The Supreme Court found the Oregon law unconstitutional as \u201can intrusion by the State into the field of foreign affairs which the Constitution entrusts to the President and the Congress.\u201d Later commentary began referring to this idea as the \u201cdormant foreign affairs doctrine,\u201d associating it with the dormant commerce clause doctrine that prohibits states from interfering with interstate commerce even in the absence of federal regulation.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe foreign affairs power may also support a related federal common law of foreign affairs, developed by federal courts, that displaces state law in certain instances. In \u003Cem\u003EBanco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino\u003C\/em\u003E (1964), the Court held that the act of state doctrine (which prohibits courts from holding invalid acts of foreign sovereigns done in their own territory) is part of federal common law and overrides state law to the contrary. Although subsequent opinions have referred to foreign affairs as an area in which federal courts can determine when federal common law displaces state legislation, the Court has not explained the boundaries of the field nor directly revisited the issue since \u003Cem\u003ESabbatino\u003C\/em\u003E. Nonetheless, lower courts have invoked the doctrine in various ways to set aside state law. At a minimum, the federal common law of foreign affairs presumably includes various common law doctrines of foreign sovereign immunity (to the extent they are not codified by statute or treaty), as well as the act of state doctrine.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EIt is unclear how much force the foreign affairs power has in modern law. After the mid\u2013twentieth-century expansion of Congress\u2019s power under the Commerce Clause and other enumerated powers, the need for Congress to rely on inherent or structural sources of foreign affairs powers has declined, and inherent congressional powers in foreign affairs have not played a material role in the modern Court\u2019s holdings. Although the executive branch continues to rely on arguments based on \u003Cem\u003ECurtiss-Wright\u003C\/em\u003E, the Court moved sharply away from the idea of inherent presidential powers in \u003Cem\u003EYoungstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer\u003C\/em\u003E (1952) (limiting the domestic impact of the president\u2019s foreign affairs power), and the modern Court has approached questions of executive power more through the lens of \u003Cem\u003EYoungstown\u003C\/em\u003E than \u003Cem\u003ECurtiss-Wright\u003C\/em\u003E. For example, \u003Cem\u003EDames \u0026amp; Moore v. Regan\u003C\/em\u003E (1981), upholding the president\u2019s power to settle the Iran hostage crisis, relied on congressional acquiescence in the longstanding presidential practice of claims settlement rather than on inherent presidential powers in foreign affairs. Similarly, the Court\u2019s war-on-terror cases, such as \u003Cem\u003EHamdi v. Rumsfeld\u003C\/em\u003E (2004), have focused on congressional authorization rather than inherent presidential power. The Court has cited \u003Cem\u003ECurtiss-Wright\u003C\/em\u003E in some modern cases, but it is not clear that it was important to the outcomes.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe foreign affairs power has the most potential for modern relevance in connection with the foreign affairs of the states. Globalization of commerce, transportation, and communications has brought state activities increasingly into the international spotlight. As a result, the states\u2019 potential to interfere with national foreign policies\u2014and, correspondingly, to have their laws challenged on that ground\u2014seems substantial. But the Constitution\u2019s express preclusions of the states from foreign affairs are narrow (chiefly relating to war, treaties, and import and export taxes). Thus preclusion of states from interference in foreign affairs may need to come, if at all, from the dormant foreign affairs power or federal common law or both.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003ENonetheless, the Supreme Court has not rendered a definitive ruling in this area since \u003Cem\u003EZschernig.\u003C\/em\u003E On several occasions the issue seemed to be presented, but the Court\u2019s ruling took a different route. For example, in \u003Cem\u003ECrosby v. National Foreign Trade Council\u003C\/em\u003E (2000), a business group challenged a Massachusetts statute that prohibited companies doing business in Burma (Myanmar) from bidding on state contracts, a law passed in response to that nation\u2019s poor human rights record. A lower court enjoined the state law, in part under the dormant foreign affairs power. The Supreme Court affirmed that judgment but did not reach the foreign affairs power, as it found the state law preempted by a federal statute relating to trade with Burma. In \u003Cem\u003EAmerican Insurance Association v. Garamendi \u003C\/em\u003E(2003), insurers challenged a California law relating to insurance contracts issued in Europe prior to the Holocaust; the law was apparently an effort to assist recovery by Holocaust victims and their beneficiaries, some of whom were California residents. The court of appeals rejected a \u003Cem\u003EZschernig\u003C\/em\u003E-based argument by the insurers. The Supreme Court reversed, invalidating the state law, but expressly declined to rely on \u003Cem\u003EZschernig\u003C\/em\u003E. Instead, the Court found that the California law conflicted with an executive branch policy of settling Holocaust claims through an international settlement body, established under various executive agreements, rather than by litigation in national courts. The Court did not clearly explain the constitutional basis of this preclusion. In a later case, \u003Cem\u003EMedellin v. Texas\u003C\/em\u003E (2008), the Court described \u003Cem\u003EGaramendi\u003C\/em\u003E as based on the president\u2019s ability to settle international claims by executive agreement, a power recognized as deriving from Congress\u2019s consent in \u003Cem\u003EDames \u0026amp; Moore\u003C\/em\u003E. \u003Cem\u003EMedellin\u003C\/em\u003E refused to extend \u003Cem\u003EGaramendi \u003C\/em\u003Eto allow the president to override Texas\u2019s decision to execute a Mexican citizen convicted of murder in Texas, even though the president argued (and the Court conceded) that the matter had substantial foreign policy implications.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe existence and operation of a non-textual foreign affairs power remains sharply contested in academic commentary. Modern scholarship has been highly critical of the historical underpinnings of the \u003Cem\u003ECurtiss-Wright\u003C\/em\u003E opinion, while the Court\u2019s federalism revival in domestic matters beginning in the 1990s caused scholars to devote more attention to the structural significance of the Tenth Amendment. Renewed interest in formalist and textualist approaches to the Constitution, including in foreign affairs, has cast doubt on the idea of inherent or structural powers not linked to constitutional grants. At the same time, some modern executive power scholarship supports a broad reading of the president\u2019s constitutional foreign affairs power under the Executive Vesting Clause (Article II, Section 1) and the Commander in Chief Clause (Article II, Section 2) that would lessen the need to rely on non-textual sources of presidential power in foreign affairs.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EAs in the courts, the debate over the foreign affairs power in academic commentary is most significant in the area of restrictions on the states. The idea that states are restricted by non-textual sources of national foreign affairs power has been broadly challenged as inconsistent with the express exclusions of the states from some foreign affairs powers (which implies that powers not listed are not excluded). Moreover, some modern scholarship indicates that pre- and post-ratification history does not support the idea of non-textual exclusions of the states. On the other hand, the structural need for a unified national foreign policy continues to persuade some scholars of the importance of \u201cdormant\u201d limits on the states. Although \u003Cem\u003EZschernig\u003C\/em\u003E itself has relatively few committed defenders, various forms of non-textual preclusion continue to be strongly advocated.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n  \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author\u0022\u003E\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--media\u0022\u003E\n            \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--info\u0022\u003E\n              \u003Ch4 class=\u0022con-essay-author--name\u0022\u003E\n                      Michael D. Ramsey\n                  \u003C\/h4\u003E\n                  \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--job\u0022\u003E\n         Professor of Law, Hugh and Hazel Darling Foundation; University of San Diego Law School\n      \u003C\/div\u003E\n            \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-tabs\u0022\u003E\n      \u003Cul data-tabs class=\u0022tabs\u0022\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-18003181-taba\u0022\u003EFurther Reading\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-18003181-tabb\u0022\u003ECase Law\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-18003181-tabc\u0022\u003ERelated Essays\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n      \u003C\/ul\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv data-tabs-content\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-18003181-taba\u0022\u003E\n          \n      \u003Cdiv\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EAnthony J. Bellia, Jr., \u0026amp; Bradford R. Clark,\u0026nbsp;\u003Ci\u003EThe\u0026nbsp;Federal Common Law of Nations\u003C\/i\u003E, 109 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (2009)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EAnthony J. Bellia, Jr., \u0026amp; Bradford R. Clark,\u0026nbsp;\u003Cem\u003EThe Law of Nations as Constitutional Law\u003C\/em\u003E, 98 Va. L. Rev. 729 (2012)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ESarah H. Cleveland,\u0026nbsp;\u003Cem\u003EPowers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs\u003C\/em\u003E, 81 Tex. L. Rev. 1 (2002)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EBrannon P. Denning * Michael D. Ramsey, American Insurance Association v. Garamendi\u0026nbsp;\u003Cem\u003Eand Executive Preemption in Foreign Affairs\u003C\/em\u003E, 46 Wm \u0026amp; Mary L. Rev. 825 (2004)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EJack L. Goldsmith,\u0026nbsp;\u003Cem\u003EFederal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism\u003C\/em\u003E, 83 Va. L. rev. 1617 (1997)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EJack L. Goldsmith,\u0026nbsp;\u003Cem\u003Ethe New Formalism in United States Foreign Relations Law\u003C\/em\u003E, 70 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1395 (1999)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ELouis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the United States Constitution, Chs. 1--3,6 (2nd ed. 1996)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EHarold Hong Koh, The National Security Constitution: Sharing Power After the Iran-Contra Affair (1990)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EGary Lawson \u0026amp; Guy Seidman, The Constitution of Empire: Territorial Expansion and American Legal History 21--85 (2004)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ECharles A. Lofgren,\u0026nbsp;\u003Cem\u003EUnited States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation: An Historical Reassessment,\u0026nbsp;\u003C\/em\u003E83 Yale L.J. 1 (1973)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EHarold G. Maier,\u0026nbsp;\u003Cem\u003EPreemption of State Law: A Recommended Analysis,\u0026nbsp;\u003C\/em\u003E83 Am. J. Int\u0027l. L. 832 (1989)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ESaikrishna B. Prakash \u0026amp; Michael D. Ramsey,\u0026nbsp;\u003Cem\u003EThe Executive Power over Foreign Affairs\u003C\/em\u003E, 111 Yale L.J. 231 (2001)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EGarrick B. Pursley,\u0026nbsp;\u003Cem\u003EDormancy\u003C\/em\u003E, 100 Geo. L.J. 497 (2012)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EMichael D. Ramsey, The Constitution\u0027s Text in Foreign Affairs, Chs. 1--6, 10, 13--14 (2007)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EMichael D. Ramsey,\u0026nbsp;\u003Cem\u003EThe Power of the States in Foreign Affairs: The Original Understanding of Foreign Policy Federalism\u003C\/em\u003E, 75 Notre Dame L. Rev. 341 (1999)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EMichael D. Ramsey,\u0026nbsp;\u003Cem\u003EThe Myth of Extraconstitutional Foreign Affairs Power\u003C\/em\u003E, 42 Wm. \u0026amp; Mary L. Rev. 379 (2000)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EMichael D. Ramsey,\u0026nbsp;\u003Cem\u003EInternational Wrongs, State Law Remedies, and Presidential Policies,\u003C\/em\u003E 32 Loy. L.A. Int\u0027l \u0026amp; Comp. L. Rev. 19 (2010)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EMichael D. Ramsey,\u0026nbsp;\u003Cem\u003EThe Textual Basis of the President\u0027s Foreign Affairs Power\u003C\/em\u003E, 30 Harv. J.L. \u0026amp; P. Pol\u0027y 141 (2006)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EPeter J. Spiro,\u0026nbsp;\u003Cem\u003EForeign Relations Federalism\u003C\/em\u003E, 70 U. Colo. L. rev. 1223 (1999)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EEdward T. Swaine,\u0026nbsp;\u003Cem\u003ENegotiating Federalism: State Bargaining and the Dormant Treaty Power\u003C\/em\u003E, 49 Duke L.J. 1127 (2000)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ECarlos Manuel Vazquez,\u0026nbsp;\u003Ci\u003EW(h)itere Zschernig?,\u003C\/i\u003E\u0026nbsp;46 Vill. L. Rev. 1259 (2001)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n          \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n        \u003C\/div\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-18003181-tabb\u0022\u003E\n          \n      \u003Cdiv\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EChae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (18889)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EJones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202 (1890)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EUnited States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1946)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EYoungstown Sheet \u0026amp; Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EBanco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EZschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EMoore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ECrosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EAmerican Ins. Ass\u0027n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EUnited States v. Lara, 541 U.S.193 (2004)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EHamdi v.\u0026nbsp;\u003Cem\u003ERumsfeld\u003C\/em\u003E, 542 U.S. 507 (2004)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EPasqualino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349 (2005)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EMedellin v. texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EArizona v. United States, 567 U.S. __ (2012)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n          \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n        \u003C\/div\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-18003181-tabc\u0022\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000132\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003ESupremacy Clause\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000162\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EReserved Powers of the States\u003C\/a\u003E\n                  \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n\u003C\/article\u003E\n"]}]