[{"command":"add_css","data":[{"rel":"stylesheet","media":"all","href":"\/sites\/default\/files\/css\/css_veuEhhb1658wti0_ZAig66JOyixENU-N9zhjLQSLfOQ.css?delta=0\u0026language=en\u0026theme=heritage_theme\u0026include=eJwrTi1LzdNPzkksLq7Uy8tPSQUAPMsGtA"}]},{"command":"invoke","selector":null,"method":"openEssay","args":["17878925","\n\n\u003Carticle about=\u0022\/constitution\/articles\/4\/essays\/207\/territories-clause\u0022 class=\u0022node node--type-constitution-essay node--promoted node--view-mode-embedded clearfix\u0022\u003E\n  \u003Ch1 class=\u0022title\u0022\u003E\u003Cspan\u003ETerritories Clause \u003C\/span\u003E\n\u003C\/h1\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-location\u0022\u003E\n      Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-context\u0022\u003E\n      \n            \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EThe Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory...belonging to the United States....\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n  \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-body\u0022\u003E\n    \n            \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EAfter the Constitution was ratified in 1788, the new United States government assumed ownership of the vast Northwest Territory that had been ceded to the pre-constitutional confederation by states with (real or potential) claims to the land. Further cessions from states were expected, and various founding-era figures hoped to acquire additional territory ranging from Canada to Cuba. The Northwest Ordinance of 1787 promised that the Northwest Territory would eventually be formed into states, and Article VI, Clause 1, of the Constitution (guaranteeing the \u0022engagements\u0022 of the government) carried that promise forward after ratification. Still, some provision needed to be made for the governance of this federally-held territory until states were formed--and provision made as well for the governance of any later-acquired federal territory. Accordingly, the Constitution gave Congress \u0022power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States...\u0022\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EAs with the Enclave Clause (Article I, Section 8, Clause 17), which gives Congress the power of \u0022exclusive legislation\u0022 over both the nation\u0027s capital and federal lands acquired from and within states, the Territories Clause appears to be a plenary grant of power to Congress to govern territory as a general government, without having to trace each act of legislation to an enumeration of power beyond the Territories Clause itself. On this understanding, Congress can pass a general criminal code, regulate the private law of torts and contracts, provide for rules of marriage and descent, and behave within territories as could any state government within its own jurisdiction. this view emerges naturally from the text, which places territories in the same phrase as, and gives Congress the same power over, \u0022other property,\u0022 such as inkwells and wagons (see Property Clause). It was surely the view of the clause\u0027s author, Gouverneur Morris, who explained in 1803, \u0022I always thought that when we should acquire Canada and Louisiana, it would be proper to govern them as provinces and allow them no voice in our councils. In wording the third section of the fourth article, I went as far as circumstances would permit to establish the exclusion.\u0022 And it is the view that has prevailed in the case law, where the Supreme Court has repeatedly declared that Congress has \u0022general and plenary\u0022 power over federal territory.\u0026nbsp;\u003Ci\u003ELate Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of\u0026nbsp;Latter-day Saints v. United States\u003C\/i\u003E\u0026nbsp;(1890).\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003ETo be sure, at various times, the Court has sought to ground federal power to govern territories in sources other than the Territories Clause, such as the treaty power or general notions of sovereignty.\u0026nbsp;\u003Cem\u003ESee sere v. Pitot\u003C\/em\u003E\u0026nbsp;(1810). Others, including Gouverneur Morris and the plurality in\u0026nbsp;\u003Cem\u003EDred Scott v. Sandford\u003C\/em\u003E\u0026nbsp;(1857), have occasionally argued that the Territories Clause applies only to territory held at the time of ratification, essentially reading the clause to say \u0022territory...belonging to the Untied States [as of June 21, 1788].\u0022 With all due respect tot he authority of the Territories Clause (and all due disrespect to the author of the plurality opinion in\u0026nbsp;\u003Cem\u003EDred Scott\u003C\/em\u003E), it is textually very difficult to limit the Territories Clause to territory held at the time of ratification. As Albert Gallatin pointed out in 1803, this would also limit the clause to \u0022other property\u0022 held at the time of ratification, as the constitutional power over \u0022territory\u0022 and \u0022other property\u0022 is identical. The Territories Clause applies to after-acquired territory as surely as it applies to after-acquired inkwells and wagons. In any event, little has turned on these disputes, as the claimed scope of the power of territorial governance has not seemed to vary significantly with the claimed source. As the Court noted in\u0026nbsp;\u003Cem\u003ENational Bank v. County of Yankton\u003C\/em\u003E\u0026nbsp;in 1880, \u0022There have been some differences of opinion as to the particular clause of the Constitution from which the power [to govern territory] is derived, but that it exists has always been conceded.\u0022\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe broad consensus that Congress can rule federal territory as a general government has not prevented the Territories Clause from becoming among the most contentious sentences in the Constitution. Debates about territorial governance have been at the heart of disputes as heated and violent as the Civil Ware and the debates over imperialism at the outset of the twentieth century.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe Territories Clause is a self-contained grant of power, in the sense that it gives (or confirms in) Congress the powers of a general government over federal territories. But does that mean that the Constitution imposes no limits not territorial legislation? The answer to that question is obviously no; Congress, for example, cannot pass territorial legislation without complying with the formalities of Article I, Section 7, for lawmaking. If that is true, however, one must then ask what other parts of the Constitution might also limit the reach of the Territories Clause.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe simple answer would be that\u0026nbsp;\u003Cem\u003Eall\u003C\/em\u003E\u0026nbsp;parts of the Constitution that impose general limitations on the scope and form of federal power, other than the principle of enumerated congressional powers, would apply to action involving federal territories as surely as they apply to other federal action. That simple answer, however, while it might well e correct as a matter of original meaning, has never been the law, and it is emphatically not the law today.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EFrom the founding onward, Congress has entrusted the inhabitants of federal territories with as much power of self-governance as has seemed prudent at the time, as a matter of democratic theory and to lay the groundwork for statehood (or nationhood if the territory eventually assumed independence), primarily by authorizing elected territorial legislatures with broad authority. If the Constitution\u0027s general separation-of-powers principles apply to territorial governance, this arrangement seems to violate even the weakest form of the non delegation doctrine by creating autonomous lawmaking bodies that act with no \u0022intelligible principle\u0022 to guide them. See Note on Separation of Powers courts have nonetheless repeatedly and consistently upheld (albeit with little reasoning) territorial legislatures against such challenges.\u0026nbsp;\u003Cem\u003ESee, e.g., District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson Co.\u003C\/em\u003E\u0026nbsp;(1953);\u003Cem\u003E\u0026nbsp;Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States\u003C\/em\u003E\u0026nbsp;(1937).\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EJudges in federal territories do not have the tenure and salary guarantees that Article III, Section 1, requires of federal judges, an anomaly that has been consistently upheld by the courts since 1828.\u0026nbsp;\u003Cem\u003ESee American Insurance Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, Canter\u003C\/em\u003E\u0026nbsp;(1828). Since the middle of the twentieth century, many federal territories have been allowed to elect their own executive officers, such as governors, in apparent violation of the Appointments Clause (Article II, Section 2, Clause 2), which requires federal officers (and territorial governors rather clearly meet this description) to be appointed by the president, executive department heads, or federal courts. The constitutionality of this arrangement actually remains an open question, and high-ranking U.S. Department of Justice officials on more than one occasion in modern times have expressed doubts about it. And in the early years of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court held that the Constitution\u0027s provisions regarding the uniformity of duties and tariffs (Article I, Section 8, Clause 1) throughout the Untied States did not apply to territories.\u0026nbsp;\u003Cem\u003ESee Downes v. Bidwell\u003C\/em\u003E\u0026nbsp;(1901). the bottom line is that, for more than two centuries, territorial governance has stood largely, though not quite entirely, outside the Constitution\u0027s normal structural rules.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EEven larger anomalies plague the question whether protections of individual rights, such as the Bill of Rights, apply to federal governance of territories. This was perhaps the nation\u0027s most pressing constitutional question in the first quarter of the twentieth century when, as the United States, became a global empire, the federal government had to decide whether to impose American legal institutions, such as trial by jury, on cultures that were unfamiliar with the practices. In a series of cases over two decades, the Court developed the so-called\u0026nbsp;\u0022doctrine of territorial incorporation\u0022 to address this issue The doctrine defies easy description, but in essence it distinguishes territories that are likely candidates for future statehood from those that are not. For the former, all provisions of the Constitution apply of their own force to territorial inhabitants. For the latter, those provisions that are \u0022fundamental\u0022--and the requirements of criminal juries and grand jury indictment have been specifically deemed\u0026nbsp;\u003Cem\u003Enot\u003C\/em\u003E\u0026nbsp;to be fundamental in this sense--apply of their own force to territorial inhabitants, while \u0022non-fundamental\u0022 constitutional rights apply only if and how Congress chooses to extend them. This doctrine has been universally criticized by scholars, but it has never been overruled, and indeed was cited approvingly by the Court in\u0026nbsp;\u003Cem\u003EBoumediene v. Bush\u003C\/em\u003E\u0026nbsp;(2008), which wrote that this \u0022century-old doctrine informs our analysis in the present matter.\u0022\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EFurthermore, federal equal protection principles have consistently been held to apply differently to inhabitants of territories than to the inhabitants of states. Courts have upheld, for example, race-based employment preferences and restrictions on land sales in territories that would be dubious if imposed in states.\u0026nbsp;\u003Cem\u003ESee Wabol v. Villacrusis\u003C\/em\u003E\u0026nbsp;(1992).\u0026nbsp;\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThus, under current doctrine, the Constitution does not apply to territorial governance in a straightforward, uniform, easily understood fashion.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EEven larger conceptual problems lurk in the interplay between congressional and presidential authority over territory. During times of war, American forces will sometimes occupy foreign land. Under international law principles, an occupying force has both the power and duty to govern the occupied territory. Because that occupied territory does not \u0022belong\u0022 to the United States, the Territories Clause does not authorize congressional legislation to govern it. Instead, the power to govern occupied territory during wartime stems from the president\u0027s \u0022executive power\u0022 and role as commander in chief to the military (Article II, Section 2, Clause 1). Territorial governance in that setting is part of, and is limited by, the international laws of war.\u0026nbsp;\u003Cem\u003ESee Fleming v. Page\u003C\/em\u003E\u0026nbsp;(1850). (Whether congress could take part in that governance pursuant to its own war powers or the Necessary and Proper Clause or both is unsettled.) If the occupied territory is eventually ceded to the United States by a treaty of peace, as has happened on several occasions then it becomes \u0022territory...belonging to the Untied States,\u0022 the president\u0027s wartime powers of governance seem to end, and congress\u0027s power to govern under the Territories Clause seems to begin. But what if Congress does not get around to governing?\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThis precise sequence of events occurred with respect to California in 1848 following the Mexican-American War. Congress, largely because of gridlock over slavery, did not pass a statute for the governance of California--not even a general statute delegating authority to executive officials. Military officials in California nonetheless et up, with no congressional authorization, a peacetime military government, including customs offices to collect tariffs. In the historically obscure but theoretically important case of\u0026nbsp;\u003Cem\u003ECross v. Harrison\u003C\/em\u003E\u0026nbsp;(1854), the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a peacetime military government in federal territory. the precedent was extended following the Spanish-American War. \u003Cem\u003ESee Santiago v. Nogueras\u003C\/em\u003E\u0026nbsp;(1909). The precise scope of this presidential authority to erect military governments during peacetime has yet to be fully explored.\u0026nbsp;\u0026nbsp;\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n  \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author\u0022\u003E\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--media\u0022\u003E\n            \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--info\u0022\u003E\n              \u003Ch4 class=\u0022con-essay-author--name\u0022\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022http:\/\/www.bu.edu\/law\/faculty\/profiles\/bios\/full-time\/lawson_g.html\u0022\u003EGary Lawson\u003C\/a\u003E\n                  \u003C\/h4\u003E\n                  \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--job\u0022\u003E\n         Philip S. Beck Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law\n      \u003C\/div\u003E\n            \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-tabs\u0022\u003E\n      \u003Cul data-tabs class=\u0022tabs\u0022\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-17878925-taba\u0022\u003EFurther Reading\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-17878925-tabb\u0022\u003ECase Law\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-17878925-tabc\u0022\u003ERelated Essays\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n      \u003C\/ul\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv data-tabs-content\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-17878925-taba\u0022\u003E\n          \n      \u003Cdiv\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EFrederic R. Coudert,\u003Cem\u003EThe Evolution of the Doctrine of Territorial Incorporation\u003C\/em\u003E, 26 Colum. L. rev. 823 (1926)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EGary Lawson \u0026amp; Guy Seidman, The Constitution of Empire: Territorial Expansion and American Legal History (2004)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EGary Lawson \u0026amp; Robert D. Sloane,\u003Cem\u003EThe Constitutionality of Decolonization by Associated Statehood: Puerto Rico\u0027s Legal Status Reconsidered,\u003C\/em\u003E50 B.C. L. Rev. 1123 (2009)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EArnold H. Leibowitz, Defining Status: A Comprehensive Analysis of United States--Territorial Relations (1989)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EGerald L. Neuman,\u003Cem\u003EAnomalous Zones,\u003C\/em\u003E38 Stan. L. Rev. 1197 (1996)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n          \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n        \u003C\/div\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-17878925-tabb\u0022\u003E\n          \n      \u003Cdiv\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ESere v. Pitot, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 332 (1820)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EAmerican Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EFleming v. Page, 50 U.S. (9 how.) 603 (1850)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ECross v. Harrison, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 603 (1854)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EDred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ENational Bank v. County of Yankton, 101 U.S. 129 (1880)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ELate Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1 (1890)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EDownes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ESantiago v. Nogueras, 214 U.S. 260 (1909)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EBalzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ECincinnati Soap Co. v. United States, 301 U.S. 308 (1937)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EDistrict of Columbia v. John R. Thompson Co., 346 U.S. 100 (1953)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EWabol v. Villacrusis, 958 F.2d 1450 (9th Cir. 1992)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EBoumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n          \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n        \u003C\/div\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-17878925-tabc\u0022\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/17848985\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003ETaxation\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000056\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EEnclave Clause\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000085\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003ECommander in Chief\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000090\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EAppointments Clause\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000125\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EProperty Clause\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000131\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EDebt Assumption\u003C\/a\u003E\n                  \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n\u003C\/article\u003E\n"]}]