[{"command":"add_css","data":[{"rel":"stylesheet","media":"all","href":"\/sites\/default\/files\/css\/css_veuEhhb1658wti0_ZAig66JOyixENU-N9zhjLQSLfOQ.css?delta=0\u0026language=en\u0026theme=heritage_theme\u0026include=eJwrTi1LzdNPzkksLq7Uy8tPSQUAPMsGtA"}]},{"command":"invoke","selector":null,"method":"openEssay","args":["17750649","\n\n\u003Carticle about=\u0022\/constitution\/articles\/1\/essays\/206\/piracy-and-felonies\u0022 class=\u0022node node--type-constitution-essay node--promoted node--view-mode-embedded clearfix\u0022\u003E\n  \u003Ch1 class=\u0022title\u0022\u003E\u003Cspan\u003EPiracy and Felonies\u003C\/span\u003E\n\u003C\/h1\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-location\u0022\u003E\n      Article I, Section 8, Clause 10\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-context\u0022\u003E\n      \n            \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EThe Congress shall have Power ... To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the High Seas....\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n  \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-body\u0022\u003E\n    \n            \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EThe need to strengthen the national government to protect against piracy and avoid the then current situation of each of the thirteen states treating the offense of piracy differently was an issue for the United States at the time of the Founding. For millennia, pirates have been referred to as\u0026nbsp;\u003Ci\u003Ehosts\u0026nbsp;humanitarian\u0027s generis---\u003C\/i\u003E\u0022enemies of all humankind.\u0022 Under the \u0022law of nations,\u0022 it was a crime of universal jurisdiction, but a state could choose only to enact proscriptions against various forms of \u0022municipal or statutory piracy\u0022 that only applied within its jurisdiction. At the time of independence each of the new states enacted new piracy statues, but not each of them dealt with universal jurisdiction piracy. For example, Connecticut\u0027s statute only dealt with municipal piracy, while Pennsylvania\u0027s statute referenced the law of nations and, therefore, had universal jurisdiction.\u0026nbsp;\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EUnder Article IX of the Articles of Confederation, congress had \u0022the sole and exclusive right ... [and] States shall be restrained from...appointing courts for the trial of piracies and felonies committed on the high seas; and establishing courts for receiving and determining finally appeals in all cases of captures.\u0022\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThere were several problems with this provision. The Articles of Confederation did not set up a system of federal courts, so when Congress did pass an ordinance appointing courts under the piracy provision of the Articles, it provided that cases be tried by \u0022the justices of the supreme or superior courts of judicature, and judge of the Court of Admiralty of the...states.\u0022\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe other problem with the piracy provision under the Articles is that it allowed Congress to appoint courts but did not allow it to declare what was a piracy or other maritime felony. In fact, the ordinance Congress passed specifically allowed the states to use their own common law for the substantive crimes and causes of action to be brought against those accused of piracy. This allowed each of the states to prosecute piracy differently. And, as already stated, not all of the states\u0027 piracy statues had universal jurisdiction.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThese problems were recognized immediately, but attempts at reform under the Articles proved impossible. Thus, at the Constitutional Convention, there was little discussion of the provision, for the delegates understood the difficulties that had beset the Confederation Congress. The delegates therefore accorded Congress the power to \u0022define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed not he High Seas.\u0022\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EAlmost immediately, in 1790, Congress undertook the task. It defined piracy as murder or robbery on the high seas, or any other crime committed on the high seas that would be punishable by death under United States law, if committed on land. In 1819, Congress passed the predecessor to the present-day piracy statute. It removed any nexus to the territory of the United States from the definition of piracy and instead conceived of piracy as a truly universal crime defined by the law of nations. The current piracy statute, enacted in 1909 and based on the 1819 statutes, can be found in 18 U.S.C. \u00a7\u0026nbsp;1651: \u0022Whoever, on the high seas, commits the crime of piracy as defined by the law of nations, and is afterwards brought into or found in the United States, shall be imprisoned for life.\u0022\u0026nbsp;\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe reference to the \u0022law of nations\u0022 in section 1651 was subject to a constitutional challenge in 1820. In\u0026nbsp;\u003Cem\u003EUnited States v. Smith\u003C\/em\u003E\u0026nbsp;(1820), Justice Joseph Story opined that the crime of piracy had a definite meaning in international law, and that consequently, Congress\u0027s definition of piracy was sufficiently precise. Justice Story also concluded that the crime of piracy under the law of nations consisted of acts of robbery at sea.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003ENo additional piracy cases have been litigated before the Supreme Court since 1820. However, piracy cases may end up before the Supreme Court int he near future, in light of recent controversy over the definition of piracy. While the first Supreme Court case limited the crime of piracy to robbery on the high seas, more recently, the courts have expanded the definition of piracy in light of contemporary customary international law.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EIn 2010, two new piracy cases litigated in federal courts raised novel issues regarding the definition of piracy.\u0026nbsp;\u003Cem\u003EUnited States v. Said\u0026nbsp;\u003C\/em\u003E(2010), involved the pirates who approached a U.S. ship on a small skiff. Although one of the pirates fired a shot at the ship, no pirates boarded or attempted to board it. Instead, pirates were apprehended by the crew of the ship and subsequently taken to Virginia for a criminal prosecution. the pirates moved for dismissal of the count of piracy against them, alleging that their acts did not constitute piracy under section 1651 because they did not board or take control of the victim vessel. The district court granted the motion to dismiss, concluding that the definition of \u0022piracy\u0022 in the 1820 Supreme Court\u0026nbsp;\u003Cem\u003ESmith\u003C\/em\u003E\u0026nbsp;case as \u0022robbery or forcible depredations committed upon the sea\u0022 was still valid, and that due process considerations did not allow a construction of the piracy statute to include other actions. The court, in effect, decided that attempted piracy was not a crime under the law of nations, either in 1820 or today.\u0026nbsp;\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EIn the second case,\u0026nbsp;\u003Cem\u003EUnited States v. Hansan\u003C\/em\u003E\u0026nbsp;(2010), pirates mistook a military vessel, the U.S.S.\u0026nbsp;\u003Cem\u003ENicholas\u003C\/em\u003E, for a merchant ship. After an initial exchange of fire between the pirates and the crew of the U.S.S.\u0026nbsp;\u003Cem\u003ENicholas\u003C\/em\u003E, the pirates fled in their vessel but were captured and brought to the United States for prosecution. These pirates similarly moved for dismissal of the piracy count under section 1651, arguing that the facts in the indictment were insufficient to constitute the crime of piracy. The court denied the motion, concluding that in light of developments in American piracy law, and of more recently drafted international treaties and customary law, piracy must be defined according to \u0022contemporary customary international law.\u0022 the court found that customary international law had evolved on the subject of maritime piracy and had changed since 1820 when the United States Supreme Court decided the\u0026nbsp;\u003Cem\u003ESmith\u003C\/em\u003E\u0026nbsp;case. Finally, the court concluded that contemporary customary international law did not require an actual robbery on the high seas as a prerequisite for a piracy conviction under section 1651.\u0026nbsp;\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe defendants in the\u0026nbsp;\u003Cem\u003EHasan\u003C\/em\u003E\u0026nbsp;case appealed their conviction and sentence of life imprisonment to the Fourth Circuit court of Appeals. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the conviction in\u0026nbsp;\u003Cem\u003EUnited States v. Dire\u003C\/em\u003E\u0026nbsp;(2012) and vacated the decision in\u0026nbsp;\u003Cem\u003ESaid.\u003C\/em\u003E\u0026nbsp;The appellate judges concluded that when Congress enacted section 1651 and provided for piracy to be defined by the \u0022law of nations,\u0022 it had contemplated that the definition of piracy would evolve as the law of nations evolved. The Fourth Circuit thus opined that limiting the definition of piracy to robbery on the high seas would \u0022render it incongruous with the modern law of nations and prevent [the federal courts] from exercising universal jurisdiction in piracy cases.\u0022\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EIn a third case,\u0026nbsp;\u003Cem\u003EUnited States v. Shibin\u003C\/em\u003E\u0026nbsp;(2012), pirates attacked and hijacked a German vessel and a United States yacht. The defendant was not directly involve din the attack; rather, he subsequently served as a hostage negotiator for the pirates and received a share of the ransom money. He was convicted under section 1651 and sentenced to life imprisonment. The district court, as in the\u0026nbsp;\u003Cem\u003EHasan\u003C\/em\u003E\u0026nbsp;case, opined that the crime of piracy under section 1651 encompassed acts other than just robbery at sea. At this writing, the case is pending appeal.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EFinally, in\u0026nbsp;\u003Cem\u003EUnited States v. Ali\u003C\/em\u003E\u0026nbsp;(2012), the d.c. District Court held that universal jurisdiction over the crime of piracy did not extend to the crime of conspiracy to commit piracy. This was the first case in United States history in which the government asserted universal jurisdiction over a crime of piracy had no connection to the United States or its citizens. The defendant in\u0026nbsp;\u003Cem\u003EAli\u003C\/em\u003E\u0026nbsp;allegedly assisted the pirates both before and after their crime. He, in fact, provided interpretation services after the hostages were already in the pirates\u0027 custody in order to negotiate their ransom. One of the counts that the defendant was charged with included conspiracy to commit piracy. The court reasoned that because of the exceptional nature of universal jurisdiction, federal courts could only rely upon it when the precise conduct in question was not universally cognizable. Moreover, the court held that universal jurisdiction over piracy only applied on the high seas and not in foreign countries. It concluded that the universal jurisdiction over piracy included acts that aided or abetted the crime, but not conspiracy to commit the crime. Under this view, pirate negotiators have a form of immunity when acting on behalf of (and aiding and abetting for profit) those pirates who actually board the vessel.\u0026nbsp;\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EIn U.S. federal courts today, piracy now includes acts committed on the high seas other than robbery. It is thus likely that an unsuccessful attempt to rob a ship on the high seas would fall under the statute.\u0026nbsp;\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n  \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author\u0022\u003E\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--media\u0022\u003E\n            \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--info\u0022\u003E\n              \u003Ch4 class=\u0022con-essay-author--name\u0022\u003E\n                      Milena Sterio\n                  \u003C\/h4\u003E\n                  \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--job\u0022\u003E\n         Associate Professor of Law, Cleveland Marshall College of Law\n      \u003C\/div\u003E\n            \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-tabs\u0022\u003E\n      \u003Cul data-tabs class=\u0022tabs\u0022\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-17750649-taba\u0022\u003EFurther Reading\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-17750649-tabb\u0022\u003ECase Law\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-17750649-tabc\u0022\u003ERelated Essays\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n      \u003C\/ul\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv data-tabs-content\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-17750649-taba\u0022\u003E\n          \n      \u003Cdiv\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EAnthony J. Colangelo,\u0026nbsp;\u003Cem\u003EThe Legal Limits of Universal Jurisdiction,\u003C\/em\u003E 47 Va. J. Int\u0027l\u0026nbsp;L. 149, 150 (2006)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ETara Helfman,\u0026nbsp;\u003Cem\u003EMarauders in the Courts: Why the Federal Courts Have Got the Problem of Maritime Piracy (Partly) Wrong\u003C\/em\u003E, 62 Syracuse L. Rev. 53, 57 (2012)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EEugene Kontorovich,\u0026nbsp;\u003Ci\u003Ethe \u0022Define and Punish Clause\u0022 and the\u0026nbsp;Limited of Universal Jurisdiction\u003C\/i\u003E, 103 Nw. U. L. rev. 149 (2008)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EMilena Sterio, \u003Cem\u003ET\u003C\/em\u003E\u003Cem\u003Ehe Somali Piracy Problem: A Global Puzzle Necessitating a Global Solution\u003C\/em\u003E, 59 Am. U.L. Rev. 1449 (2010)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EU.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 297 (entered into force November 16, 1994, without U.S. ratification)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n          \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n        \u003C\/div\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-17750649-tabb\u0022\u003E\n          \n      \u003Cdiv\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EUnited States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153 (1820)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EUnited States v. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 599 (D.D. Va. 2010)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EUnited States v. Said, 757 F. Supp. 2d 554 (E.d. Va. 2010)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EUnited States v. Dire, 680 F.3d 446, 450 (4th Cit. 2012)\u0026nbsp;\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EUnited States v. Shibin, No. 2:11-cr-033,\u0026nbsp;\u003Cem\u003Eslip op. at\u003C\/em\u003E\u0026nbsp;14 (E.D. Va. Apr. 16, 2012)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EUnited States v. Ali, CRIM. 11-0106, 20120 WL 2870263 (D.D.C. July 13, 2012);\u0026nbsp;\u003Cem\u003Eopinion vacated in part,\u003C\/em\u003E\u0026nbsp;CRIM. 11-0106, 2012 WL 3024763 (D.D.C. July 25, 2012)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n          \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n        \u003C\/div\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-17750649-tabc\u0022\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000047\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EOffenses Against the Law of Nations Clause\u003C\/a\u003E\n                  \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n\u003C\/article\u003E\n"]}]