[{"command":"add_css","data":[{"rel":"stylesheet","media":"all","href":"\/sites\/default\/files\/css\/css_veuEhhb1658wti0_ZAig66JOyixENU-N9zhjLQSLfOQ.css?delta=0\u0026language=en\u0026theme=heritage_theme\u0026include=eJwrTi1LzdNPzkksLq7Uy8tPSQUAPMsGtA"}]},{"command":"invoke","selector":null,"method":"openEssay","args":["10000174","\n\n\u003Carticle about=\u0022\/constitution\/amendments\/14\/essays\/175\/enforcement-clause\u0022 class=\u0022node node--type-constitution-essay node--promoted node--view-mode-embedded clearfix\u0022\u003E\n  \u003Ch1 class=\u0022title\u0022\u003E\u003Cspan\u003EEnforcement Clause\u003C\/span\u003E\n\u003C\/h1\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-location\u0022\u003E\n      Amendment XIV, Section 5\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-context\u0022\u003E\n      \n            \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EThe Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n  \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-body\u0022\u003E\n    \n            \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EFollowing the pattern of the Necessary and Proper Clause of Article I, Section 8, the enforcement clause of the Fourteenth Amendment grants to Congress the power to pass legislation directed at effectuating the provisions of Sections 1 through 4 of the amendment. Like the enforcement clauses of the two other Reconstruction Amendments (the Thirteenth and the Fifteenth), as well as those found in the Nineteenth, Twenty-third, Twenty-fourth, and Twenty-sixth Amendments, Section 5 delegates to Congress a power in addition to those listed in Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EOne specific purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment when Congress proposed it in 1866 was to ensure that Congress had adequate power to adopt the Civil Rights Act of that year, of which the current 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1981 is a descendant. That act prohibited state legislation\u2014specifically, the notorious \u201cBlack Codes\u201d\u2014that denied blacks certain rights afforded to whites, including the power to make and enforce contracts.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EA significant limitation in the text of Section 5 is that Congress is authorized only to \u201cenforce, by appropriate legislation\u201d the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice William J. Brennan Jr.\u2019s opinion in \u003Cem\u003EKatzenbach v. Morgan\u003C\/em\u003E (1966) suggested that Section 5 might also give Congress authority to define the substantive scope of the rest of the Fourteenth Amendment, but this interpretation seems at odds with the text and history of Section 5, and more recent opinions of the Supreme Court have rejected it. As early as 1883 in \u003Cem\u003EThe Civil Rights Cases\u003C\/em\u003E, the Court declared that because the prohibitions of Section 1 of the amendment reached only actions committed by the state or its agents, Congress was not empowered to legislate against the discriminatory actions of private individuals. More recently, in \u003Cem\u003ECity of Boerne v. Flores\u003C\/em\u003E (1997), the Court struck down as unconstitutional the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, in which Congress tried to use Section 5 to overturn an earlier Supreme Court decision defining the scope of the Free Exercise Clause with respect to the states. In doing so, the Court explicitly rejected Justice Brennan\u2019s suggestion in \u003Cem\u003EMorgan\u003C\/em\u003E that Section 5 allows Congress to expand the meaning of the rest of the amendment. Thus, for Congress to invoke its power under Section 5, the proposed legislation must be aimed at remedying or preventing actions that would violate some prohibition within the Fourteenth Amendment.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe legislation cannot be aimed at changing the scope of the amendment.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EOn the other hand, the Supreme Court has declared that Congress may, as a prophylactic matter, ban state actions that it has found generally to violate the Fourteenth Amendment, even if in some instances they might not. A classic example is the literacy test for voting. \u003Cem\u003ESee Oregon v. Mitchell\u003C\/em\u003E (1970). In theory, a state could use such a test in a constitutional way, but Congress determined that these tests were so commonly abused that they should be banned across the board, and the Court upheld this ban. The law was aimed at preventing actual and potential violations of the Constitution; it did not change the Constitution\u2019s substantive meaning and guarantees.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EIn \u003Cem\u003ECity of Boerne\u003C\/em\u003E, the Supreme Court declared that there must be a \u201cproportionality\u201d and \u201ccongruence\u201d between the statute \u201cand the legitimate end to be achieved.\u201d It follows that, before Congress invokes its Section 5 authority, it must ascertain that the actions it is concerned about do in fact violate the protections within the Fourteenth Amendment and that legislation remedying such violations has a \u201cproportionality\u201d and a \u201ccongruence\u201d in accomplishing the remedy. This, in turn, requires a careful analysis of the rest of the Fourteenth Amendment and the scope of its guarantees.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EFor instance, there must be \u201cstate action.\u201d Section 5 gives Congress no authority to legislate with respect to the private sector because, the Court has held, there can be no Section 1 violation without state action. \u003Cem\u003EThe Civil Rights Cases\u003C\/em\u003E. Likewise, with respect to religious discrimination, the state action must amount to intentional discrimination. The Court found in \u003Cem\u003ECity of Boerne \u003C\/em\u003Ethat laws that are neutral in text and intention and that have only a disproportionate effect on a religious group are beyond Congress\u2019s authority to prohibit. The same kinds of distinctions and limitations apply with respect to other anti-discrimination legislation. For example, because the disabled are not \u201ca suspect classification,\u201d state discrimination against the disabled violates the Fourteenth Amendment only if it is \u201cirrational.\u201d Thus, the Court has held in\u003Cem\u003E Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett\u003C\/em\u003E (2001) that Section 5 gives Congress authority only to ban irrational state employment discrimination against the disabled, although in the closely disputed case of \u003Cem\u003ETennessee v. Lane\u003C\/em\u003E (2004), the Court upheld Congressional abrogation of state sovereign immunity in actions brought under the Americans with Disabilities Act where Congress was seeking to ensure the right of access to the courts for persons with disabilities.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n  \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author\u0022\u003E\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--media\u0022\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--photo\u0022 style=\u0022background-image: url(\/sites\/default\/files\/Roger_Clegg.jpg)\u0022\u003E\u003C\/div\u003E\n            \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--info\u0022\u003E\n              \u003Ch4 class=\u0022con-essay-author--name\u0022\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022http:\/\/www.ceousa.org\/about-ceo\/about-ceo\/staff\/511-roger-clegg\u0022\u003ERoger Clegg\u003C\/a\u003E\n                  \u003C\/h4\u003E\n                  \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--job\u0022\u003E\n         President and General Counsel, Center for Equal Opportunity\n      \u003C\/div\u003E\n            \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-tabs\u0022\u003E\n      \u003Cul data-tabs class=\u0022tabs\u0022\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000174-taba\u0022\u003EFurther Reading\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000174-tabb\u0022\u003ECase Law\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000174-tabc\u0022\u003ERelated Essays\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n      \u003C\/ul\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv data-tabs-content\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000174-taba\u0022\u003E\n          \n      \u003Cdiv\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EAlexander Bickel, \u003Ci\u003EThe Voting Rights Cases\u003C\/i\u003E, 1966 Sup. Ct. Rev. 79\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ERobert A. Burt, \u003Ci\u003EMiranda and Title II: A Morganatic Marriage\u003C\/i\u003E, 1969 Sup. Ct. Rev. 81\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ERonald D. Rotunda, \u003Ci\u003EThe Power of Congress Under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment after \u003C\/i\u003ECity of Boerne v. Flores, 32 Ind. L.Rev. 163 (1998)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EJ. TenBroek, Equal Under Law (pb. ed. 1965)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003E\u003Ci\u003EThe Human Life Bill: Hearings on S. 158 before the Subcommittee on Separation of Powers of the Committee on the Judiciary\u003C\/i\u003E, United States Senate, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 310 (1982) (statement of Robert H. Bork)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n          \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n        \u003C\/div\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000174-tabb\u0022\u003E\n          \n      \u003Cdiv\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EThe Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EKatzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EOregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ECity of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EUnited States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EBd. of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ETennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n          \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n        \u003C\/div\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000174-tabc\u0022\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000058\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003ENecessary and Proper Clause\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000165\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EAbolition of Slavery\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000175\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003ESuffrage\u2014Race\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000180\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003ESuffrage\u2014Sex\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000184\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EElectors for the District of Columbia\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000185\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EPoll Taxes\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000187\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003ESuffrage\u2014Age\u003C\/a\u003E\n                  \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n\u003C\/article\u003E\n"]}]