[{"command":"add_css","data":[{"rel":"stylesheet","media":"all","href":"\/sites\/default\/files\/css\/css_veuEhhb1658wti0_ZAig66JOyixENU-N9zhjLQSLfOQ.css?delta=0\u0026language=en\u0026theme=heritage_theme\u0026include=eJwrTi1LzdNPzkksLq7Uy8tPSQUAPMsGtA"}]},{"command":"invoke","selector":null,"method":"openEssay","args":["10000169","\n\n\u003Carticle about=\u0022\/constitution\/amendments\/14\/essays\/170\/due-process-clause\u0022 class=\u0022node node--type-constitution-essay node--promoted node--view-mode-embedded clearfix\u0022\u003E\n  \u003Ch1 class=\u0022title\u0022\u003E\u003Cspan\u003EDue Process Clause\u003C\/span\u003E\n\u003C\/h1\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-location\u0022\u003E\n      Amendment XIV, Section 1\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-context\u0022\u003E\n      \n            \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003E....nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law....\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n  \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-body\u0022\u003E\n    \n            \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EBoth the Fifth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution prohibit governmental deprivations of \u201clife, liberty, or property, without due process of law.\u201d The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment serves three distinct functions in modern constitutional doctrine, in the words of the Supreme Court in 1986: \u201cFirst, it incorporates [against the States] specific protections defined in the Bill of Rights\u2009.\u2009.\u2009.\u2009Second, it contains a substantive component, sometimes referred to as \u2018substantive due process\u2019\u2009.\u2009.\u2009.\u2009Third, it is a guarantee of fair procedure, sometimes referred to as \u2018procedural due process\u2019\u2009.\u2009.\u2009.\u201d \u003Cem\u003EDaniels v. Williams\u003C\/em\u003E (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring).\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EModern law interprets the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to impose the same substantive due process and procedural due process requirements on the federal and state governments. The doctrine of procedural due process under both amendments, as well as the definition of \u201clife, liberty, or property\u201d as the range of interests protected by the respective Due Process Clauses, is addressed in more detail in the essay on Due Process in the Fifth Amendment. This essay will address substantive due process and the use of the Fourteenth Amendment\u2019s Due Process Clause as a vehicle for incorporating selected provisions of the Bill of Rights against the states.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003ETo understand the Fourteenth Amendment\u2019s Due Process Clause, one must start with the Fifth Amendment\u2019s Due Process Clause, from which the language of the Fourteenth Amendment\u2019s provision was drawn nearly verbatim. Although the phrase \u201cdue process of law\u201d first appeared in the fourteenth century with a very narrow and technical meaning involving the service of appropriate writs, the American Founding generation likely identified the Fifth Amendment\u2019s Due Process Clause with the clauses, prevalent in state constitutions in 1791, that required governmental deprivations of life, liberty, or property to conform to \u201cthe law of the land,\u201d as well as appropriate notice and ability to defend oneself in court.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThere are certain respects in which \u201cdue process of law,\u201d understood as equivalent to \u201cthe law of the land,\u201d uncontroversially regulates the substance of governmental action. Most obviously, the core meaning of \u201claw of the land\u201d provisions, dating back to the Magna Carta, is to secure the principle of legality by ensuring that executive and judicial deprivations are grounded in valid legal authority. In this respect, the Fifth Amendment\u2019s Due Process Clause limits the substance of executive or judicial action by requiring it to be grounded in law.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe term \u201csubstantive due process\u201d as used in modern discourse conventionally does not refer to the principle of legality or limitations on Congress\u2019s power to prescribe novel adjudicatory procedures for the deprivation of life, liberty, or property. Instead, it generally refers to limitations on the substance of legislation (other than legislation that seeks to alter the procedural aspect of \u201cdue process of law\u201d). Few constitutional doctrines generate more heat than substantive due process. Many scholars doubt whether there is any legitimate doctrine of substantive due process, and there is a dispute among those who advocate some form of substantive due process about the scope and content of that doctrine.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EMany advocates of substantive due process openly eschew any reliance on original meaning as support for their position, but some do find an originalist warrant in the doctrine. Originalist defenders of substantive due process emphasize the Due Process Clause\u2019s links to \u201claw of the land\u201d provisions and the likely eighteenth-century American understanding of those provisions. Americans were familiar with, and influenced by, the writings of English judges and legal scholars such as Sir Edward Coke and Sir William Blackstone. In the seventeenth century, Coke sought to check the arbitrary rule of the Stuart monarchs by emphasizing that the \u201claw of the land\u201d clause in the Magna Carta encompassed both procedural safeguards and substantive limitations on the power of government; monopoly grants, according to Coke, were invalid as contrary to \u201cthe law of the land.\u201d Scholars have debated whether Coke\u2019s understanding of the Magna Carta was correct, but there is no doubt that his views markedly influenced constitutional development in the American colonies. Blackstone, in his widely read and influential \u003Cem\u003ECommentaries on the Laws of England\u003C\/em\u003E (1765\u20131769), also discussed the Magna Carta\u2019s \u201claw of the land\u201d provision in terms of both procedure and substance. Thus, some have argued, founding-era persons conversant with Blackstone and Coke would be disposed to a broad reading of \u201claw of the land\u201d provisions so as to place certain fundamental rights beyond the reach of government, and the Fifth Amendment\u2019s Due Process Clause, and therefore the Fourteenth Amendment\u2019s Due Process Clause, are best understood as part of this \u201claw of the land\u201d tradition.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003ESkeptics of substantive due process counter on several levels. First, they respond that British traditions of restraints on royal power do not readily translate into American constitutional restraints on congressional power. Second, they say that most of the substantive concerns voiced by pre-1791 writers are addressed by provisions written into the Constitution rather than the Due Process Clause, such as the Fifth Amendment\u2019s Takings Clause and the original Constitution\u2019s Ex Post Facto, Bill of Attainder, and Necessary and Proper Clauses. The skeptics maintain that there is no reason to force those substantive concerns into the unpromising language of \u201cdue process of law.\u201d Third, they argue that attempts to draw too close a linkage between the Due Process Clause and broadly and substantively construed \u201claw of the land\u201d provisions run headlong into the Supremacy Clause, which declares that all valid congressional statutes are, in fact, the \u201csupreme Law of the Land.\u201d On balance, say the critics of substantive due process, the phrase \u201cdue process of law\u201d is best read as compelling the government to act according to traditional modes of procedure (\u201cdue process\u201d) and pursuant to valid legal authorization (\u201cof law\u201d).\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe scope of the Due Process Clause was not a serious topic of discussion in the decades immediately after the Founding. The Supreme Court did not decide a case squarely involving the Fifth Amendment due process guarantee until the infamous \u003Cem\u003EDred Scott v. Sandford\u003C\/em\u003E decision in 1857. Even so, the use of the Due Process Clause in that case was brief and cryptic: the Court said only that a statute that effectively frees any slave brought by his or her master into federal territory \u201ccould hardly be dignified with the name of due process of law.\u201d\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EState courts in the pre\u2013Civil War era dealt more actively with issues of due process. Some courts equated due process with procedural requirements only, whereas others in the antebellum era wrestled with substantive interpretations of due process. State courts early established the principle that transfer of property from one person to another by legislative fiat violated due process. Further, in the landmark case of \u003Cem\u003EWynehamer v. People\u003C\/em\u003E (1856), the New York Court of Appeals struck down a prohibition statute as applied to the sale of liquor owned when the law became effective. Holding that the act constituted a deprivation of property without due process, the Wynehamer court anticipated later doctrinal development by invalidating a generally applicable regulation on due process grounds. Thomas M. Cooley, in his influential work, \u003Cem\u003EA Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations Which Rest Upon the Legislative Power of the States of the American Union\u003C\/em\u003E (1868), insisted that due process was not satisfied merely by any duly enacted legislation.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003ERather, he argued that due process was not simply procedural but limited the legislature from violating fundamental constitutional values.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EIn 1868, the Fourteenth Amendment was added to the Constitution, and since that time, historians have debated what the intentions of the framers and ratifiers of the amendment were. Clearly the amendment was designed to extend protection to the newly freed slaves against mistreatment by the states. Some thought that the Bill of Rights\u2019 guarantees would now limit the states through the Privileges or Immunities Clause. A few, like Justice Joseph P. Bradley, thought that whatever \u201cdue process of law\u201d meant in 1791, by 1868 it clearly signaled substantive restraints on legislation. Yet others no doubt believed that the Fourteenth Amendment\u2019s Due Process Clause had precisely the same meaning as the Fifth Amendment\u2019s Due Process Clause, so that if there was no legitimate doctrine of substantive due process under the latter, there could not be any such doctrine under the former either.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe Supreme Court at first construed narrowly the due process requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment. It adhered to the view that the Bill of Rights was not extended to the states by virtue of that amendment. It further held that the Due Process Clauses in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments had the same meaning, so that substantive due process under the two provisions had to stand or fall together. Disagreeing with the majority, Justice John M. Harlan argued that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment created a national standard of rights. And Justice Stephen J. Field forcefully maintained that the Due Process Clause protected the right to pursue lawful trades and contractual freedom from abridgement by the states. Field\u2019s understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment gained ground on the Supreme Court in the late nineteenth century.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EUnder Chief Justice Melville W. Fuller, the Court relied on substantive due process to uphold a variety of economic rights. In a line of cases, the Court held that under due process, regulated industries were entitled to charge reasonable rates. The justices ruled in\u003Cem\u003E Allgeyer v. Louisiana\u003C\/em\u003E (1897) that the right to make contracts was a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause, thereby establishing the liberty of contract doctrine. In the seminal case of \u003Cem\u003ELochner v. New York\u003C\/em\u003E (1905), the Court invoked due process to strike down a state law regulating the hours of work in bakeries as an interference with contractual freedom. Building on the liberty of contract principle, the Court later determined in \u003Cem\u003EAdkins v. Children\u2019s Hospital of D.C.\u003C\/em\u003E (1923) that a minimum wage law for women violated due process. The Court also relied on substantive due process to safeguard other types of fundamental rights not enumerated in the Constitution. For example, \u003Cem\u003EPierce v. Society of Sisters \u003C\/em\u003E(1925) affirmed the right of parents to control the education of their children.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe political triumph of the New Deal and the resulting constitutional revolution of 1937 transformed the interpretation of the Due Process Clause. The Supreme Court signaled its rejection of substantive due process as a basis on which to review economic legislation in \u003Cem\u003EWest Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish\u003C\/em\u003E (1937). Until this point state and federal courts had not carefully differentiated between the procedural and substantive components of due process. As the unitary understanding of due process shattered, judges began in the 1940s to employ the term \u201csubstantive due process\u201d for the first time.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe Court further downplayed the rights of property owners in \u003Cem\u003EUnited States v. Carolene Products Co.\u003C\/em\u003E (1938) by holding that economic regulations would not be found to violate the Due Process Clause so long as they satisfied a minimal \u201crational basis\u201d test. Conversely, the Court indicated that other rights deemed fundamental would receive heightened scrutiny. It is difficult to reconcile\u003Cem\u003E Carolene Products\u003C\/em\u003E with the language of the Due Process Clause, which draws no distinction between the right to property and other personal rights, especially because the Framers of the Constitution and Bill of Rights closely identified security of private property with political freedom. The opinion also ranked rights into categories not expressed in the Constitution. Nonetheless, \u003Cem\u003ECarolene Products\u003C\/em\u003E virtually eliminated due process review of economic regulations. In any event, scholars and justices steeped in Progressive\u2013New Deal jurisprudence exaggerated the impact of the earlier substantive due process decisions and pictured these cases as examples of unwarranted judicial policy-making. After the mid-1930s, the Supreme Court did not invalidate a regulatory statute on grounds of due process until \u003Cem\u003EBMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore \u003C\/em\u003E(1996), which concluded that there was a due process right not to be charged excessive punitive damages. Scholars debate whether the decision is grounded in substantive due process or in the procedural due process principle requiring one to be given fair notice of possible punishment.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003ERecent scholarship among originalists has sought to rehabilitate the bona fides of the \u003Cem\u003ELochner\u003C\/em\u003E line of cases, noting, for example, that the so-called substantive due process cases sought only to protect property owners from arbirtrary deprivations by applying the traditional due process principle of legality.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EMore controversial has been the Supreme Court\u2019s revival of substantive due process to safe-guard noneconomic rights that are not set out in the written text of the Constitution. Some modern critics, such as Robert H. Bork, have insisted that due process pertains entirely to matters of procedure, and the Court has gone beyond its function in finding that due process protects certain substantive liberties. Justice Antonin Scalia, in particular, has criticized the inconsistent picking among rights to receive substantive due process protection. In the discovery of new liberties protected by due process, the Court has more recently left behind both the text of the Constitution and historical tradition. These substantive personal rights include the right to marry and a right of privacy that encompasses the right of married couples to use birth-control devices. In \u003Cem\u003ERoe v. Wade\u003C\/em\u003E (1973) the Court extended the concept of privacy to cover the right to obtain an abortion. In \u003Cem\u003EPlanned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey\u003C\/em\u003E (1992), the Court grounded the abortion right in a highly subjective theory of the individual, extending, some observers believe, the principle to protect private homosexual acts in \u003Cem\u003ELawrence v. Texas\u003C\/em\u003E (2003). In striking down part of the federal Defense of Marriage Act that had denied federal benefits to \u201cmarried\u201d same-sex couples, the Court seemed to extend the principle from \u003Cem\u003ELawrence\u003C\/em\u003E. Justice Anthony Kennedy declared that the federal law violated \u201cbasic due process\u2009.\u2009.\u2009.\u2009principles\u201d in that it was \u201cmotivated by an improper animus\u201d against homosexual persons lawfully married under state law. \u003Cem\u003EUnited States v. Windsor\u003C\/em\u003E (2013). On the other hand, earlier in \u003Cem\u003EWashington v. Glucksberg\u003C\/em\u003E (1997), the justices held that the Due Process Clause does not encompass an asserted individual liberty to commit an assisted suicide.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EUntil the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, the accepted opinion was that the Bill of Rights restricted only the federal government, a principle affirmed in \u003Cem\u003EBarron v. City of Baltimore \u003C\/em\u003E(1833). Some abolitionists thought otherwise, and some think that the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was meant to undo \u003Cem\u003EBarron\u003C\/em\u003E and apply the Bill of Rights protections (and perhaps others in the Constitution) to the states. In \u003Cem\u003EThe Slaughter-House Cases\u003C\/em\u003E (1873), the Supreme Court sheared the Privileges or Immunities Clause of any real strength. If there were to be any application to the states of the guarantees found within the Bill of Rights, it would have to come through some other route.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EAt first, the Court did not \u201cincorporate\u201d rights within the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment. Rather, the Court determined that the same right that was protected by the Bill of Rights against federal infringement was also protected against state infringement by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Later, Justice Felix Frankfurter would state that the clause had an \u201cindependent potency\u201d separate from that of the Bill of Rights.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EIn \u003Cem\u003EChicago, Burlington \u0026amp; Quincey Railroad Co. v. Chicago \u003C\/em\u003E(1897), the justices unanimously determined that the Due Process Clause required the states to provide just compensation when they acquired private property for public use. Thus, the just compensation principle of the Fifth Amendment became in effect the first provision of the Bill of Rights to be federalized. In \u003Cem\u003EGitlow v. New York\u003C\/em\u003E (1925), the Court similarly suggested that principles of free speech basically identical to those contained in the First Amendment applied to the states by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment. From the 1940s onward, however, the view that the Fourteenth Amendment\u2019s Due Process Clause literally \u201cincorporates\u201d the text of various provisions of the Bill of Rights rapidly gained steam. By the 1960s, what we know today as the \u201cincorporation doctrine\u201d was complete. Under current law, most provisions of the Bill of Rights are deemed applicable to the states in precisely the same manner that they are applicable to the federal government. Notable exceptions to the rule of incorporation are the Fifth Amendment\u2019s requirement of indictment by grand jury, the Seventh Amendment\u2019s guarantee of jury trial in civil cases, and, perhaps, the Third Amendment. (Similarly, ever since \u003Cem\u003EBolling v. Sharpe\u003C\/em\u003E in 1954, the Fifth Amendment\u2019s Due Process Clause has been held to \u201creverse-incorporate\u201d the Fourteenth Amendment\u2019s Equal Protection Clause against the federal government.)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe incorporation doctrine, although settled as law, remains controversial in a number of respects. During the doctrine\u2019s formative years in the mid-twentieth century, Justice Hugo L. Black consistently maintained that all of the provisions in the first eight amendments should be deemed incorporated against the states, not simply those that the Court considers to be sufficiently fundamental. \u003Cem\u003EAdamson v. California\u003C\/em\u003E (1947). Justice Frankfurter, as noted above, believed that the fundamental rights protected by the Due Process Clause were independent of those in the Bill of Rights, though they may coincide in some instances. The route the Court chose was \u201cselective incorporation,\u201d often attributed to Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo\u2019s opinion in \u003Cem\u003EPalko v. Connecticut \u003C\/em\u003E(1937). Through selective incorporation, the Warren Court brought most of the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment, though the selective incorporation doctrine did not restrain some justices from finding additional rights to add that were not in the Bill of Rights.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EMore recently, in \u003Cem\u003EMcDonald v. City of Chicago \u003C\/em\u003E(2010), a plurality of the Supreme Court concluded that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment made the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms applicable to the states. It reasoned that self-defense was a fundamental right entitled to substantive protection. Justice Clarence Thomas, concurring, favored overruling\u003Cem\u003E Slaughter-House\u003C\/em\u003E and insisted that the right to bear arms is a privilege of citizenship protected under the Privileges or Immunities Clause.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n  \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author\u0022\u003E\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--media\u0022\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--photo\u0022 style=\u0022background-image: url(\/sites\/default\/files\/James_Ely.jpg)\u0022\u003E\u003C\/div\u003E\n            \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--info\u0022\u003E\n              \u003Ch4 class=\u0022con-essay-author--name\u0022\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022http:\/\/law.vanderbilt.edu\/faculty\/faculty-detail\/index.aspx?faculty_id=165\u0022\u003EJames W. Ely, Jr.\u003C\/a\u003E\n                  \u003C\/h4\u003E\n                  \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--job\u0022\u003E\n         Milton R. Underwood Professor of Law Emeritus, Vanderbilt University Law School\n      \u003C\/div\u003E\n            \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-tabs\u0022\u003E\n      \u003Cul data-tabs class=\u0022tabs\u0022\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000169-taba\u0022\u003EFurther Reading\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000169-tabb\u0022\u003ECase Law\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000169-tabc\u0022\u003ERelated Essays\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n      \u003C\/ul\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv data-tabs-content\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000169-taba\u0022\u003E\n          \n      \u003Cdiv\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EAkhil Amar, The Bill of Rights: Creation and Reconstruction (1998)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EDAVID E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER: DEFENDING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AGAINST PROGRESSIVE REFORM (2011)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EEdward S. Corwin, The Doctrine of Due Process of Law Before the Civil War, 24 Harv. L. Rev. 366 (1911)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EBARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION (1998)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EJames W. Ely Jr., The Oxymoron Reconsidered: Myth and Reality in the Origins of Substantive Due Process, 16 Const. Comm. 315 (1999)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EJames W. Ely Jr., The Progressive Era Assault on Individualism and Property Rights, 29 Soc. Phil. \u0026amp; Pol\u2019y 255 (2012)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EHOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE (1993)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EHerbert Hovenkamp, The Political Economy of Substantive Due Process, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 379 (1988)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EKurt T. Lash, The Origins of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, Part I: \u201cPrivileges and Immunities\u201d as an Antebellum Term of Art, 98 Geo. L.J. 1241 (2010)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EKurt T. Lash, The Origins of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, Part II: John Bingham and the Second Draft of the Fourteenth Amendment, 99 Geo. L.J. 329 (2011)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EKurt T. Lash, The Origins of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, Part III: Andrew Johnson and the Constitutional Referendum of 1866, 101 Geo. L.J. 1275 (2013)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EEarl M. Maltz, Fourteenth Amendment Concepts in the Antebellum Era, 32 Am. J. Legal Hist. 305 (1988)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EDAVID N. MAYER, LIBERTY OF CONTRACT: REDISCOVERING A LOST CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT (2011)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ERODNEY L. MOTT, DUE PROCESS OF LAW (1926)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EMichael J. Phillips, The Slow Return of Economic Substantive Due Process, 49 Syracuse L. Rev. 917 (1999)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ERobert E. Riggs, Substantive Due Process in 1791, 1990 Wis. L. Rev. 941 (1990)\u003Cbr\u003E\n\u0026nbsp;\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ERyan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120 Yale L.J. 408 (2010)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n          \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n        \u003C\/div\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000169-tabb\u0022\u003E\n          \n      \u003Cdiv\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ECalder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EBarron v. City of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EMurray\u2019s Lessee v. Hoboken Land \u0026amp; Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EWynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378 (1856)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EDred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EThe Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36\u003Cbr\u003E\n(1873)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EMunn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EHurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EMugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EAllgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EChicago, Burlington \u0026amp; Quincey R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ELochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EMuller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EBunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EAdkins v. Children\u0027s Hospital of D.C., 261 U.S. 525 (1923)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EMeyer v. State of Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EGitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EPierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ENebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EPalko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003E\u003Ci\u003EWest Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937)\u003C\/i\u003E\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EUnited States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EAdamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EIn re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ERochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EBolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EWilliamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EMapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EGideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EMalloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EGriswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EPointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EKlopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EDuncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EBenton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ERoe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EDaniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EPlanned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EBMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EWashington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ELawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EJohnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EMcDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EUnited States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n          \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n        \u003C\/div\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000169-tabc\u0022\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000149\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EDue Process Clause\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000168\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EPrivileges or Immunities\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000170\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EEqual Protection\u003C\/a\u003E\n                  \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n\u003C\/article\u003E\n"]}]