[{"command":"add_css","data":[{"rel":"stylesheet","media":"all","href":"\/sites\/default\/files\/css\/css_veuEhhb1658wti0_ZAig66JOyixENU-N9zhjLQSLfOQ.css?delta=0\u0026language=en\u0026theme=heritage_theme\u0026include=eJwrTi1LzdNPzkksLq7Uy8tPSQUAPMsGtA"}]},{"command":"invoke","selector":null,"method":"openEssay","args":["10000160","\n\n\u003Carticle about=\u0022\/constitution\/amendments\/8\/essays\/161\/cruel-and-unusual-punishment\u0022 class=\u0022node node--type-constitution-essay node--promoted node--view-mode-embedded clearfix\u0022\u003E\n  \u003Ch1 class=\u0022title\u0022\u003E\u003Cspan\u003ECruel and Unusual Punishment\u003C\/span\u003E\n\u003C\/h1\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-location\u0022\u003E\n      Amendment VIII\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-context\u0022\u003E\n      \n            \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003E...nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n  \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-body\u0022\u003E\n    \n            \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EThere is little in the historical record to suggest that the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause was the subject of much discussion during the drafting and ratification of the Bill of Rights. Consequently, there has been a continuing controversy over the particular meanings of \u201ccruel\u201d and \u201cunusual\u201d and the categories of punishments that the clause prohibits.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThree categories of punishments are at issue:\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003E(1) punishments not prescribed by the legislature,\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003E(2) torturous punishments, and (3) disproportionate and excessive punishments.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe declaration in the English Bill of Rights that \u201ccruel and unusual punishments [ought not to be] inflicted\u201d was commonly understood to apply only to those punishments not authorized by Parliament, that is to say, the form of punishment could no longer be the king\u2019s prerogative. The Magna Carta (1215) had prohibited arrest and other like actions unless carried out according to \u201cthe law of the land,\u201d and the 1689 Bill of Rights extended the principle to punishments as well. But though the king was limited, Parliament could, at least in theory, devise new punishments. Some scholars, however, have suggested that the proscription of \u201ccruel and unusual punishments\u201d included any novel punishment devised by Parliament that conflicted with longstanding tradition.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe second category, which arguably reflects the understanding that prevailed in America before the drafting of the Eighth Amendment, would prohibit torturous punishments such as pillorying, disemboweling, decapitation, and drawing and quartering. Inasmuch as such punishments were virtually absent in colonial America, Justice Joseph Story in his\u003Cem\u003E Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States\u003C\/em\u003E (1833) believed that \u201c[t]he provision would seem to be wholly unnecessary in a free government, since it is scarcely possible, that any department of such a government should authorize, or justify such atrocious conduct.\u201d\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EEarly Supreme Court interpretations subscribed to the view that the clause curbed only torturous punishments as defined at the time of the amendment\u2019s ratification. See \u003Cem\u003EPervear v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts \u003C\/em\u003E(1866). Based on that understanding, the Court subsequently upheld execution by public shooting, \u003Cem\u003EWilkerson v. Utah \u003C\/em\u003E(1879), and electrocution, \u003Cem\u003EIn re Kemmler\u003C\/em\u003E (1890). Some scholarly opinion, however, holds that \u201cunusual\u201d referred not only to punishments that were illegal at the time of the Founding but to punishments that did not conform to long-standing practice. In this sense, \u201cunusual\u201d would also include the third category of proscribed punishments, those that are disproportionate or excessive.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe notion that \u201cunusual\u201d requires respect to ongoing tradition and to the humane treatment of criminals was first raised in dissent in \u003Cem\u003EO\u2019Neil v. Vermont\u003C\/em\u003E (1892). The Court adopted the dissent\u2019s view in \u003Cem\u003EWeems v. United States \u003C\/em\u003E(1910) and reconfirmed that holding in\u003Cem\u003E Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber \u003C\/em\u003E(1947). In \u003Cem\u003ETrop v. Dulles\u003C\/em\u003E (1958), Chief Justice Earl Warren rejected the notion of reliance on the original understanding as the appropriate standard in favor of the aforementioned \u201cevolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.\u201d Since that time, the Supreme Court\u2019s views on the amendment have been confused, and the current Court appears divided and unable to agree on a common interpretive standard.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe Court first considered the question of incorporating the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in\u003Cem\u003E Resweber\u003C\/em\u003E, but it did not resolve it definitively until\u003Cem\u003E Robinson v. California\u003C\/em\u003E (1962).\u003Cbr\u003E\n\u003Cbr\u003E\nIn \u003Cem\u003EFurman v. Georgia \u003C\/em\u003E(1972), the Court held in a five-to-four decision that the Eighth Amendment banned the arbitrary infliction of the death penalty, requiring states to rewrite their laws to give judges and juries standards according to which the penalty could be imposed. In the majority, three justices opined that the intent of the clause was to ban \u201carbitrary\u201d punishments. Two other justices rejected an originalist approach to reach the same result. In toto, the majority believed that the penalty had been applied in a discriminatory or arbitrary manner, and the decision inspired some expectation that the Court would ban the death penalty altogether. In dissent in \u003Cem\u003EFurman\u003C\/em\u003E, Chief Justice Warren E. Burger clung to the view that the Framers meant to ban only punishments not prescribed by law as well as torturous punishments.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EIn \u003Cem\u003EGregg v. Georgia\u003C\/em\u003E (1976), the Court flatly held that the death penalty was not a per se violation of the Eighth Amendment. The majority opinion agreed with Chief Justice Burger\u2019s historical view of the original intent of the Eighth Amendment, but nonetheless adopted Chief Justice Warren\u2019s added \u201cevolving standards of decency\u201d standard. The Court declared that the decision to impose capital punishment requires separate phases in a trial for the determination of guilt and the imposition of the death sentence. In the punishment phase, the law must leave the jury with discretion. \u003Cem\u003EWoodson v. North Carolina\u003C\/em\u003E (1976).\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe meandering history of Supreme Court opinions continued. In \u003Cem\u003ESolem v. Helm\u003C\/em\u003E (1983), Justice Lewis F. Powell\u2019s majority opinion held that the ban on disproportionate punishments was part of the 1689 English Bill of Rights, even if the Framers\u2019 view was different. \u003Cem\u003EHarmelin v. Michigan\u003C\/em\u003E (1991), however, reversed \u003Cem\u003ESolem\u003C\/em\u003E, and Chief Justice William Rehnquist rejected Justice Powell\u2019s analysis. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Antonin Scalia reiterated that the primary purpose of the amendment was to void judge-imposed punishments that were not prescribed in the law. Concurring, Justice Anthony Kennedy nonetheless argued that disproportionality is also forbidden by the amendment. Justice Kennedy\u2019s views were accepted by the majority in \u003Cem\u003EAtkins v. Virginia \u003C\/em\u003E(2002) in an opinion written by Justice John Paul Stevens. Nonetheless, Stevens refused to base his decision on the original meaning and relied on Warren\u2019s \u201cevolving standards of decency\u201d to hold that it is cruel and unusual to execute the mentally ill.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EGenerally speaking, we can now conclude that there is a proportionality requirement at least in the Court\u2019s death-penalty cases. In back-to-back cases, \u003Cem\u003EEwing v. California\u003C\/em\u003E (2003) and \u003Cem\u003ELockyer v. Andrade\u003C\/em\u003E (2003), the Court continued to follow Justice Kennedy\u2019s interpretation of the Eighth Amendment but held that the life sentence in California\u2019s three-strikes law did not offend the principle of proportionality. In Ewing, Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, concurred, but asserted that the clause lacks a proportionality requirement.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EOver the past few decades, the Court has held that rape may not be punished by death,\u003Cem\u003E Coker v. Georgia\u003C\/em\u003E (1977), because the state should not be able to take away the perpetrator\u2019s life if he did not take away the life of his victim. In line with this argument, the Court later held that only major accomplices in a felony murder conviction may be sentenced to death. \u003Cem\u003EEnmund v. Florida \u003C\/em\u003E(1982), \u003Cem\u003ETison v. Arizona\u003C\/em\u003E (1987). In Kennedy v. Louisiana (2008), the Supreme Court determined that the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause prohibited the use of capital punishment against a convicted child rapist. In so doing, the Court also seemed to suggest that the death penalty would violate the Eighth Amendment in all instances where it was imposed on non-homicide offenders, except for those who commit \u201coffenses against the State,\u201d namely, \u201ctreason, espionage, terrorism, and drug kingpin activity.\u201d\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EBased on the standard of disproportionality, the Court has also held that Congress may not take away a person\u2019s citizenship for desertion from the army. \u003Cem\u003ETrop v. Dulles\u003C\/em\u003E. Nor are inhumane prison conditions permissible under the Eighth Amendment, \u003Cem\u003EEstelle v. Gamble\u003C\/em\u003E (1976), \u003Cem\u003ERhodes v. Chapman\u003C\/em\u003E (1981). Further, the amendment forbids serious or malicious harm caused by prison officials. \u003Cem\u003EWilson v. Seiter\u003C\/em\u003E (1991), \u003Cem\u003EHudson v. McMillian\u003C\/em\u003E (1992). But in order to succeed on an Eighth Amendment claim against prison officers for excessive use of force, an inmate must show (1) that the alleged wrongdoing was objectively harmful and (2) that the officers acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind. \u003Cem\u003ENorton v. City of Marietta\u003C\/em\u003E (2005).\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003ENor may a state execute a person under eighteen years of age, \u003Cem\u003ERoper v. Simmons\u003C\/em\u003E (2005). In\u003Cem\u003E Graham v. Florida\u003C\/em\u003E (2010), the Supreme Court extended Roper and held that juvenile offenders, and now even those convicted of murder, \u003Cem\u003EMiller v. Alabama \u003C\/em\u003E(2012), could not be sentenced to life imprisonment without possibility of parole for non-homicide offenses. A state may not punish a person for a \u201cstatus offense,\u201d such as being a drug addict, \u003Cem\u003ERobinson v. California\u003C\/em\u003E, though the amendment does not, of course, bar prosecution for the buying and selling of drugs. The amendment, however, does not prohibit corporal punishment in public schools, \u003Cem\u003EIngraham v. Wright \u003C\/em\u003E(1977). In addition, a mandatory life sentence after three convictions is constitutional. \u003Cem\u003ERummel v. Estelle\u003C\/em\u003E (1980).\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe disproportionality rule has not seemed overly restrictive in recent lower federal court rulings. The imposition of two concurrent sixty-year prison sentences, with the last thirty years suspended for supervised release, was determined to be permissible for a defendant convicted of two counts of unlawful sale of a controlled substance next to a church.\u003Cem\u003E Brooks v. Kelly \u003C\/em\u003E(2009). Given the nature of the offense, and the type of harm it causes, a statutory minimum sentence of five years for the receipt of child pornography was determined not to be grossly disproportionate to the offense. \u003Cem\u003EUnited States v. Woods \u003C\/em\u003E(2010). In \u003Cem\u003EGherebi v. Bush\u003C\/em\u003E (2003), the federal appeals court did not reach the merits of the assertion by plaintiffs that the detention of persons at Guantanamo Bay was a violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EIn sum, the current law is that punishments do not violate the clause if they involve no \u201cunnecessary and wanton infliction of pain\u201d and if they are not \u201cgrossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime.\u201d \u003Cem\u003EGregg v. Georgia\u003C\/em\u003E. The clause also proscribes \u201call excessive punishments, as well as cruel and unusual punishments that may or may not be excessive.\u201d\u003Cem\u003E Atkins v. Virginia\u003C\/em\u003E. More recently, the Court has grounded the clause\u2019s protection in \u201cthe basic \u2018precept of justice that punishment for [a] crime should be graduated and proportioned to [the] offense.\u2019\u201d In adopting this approach, courts ought to consider contemporary and \u201cevolving standards of decency,\u201d rather than those conceptions of \u201ccruel\u201d or \u201cunusual\u201d punishment that prevailed at the time of the Eighth Amendment\u2019s adoption. Today, this would specifically include consideration for the \u201crespect for the dignity of the person.\u201d \u003Cem\u003EKennedy v. Louisiana\u003C\/em\u003E.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n  \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author\u0022\u003E\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--media\u0022\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--photo\u0022 style=\u0022background-image: url(\/sites\/default\/files\/David_Forte.jpg)\u0022\u003E\u003C\/div\u003E\n            \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--info\u0022\u003E\n              \u003Ch4 class=\u0022con-essay-author--name\u0022\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022http:\/\/facultyprofile.csuohio.edu\/csufacultyprofile\/detail.cfm?FacultyID=D_FORTE\u0022\u003EDavid F. Forte\u003C\/a\u003E\n                  \u003C\/h4\u003E\n                  \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--job\u0022\u003E\n         Professor, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law\n      \u003C\/div\u003E\n            \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-tabs\u0022\u003E\n      \u003Cul data-tabs class=\u0022tabs\u0022\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000160-taba\u0022\u003EFurther Reading\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000160-tabb\u0022\u003ECase Law\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000160-tabc\u0022\u003ERelated Essays\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n      \u003C\/ul\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv data-tabs-content\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000160-taba\u0022\u003E\n          \n      \u003Cdiv\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003ERichard S. Frase\u003Ci\u003E, Limiting Excessive Prison Sentences\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003EUnder Federal and State Constitutions\u003C\/i\u003E, 11\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003EU. PA. J.\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003ECONST. L. 39 (2008)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EMegan J. Ryan, \u003Ci\u003EDoes the Eighth Amendment Punishments Clause Prohibit Only Punishments That Are Both Cruel and Unusual?\u003C\/i\u003E, 87\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003EWASH. U. L. REV. 567\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003E(2010)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EJohn F. Stinneford, \u003Ci\u003EThe Original Meaning of \u201cUnusual\u201d:\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003EThe Eighth Amendment as a Bar to Cruel Innovation\u003C\/i\u003E, 102\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003ENW. U. L. REV.\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003E1739 (2008)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n          \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n        \u003C\/div\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000160-tabb\u0022\u003E\n          \n      \u003Cdiv\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EPervear v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 475 (1866)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EWilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1879)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003E\u003Ci\u003EIn re \u003C\/i\u003EKemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EO\u2019Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323 (1892)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EWeems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ELouisiana \u003Ci\u003Eex rel.\u003C\/i\u003E Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ETrop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ERobinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EFurman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EGregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EEstelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EWoodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EIngraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ECoker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ELockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ERummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ERhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EEnmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ESolem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EFord v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ETison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EThompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EPenry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EStanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EWilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EHarmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EHudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EAtkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EEwing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ELockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EGherebi v. Bush, 352 F.3d 1278 (9th Cir. 2003)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ERoper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003ENorton v. City of Marietta, 432 F.3d 1145 (10th Cir. 2005)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EKennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EBrooks v. Kelly, 579 F.3d 521 (5th Cir. 2009)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EUnited States v. Woods, 730 F. Supp. 2d 1354 (S.D. Ga. 2010)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EGraham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EMiller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n          \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n        \u003C\/div\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000160-tabc\u0022\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000060\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003ESuspension of Habeas Corpus\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000149\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EDue Process Clause\u003C\/a\u003E\n                  \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n\u003C\/article\u003E\n"]}]