[{"command":"add_css","data":[{"rel":"stylesheet","media":"all","href":"\/sites\/default\/files\/css\/css_veuEhhb1658wti0_ZAig66JOyixENU-N9zhjLQSLfOQ.css?delta=0\u0026language=en\u0026theme=heritage_theme\u0026include=eJwrTi1LzdNPzkksLq7Uy8tPSQUAPMsGtA"}]},{"command":"invoke","selector":null,"method":"openEssay","args":["10000159","\n\n\u003Carticle about=\u0022\/constitution\/amendments\/7\/essays\/160\/reexamination-clause\u0022 class=\u0022node node--type-constitution-essay node--promoted node--view-mode-embedded clearfix\u0022\u003E\n  \u003Ch1 class=\u0022title\u0022\u003E\u003Cspan\u003EReexamination Clause\u003C\/span\u003E\n\u003C\/h1\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-location\u0022\u003E\n      Amendment VII\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-context\u0022\u003E\n      \n            \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EIn Suits at common law...no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law....\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n  \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-body\u0022\u003E\n    \n            \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EThe principle that juries determine questions of fact is a fundamental underpinning of the American legal system. The Seventh Amendment was drafted in response to complaints raised during the ratification process that the Constitution failed to protect the institution of the civil jury. The Reexamination Clause, in particular, answered the chorus of objections in the ratifying conventions that the Supreme Court\u2019s appellate power \u201cboth as to Law and Fact\u201d would effectively abolish the civil jury by allowing the Supreme Court to retry facts on appeal. It is for this reason that Justice Joseph Story characterized the Reexamination Clause as \u201cmore important\u201d than the initial phrase of the amendment guaranteeing juries in civil trials. Parsons v. Bedford (1830).\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe \u201claw and facts\u201d provision in Article III, combined with the lack of express protection for civil juries in the Constitution, caused Anti-Federalists to fear that the right to juries in civil matters would be abolished upon the Constitution\u2019s ratification. Both George Mason and Richard Henry Lee of Virginia argued that the Constitution abolished juries in all civil cases. As \u003Cem\u003EThe Federal Farmer \u003C\/em\u003E(thought to be Lee) noted, \u201cBy Article 3, section 2,\u2009.\u2009.\u2009.\u2009the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact.\u2009.\u2009.\u2009. By court is understood a court consisting of judges; and the idea of a jury is excluded.\u201d\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EIn \u003Cem\u003EThe Federalist\u003C\/em\u003E No. 83, Alexander Hamilton denied that the Constitution\u2019s silence regarding civil juries amounted to an abolition of civil juries. Reexaminations of facts, he said, would only result in a remand for another jury trial. He declared that under the Constitution, Congress had the power to protect the right to a jury trial in civil cases. Hamilton\u2019s disclaimer did not silence the Anti-Federalist demands for constitutional guarantees, and the ratifying conventions of New York, Virginia, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire proposed adding a protection for civil juries in the Constitution. Thus, although the Anti-Federalists were unsuccessful in preventing the ratification of the Constitution, they made it clear that their demand for a right to a civil jury trial would have to be acceded to.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe Seventh Amendment\u2019s Reexamination Clause prohibits reviewing courts from reexamining any fact tried by a jury in any manner other than according to the common law (juries are not required in equitable or admiralty actions). Congress codified the distinction in the Judiciary Act of 1789, prior to the ratification of the Seventh Amendment. Under common law, appellate courts could review judgments only on writ of error, which limited review to questions of law. For example, in \u003Cem\u003EParsons v. Bedford\u003C\/em\u003E, Justice Story held that reviewing courts have no power to grant new trials based on a reexamination of the facts tried by a jury. The court can consider only those facts that \u201cbear upon any question of law arising at the trial,\u201d and if there is error, the reviewing court\u2019s only option is to grant a new trial. Earlier, while on circuit in \u003Cem\u003EUnited States v. Wonson\u003C\/em\u003E (1812), Story noted that a writ of error allows examination of \u201cgeneral errors of law only,\u201d and appellate courts \u201cnever can retry the issues already settled by a jury, where the judgment of the inferior court is affirmed.\u201d Trial courts could order a new trial for good cause, but reviewing courts could examine only alleged errors of law. Story\u2019s opinion encapsulates the traditional meaning of the Reexamination Clause.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe advent of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, along with other procedural devices allowing courts to weigh evidence, has cut into the traditional interpretation of the Reexamination Clause. Specifically, procedures such as summary judgment and directed verdicts, which greatly affect the substantive power enjoyed by juries, call into question the traditional view that appellate courts are allowed to review only questions of law, not fact. Dissenting in \u003Cem\u003EParklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore\u003C\/em\u003E (1979), Justice William H. Rehnquist declared, \u201c[T]o sanction creation of procedural devices which limit the province of the jury to a greater degree than permitted at common law in 1791 is in direct contravention of the Seventh Amendment.\u201d\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe Supreme Court had, until recently, consistently held that the calculation of damages, including punitive damages, \u201cinvolves only a question of fact.\u201d \u003Cem\u003ESt. Louis, Iron Mountain \u0026amp; Southern Railway Co. v. Craft\u003C\/em\u003E (1915); \u003Cem\u003EBarry v. Edmunds\u003C\/em\u003E (1886). However, in \u003Cem\u003ECooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc. \u003C\/em\u003E(2001), the Court characterized punitive damages as a question of law and therefore not subject to the reexamination clause, permitting a de novo review by the appeals court of excessive jury awards under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EA parallel trend is present in the handling of ordinary or compensable damages. The Court\u2019s decision in \u003Cem\u003EGasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc.\u003C\/em\u003E (1996) specifically rejected the common law standard of review in place in 1791 and validated review of the jury\u2019s fact-finding power by permitting appellate consideration of a jury award on the ground of excessiveness. The Court in \u003Cem\u003EGasperini\u003C\/em\u003E validated the practice, in which federal appellate courts had set aside jury verdicts only for \u201cgross error,\u201d or if the result \u201cshocked the conscience,\u201d or, later, if there was an \u201cabuse of discretion\u201d by the jury. None of these, the Court held, was contrary to the Reexamination Clause. It characterized such actions as \u201cquestions of law.\u201d In dissent, Justice Antonin Scalia stated, \u201cIt is not for us, much less for the Courts of Appeals, to decide that the Seventh Amendment\u2019s restriction on federal-court review of jury findings has outlived its usefulness.\u201d\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe general rule, as articulated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, remains that when an appellate court reduces a jury award on grounds on excessiveness, the \u201c\u2018Seventh Amendment [ordinarily] requires that a plaintiff be given the option of a new trial in lieu of remitting a portion of the jury award[,]\u2019\u201d unless the award is reduced because of legal error. \u003Cem\u003EMinks v. Polaris Industries, Inc.\u003C\/em\u003E (2008). Thus, when a district court imposed a cap on an asbestos settlement that limited a jury award, the court declared the Reexamination Clause inapplicable, because it was merely effectuating what the legislature deemed reasonable. \u003Cem\u003EIn re W. R. Grace \u0026amp; Co.\u003C\/em\u003E (D. Del.).\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003ESimilarly, in \u003Cem\u003EWeisgram v. Marly Co.\u003C\/em\u003E (2000), the Supreme Court rejected the argument that a reviewing court\u2019s striking of evidence from the record required remand to the lower court to consider whether a new trial was warranted. Instead, the Court found that a federal appellate court can direct the entry of judgment as a matter of law when, after \u201cexcis[ing] testimony erroneously admitted, there remains insufficient evidence to support the jury\u2019s verdict.\u201d A federal district court subsequently extended \u003Cem\u003EWeisgram\u003C\/em\u003E to hold that in granting a motion for a new trial, the court is entitled to reject jury findings when the court determines that certain testimony is \u201cnot credible in light of the manifest weight of the evidence.\u201d \u003Cem\u003EGalvan v. Norberg\u003C\/em\u003E (2011).\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe continuing erosion of the jury function exemplified in \u003Cem\u003EGasperini\u003C\/em\u003E and \u003Cem\u003EWeisgram\u003C\/em\u003E seems therefore to confirm at least partially what the Anti-Federalists\u2019 suspicion, which the Framers of the Seventh Amendment sought to allay that jury findings would become vulnerable to judicial reexamination.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n  \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author\u0022\u003E\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--media\u0022\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--photo\u0022 style=\u0022background-image: url(\/sites\/default\/files\/David_Forte.jpg)\u0022\u003E\u003C\/div\u003E\n            \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--info\u0022\u003E\n              \u003Ch4 class=\u0022con-essay-author--name\u0022\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022http:\/\/facultyprofile.csuohio.edu\/csufacultyprofile\/detail.cfm?FacultyID=D_FORTE\u0022\u003EDavid F. Forte\u003C\/a\u003E\n                  \u003C\/h4\u003E\n                  \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--job\u0022\u003E\n         Professor, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law\n      \u003C\/div\u003E\n            \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-tabs\u0022\u003E\n      \u003Cul data-tabs class=\u0022tabs\u0022\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000159-taba\u0022\u003EFurther Reading\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000159-tabb\u0022\u003ECase Law\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000159-tabc\u0022\u003ERelated Essays\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n      \u003C\/ul\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv data-tabs-content\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000159-taba\u0022\u003E\n          \n      \u003Cdiv\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EDebra Lyn Bassett, \u003Ci\u003E\u0022I Lost at Trial\u2014In the Court of Appeals!\u0022: The Expanding Power of the Federal Appellate Courts to Reexamine Facts\u003C\/i\u003E, 38 Hous. L. Rev. 1129 (2001)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EEllen E. Sward, \u003Ci\u003EThe Seventh Amendment and the Alchemy of Fact and Law\u003C\/i\u003E, 33 Seton Hall L. Rev. 573 (2003)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ERachael E. Swartz, \u003Ci\u003E\u0022Everything Depends on How You Draw the Lines\u0022: An Alternative Interpretation of the Seventh Amendment\u003C\/i\u003E, 6 Seton Hall Const. L.J. 599 (1996)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EPatrick Woolley, \u003Ci\u003EMass Tort Litigation and the Seventh Amendment Reexamination Clause\u003C\/i\u003E, 83 Iowa L. Rev. 499 (1998)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n          \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n        \u003C\/div\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000159-tabb\u0022\u003E\n          \n      \u003Cdiv\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EUnited States v. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No. 16,750)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EBlunt v. Little, 3 F. Cas. 760 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822) (No. 1578)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EParsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433 (1830)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EBarry v. Edmunds, 116 U.S. 550 (1886)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EMetropolitan Railway Co. v. Moore, 121 U.S. 558 (1887)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EAetna Life Insurance Co. v. Ward, 140 U.S. 76 (1891)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ESt. Louis, Iron Mountain \u0026amp; Southern Railway Co. v. Craft, 237 U.S. 648 (1915)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EUnited States v. Jefferson Electric Manufacturing Co., 291 U.S. 386 (1934)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EParklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EPullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273 (1982)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EGasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EWeisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440 (2000)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ECooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424 (2001)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EMinks v. Polaris Indus., Inc., 546 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2008)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EGalvan v. Norberg, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53208 (N.D. IL May 18, 2011); upheld 678 F.3d 581, 589 (7th Cir. 2012)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003E\u003Ci\u003EIn re \u003C\/i\u003EW.R. Grace \u0026amp; Co., 475 B.R. 34, (D. Del. July 23,\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003E2012)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n          \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n        \u003C\/div\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000159-tabc\u0022\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000116\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EAppellate Jurisdiction Clause\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000158\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003ERight to Jury in Civil Cases\u003C\/a\u003E\n                  \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n\u003C\/article\u003E\n"]}]