[{"command":"add_css","data":[{"rel":"stylesheet","media":"all","href":"\/sites\/default\/files\/css\/css_veuEhhb1658wti0_ZAig66JOyixENU-N9zhjLQSLfOQ.css?delta=0\u0026language=en\u0026theme=heritage_theme\u0026include=eJwrTi1LzdNPzkksLq7Uy8tPSQUAPMsGtA"}]},{"command":"invoke","selector":null,"method":"openEssay","args":["10000156","\n\n\u003Carticle about=\u0022\/constitution\/amendments\/6\/essays\/157\/compulsory-process-clause\u0022 class=\u0022node node--type-constitution-essay node--promoted node--view-mode-embedded clearfix\u0022\u003E\n  \u003Ch1 class=\u0022title\u0022\u003E\u003Cspan\u003ECompulsory Process Clause\u003C\/span\u003E\n\u003C\/h1\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-location\u0022\u003E\n      Amendment VI\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-context\u0022\u003E\n      \n            \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EIn all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to... have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor....\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n  \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-body\u0022\u003E\n    \n            \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EFor centuries, the common law forbade an accused person from calling witnesses in his defense in cases of treason or felony or forbade the defense witnesses, if called, to testify under oath. The English remedied that injustice for treason trials in a 1695 statute and for all cases in 1702. Sir William Blackstone in his \u003Cem\u003ECommentaries on the Laws of England\u003C\/em\u003E (1765\u20131769) summarized the right by declaring, \u201c[the defendant] shall have the same compulsive process to bring in his witnesses for him, as was usual to compel their appearance against him.\u201d\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EBefore he came to America, William Penn had been the victim of the old common law rule. In 1670, he was arrested for preaching his dissenting religious views to a group of Quakers in London, that is, to an \u201cunlawful assembly.\u201d Penn attempted to put on his own defense without\u0026nbsp;having counsel and without the right to compel the testimony of witnesses on his behalf. The presiding judge ultimately silenced and removed Penn from the proceedings. Later in America, when Penn wrote Pennsylvania\u2019s Charter of Privileges (1701), he included: \u201cTHAT all Criminals shall have the same Privileges of Witnesses and Council as their Prosecutors.\u201d\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EAfter the Revolution, nine of the new state constitutions established in one form or another the right to call defense witnesses. Two of them, Massachusetts and New Hampshire, added the subpoena power. When James Madison, in the First Congress, formulated what would become the Compulsory Process Clause, he opted for including not only the right to call witnesses, but the stronger privilege of being able to subpoena them as well. Congress considered Madison\u2019s draft language with little debate, and it became part of the Sixth Amendment without opposition. As written, the clause assures that the accused in a criminal case enjoys the right to call or subpoena witnesses, so that evidence available to the defense can be evaluated by a jury or, in a nonjury criminal case, by a judge. It became, in sum, an essential part of the right of an accused to present a defense.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EIssues that surrounded the clause centered on (1) whether the right to call witnesses included the right to documentary evidence, (2) whether the right was available before as well as after indictment, and (3) whether the defense enjoyed the same degree of subpoena power as did the prosecution. Chief Justice John Marshall answered these questions when he presided over the treason trial of Aaron Burr in 1807. \u003Cem\u003EUnited States v. Burr \u003C\/em\u003E(1807). Burr\u2019s lawyers had requested a subpoena for documents in the possession of the president, and the government opposed the request. Marshall approved the request to obtain documents and ruled that an indictment was not needed to trigger the right to compulsory process. In upholding a 1790 federal statute that he regarded as declaratory of the constitutional right to compulsory process, Marshall also found that there was parity between the defense and the prosecution in the enjoyment of the right: \u201c[the defense] shall have the like process of the court where he or they shall be tried, to compel his or their witnesses to appear at his or their trial as is usually granted to compel witnesses to appear on the prosecution against them.\u201d\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EHe further allowed the defense to obtain any relevant documents before having to decide which ones might be material at trial, and that the subpoena right allowed the defense to obtain original documents, not mere copies.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThough John Marshall had explicated the contours of the clause in the Aaron Burr trial, the Supreme Court itself had little opportunity to interpret the Compulsory Process Clause and explain its meaning prior to 1967, when the Court ruled in \u003Cem\u003EWashington v. Texas \u003C\/em\u003Ethat the clause was so fundamental to a fair trial that it was part of the Fourteenth Amendment\u2019s Due Process Clause and therefore binding on the states as well as on the federal government. \u003Cem\u003EWashington v. Texas\u003C\/em\u003E also expanded the reach of the clause by holding unconstitutional a Texas penal statute that permitted the government to offer the testimony of one charged as a principal, accomplice, or accessory, but barred a defendant from calling the same person unless that person had been previously acquitted of the charges. The rationale for the disadvantage imposed upon defendants was that defendants would attempt to exculpate each other, and thus their testimony would be inherently biased and untrustworthy. The Supreme Court had upheld a similar rule in federal trials in \u003Cem\u003EUnited States v. Reid\u003C\/em\u003E (1852) before changing its mind and rejecting the rule for federal trials in \u003Cem\u003ERosen v. United States\u003C\/em\u003E (1918). Although \u003Cem\u003ERosen\u003C\/em\u003E was not a constitutional ruling, the Court adopted its position in \u003Cem\u003EWashington v. Texas \u003C\/em\u003Eas binding under the Compulsory Process Clause, reasoning that \u201cit could hardly be argued that a State would not violate the clause if it made all defense testimony inadmissible as a matter of procedural law.\u201d Furthermore, the Court declared that \u201c[i]t is difficult to see how the Constitution is any less violated by arbitrary rules that prevent whole categories of defense witnesses from testifying on the basis of a priori categories that presume them unworthy of belief.\u201d\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe Court has had few occasions since to deal with the clause. \u003Cem\u003EGreen v. Georgia\u003C\/em\u003E (1979) held that it was an error for a state court to exclude a codefendant\u2019s confession offered by a defendant in a capital sentencing proceeding where the prosecution had\u0026nbsp;relied on a codefendant\u2019s confession at his own trial. In \u003Cem\u003EUnited States v. Valenzuela-Bernal \u003C\/em\u003E(1982), the defendant complained that the government had violated his rights under the clause when it deported potential alien witnesses; the Court ruled that the defendant must show that the testimony of the deported aliens would have been favorable and material. Similarly, in \u003Cem\u003EPennsylvania v. Ritchie \u003C\/em\u003E(1987), the Court modified John Marshall\u2019s position in the Aaron Burr case by declaring that the Compulsory Process Clause does not permit a defendant free rein to peruse files that are confidential under state law. Rather, the defendant is entitled to have access only to material evidence, a right that is in fact also guaranteed by the Due Process Clause. In \u003Cem\u003ERock v. Arkansas \u003C\/em\u003E(1987), the Court held that a \u003Cem\u003Eper se\u003C\/em\u003E rule excluding all hypnotically refreshed testimony impermissibly infringed on a criminal defendant\u2019s right to call \u201cwitnesses in his own favor,\u201d including the right to testify on one\u2019s own behalf.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EUnlike other Sixth Amendment guarantees, the right to call witnesses is at the defendant\u2019s initiative. It is not unlimited, but subject to reasonable restrictions. \u003Cem\u003ETaylor v. Illinois\u003C\/em\u003E (1988). The ordinary rules of evidence apply to the exercise of the right. The Compulsory Process Clause, for example, does not guarantee a defendant the right to use polygraph evidence in a jurisdiction that forbids such evidence. \u003Cem\u003EUnited States v. Scheffer\u003C\/em\u003E (1998).\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EIt should also be noted that the Supreme Court has declared that the word \u201cwitnesses\u201d in the Compulsory Process Clause has a different meaning than the same term in the Confrontation Clause. In the Compulsory Process Clause, it refers to those who have relevant information that the defense might present at trial. In the Confrontation Clause, it refers to all witnesses who provide \u201ctestimony\u201d against the accused, including hearsay declarants whose testimonial statements are offered by the government. \u003Cem\u003ECrawford v. Washington\u003C\/em\u003E (2004).\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe federal courts faced the invocation of the Compulsory Process Clause in the trial of Zacarias Moussaoui, accused of acts of terrorism in connection with the 9\/11 attacks. Moussaoui requested access to al Qaeda members in United States custody in order to gain exculpatory evidence. The government wanted to deny him access to other al Qaeda members, citing national security concerns. To resolve the dispute, the Fourth Circuit balanced the interests of Moussaoui and the government. The court, as Megan Healy has written, held that \u201calthough the production of these witnesses imposed substantial burdens on the government, such burdens could not outweigh the finding that the witnesses possessed information material to the defense.\u201d Nonetheless, in an effort to protect the government\u2019s interest in national security, the court did not allow the defendant direct access to witnesses, but ordered the government to produce summaries of classified information compiled from interrogations of witnesses. \u003Cem\u003EUnited States v. Moussaoui\u003C\/em\u003E, (2004).\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n  \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author\u0022\u003E\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--media\u0022\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--photo\u0022 style=\u0022background-image: url(\/sites\/default\/files\/Stephen_Saltzburg.jpg)\u0022\u003E\u003C\/div\u003E\n            \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--info\u0022\u003E\n              \u003Ch4 class=\u0022con-essay-author--name\u0022\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022http:\/\/www.law.gwu.edu\/Faculty\/profile.aspx?id=1761\u0022\u003EStephen Saltzburg\u003C\/a\u003E\n                  \u003C\/h4\u003E\n                  \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--job\u0022\u003E\n         Wallace and Beverley Woodbury University Professor of Law, The George Washington University Law School\n      \u003C\/div\u003E\n            \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-tabs\u0022\u003E\n      \u003Cul data-tabs class=\u0022tabs\u0022\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000156-taba\u0022\u003EFurther Reading\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000156-tabb\u0022\u003ECase Law\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000156-tabc\u0022\u003ERelated Essays\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n      \u003C\/ul\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv data-tabs-content\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000156-taba\u0022\u003E\n          \n      \u003Cdiv\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ERobert N. Clinton, The Right to Present a Defense, An Emergent Constitutional Guarantee in Criminal Trials, 9 IND. L. REV. 713 (1976)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EMegan A. Healy, Note, Compulsory Process and the War on Terror: A Proposed Framework, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1821 (2006)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003ERandolph N. Jonakait, \u003Ci\u003E\u201cWitnesses\u201d in the Confrontation Clause: \u003C\/i\u003ECrawford v. Washington,\u003Ci\u003E Noah Webster, and Compulsory Process\u003C\/i\u003E, 79\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003ETEMP. L. REV. 155\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003E(2006)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EPeter Westen, \u003Ci\u003EThe Compulsory Process Clause\u003C\/i\u003E, 73 Mich. L. Rev. 71 (1974)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EPeter Westen, \u003Ci\u003ECompulsory Process II\u003C\/i\u003E, 74 Mich. L. Rev. 191 (1974)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EPeter Westen, \u003Ci\u003EConfrontation and Compulsory Process:\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003EA Unified Theory of Evidence for Criminal Cases\u003C\/i\u003E, 91\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003EHARV. L. REV. 567 (1978)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n          \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n        \u003C\/div\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000156-tabb\u0022\u003E\n          \n      \u003Cdiv\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EUnited States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30 (C.C.D. Va. 1807)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EUnited States v. Reid, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 361 (1852)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ERosen v. United States, 245 U.S. 467 (1918)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EWashington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EGreen v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 (1979)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EUnited States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858 (1982)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EPennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ERock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ETaylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 (1988)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EUnited States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303 (1998)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ECrawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EUnited States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453 (4\u003Csup\u003Eth\u003C\/sup\u003E Cir. 2004), \u003Ci\u003Ecert. denied,\u003C\/i\u003E 544 U.S. 931 (2005)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EHolmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319 (2006)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EClark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735 (2006)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EMelendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n          \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n        \u003C\/div\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000156-tabc\u0022\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000149\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EDue Process Clause\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000155\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EConfrontation Clause\u003C\/a\u003E\n                  \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n\u003C\/article\u003E\n"]}]