[{"command":"add_css","data":[{"rel":"stylesheet","media":"all","href":"\/sites\/default\/files\/css\/css_veuEhhb1658wti0_ZAig66JOyixENU-N9zhjLQSLfOQ.css?delta=0\u0026language=en\u0026theme=heritage_theme\u0026include=eJwrTi1LzdNPzkksLq7Uy8tPSQUAPMsGtA"}]},{"command":"invoke","selector":null,"method":"openEssay","args":["10000153","\n\n\u003Carticle about=\u0022\/constitution\/amendments\/6\/essays\/154\/jury-trial\u0022 class=\u0022node node--type-constitution-essay node--promoted node--view-mode-embedded clearfix\u0022\u003E\n  \u003Ch1 class=\u0022title\u0022\u003E\u003Cspan\u003EJury Trial\u003C\/span\u003E\n\u003C\/h1\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-location\u0022\u003E\n      Amendment VI\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-context\u0022\u003E\n      \n            \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EIn all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a... trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law....\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n  \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-body\u0022\u003E\n    \n            \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EThe Framers of the Constitution and of the Bill of Rights revered trial by jury\u2014a right that Sir William Blackstone had described as \u201cthe palladium of English liberty.\u201d By the time of the Framing, common law juries had a more than five-century history in England, and they had been part of the American experience from the start. Although juries then were considerably less representative of the adult population than they are today, they were the most democratic of the governmental institutions in the colonies. Most Americans cheered their resistance to repressive colonial measures, especially British revenue laws and seditious libel laws.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EIn some colonies, juries had the power to judge questions of law as well as fact. They consisted of twelve people who always acted by unanimous vote. In felony cases, nonjury trials were unknown and guilty pleas infrequent. Trials were expeditious and routine.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe period since the Framing has seen notable changes in the general understanding of the right to jury trial.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EAs originally understood, the Sixth Amendment guaranteed the right to jury trial only in the federal courts, although each of the states also guaranteed trial by jury. The ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 did not alter this understanding. One hundred years after the approval of the Fourteenth Amendment, however, the Supreme Court held in \u003Cem\u003EDuncan v. Louisiana \u003C\/em\u003E(1968) that the amendment\u2019s Due Process Clause \u201cincorporated\u201d the right to jury trial and made it applicable to the states. The Court said that although juries were not essential to fairness in every legal system, they were essential to the U.S. system. It wrote, \u201cProviding an accused with the right to be tried by a jury of his peers gave him an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge.\u201d\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe federal courts initially followed the jury selection rules of the states in which they sat, and all of the states limited jury service to men. All except Vermont also limited jury service to property owners or taxpayers. Only a few states formally disqualified blacks.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe Sixth Amendment was not thought to preclude the expansion of the right to serve on juries, but neither was it thought to require any expansion. Moreover, the Fourteenth Amendment\u2019s Equal Protection Clause was not initially thought to extend \u201cpolitical\u201d rights, including the right to serve on juries, to either African-Americans or women.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EIn 1880, however, the Supreme Court held in \u003Cem\u003EStrauder v. West Virginia\u003C\/em\u003E that a statute disqualifying blacks from jury service violated the equal protection rights of black litigants. It was only in 1991 that the Court concluded that the Equal Protection Clause protected prospective jurors themselves from discrimination.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe Court has read the Sixth Amendment as well as the Equal Protection Clause to eliminate jury disqualifications of the sort the Framers approved. It held in 1975 that a \u201cfair cross-section requirement\u201d implicit in the amendment precluded the \u201csystematic\u201d exclusion of a \u201cdistinctive group in the community.\u201d Because \u201csystematic\u201d exclusion need not be purposeful, the Sixth Amendment prohibits some forms of exclusion the Equal Protection Clause does not reach. Racial minorities and women qualify as \u201cdistinctive groups,\u201d and under the Sixth Amendment, the exclusion of a distinctive group need not be purposeful and need not be total; it must merely be regular and foreseeable.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EAt the time of the Framing, litigants could challenge a limited number of prospective jurors peremptorily. In a series of cases beginning in 1986, however, the Court held that litigants may not use peremptory challenges to discriminate on the basis of race, sex, or any other classification subject to heightened scrutiny.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EAlthough the Supreme Court previously had said that the Sixth Amendment required juries of twelve (a number that had more than half a millennium of history behind it), the Court concluded in 1970 that the amendment allows juries of six. In 1978, however, it held five-person juries impermissible. A great many states now use six-person juries, especially in misdemeanor cases.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EIn \u003Cem\u003EApodaca v. Oregon\u003C\/em\u003E in 1972, four Supreme Court justices concluded that conviction by a vote of ten to two did not violate the Sixth Amendment. Four justices dissented, arguing that the amendment preserved the historical requirement of unanimity. The remaining justice agreed with the dissenters on the construction of the Sixth Amendment but rejected the view that \u201call of the elements of jury trial within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment are necessarily embodied in or incorporated into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth.\u201d As a result, non-unanimous verdicts are permissible in state but not federal courts. In a companion case, the Court upheld a state court conviction by a jury vote of nine to three. Later, the Court held conviction by a vote of five to one unconstitutional; convictions by six-person juries must be unanimous.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EAlthough juries sometimes disregarded the legal instructions of judges in England, they never acquired formal authority to do so. As early as 1628, Chief Justice Edward Coke declared that judges do not decide questions of fact and juries do not decide issues of law.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe American practice, however, was different. In 1735 in New York, Andrew Hamilton told\u0026nbsp;the court trying his client, publisher John Peter Zenger, that the authority of juries \u201cto determine both the law and the fact\u201d was \u201cbeyond all dispute.\u201d The jury\u2019s acquittal of Zenger, despite his apparent guilt of seditious libel, helped shape the American understanding of the role and duties of jurors. Some, but not all, American colonies permitted juries to decide issues of law, and in 1771 John Adams called it \u201can Absurdity to suppose that the Law would oblige [jurors] to find a Verdict according to the Direction of the Court, against their own Opinion, Judgment, and Conscience.\u201d\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe authority of juries to decide issues of law was contested throughout the nineteenth century, but the opponents of jury authority gained the clear upper hand in the century\u2019s second half. Although three state constitutions still declare that juries may decide legal issues, the Supreme Court\u2019s 1895 decision in \u003Cem\u003ESparf and Hansen v. United States\u003C\/em\u003E effectively ended the battle and held that federal juries may not decide questions of law.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EIn the late 1960s and early 1970s, defendants charged with unlawful resistance to the war in Vietnam sought to revive the issue. They argued that judges should inform jurors of their right to acquit whenever conviction would be unjust (or at least permit defense attorneys to argue in favor of jury nullification). Although appellate courts rejected the defendants\u2019 arguments, the courts did not deny in all circumstances the appropriateness of jury nullification. If, as a matter of conscience, jurors decided to disregard the court\u2019s instruction, their disobedience might be justified. More recently, however, many courts have denied the legitimacy of nullification altogether. Several have held that, even after jury deliberations have begun, a trial judge may remove a juror who has revealed \u201cbeyond doubt\u201d an intention to violate the court\u2019s instructions on the law.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe Anti-Federalists who opposed ratification of the Constitution protested that the right to jury trial guaranteed by Article III was inadequate. Their objections led to the Sixth Amendment\u2019s requirement that juries must be drawn from \u201cthe State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed.\u201d Although the Sixth Amendment also declared that juries must be impartial, the requirement of impartiality did not imply that jurors should arrive at the courtroom unaware of the circumstances of the case before them. George Mason and Patrick Henry insisted that local juries would protect the defendant\u2019s right to be judged on the basis of \u201chis character and reputation.\u201d Courts now voice greater concern about information obtained prior to trial, especially in cases of widespread pre-trial publicity. The Supreme Court has said that although a juror need not \u201cbe totally ignorant of the facts and issues,\u201d he must be able to \u201clay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court.\u201d\u003Cem\u003E Irvin\u0026nbsp;v. Dowd \u003C\/em\u003E(1961).\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003ESince the Framing, a defendant has been entitled to a jury determination of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he has been charged. When finding a particular element would make the defendant guilty of a more serious crime rather than a lesser one, the effect was to increase his punishment. A defendant found guilty of murder, for example, was punished more severely than one found guilty of manslaughter.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EIn 2000, the Supreme Court held that a defendant is entitled to a jury determination of every fact necessary to increase the punishment to which he is exposed even when this fact is not formally called an element of a crime. Although a legislature might have called such a fact a sentencing aggravator, the Court concluded that it was functionally an element.\u003Cem\u003E Apprendi v. New Jersey\u003C\/em\u003E (2000). \u003Cem\u003EApprendi\u003C\/em\u003E requires a jury to determine beyond a reasonable doubt every fact other than conviction of a prior offense that increases the \u003Cem\u003Emaximum \u003C\/em\u003Esentence a defendant faces. At the same time, the Supreme Court has said that the \u003Cem\u003EApprendi\u003C\/em\u003E principle does not require a jury to determine every fact necessary to impose a mandatory \u003Cem\u003Eminimum \u003C\/em\u003Esentence. In 2013, the Supreme Court decided that under the Sixth Amendment, any fact that increases the mandatory sentence is an \u201celement\u201d that must be submitted to the jury. \u003Cem\u003EAlleyne v. United States\u003C\/em\u003E (2013).\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe Supreme Court has applied \u003Cem\u003EApprendi\u003C\/em\u003E in a number of subsequent cases\u2014notably in \u003Cem\u003EUnited States v. Booker\u003C\/em\u003E (2005), which held mandatory federal sentencing guidelines unconstitutional.Under these guidelines, a judicial determination of fact automatically increased the sentence to which a defendant was exposed.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThere were two majority opinions in \u003Cem\u003EBooker\u003C\/em\u003E\u2014one holding the guidelines unconstitutional and the other prescribing the remedy for this violation. Both majority opinions were by five to four votes, and only one justice joined both of them. The remedy approved by the Court was not to require a jury determination of every fact that would increase the maximum guideline sentence. It was to make the federal sentencing guidelines advisory. In other words, the Court\u2019s remedy for a violation of the right to jury trial did not provide jury trials.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EEvery justice recognized, however, that discretionary sentencing by judges is constitutional, and the majority reasoned that Congress would have preferred advisory guidelines to guidelines administered by juries. In fact, discretionary sentencing was familiar to the Framers. The Crimes Act of 1790, for example, authorized judges to impose such punishments as maximum imprisonment of one, three, or seven years, or death, depending on the crime; a fine of up to \u201cone thousand dollars,\u201d and public whipping \u201cnot exceeding thirty-nine stripes.\u201d It was only when finding a material fact automatically increased the punishment to which a defendant was exposed that the Sixth Amendment entrusted this finding to a jury.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EAt the time of the Sixth Amendment, all trials in serious criminal cases were jury trials. In 1874, the Supreme Court declared that a defendant could not \u201cbe tried in any other manner than by a jury of twelve men, although he consent in open court to be tried by a jury of eleven men.\u201d \u003Cem\u003EHome Insurance Co. of New York v. Morse\u003C\/em\u003E (1874). Nevertheless, the Court held in \u003Cem\u003EPatton v. United States \u003C\/em\u003E(1930) that a defendant could waive the right to jury trial and agree to be tried by the court alone.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EToday about half of all convictions in the felony cases that are resolved by trials occur in trials without juries. Moreover, only a small minority of felony cases go to trial. Ninety-seven percent of the felony convictions in federal courts and 94 percent of those in state courts are by guilty plea. Behind these figures lies the practice of bargaining with defendants to waive the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EFar from encouraging guilty pleas in felony cases, courts at the time of the Bill of Rights actively discouraged them. Sir William Blackstone\u2019s \u003Cem\u003ECommentaries on the Laws of England\u003C\/em\u003E (1765\u20131769) observed that courts were \u201cvery backward in receiving and recording [a guilty plea]\u2009.\u2009.\u2009.\u2009and will generally advise the prisoner to retract it.\u201d Similar statements appeared in American treatises throughout the nineteenth century. When instances of plea bargaining began to appear in appellate reports in the decades following the Civil War, lower courts generally denounced the practice and often declared it unconstitutional. The Supreme Court did not uphold the constitutionality of plea-bargained waivers of the right to jury trial until 1970.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EWhen jury trial was routine, it was a reasonably summary procedure. As recently as the 1890s, a felony court apparently could conduct a half-dozen jury trials in a single day. The intervening decades have seen a proliferation of procedures in contested cases and, as a result, an inability to contest many cases. Prolonged jury-selection procedures, cumbersome rules of evidence, repetitive cross-examination of witnesses, courtroom battles of experts, jury instructions that many empirical studies tell us jurors do not understand, and other complications have made trials inaccessible for all but a small minority of defendants. Only a shadow of the communitarian institution the Framers wished to preserve has survived into the twenty-first century. Although the Sixth Amendment declares, \u201cIn all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury,\u201d one commentator has said that Americans could replace the word \u201call\u201d in this Amendment with the words \u201cvirtually none.\u201d\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n  \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author\u0022\u003E\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--media\u0022\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--photo\u0022 style=\u0022background-image: url(\/sites\/default\/files\/Albert_Alschuler.jpg)\u0022\u003E\u003C\/div\u003E\n            \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--info\u0022\u003E\n              \u003Ch4 class=\u0022con-essay-author--name\u0022\u003E\n                      Albert W. Alschuler\n                  \u003C\/h4\u003E\n                  \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--job\u0022\u003E\n         Julius Kreeger Professor Emeritus of Law and Criminology, Northwestern University Law School\n      \u003C\/div\u003E\n            \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-tabs\u0022\u003E\n      \u003Cul data-tabs class=\u0022tabs\u0022\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000153-taba\u0022\u003EFurther Reading\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000153-tabb\u0022\u003ECase Law\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000153-tabc\u0022\u003ERelated Essays\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n      \u003C\/ul\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv data-tabs-content\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000153-taba\u0022\u003E\n          \n      \u003Cdiv\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EJeffrey Abramson, We, the Jury: The Jury System and the Ideal of Democracy (1994)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ESteven Adler, The Jury: Trial and Error in the American Courtroom (1994)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EAlbert W. Alschuler, \u003Ci\u003EPlea Bargaining and Its History\u003C\/i\u003E, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1979)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EAlbert W. Alschuler, \u003Ci\u003EThe Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges and the Review of Jury Verdicts\u003C\/i\u003E, 56 U. Chi. l. Rev. 153 (1989)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EAlbert W. Alschuler \u0026amp; Andrew G. Deiss, \u003Ci\u003EA Brief History of the Criminal Jury in the United States\u003C\/i\u003E, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 867 (1994)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ESTEVE BOGIRA, COURTROOM 302: A YEAR BEHIND THE SCENES IN AN AMERICAN CRIMINAL COURTHOUSE (2006)\u003Cbr\u003E\n\u0026nbsp;\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ERANDOLPH N. JONAKAIT, THE AMERICAN JURY SYSTEM (2003)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EHARRY KALVEN JR. \u0026amp; HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003ELINDA K. KERBER, NO CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE LADIES: WOMEN AND THE OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP (1998)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EBenno C. Schmidt, \u003Ci\u003EJuries, Jurisdiction, and Race Discrimination: The Lost Promise of \u003C\/i\u003EStrauder v. West\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003EVirginia, 61 Tex. L. Rev. 1401 (1983)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n          \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n        \u003C\/div\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000153-tabb\u0022\u003E\n          \n      \u003Cdiv\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EHome Insurance Co. of New York v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445 (1874)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EStrauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ESparf and Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EPatton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EHoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EIrvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ESwain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EDuncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EWilliams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EApodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EJohnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EUnited States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1972)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ETaylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EBallew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EBurch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130 (1979)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EDuren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EBatson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ETanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107 (1987)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EPowers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EGeorgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EJ.E.B. v. Alabama \u003Ci\u003Eex rel.\u003C\/i\u003E T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EUnited States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606 (2d Cir. 1997)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EApprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EBlakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EMiller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EUnited States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ESkilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 40 (2010)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ESouthern Union Co. v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2344 (2012)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EAlleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n          \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n        \u003C\/div\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000153-tabc\u0022\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000117\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003ECriminal Trials\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000158\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003ERight to Jury in Civil Cases\u003C\/a\u003E\n                  \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n\u003C\/article\u003E\n"]}]