[{"command":"add_css","data":[{"rel":"stylesheet","media":"all","href":"\/sites\/default\/files\/css\/css_veuEhhb1658wti0_ZAig66JOyixENU-N9zhjLQSLfOQ.css?delta=0\u0026language=en\u0026theme=heritage_theme\u0026include=eJwrTi1LzdNPzkksLq7Uy8tPSQUAPMsGtA"}]},{"command":"invoke","selector":null,"method":"openEssay","args":["10000150","\n\n\u003Carticle about=\u0022\/constitution\/amendments\/5\/essays\/151\/takings-clause\u0022 class=\u0022node node--type-constitution-essay node--promoted node--view-mode-embedded clearfix\u0022\u003E\n  \u003Ch1 class=\u0022title\u0022\u003E\u003Cspan\u003ETakings Clause\u003C\/span\u003E\n\u003C\/h1\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-location\u0022\u003E\n      Amendment V\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-context\u0022\u003E\n      \n            \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003E...nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n  \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-body\u0022\u003E\n    \n            \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EConsidering its modern importance, the original purpose of the Takings Clause is surprisingly obscure. Most provisions of the Bill of Rights were requested in some form as the states ratified the original Constitution. The Takings Clause was not. Representative James Madison added it for unexplained reasons as he sifted through the requested amendments to propose a slate of them. There were a few historical precedents for the clause. The Northwest Ordinance contained a just-compensation requirement. Two colonial charters and two state constitutions had such a requirement as well. Other states sometimes provided just compensation by custom or due process. But there was virtually no recorded discussion about the Takings Clause itself.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe origins of the clause are still more enigmatic in light of the background of limited federal power. It has been argued that the original Constitution did not grant Congress the power of eminent domain within the boundaries of a state. Indeed, in 1845, the Supreme Court declared that \u201cthe United States have no constitutional capacity to exercise\u2009.\u2009.\u2009.\u2009eminent domain\u201d in the states. \u003Cem\u003EPollard\u2019s Lessee v. Hagan\u003C\/em\u003E (1845). Under this theory, neither Congress\u2019s enumerated powers nor the Necessary and Proper Clause grants a general power of eminent domain.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EWhether or not that is so, Congress did not generally exercise such a power. For the first seventy-five years of the republic, when Congress authorized federal roads, lighthouses, fortifications, or military bases, it relied upon the states to exercise eminent domain over land for the federal project. Congress did exercise eminent domain in areas where it had plenary power under the Constitution, such as the District of Columbia and occasionally the territories. It also may have occasionally taken property in other ways, such as the temporary impressment of personal property for military purposes. But neither of these\u0026nbsp;methods was commonplace. Hence, the clause\u2019s purpose and original scope can sometimes be difficult to discern.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EUnder modern doctrine, the Takings Clause is of much greater importance and its zone of application is much broader. Beginning with its decision in \u003Cem\u003EKohl v. United States\u003C\/em\u003E (1875), the Supreme Court has recognized a federal power of eminent domain. The Court has alternately suggested that the power is granted by the Necessary and Proper Clause, \u003Cem\u003EUnited States v. Gettysburg Electric Railway Co\u003C\/em\u003E. (1896), that it is granted by implication of the Takings Clause itself (despite the Ninth Amendment), or that it is an inherent power of sovereignty whose specific enumeration is unnecessary, \u003Cem\u003EUnited States v. Jones \u003C\/em\u003E(1883). Whatever its source, the power is seated in Congress, not the executive. Furthermore, the clause, like most of the Bill of Rights, has been held to be incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment and thus applicable to the states. In fact, a requirement of just compensation was the first element of the Bill of Rights held to be part of the Fourteenth Amendment\u2019s Due Process requirement. \u003Cem\u003EChicago, Burlington \u0026amp; Quincy Railroad Co. v. Chicago\u003C\/em\u003E (1897). Thus, the clause applies today to takings by any government\u2014federal, state, or local. A state\u2019s power to exercise eminent domain derives, like the police power, from the state\u2019s inherent sovereignty.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe Fifth Amendment\u2019s protections are triggered only when the property at issue is \u201ctaken\u201d and when it is \u201cproperty\u201d as defined by applicable state or federal law. For purposes of the clause, property need not be land (real property), but can be personal property, such as bank accounts, \u003Cem\u003EWebb\u2019s Fabulous Pharmacies v. Beckwith\u003C\/em\u003E (1980) or intangible property, such as trade secrets. \u003Cem\u003ERuck-elshaus v. Monsanto Co.\u003C\/em\u003E (1984).\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThere are a range of government actions that affect the value or use of property\u2014some of which are clearly takings, some of which are more subject to doubt. It is easiest to see that there has been a taking when the government formally \u201ccondemns\u201d property and takes legal title to it. Such an exercise of eminent domain is the paradigmatic example of a taking. But as noted above, the federal government rarely exercised eminent domain in the generations after the Founding, and today the hard takings questions occur when there is no formal condemnation.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EEven when there has been no formal condemnation, the courts have held that there is a taking any time the government authorizes a \u201cpermanent physical occupation,\u201d even of only part of the property. \u003Cem\u003ELoretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.\u003C\/em\u003E (1982). The Supreme Court made a similar ruling as early as 1871, concluding that a government-authorized flooding was a taking of property. \u003Cem\u003EPumpelly v. Green Bay \u0026amp; Mississippi Canal Co.\u003C\/em\u003E (1871). There is some historical basis for this rule: state courts frequently confronted similar problems in the nineteenth century under state \u201cmill acts,\u201d which let one landowner dam a river for a mill, permanently flooding neighboring properties.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003ETemporary physical occupations can also be takings for purposes of the clause, \u003Cem\u003EFirst English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County \u003C\/em\u003E(1987), but temporary occupations are judged by a less categorical analysis. Recent Supreme Court decisions have said that they \u201care subject to a more complex balancing process to determine whether they are a taking,\u201d and that there is no \u201cmagic formula\u201d for evaluating them. \u003Cem\u003EArkansas Game \u0026amp; Fish Comm\u2019n v. United States \u003C\/em\u003E(2012).\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003ERegulations of land pose even harder questions. There were regulations of land at the Founding, but there is no evidence that land-owners were compensated during this period. At the Founding, regulations of land generally did not give rise to claims for compensation. But in the early twentieth century, the Supreme Court created a doctrine of so-called \u201cregulatory takings.\u201d Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote for the Court that \u201cwhile property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.\u201d \u003Cem\u003EPennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon \u003C\/em\u003E(1922). The doctrine has been criticized for lacking a historical basis, especially in light of the Founding-era practice of uncompensated regulations, and an opinion for the Court by Justice Antonin Scalia has conceded that \u201cearly constitutional theorists did not believe the Takings Clause embraced regulations of property at all.\u201d \u003Cem\u003ELucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council \u003C\/em\u003E(1992).\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EOn the other hand, some scholars have suggested that the implications from the history are\u0026nbsp;not so clear cut. It is possible, for example, that the early regulations were consistent with a background theory that still prohibited some regulatory takings. In particular, it has been argued that early uncompensated regulations were limited to those consistent with the owners\u2019 natural rights, whereas regulations that violate natural rights require compensation. Alternatively, it has been argued that the purpose and structure of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as judicial decisions between the Founding and the ratification of that amendment, justify a doctrine of regulatory takings against state governments under the Fourteenth Amendment, even if none was originally established against the federal government under the Fifth Amendment.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EAt any rate, under modern doctrine, regulations of property are sometimes, but not frequently, held to be takings. The general principle is that the government is forbidden \u201cfrom forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.\u201d \u003Cem\u003EArmstrong v. United States\u003C\/em\u003E (1960). In making this \u201cessentially ad hoc\u201d determination, the Court has particularly emphasized \u201cthe economic impact of the regulation on the claimant,\u201d the interference with \u201cdistinct investment-backed expectations,\u201d and \u201cthe character of the government action.\u201d \u003Cem\u003EPenn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York\u003C\/em\u003E (1978).\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EIn practice, courts rarely find that a regulation qualifies as a taking under this test. Zoning regulations, for example, are almost never held to be takings. \u003Cem\u003EVillage of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.\u003C\/em\u003E (1926). However, there are a few specific types of regulation that are categorically considered takings\u2014for example, a regulation that deprives an owner of all economically viable use of the land, \u003Cem\u003ELucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council\u003C\/em\u003E, or a regulation that unfairly conditions the grant of a governmental permit upon the forfeiture of a physical property interest or the exaction of inappropriate fees. \u003Cem\u003ENollan v. California Coastal Comm\u2019n \u003C\/em\u003E(1987); \u003Cem\u003EDolan v. City of Tigard\u003C\/em\u003E (1994); \u003Cem\u003EKoontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District\u003C\/em\u003E (2013).\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe Takings Clause has also long been held to require that the taking be \u201cfor public use.\u201d In other words, it must not take property from one person and give it to another for purely private gain. As a purely textual matter, the clause is ambiguous about such a requirement. It is possible to read the clause as simply \u003Cem\u003Edescribing\u003C\/em\u003E the conditions under which property will be taken. Indeed, one might say that the enumerated powers doctrine independently requires all federal takings to be for a public use, and hence that any federal taking that is within the enumerated powers is necessarily one for public use. One could also read the clause as\u003Cem\u003E limiting \u003C\/em\u003Ecompensation to takings for public use, while providing no compensation if the taking is for private use.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe conventional reading of the Takings Clause, however, infers an independent public use requirement. This avoids rendering the \u201cpublic use\u201d phrase redundant and avoids the strange result of leaving takings for private interest without compensation. It is also the view taken by many state courts throughout the nineteenth century in the course of interpreting their own state constitutional law. As with the regulatory takings doctrine, it is possible that the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates a public use requirement against the states even if the Fifth Amendment was not originally understood to apply it against the federal government.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThere has been controversy over how to define a \u201cpublic use.\u201d As an original matter, given the text\u2019s focus on \u201cuse,\u201d one might have thought that the property taken must be usable by the public\u2014either by a government entity or a private entity obligated to grant access on broad and neutral terms, like a common carrier. Again, many nineteenth-century state courts interpreted the requirement in this fashion, as when the courts allowed eminent domain for railroads to claim a right-of-way or for flooding under the \u201cmill acts\u201d mentioned above.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThroughout the twentieth century, however, the Supreme Court has only required the taking to have a public \u003Cem\u003Epurpose\u003C\/em\u003E rather than requiring that the property be used by the public, and it has gradually adopted a more relaxed view of that public-purpose requirement. In \u003Cem\u003EBerman v. Parker\u003C\/em\u003E (1954), it upheld the use of eminent domain to condemn blighted property for urban renewal, saying that \u201cthe legislature, not the judiciary, is the main guardian of the public needs to be\u0026nbsp;served by social legislation.\u201d In \u003Cem\u003EHawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff\u003C\/em\u003E, (1984), the Court unanimously approved the State of Hawaii\u2019s breaking up of large landed estates to transfer titles from the landowners to smaller lessees on the principle that the people of Hawaii were breaking up a \u201cland oligopoly traceable to their monarchs.\u201d\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EMost recently, the Court invoked the \u201cdiverse and always evolving needs of society\u201d to conclude that governments have \u201cbroad latitude in determining what public needs justify the use of the takings power.\u201d \u003Cem\u003EKelo v. City of New London\u003C\/em\u003E (2005). In \u003Cem\u003EKelo\u003C\/em\u003E, the Court allowed a local government to take a private home and give it to a private corporation for purposes of economic development. It was a closely divided and extremely controversial decision, prompting Justice Sandra Day O\u2019Connor to write in dissent, \u201cThe specter of condemnation hangs over all property.\u201d The unfavorable reaction to the five-to-four decision in \u003Cem\u003EKelo\u003C\/em\u003E resulted in state laws designed to increase protection for property holders throughout much of the country.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EWhen property has been taken for public use, the Takings Clause mandates \u201cjust compensation.\u201d At bottom, the exercise of eminent domain is a forced sale. Obviously, the amount of this compensation requires a case-specific inquiry. In principle, the Court has said, just compensation means that the owner \u201cis entitled to be put in as good a position pecuniarily as if his property had not been taken.\u201d \u003Cem\u003EOlson v. United States\u003C\/em\u003E (1934). It has also said, however, that \u201cserious practical difficulties\u201d preclude giving \u201cthis principle of indemnity\u2009.\u2009.\u2009.\u2009its full and literal force.\u201d Instead, the owner is awarded the \u201cfair market value\u201d of his property, even if that is less than his true loss. \u003Cem\u003EUnited States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, More or Less\u003C\/em\u003E (1979).\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EA few kinds of takings, as a matter of law, are non-compensable. The confiscation or destruction of property during military hostilities, for example, is normally non-compensable. \u003Cem\u003EUnited States v. Caltex\u003C\/em\u003E (1952). But when compensation is due, in normal takings situations, the amount awarded may well depend on who awards it, judge or jury. Early eminent domain proceedings varied as to whether juries, judges, or other officials were in charge of determining just compensation. More recently, the Supreme Court has said that \u201cthere is no constitutional right to a jury in eminent domain proceedings,\u201d \u003Cem\u003EUnited States v. Reynolds\u003C\/em\u003E (1970), but in the different context of a \u201cregulatory taking,\u201d landowners do have the right to a jury trial. \u003Cem\u003ECity of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey\u003C\/em\u003E (1999).\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n  \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author\u0022\u003E\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--media\u0022\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--photo\u0022 style=\u0022background-image: url(\/sites\/default\/files\/Douglas_Kmiec.jpg)\u0022\u003E\u003C\/div\u003E\n            \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--info\u0022\u003E\n              \u003Ch4 class=\u0022con-essay-author--name\u0022\u003E\n                      William Baude\n                  \u003C\/h4\u003E\n                  \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--job\u0022\u003E\n         Neubaurer Family Assistant Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School\n      \u003C\/div\u003E\n            \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-tabs\u0022\u003E\n      \u003Cul data-tabs class=\u0022tabs\u0022\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000150-taba\u0022\u003EFurther Reading\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000150-tabb\u0022\u003ECase Law\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000150-tabc\u0022\u003ERelated Essays\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n      \u003C\/ul\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv data-tabs-content\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000150-taba\u0022\u003E\n          \n      \u003Cdiv\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EAKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION (1998)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EWilliam Baude, \u003Ci\u003ERethinking the Federal Eminent\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003EDomain Power\u003C\/i\u003E, 122 Yale L.J. 1738 (2013)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EPaxton Blair, \u003Ci\u003EFederal Condemnation Proceedings and\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003Ethe Seventh Amendment\u003C\/i\u003E, 41 Harv. L. Rev. 29 (1927)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EEric R. Claeys, \u003Ci\u003ETakings, Regulations, and Natural Property Rights\u003C\/i\u003E, 88 Cornell L. Rev. 1549 (2003)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003ERICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EMatthew P. Harrington, \u201c\u003Ci\u003EPublic Use\u201d and the Original\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003EUnderstanding of the So-Called \u201cTakings\u201d Clause\u003C\/i\u003E,\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003E53 Hastings L.J. 1245, 1263 (2002)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EJohn F. Hart, \u003Ci\u003ELand Use Law in the Early Republic and\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003Ethe Original Meaning of the Takings Clause\u003C\/i\u003E, 94 Nw.\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003EU. L. Rev. 1099 (2000)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EMichael B. Rappaport, \u003Ci\u003EOriginalism and Regulatory\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003ETakings: Why the Fifth Amendment May Not Protect Against Regulatory Takings, but the Fourteenth Amendment May\u003C\/i\u003E, 45 San Diego L. Rev. 729 (2008)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EWilliam Michael Treanor, \u003Ci\u003EThe Original Understanding\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003Eof the Takings Clause and the Political Process\u003C\/i\u003E, 95\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003EColum. L. Rev. 782 (1995)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n          \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n        \u003C\/div\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000150-tabb\u0022\u003E\n          \n      \u003Cdiv\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EPollard\u2019s Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022text-align:justify\u0022\u003EUnited States v. Gettysburg Electric Ry. Co., 160 U.S. 668 (1896)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EPumpelly v. Green Bay \u0026amp; Mississippi Canal Co., 80 U.S. 166 (1871)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EKohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1876)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EUnited States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513 (1883)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EChicago, Burlington \u0026amp; Qunicy. R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EPennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EVillage of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 US 365 (1926)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EOlson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246 (1934)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EYoungstown Sheet \u0026amp; Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EUnited States v. Caltex, 344 U.S. 149 (1952)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EBerman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EArmstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EUnited States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14 (1970)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EPenn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EUnited States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, More or Less, 441 U.S. 506 (1979)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EWebb\u2019s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003ELoretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EHawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ERuckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EFirst English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County, 482 U.S. 304 (1987)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003ENollan v. California Coastal Comm\u2019n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003ELucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EDolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003ECity of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687 (1999)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EPalazollo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ETahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EKelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EArkansas Game \u0026amp; Fish Comm\u2019n v. United States, 133\u003Cbr\u003E\nS. Ct. 511 (2012)\u003Cbr\u003E\n\u0026nbsp;\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EKoontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District, 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n          \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n        \u003C\/div\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000150-tabc\u0022\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000071\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EObligation of Contract\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000149\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EDue Process Clause\u003C\/a\u003E\n                  \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n\u003C\/article\u003E\n"]}]