[{"command":"add_css","data":[{"rel":"stylesheet","media":"all","href":"\/sites\/default\/files\/css\/css_veuEhhb1658wti0_ZAig66JOyixENU-N9zhjLQSLfOQ.css?delta=0\u0026language=en\u0026theme=heritage_theme\u0026include=eJwrTi1LzdNPzkksLq7Uy8tPSQUAPMsGtA"}]},{"command":"invoke","selector":null,"method":"openEssay","args":["10000149","\n\n\u003Carticle about=\u0022\/constitution\/amendments\/5\/essays\/150\/due-process-clause\u0022 class=\u0022node node--type-constitution-essay node--promoted node--view-mode-embedded clearfix\u0022\u003E\n  \u003Ch1 class=\u0022title\u0022\u003E\u003Cspan\u003EDue Process Clause\u003C\/span\u003E\n\u003C\/h1\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-location\u0022\u003E\n      Amendment V\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-context\u0022\u003E\n      \n            \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ENo person shall...be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law....\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n  \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-body\u0022\u003E\n    \n            \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EArticle Thirty-nine of the Magna Carta\u0026nbsp;(1215) proclaimed that \u201cno free man shall be\u0026nbsp;taken or imprisoned or disseised or outlawed\u0026nbsp;or exiled or in any way ruined, nor will we go or\u0026nbsp;send against him, except by the lawful judgment\u0026nbsp;of his peers or by the law of the land.\u201d This \u201claw\u0026nbsp;of the land\u201d requirement, which is often called\u0026nbsp;the principle of legality, prohibited unilateral,\u0026nbsp;arbitrary action by the king against certain protected\u0026nbsp;private interests. Executive and judicial\u0026nbsp;deprivations of such interests could take place\u0026nbsp;only pursuant to valid legal authority.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe phrase \u201cdue process of law\u201d made its\u0026nbsp;first appearance in a statute of 1354 concerning\u0026nbsp;court procedures. \u201cDue process of law\u201d meant\u0026nbsp;that judgments could issue only when the defendant\u0026nbsp;was personally given the opportunity to\u0026nbsp;appear in court pursuant to an appropriate writ\u0026nbsp;(i.e., was served process). The phrase retained\u0026nbsp;this technical meaning in English law into the\u0026nbsp;eighteenth century.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EAt the time of the drafting of the Bill of\u0026nbsp;Rights, at least eight state constitutions contained\u0026nbsp;clauses restraining government from depriving\u0026nbsp;persons of life, liberty, or property except pursuant\u0026nbsp;to the law of the land. The Fifth Amendment,\u0026nbsp;which otherwise tracked the form of these state\u0026nbsp;provisions, used the phrase \u201cdue process of law\u201d\u0026nbsp;instead of \u201claw of the land.\u201d The reasons for this\u0026nbsp;change in terminology are uncertain, but it is likely\u0026nbsp;that the founding generation was misled by some\u0026nbsp;seventeenth-century statements of Sir Edward\u0026nbsp;Coke (familiar to virtually all the Founders), who\u0026nbsp;in 1642 had declared\u2014wrongly, in the judgment\u0026nbsp;of modern historians\u2014that the phrases \u201claw of\u0026nbsp;the land\u201d and \u201cdue process of law\u201d were essentially\u0026nbsp;equivalent. Accordingly, the constitutional\u0026nbsp;meaning of \u201cdue process of law,\u201d as understood\u0026nbsp;in America in the late eighteenth century, almost\u0026nbsp;certainly refers to the principle of legality rather\u0026nbsp;than to pleading technicalities.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EUntil very close to the time of the framing, the\u0026nbsp;judicial power was generally viewed as an aspect of\u0026nbsp;executive power. In eighteenth-century America,\u0026nbsp;therefore, the phrase \u201cwithout due process of law\u201d\u0026nbsp;meant something like \u201cexecutive or judicial action\u0026nbsp;taken without lawful authorization or not in accordance\u0026nbsp;with traditional procedural forms of justice.\u201d\u0026nbsp;The Supreme Court modestly extended the\u0026nbsp;principle to Congress in \u003Cem\u003EMurray\u2019s Lessee v. Hoboken\u0026nbsp;Land \u0026amp; Improvement Co.\u003C\/em\u003E (1856)\u2014the first\u0026nbsp;Supreme Court case that turned on the meaning\u0026nbsp;of the Due Process Clause. There the Court\u0026nbsp;determined that the Due Process Clause limited\u0026nbsp;the power of Congress to authorize novel forms of\u0026nbsp;adjudication. The case involved a constitutional\u0026nbsp;challenge to a statutory procedure in which the\u0026nbsp;government collected deficiencies from tax collectors\u0026nbsp;without first having a court determine\u0026nbsp;whether the tax collector really owed the money to\u0026nbsp;the government. The Court found that the clause\u0026nbsp;\u201cis a restraint on the legislative as well as on the\u0026nbsp;executive and judicial powers of the government,\u0026nbsp;and cannot be so construed as to leave congress\u0026nbsp;free to make any process \u2018due process of law,\u2019 by\u0026nbsp;its mere will.\u201d In order to determine whether legislatively\u0026nbsp;prescribed forms of adjudication violated\u0026nbsp;due process of law, the Court looked to \u201cthose\u0026nbsp;settled usages and modes of proceeding existing\u0026nbsp;in the common and statute law of England.\u201d The\u0026nbsp;Court found a long tradition in English and American\u0026nbsp;law of auditing tax collectors without prior\u0026nbsp;hearings and accordingly upheld the practice.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe Due Process Clause requires that deprivations\u0026nbsp;of \u201clife, liberty, or property\u201d be accompanied\u0026nbsp;by due process of law. The deprivation of\u0026nbsp;other interests not enumerated here need not be\u0026nbsp;accompanied by due process of law. When the Due\u0026nbsp;Process Clause was ratified in 1791, the meaning\u0026nbsp;of \u201cliberty\u201d as a personal right was clear. Sir William\u0026nbsp;Blackstone, whose influence on the founding\u0026nbsp;generation was enormous, wrote in his \u003Cem\u003ECommentaries\u0026nbsp;on the Laws of England\u003C\/em\u003E (1765\u20131769) that the\u0026nbsp;right to liberty meant \u201cthe power of locomotion,\u0026nbsp;of changing situation, or removing one\u2019s person to\u0026nbsp;whatsoever place one\u2019s own inclination may direct;\u0026nbsp;without imprisonment or restraint, unless by due\u0026nbsp;course of law.\u201d That definition is quite narrow and\u0026nbsp;focused, and it excludes such matters as bodily\u0026nbsp;integrity and reputation. Those interests, however,\u0026nbsp;were encompassed by Blackstone\u2019s (expansive to\u0026nbsp;modern ears) definition of \u201clife,\u201d which referred\u0026nbsp;to an array of rights lumped together under the\u0026nbsp;general heading of personal security: \u201ca person\u2019s\u0026nbsp;legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his\u0026nbsp;limbs, his body, his health, and his reputation.\u201d\u0026nbsp;The term \u201cproperty\u201d in 1791 was more ambiguous.\u0026nbsp;It could have referred to land, to land plus chattels,\u0026nbsp;to anything of exchangeable value, or (what seems\u0026nbsp;most likely) to whatever interests common law\u0026nbsp;courts would have recognized as property entitled\u0026nbsp;to legal protection. None of these understandings\u0026nbsp;would include as property future enjoyment of\u0026nbsp;government benefits, such as jobs or licenses. The\u0026nbsp;law sharply distinguished between property rights\u0026nbsp;and mere privileges that the government could\u0026nbsp;continue or terminate at its pleasure.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe eighteenth-century lawyer trying to\u0026nbsp;define the phrase \u201clife, liberty, or property\u201d\u0026nbsp;would have faced a sticky problem that could not\u0026nbsp;be answered by reference to Blackstone, tradition,\u0026nbsp;or any other authority: Do these terms draw their\u0026nbsp;meaning from federal law, state law, or both? Does\u0026nbsp;the Constitution contain its own internal definitions\u0026nbsp;of those terms, so that the Constitution itself\u0026nbsp;determines whether a particular interest is property?\u0026nbsp;Are they defined by reference to the laws of\u0026nbsp;the states, so that a particular interest might be\u0026nbsp;constitutional \u201cproperty\u201d in Pennsylvania but not\u0026nbsp;in New York? Or must the universe of constitutionally\u0026nbsp;protected interests be determined by some\u0026nbsp;combination of federal and state law?\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EPerhaps the best answer, though it is impossible\u0026nbsp;to say decisively, is that federal law sets the\u0026nbsp;outer boundaries of \u201clife, liberty, and property\u201d\u0026nbsp;and state law fixes the details. Surely the Constitution\u0026nbsp;does not itself determine whether a particular\u0026nbsp;estate in land, such as a surface estate on\u0026nbsp;mining land, is or is not \u201cproperty\u201d for purposes\u0026nbsp;of the Due Process Clause or whether water rights\u0026nbsp;must be appropriative or riparian; either answer\u0026nbsp;is permissible and, accordingly, can vary from one\u0026nbsp;jurisdiction to another. But if a state decided that\u0026nbsp;land itself was henceforth no longer to be considered\u0026nbsp;\u201cproperty,\u201d that would pass the boundaries of\u0026nbsp;acceptability. Federal law thus establishes for each\u0026nbsp;term a \u201ccore\u201d of meaning that no jurisdiction can\u0026nbsp;alter, but beyond that core, governments are free\u0026nbsp;to expand or contract the range of constitutionally\u0026nbsp;protected interests.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EAccordingly, the original meaning of the Due\u0026nbsp;Process Clause was essentially that the federal\u0026nbsp;government could not take people\u2019s lives, health,\u0026nbsp;reputation, freedom of movement, or common\u0026nbsp;law property without prior legal authorization and\u0026nbsp;without following traditional judicial procedures.\u0026nbsp;Describing modern doctrine is considerably more\u0026nbsp;difficult.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EModern doctrine has significantly modified\u0026nbsp;the original understanding of how one determines\u0026nbsp;compliance with \u201cdue process of law.\u201d Instead of\u0026nbsp;reference to traditionally accepted procedural\u0026nbsp;forms, contemporary law dating back more than a\u0026nbsp;century has judged the adequacy of procedures by\u0026nbsp;a m\u00e9lange of practical factors that resist easy reduction.\u0026nbsp;Late nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century\u0026nbsp;cases described due process as procedures\u0026nbsp;\u201cappropriate to the case, and just to the parties to\u0026nbsp;be affected,\u201d \u003Cem\u003EHagar v. Reclamation Dist. No. 108\u003C\/em\u003E\u0026nbsp;(1884), and the absence of due process as procedures\u0026nbsp;that are \u201cinadequate or manifestly unfair.\u201d\u0026nbsp;\u003Cem\u003EICC v. Louisville \u0026amp; Nashville R.R. Co.\u003C\/em\u003E (1913). As\u0026nbsp;Justice Felix Frankfurter summarized matters in\u0026nbsp;a famous concurring opinion in \u003Cem\u003EJoint Anti-Fascist\u0026nbsp;Refugee Committee v. McGrath\u003C\/em\u003E (1951), due process\u0026nbsp;\u201cis compounded of history, reason, the past course\u0026nbsp;of decisions, and stout confidence in the strength\u0026nbsp;of the democratic faith which we profess. . . . It is a\u0026nbsp;delicate process of judgment by those whom the\u0026nbsp;Constitution entrusted with the unfolding of the\u0026nbsp;process.\u201d\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EIn \u003Cem\u003EMathews v. Eldridge\u003C\/em\u003E (1976), the Court clarified\u0026nbsp;that this \u201cdelicate process of judgment\u201d generally\u0026nbsp;requires consideration of\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cblockquote\u003E\n\u003Cp\u003Efirst, the [significance of the] private\u0026nbsp;interest that will be affected by the\u0026nbsp;official action; second, the risk of an\u0026nbsp;erroneous deprivation of such interest\u0026nbsp;through the procedures used, and\u0026nbsp;the probable value, if any, of additional\u0026nbsp;or substitute procedural safeguards;\u0026nbsp;and finally, the [weight of\u0026nbsp;the] Government\u2019s interest, including\u0026nbsp;the function involved and the\u0026nbsp;fiscal and administrative burdens\u0026nbsp;that the additional or substitute procedural\u0026nbsp;requirement would entail.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/blockquote\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EWhile there is no indication that the Court\u0026nbsp;in \u003Cem\u003EMathews\u003C\/em\u003E thought that it was changing or\u0026nbsp;limiting the previous century\u2019s focus on fundamental\u0026nbsp;fairness as determined by all-things-considered\u0026nbsp;reasoning, within a few years this\u0026nbsp;formulation from \u003Cem\u003EMathews\u003C\/em\u003E took on a life of its\u0026nbsp;own, and today it serves as the near-exclusive\u0026nbsp;frame of reference for analyzing procedural adequacy\u0026nbsp;under the Due Process Clause. This modern\u0026nbsp;balancing-of-factors approach is universally\u0026nbsp;criticized as unpredictable. Many observers also\u0026nbsp;object to the Court\u2019s optimistic goal of accurate\u0026nbsp;decision-making, and there is considerable disagreement\u0026nbsp;about which other possible goals of\u0026nbsp;procedure should be factored into the mix. For\u0026nbsp;example, if one limits the due process analysis\u0026nbsp;to the concerns identified in \u003Cem\u003EMathews\u003C\/em\u003E, then\u0026nbsp;the interests of children and custodial parents\u0026nbsp;would not seem to be relevant to determining\u0026nbsp;the procedures for enforcement of child support,\u0026nbsp;which struck the Court\u2019s originalist-leaning justices\u0026nbsp;in 2011 as implausible. See \u003Cem\u003ETurner v. Rogers\u003C\/em\u003E\u0026nbsp;(2011). Nonetheless, a relatively rote application\u0026nbsp;of the \u003Cem\u003EMathews\u003C\/em\u003E factors is the standard modern\u0026nbsp;approach to establishing the constitutional adequacy\u0026nbsp;of procedures.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EOne of the trickiest questions in modern\u0026nbsp;law concerns the timing of procedures: which\u0026nbsp;procedures (if any) must come before the government\u0026nbsp;deprives people of protected interests?\u0026nbsp;The law in this area remains unsettled in many\u0026nbsp;important respects and defies simple description.\u0026nbsp;Perhaps the most that can be said\u2014and\u0026nbsp;can be said only as a rough generalization\u2014is\u0026nbsp;that there is a presumption in favor of pre-deprivation\u0026nbsp;procedures that can be overcome when\u0026nbsp;the value of such procedures would be low, the\u0026nbsp;potential risks to the government or public from\u0026nbsp;delaying the deprivation would be high, or the\u0026nbsp;person deprived would have an adequate remedy\u0026nbsp;after the deprivation.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe most dramatic transformations in\u0026nbsp;modern due process have concerned the range\u0026nbsp;of interests encompassed by the phrase \u201clife,\u0026nbsp;liberty, or property.\u201d As late as 1950, the original\u0026nbsp;meaning still largely held sway, though\u0026nbsp;Blackstone\u2019s broad understanding of \u201clife\u201d as\u0026nbsp;including bodily integrity and reputation mysteriously\u0026nbsp;vanished in favor of a much narrower\u0026nbsp;meaning. No doubt this development, which\u0026nbsp;was never expressly acknowledged, put pressure\u0026nbsp;on the other terms in the enumeration (\u201cliberty\u201d\u0026nbsp;and \u201cproperty\u201d) to include such worthy\u0026nbsp;interests as physical integrity and reputation.\u0026nbsp;More importantly, the rise of the post\u2013New Deal\u0026nbsp;administrative state vastly expanded the range\u0026nbsp;of circumstances under which official action\u0026nbsp;could affect people\u2019s lives; and the concomitant\u0026nbsp;expansion of government benefits, jobs, and\u0026nbsp;licenses raised the stakes of excluding such interests\u0026nbsp;from procedural protection. By the early\u0026nbsp;1960s, a majority of the Court was prepared to\u0026nbsp;treat the phrase \u201clife, liberty, or property\u201d as a\u0026nbsp;convenient shorthand for any interest whose\u0026nbsp;loss would be grievous rather than as a list of\u0026nbsp;three distinct terms with distinct, ascertainable\u0026nbsp;meanings\u2014a development that some commentators\u0026nbsp;half-jokingly described as the emergence\u0026nbsp;of \u201clifelibertyproperty.\u201d On this new understanding,\u0026nbsp;government benefits could easily constitute\u0026nbsp;an interest whose loss would be grievous\u0026nbsp;and whose deprivation therefore required some\u0026nbsp;measure of procedure.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EIn 1970, the Court formalized this understanding\u0026nbsp;in \u003Cem\u003EGoldberg v. Kelly\u003C\/em\u003E, where the State\u0026nbsp;of New York, in its argument to the Supreme\u0026nbsp;Court concerning hearings prior to termination\u0026nbsp;of benefits under the Aid to Families with\u0026nbsp;Dependent Children Act, did not even argue that\u0026nbsp;expected future receipt of AFDC benefits was not\u0026nbsp;a constitutionally protected interest. Subsequent\u0026nbsp;cases quickly extended constitutional protection\u0026nbsp;to such interests as government licenses and\u0026nbsp;reputation.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EIn 1972, the Supreme Court established the\u0026nbsp;framework of modern law in \u003Cem\u003EBoard of Regents\u0026nbsp;of State Colleges v. Roth\u003C\/em\u003E. That case reestablished\u0026nbsp;some differentiations among the three enumerated\u0026nbsp;categories of protected interests. The Court\u0026nbsp;held that \u201cliberty\u201d and \u201cproperty\u201d were distinct\u0026nbsp;terms with ascertainable meanings, though \u201clife\u201d\u0026nbsp;continues to be conspicuously absent from modern\u0026nbsp;recitations of the range of protected interests\u0026nbsp;in anything other than its narrowest and most\u0026nbsp;literal application. The Court explicitly stated,\u0026nbsp;however, that these terms would not be construed\u0026nbsp;in accordance with their original meaning,\u0026nbsp;but would have to be construed to include\u0026nbsp;the extended range of interests recognized in\u0026nbsp;prior case law, including government benefits.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EAccordingly, the Court has expanded the\u0026nbsp;definition of the term \u201cliberty,\u201d drawing upon\u0026nbsp;\u003Cem\u003EMeyer v. Nebraska\u003C\/em\u003E (1923), in which it declared\u0026nbsp;that \u201cliberty\u201d includes \u201cnot merely freedom\u0026nbsp;from bodily restraint but also the right of the\u0026nbsp;individual to contract, to engage in any of the\u0026nbsp;common occupations of life, to acquire useful\u0026nbsp;knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring\u0026nbsp;up children, to worship God according to the\u0026nbsp;dictates of his own conscience, and generally\u0026nbsp;to enjoy those privileges long recognized . . . as\u0026nbsp;essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by\u0026nbsp;free men.\u201d The Court\u2019s extraordinary expansion\u0026nbsp;of the concept of \u201cliberty\u201d reached its apogee in\u0026nbsp;the famous (some critics say infamous) declaration\u0026nbsp;by Justice Anthony Kennedy: \u201cAt the heart\u0026nbsp;of liberty is the right to define one\u2019s own concept\u0026nbsp;of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of\u0026nbsp;the mystery of human life.\u201d \u003Cem\u003EPlanned Parenthood\u0026nbsp;of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey\u003C\/em\u003E (1992).\u0026nbsp;He quoted this passage a decade later, holding\u0026nbsp;in \u003Cem\u003ELawrence v. Texas\u003C\/em\u003E (2003) that the state could\u0026nbsp;not prohibit homosexual sodomy, and in \u003Cem\u003EUnited\u0026nbsp;States v. Windsor\u003C\/em\u003E (2013), that the federal government\u0026nbsp;could not deny federal benefits to legally\u0026nbsp;married same-sex couples.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EAlthough one may have the right to define\u0026nbsp;reality in any way that one may please, acting\u0026nbsp;upon those beliefs is another story. So despite\u0026nbsp;Justice Kennedy\u2019s sweeping language, the constitutional\u0026nbsp;meaning of liberty has been held not\u0026nbsp;to include, at least under some circumstances,\u0026nbsp;a right to government employment, an interest\u0026nbsp;in reputation, or many interests claimed by\u0026nbsp;prisoners. The government is free to construct\u0026nbsp;these excluded interests to be constitutionally\u0026nbsp;protected through statutes and regulations by\u0026nbsp;specifying a clear causal connection between satisfaction\u0026nbsp;of criteria of eligibility and receipt of a\u0026nbsp;benefit, but they are not automatically protected\u0026nbsp;as a matter of constitutional command.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EToday, it is state law that primarily defines\u0026nbsp;the term \u201cproperty.\u201d Interests within the traditional\u0026nbsp;common-law understanding of property\u0026nbsp;are generally still considered to be property. Different\u0026nbsp;states can, for example, prescribe different\u0026nbsp;kinds of estates in land as \u201cproperty,\u201d but a state\u0026nbsp;could not by statutory or judicial fiat declare\u0026nbsp;land per se (or money in a bank account) not to\u0026nbsp;be private property for purposes of the Constitution.\u0026nbsp;Interests beyond the traditional common\u0026nbsp;law understanding, such as government benefits\u0026nbsp;and licenses, are constitutionally protected if\u0026nbsp;statutory or regulatory provisions draw a clear\u0026nbsp;causal line from the satisfaction of eligibility\u0026nbsp;criteria to the receipt of benefits. The case law\u0026nbsp;distinguishes the substance of the created interest\u0026nbsp;from the procedures for its termination. The\u0026nbsp;latter is what the Due Process Clause protects.\u0026nbsp;Within the zone beyond the constitutional\u0026nbsp;core of \u201cliberty\u201d and \u201cproperty,\u201d government\u0026nbsp;can determine which substantive interests shall\u0026nbsp;receive due process protection, but once that\u0026nbsp;substantive decision is made, the constitutional\u0026nbsp;law of due process assesses the adequacy of the\u0026nbsp;procedures. In other words, the government may\u0026nbsp;not make acceptance of \u201cunconstitutional\u201d termination\u0026nbsp;procedures a condition of receiving\u0026nbsp;government benefits.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EIf an interest does not fall within the meaning\u0026nbsp;of the phrase \u201clife, liberty, or property,\u201d\u0026nbsp;the Due Process Clause does not mandate any\u0026nbsp;particular procedures for its deprivation. Other\u0026nbsp;sources of law, whether constitutional or statutory,\u0026nbsp;may well do so, but the Due Process Clause\u0026nbsp;is, so to speak, \u201cturned off.\u201d There are several\u0026nbsp;other \u201con-off switches\u201d that also determine the\u0026nbsp;applicability of the Due Process Clause.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EFirst, the clause applies only to government\u0026nbsp;action; private entities are not bound by the Fifth\u0026nbsp;Amendment or, indeed, by anything in the Constitution\u0026nbsp;except the Thirteenth Amendment.\u0026nbsp;This can pose difficult questions when the acting\u0026nbsp;entity is nominally private but is involved\u0026nbsp;in some fashion with the government. \u003Cem\u003ESee\u003C\/em\u003E State\u0026nbsp;Action Clause (Amendment XIV, Section 1). Second,\u0026nbsp;modern law holds that the word \u201cdeprived\u201d\u0026nbsp;in the Due Process Clause means an intentional\u0026nbsp;(or, at a minimum, a reckless) taking of a protected\u0026nbsp;interest. Losses inflicted by government\u0026nbsp;negligence do not implicate the Due Process\u0026nbsp;Clause.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThird, and most importantly, administrative\u0026nbsp;agencies are responsible for the vast bulk of\u0026nbsp;governmental actions that work deprivations of\u0026nbsp;interests within the compass of the Due Process\u0026nbsp;Clause, but large classes of agency action have\u0026nbsp;been held to fall outside the clause\u2019s protection.\u0026nbsp;Agencies engage in two forms of official action:\u0026nbsp;rule-making, which strongly resembles in form\u0026nbsp;and function the promulgation of a statute by\u0026nbsp;the legislature, and adjudication, which strongly\u0026nbsp;resembles in form and function the decision of\u0026nbsp;a case by a court. The Due Process Clause has\u0026nbsp;never been understood to impose procedural\u0026nbsp;requirements on legislatures (though it does,\u0026nbsp;under modern understandings, regulate the content\u0026nbsp;of legislation that authorizes executive or\u0026nbsp;judicial procedures). For almost a century, courts\u0026nbsp;have held that agency rule-making shares in this\u0026nbsp;legislative immunity from due-process analysis;\u0026nbsp;agency rule-making is subject to no constitutional\u0026nbsp;procedural requirements. \u003Cem\u003EBi-Metallic\u0026nbsp;Investment Co. v. State Board of Equalization of\u0026nbsp;Colorado\u003C\/em\u003E (1915). Agency adjudication, however,\u0026nbsp;is subject to due process analysis, but agencies do\u0026nbsp;not stand in the same shoes as courts. Procedures\u0026nbsp;that would be obviously inadequate in judicial\u0026nbsp;proceedings are considered constitutionally adequate\u0026nbsp;for agency adjudication. The size of the gap\u0026nbsp;is uncertain, which typifies the complexity of the\u0026nbsp;modern law of procedural due process.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n  \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author\u0022\u003E\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--media\u0022\u003E\n            \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--info\u0022\u003E\n              \u003Ch4 class=\u0022con-essay-author--name\u0022\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022http:\/\/www.bu.edu\/law\/faculty\/profiles\/bios\/full-time\/lawson_g.html\u0022\u003EGary Lawson\u003C\/a\u003E\n                  \u003C\/h4\u003E\n                  \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--job\u0022\u003E\n         Philip S. Beck Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law\n      \u003C\/div\u003E\n            \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-tabs\u0022\u003E\n      \u003Cul data-tabs class=\u0022tabs\u0022\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000149-taba\u0022\u003EFurther Reading\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000149-tabb\u0022\u003ECase Law\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000149-tabc\u0022\u003ERelated Essays\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n      \u003C\/ul\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv data-tabs-content\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000149-taba\u0022\u003E\n          \n      \u003Cdiv\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EFrank Easterbrook, \u003Ci\u003ESubstance and Due Process\u003C\/i\u003E, 1982 Sup. Ct. Rev. 85 (1982)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EJohn C. Harrison, \u003Ci\u003ESubstantive Due Process and the Constitutional Text\u003C\/i\u003E, 83 Va. L. Rev. 493 (1997)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EKeith Jurow, \u003Ci\u003EUntimely Thoughts: A Reconsideration of the Origins of Due Process of Law\u003C\/i\u003E, 19 Am. J. Legal Hist. 265 (1975)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EGary Lawson, Federal Administrative Law 357\u2013498 (2d ed. 2001)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EGary Lawson, Katharine Ferguson \u0026amp; Guillermo A. Montero, \u0022\u003Cem\u003EOh Lord, Please Don\u0027t Let Me Be Misunderstood!\u0022: Rediscovering the\u0026nbsp;\u003C\/em\u003EMathews v. Eldridge\u0026nbsp;\u003Cem\u003Eand\u003C\/em\u003E\u0026nbsp;Penn Central\u0026nbsp;\u003Cem\u003EFrameworks,\u0026nbsp;\u003C\/em\u003E81 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1 (2005)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EJerry L. Mashaw, Due Process in the Administrative State (1985)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ERyan C. Williams,\u0026nbsp;\u003Cem\u003Ethe One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause\u003C\/em\u003E, 120 Yale L.J. 408 (2010)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n          \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n        \u003C\/div\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000149-tabb\u0022\u003E\n          \n      \u003Cdiv\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EMurray\u0027s Lessee v. Hoboken Land \u0026amp; Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EHagar v. Reclamation dist. No. 108, 111 U.S. 701 (1884)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EICC v. Louisville \u0026amp; Nashville R.R. Co., 227 U.S. 88 (1913)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EBi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization of Colorado, 239 U.S. 411 (1915)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EMeyer v. State of Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EJoint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EGoldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EBoard of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EMatthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EPlanned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ELawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ETurner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EUnited States v. Windsor, 133 St. Ct. 2675 (2013)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n          \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n        \u003C\/div\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000149-tabc\u0022\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000167\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EState Action\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000169\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EDue Process Clause\u003C\/a\u003E\n                  \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n\u003C\/article\u003E\n"]}]