[{"command":"add_css","data":[{"rel":"stylesheet","media":"all","href":"\/sites\/default\/files\/css\/css_veuEhhb1658wti0_ZAig66JOyixENU-N9zhjLQSLfOQ.css?delta=0\u0026language=en\u0026theme=heritage_theme\u0026include=eJwrTi1LzdNPzkksLq7Uy8tPSQUAPMsGtA"}]},{"command":"invoke","selector":null,"method":"openEssay","args":["10000139","\n\n\u003Carticle about=\u0022\/constitution\/amendments\/1\/essays\/140\/freedom-of-speech-and-of-the-press\u0022 class=\u0022node node--type-constitution-essay node--promoted node--view-mode-embedded clearfix\u0022\u003E\n  \u003Ch1 class=\u0022title\u0022\u003E\u003Cspan\u003EFreedom of Speech and of the Press\u003C\/span\u003E\n\u003C\/h1\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-location\u0022\u003E\n      Amendment I\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-context\u0022\u003E\n      \n            \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ECongress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press....\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n  \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-body\u0022\u003E\n    \n            \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EWhat exactly did the Framers mean by \u201cfreedom of speech, or of the press\u201d? Little is definitively known about the subject. The debates in the First Congress, which proposed the Bill of Rights, are brief and unilluminating. Early state constitutions generally included similar provisions, but there is no record of detailed debate about what those state provisions meant. The Framers cared a good deal about the freedom of the press, as the \u003Cem\u003EAppeal to the Inhabitants of Quebec\u003C\/em\u003E, written by the First Continental Congress in 1774, shows:\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cblockquote\u003EThe last right we shall mention regards the freedom of the press. The importance of this consists, besides the advancement of truth, science, morality, and arts in general, in its diffusion of liberal sentiments on the administration of Government, its ready communication of thoughts between subjects, and its consequential promotion of union among them, whereby oppressive officers are shamed or intimidated into more honorable and just modes of conducting affairs.\u003C\/blockquote\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe statement mentions some of the values that the Founders saw as inherent in the principle of freedom of the press: the search and attainment of truth, scientific progress, cultural development, the increase of virtue among the people, the holding of governmental officials to republican values, the strengthening of community, and a check upon self-aggrandizing politicians. But broad statements such as this tell us less than we would like to know about what \u201cthe freedom of the press\u201d meant to the Founders as a rule of law, when the freedom would yield to competing concerns, or whether the freedom prohibited only prior restraints or also subsequent punishments.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThere were few reported Founding-era court cases that interpreted the federal and state Free Speech and Free Press Clauses, and few Founding-era political controversies excited detailed discussion of what the clauses meant. The governments of the time were small, and the statute books thin. Not many states passed laws restricting commercial advertising. Only one state law banned pornography, and that ban appears to have been unenforced until 1821. Some states had blasphemy laws, but they were largely unenforced from the early 1700s until the 1810s. No laws banned flag-burning, campaign spending, or anonymous speech.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThis may but does not necessarily mean that such speech was broadly believed to be constitutionally protected; then, as today, the government did not ban all that it had the power to ban. But the paucity of such bans meant that few people in that era had occasion to define carefully what the constitutional boundaries of speech and press protection might be.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EIn fact, the most prominent free press debate of the years immediately following the Framing\u2014the Sedition Act controversy\u2014illustrated that there was little consensus on even as central an issue as whether the free press guarantee only prohibited prior restraints on publications critical of the government, or whether it also forbade punishment for \u201cseditious\u201d speech once it was made.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EIn 1798, the country was fighting the Quasi-War with France. The Federalist Party controlled all three branches of the federal government, and its members suspected many Republican party stalwarts of sympathizing with France and the French Revolution and thus of fomenting disloyalty. Congress consequently made it a crime to publish \u201cany false, scandalous and malicious writing or writings\u2009.\u2009.\u2009.\u2009with intent to defame\u201d the government, Congress, or the President, \u201cor to stir up sedition within the United States, or to excite any unlawful combinations\u2009.\u2009.\u2009.\u2009for opposing or resisting any law of the United States\u2009.\u2009.\u2009.\u2009or to aid, encourage or abet any hostile designs of any foreign nation against the United States, their people or government.\u201d Several publishers were in fact convicted under the law, often under rather biased applications of the falsity requirement.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe Federalists\u2019 actions likely represented a serious constitutional judgment, and not just political expediency. True, malicious falsehoods about the Vice President\u2014Thomas Jefferson, who was a leading Republican\u2014were not covered by the law, and the law was scheduled to expire on March 3, 1801, the day before Federalist President John Adams\u2019s term was to end. But shortly before the law expired, and after the Federalists lost the 1800 election, Federalist Representatives nonetheless tried to renew the Act; had they succeeded, the Act would have punished libels against President Jefferson and the new Democratic-Republican Congressional majority. The bill was defeated in the House by a 53\u201349 vote, with all but four Federalists voting for it and all Republicans voting against it.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EIndeed, in 1799 Federalist Congressman John Marshall (who would soon become Chief Justice), expressed doubts that the Sedition Act was wise but nonetheless argued that the free press guarantee meant only \u201cliberty to publish, free from previous restraint\u201d\u2014free of requirements that printers be licensed, or that their material be approved before publication. Under this view, which echoed the British law as expounded by Sir William Blackstone, criminal punishment after publication was constitutional, at least if the punishment was consistent with the traditional rules of the common law. Other early American political leaders, such as James Madison, the principal drafter of the Bill of Rights, argued the opposite: \u201c[T]his idea of\u0026nbsp;the freedom of the press can never be admitted to be the American idea of it; since a law inflicting penalties on printed publications would have a similar effect with a law authorizing a previous restraint on them.\u201d\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003ELikewise, Marshall and other Federalists argued that the freedom of the press must necessarily be limited, because \u201cgovernment cannot be\u2009.\u2009.\u2009.\u2009secured, if by falsehood and malicious slander, it is to be deprived of the confidence and affection of the people.\u201d Not so, reasoned Madison and other Republicans: even speech that creates \u201ca contempt, a disrepute, or hatred [of the government] among the people\u201d should be tolerated because the only way of determining whether such contempt is justified is \u201cby a free examination [of the government\u2019s actions], and a free communication among the people thereon.\u201d It was as if half the country read the constitutional guarantee one way, and the other half, the other way.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe Founding generation undoubtedly believed deeply in the freedom of speech and of the press, but then, as now, these general terms were understood differently by different people. Many people did not think about their precise meaning until a concrete controversy arose; and when a controversy did arise, people disagreed sharply on that meaning.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EA Supreme Court case,\u003Cem\u003E McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission\u003C\/em\u003E (1995), illustrates the continuing debate over the original meaning of the clause. The question in\u003Cem\u003E McIntyre\u003C\/em\u003E was whether the government could outlaw anonymous electioneering. The majority dealt with the question based on the Court\u2019s twentieth-century case law and twentieth-century First Amendment theories. Justices Clarence Thomas and Antonin Scalia, the Court\u2019s most devoted originalists, however, did focus on the original meaning discussion but reached different results.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EBoth Justices recognized that there was \u201cno record of discussions of anonymous political expression either in the First Congress, which drafted the Bill of Rights, or in the state ratifying conventions.\u201d They both recognized that much political speech in the time of the Framers (such as \u003Cem\u003EThe Federalist Papers\u003C\/em\u003E itself) was anonymous. Indeed, much political speech justifying resistance to Parliament before the Revolution was also anonymous.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003ETo Justice Thomas, the experience of the Founders in their own use of anonymous speech\u2014\u003Cem\u003EThe Federalist Papers\u003C\/em\u003E being a classic example\u2014was dispositive of what they would have regarded as a vital part of the freedom of speech, particularly where political speech was at issue. Justice Scalia, however, who has a narrower view of what can be accepted as evidence of original intent apart from the text of the pro-vision itself, argued that \u201cto prove that anonymous electioneering was used frequently is not to establish that it is a constitutional right\u201d; perhaps the legislatures simply chose not to prohibit the speech, even though they had the constitutional power to do so.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EJustice Thomas did produce evidence that some Founding-era commentators saw anonymous commentary as protected by \u201cthe Liberty of the Press,\u201d but Justice Scalia replied that many of these were mere \u201cpartisan cr[ies]\u201d that said little about any generally accepted understanding. Justice Thomas found the evidence sufficient to justify reading the First Amendment as protecting anonymous speech. Justice Scalia did not think the historical evidence of what people did necessarily shows much about what people believed they had a constitutional right to do. Instead, Scalia turned to American practices of the 1800s and the 1900s, a source that he considers authoritative where the original meaning is uncertain. A consensus on the original meaning on this subject thus remains elusive.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThis having been said, on some questions it is possible to have a good idea of what the Framers thought, based on a combination of pre-Framing, Framing-era, and shortly post-Framing evidence. First, traditional libel law was seen as permissible. Several state constitutions also secured the \u201cfreedom of the press\u201d and the \u201cliberty of the press,\u201d and under them, defaming another person was understood to be constitutionally unprotected.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003ESecond, the Free Press Clause was seen as covering the press as technology\u2014all who used printing presses to try to communicate to the public at large\u2014and not the press in the sense of a specific industry or occupation. Professional publishers and journalists were not seen as having symbolic expression, such as paintings, effigies (whether just being displayed or being burnt), liberty poles, and the like as tantamount to verbal expression. Both would be equally punishable as libel, if they conveyed false and defamatory messages about someone. But both would also be equally covered by the freedom of speech or of the press.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EFourth, Framing-era sources treat civil tort liability for speech the same as criminal liability for constitutional purposes. Indeed, the very first court cases setting aside government action on constitutional freedom of expression grounds, an 1802 Vermont case and an 1806 South Carolina case, involved civil libel verdicts set aside because of the state constitutions\u2019 Petition Clauses. Similar cases from that era applied the same principle to state Free Speech and Free Press Clauses.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EAs noted above, there was considerable controversy about how broad the constitutional protections were, and what the scope of the exceptions to protection might be. But the constitutional protections, whatever their substantive breadth, applied equally without regard to whether the speaker was a professional publisher, whether the communication was symbolic expression or verbal expression, and whether the case involved tort liability or criminal punishment.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003ENotwithstanding occasional references to originalist debates\u2014such as the originalist debate between Justices Thomas and Scalia in \u003Cem\u003EMcIntyre\u003C\/em\u003E\u2014today\u2019s free speech and free press law is not much influenced by original meaning. It mostly stems from the experience and thinking of the twentieth century, as the Court first began to hear a wide range of free speech cases only in the late 1910s. This approach has produced the following general free speech rules:\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003E\u0026nbsp;\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Col\u003E\n\t\u003Cli\u003EAs with all of the Bill of Rights, the free speech\/free press guarantee restricts only government action, not action by private employers, property owners, householders, churches, universities, and the like.\u003C\/li\u003E\n\t\u003Cli\u003EAs with most of the Bill of Rights, the free speech\/free press guarantee applies equally to federal and state governments, which includes local governments as well as all branches of each government. In particular, the civil courts are subject to the First Amendment, which is why libel law and other tort law rules must comply with free speech\/press principles. \u003Cem\u003ENew York Times Co. v. Sullivan\u003C\/em\u003E (1964).\u003C\/li\u003E\n\t\u003Cli\u003EThe Free Speech and Free Press Clauses have been read as providing essentially equal protection to speakers and writers, whether or not they are members of the institutional press, and largely regardless of the medium\u2014books, newspapers, movies, the Internet\u2014in which they communicate. Newspapers enjoy no more and no fewer constitutional rights than individuals. The one exception is over-the-airwaves radio and television broadcasting, which has for historical reasons been given less constitutional protection. \u003Cem\u003EReno v. ACLU\u003C\/em\u003E (1997).\u003C\/li\u003E\n\t\u003Cli\u003EThe free speech\/free press guarantee also extends to any conduct that is conventionally understood as expressive\u2014for instance, waving a flag, wearing an armband, or burning a flag. It also extends to conduct that is necessary in order to speak effectively, as, for example, using money to buy a public address system or to buy advertising. Restrictions on independent campaign expenditures, for instance, raise First Amendment problems because restricting the use of money for speech purposes is a speech restriction. \u003Cem\u003EStromberg v. California\u003C\/em\u003E (1931); \u003Cem\u003EBuckley v. Valeo\u003C\/em\u003E (1976); \u003Cem\u003ECitizens United v. FEC\u003C\/em\u003E (2010).\u003C\/li\u003E\n\t\u003Cli\u003EThe free speech\/free press guarantee extends not just to political speech but also to speech about religion, science, morality, social conditions, and daily life, as well as to art and entertainment. In the words of a 1948 case, \u201cThe line between the informing and the entertaining is too elusive for the protection of that basic right. Everyone is familiar with instances of propaganda through fiction. What is one man\u2019s amusement, teaches another\u2019s doctrine.\u201d And the guarantee extends to low-brow expression (such as jokes or even profanity) as well as high-brow expression. \u003Cem\u003EWinters v. New York\u003C\/em\u003E (1948); \u003Cem\u003ECohen v. California\u003C\/em\u003E (1971).\u003C\/li\u003E\n\t\u003Cli\u003EThe free speech\/free press guarantee extends to all viewpoints, good or evil. There is no exception, for instance, for Communism, Nazism, Islamic radicalism, sexist speech, or \u201chate speech,\u201d what-ever that term may mean. \u201cUnder the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas.\u201d \u003Cem\u003EGertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.\u003C\/em\u003E (1974); \u003Cem\u003ENew York Times Co. v. Sullivan.\u003C\/em\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n\t\u003Cli\u003EThere is, however, a small set of rather narrow exceptions to free speech protection:\u0026nbsp;\n\t\u003Cp\u003Ea. \u003Cem\u003EIncitement\u003C\/em\u003E: Speech may be restricted if it is: (i) intended to persuade people to engage in (ii) imminent unlawful conduct, and (iii) likely to cause such imminent unlawful conduct. Outside this narrow zone, even speech that advocates lawbreaking is constitutionally protected. \u003Cem\u003EBrandenburg v. Ohio\u003C\/em\u003E (1969).\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\t\u003Cp\u003Eb. \u003Cem\u003ELibel, fraud,\u003C\/em\u003E and \u003Cem\u003Eperjury\u003C\/em\u003E: Libel, fraud, and perjury may generally be punished if they consist of knowing lies, though generally not if they are honest mistakes (even unreasonable mistakes). There are, however, some situations where even honest mistakes can be punished. \u003Cem\u003EUnited States v. Alvarez\u003C\/em\u003E (2012); \u003Cem\u003EGertz v. Robert Welch, Inc\u003C\/em\u003E.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\t\u003Cp\u003Ec. \u003Cem\u003EObscenity\u003C\/em\u003E: Hard-core pornography is punishable if: (i) the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to a shameful or morbid interest in sex or excretion; (ii) the work depicts or describes, in a way that is patently offensive under contemporary community standards, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (iii) the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. \u003Cem\u003EMiller v. California\u003C\/em\u003E (1973).\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\t\u003Cp\u003Ed. \u003Cem\u003EChild pornography\u003C\/em\u003E: Sexually themed live performances, photographs, and movies that were made using actual children may be punished even if they do not fit within the obscenity test. This does not cover digitized pictures, drawings, or text materials, which are constitutionally protected unless they are obscene. The Court has reasoned that child pornography is unprotected because it hurts the children involved in its making, so the exception only covers cases where actual children were indeed involved. \u003Cem\u003EAshcroft v. Free Speech Coalition\u003C\/em\u003E (2002).\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\t\u003Cp\u003Ee. \u003Cem\u003EThreats\u003C\/em\u003E: Speech that is reasonably perceived as a threat of violence (and not just rhetorical hyperbole) can be punished. \u003Cem\u003EVirginia v. Black\u003C\/em\u003E (2003).\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\t\u003Cp\u003Ef. \u003Cem\u003EFighting words\u003C\/em\u003E: Face-to-face insults that are addressed to a particular person and are likely to cause an imminent fight can be punished. More generalized offensive speech that is not addressed to a particular person cannot be punished even if it is profane or deeply insulting. \u003Cem\u003ECohen v. California\u003C\/em\u003E.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\t\u003Cp\u003Eg. \u003Cem\u003ESpeech owned by others\u003C\/em\u003E: Intellectual property laws, such as copy-right law, may restrict people from using particular expression that is owned by someone else; but the law may not let any-one monopolize facts or ideas. \u003Cem\u003EHarper \u0026amp; Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises\u003C\/em\u003E (1985).\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\t\u003Cp\u003Eh. \u003Cem\u003ECommercial advertising\u003C\/em\u003E: Commercial advertising is constitutionally protected, but less so than other speech (political, scientific, artistic, and the like). Misleading commercial advertising may be barred, whereas misleading political speech can-not be. Commercial advertising may also be required to include disclaimers to keep it from being misleading; such disclaimers can\u2019t be required for political speech. Recent cases hold that commercial advertising may not be restricted for paternalistic reasons, because of a fear that people will learn accurate information but will do bad things based on that information\u2014for example, buy more alcohol, smoke more, or prescribe more expensive pharmaceuticals than the government thinks wise. This rule applies only to speech that proposes a commercial transaction between the speaker and the listener; it does not apply to speech that is merely sold in commerce, such as books, videos, and databases. \u003Cem\u003ESorrell v. IMS Health Inc.\u003C\/em\u003E (2011).\u003C\/p\u003E\n\t\u003C\/li\u003E\n\t\u003Cli\u003EAll of the preceding rules apply to restrictions that relate to what the speech communicates\u2014to the tendency of the speech to persuade people, offend them, or make them feel unsafe. Content-neutral restrictions that relate to the noncommunicative impact of speech\u2014for instance, noise, obstruction of traffic, and so on\u2014are easier to justify. The test for content-neutral restrictions is complicated, but the key point is that the government may generally impose content-neutral \u201ctime, place, and manner restrictions\u201d so long as those restrictions leave open ample alternative channels for communication. All such restrictions, however, must be neutral as to content: if they treat speech differently based on con-tent, they are generally unconstitutional even if they focus only on the time, place, and manner of the speech. \u003Cem\u003EWard v. Rock Against Racism\u003C\/em\u003E (1989).\u003C\/li\u003E\n\t\u003Cli\u003EFinally, the preceding rules apply to restrictions that are imposed by the government acting as sovereign and backed by the threat of jail terms, fines, or civil liability. They also apply to the government con-trolling what is said in \u201ctraditional public fora,\u201d such as parks, streets, sidewalks, or the post office. But when the government is acting as, for instance, (a) employer, (b) K\u201312 educator, (c) proprietor of government property other than traditional public fora, (d) subsidizer, (e) speaker, or (f) regulator of the airwaves, it has broader (though not unlimited) authority. The rules for that, unfortunately, are too elaborate to set forth here.\u0026nbsp;\u003Cem\u003EConnick v. Myers\u003C\/em\u003E\u0026nbsp;(1969);\u0026nbsp;\u003Cem\u003ETinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District\u003C\/em\u003E\u0026nbsp;(1969);\u0026nbsp;\u003Cem\u003EISKCON v. Lee\u003C\/em\u003E\u0026nbsp;(1992);\u0026nbsp;\u003Cem\u003ERosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia\u0026nbsp;\u003C\/em\u003E(1995);\u0026nbsp;\u003Cem\u003EFCC v. League of Women Voters of California\u003C\/em\u003E\u0026nbsp;(1984).\u003C\/li\u003E\n\u003C\/ol\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EFree speech\/free press law is sometimes called the tax code of constitutional law. The discussion above suggests how complex the law is, but while some of the complexity may be needless, much of it is inevitable. Communication is in many ways the most complicated of human activities, and no simple rule can properly deal with all the different kinds of harms that it can cause--or all the different kinds of harms that restricting communication can cause.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n  \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author\u0022\u003E\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--media\u0022\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--photo\u0022 style=\u0022background-image: url(\/sites\/default\/files\/Eugene_Volokh.jpg)\u0022\u003E\u003C\/div\u003E\n            \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--info\u0022\u003E\n              \u003Ch4 class=\u0022con-essay-author--name\u0022\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022http:\/\/www.law.ucla.edu\/faculty\/all-faculty-profiles\/professors\/Pages\/eugene-volokh.aspx\u0022\u003EEugene Volokh\u003C\/a\u003E\n                  \u003C\/h4\u003E\n                  \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--job\u0022\u003E\n         Gary T. Schwartz Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles School of Law\n      \u003C\/div\u003E\n            \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-tabs\u0022\u003E\n      \u003Cul data-tabs class=\u0022tabs\u0022\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000139-taba\u0022\u003EFurther Reading\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000139-tabb\u0022\u003ECase Law\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000139-tabc\u0022\u003ERelated Essays\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n      \u003C\/ul\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv data-tabs-content\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000139-taba\u0022\u003E\n          \n      \u003Cdiv\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EMichael Kent Curtis, Free Speech, \u0022The People\u0027s Darling Privilege\u0022 (2000)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ELeonard Levy, Emergence of a Free Press (1995)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EDavid Rabban, Free Speech in Its Forgotten Years, 1870\u20131920 (1997)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ERodney A. Smolla, Smolla and Nimmer on Freedom of Speech (1996)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EEugene Volokh, \u003Ci\u003EFreedom for the Press as an Industry, or\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003Efor the Press as a Technology? From the Framing to Today\u003C\/i\u003E, 160 U. Pa. L. Rev. 459 (2012)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EEugene Volokh, \u003Ci\u003ETort Liability and the Original Meaning\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003Eof the Freedom of Speech, Press, and Petition\u003C\/i\u003E, 96 Iowa\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003EL. Rev. 249 (2010)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EEugene Volokh, \u003Ci\u003ESymbolic Expression and the Original\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003EMeaning of the First Amendment\u003C\/i\u003E, 97 Geo. L.J. 1057\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003E(2009)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EThomas G. West, \u003Ci\u003EFreedom of Speech in the American\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003EFounding and in Modern Liberalism\u003C\/i\u003E, 21 Soc. Phil.\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003E\u0026amp; Pol\u2019y 310 (2004)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n          \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n        \u003C\/div\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000139-tabb\u0022\u003E\n          \n      \u003Cdiv\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EStromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EWinters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ENew York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EBrandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003ETinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ECohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EMiller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EGertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EBuckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EConnick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EFCC v. League of Women Voters of California, 468 U.S. 364 (1984)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EHarper \u0026amp; Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EWard v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EISKCON v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EMcIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm\u2019n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003ERosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003E44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EReno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997)\u003Cbr\u003E\n\u0026nbsp;\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EAshcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EVirginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EJohanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass\u2019n, 544 U.S. 550 (2005)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003ECitizens United v. Federal Elections Comm\u2019n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ESorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EUnited States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n          \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n        \u003C\/div\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000139-tabc\u0022\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000026\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003ESpeech and Debate Clause\u003C\/a\u003E\n                  \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n\u003C\/article\u003E\n"]}]