[{"command":"add_css","data":[{"rel":"stylesheet","media":"all","href":"\/sites\/default\/files\/css\/css_veuEhhb1658wti0_ZAig66JOyixENU-N9zhjLQSLfOQ.css?delta=0\u0026language=en\u0026theme=heritage_theme\u0026include=eJwrTi1LzdNPzkksLq7Uy8tPSQUAPMsGtA"}]},{"command":"invoke","selector":null,"method":"openEssay","args":["10000124","\n\n\u003Carticle about=\u0022\/constitution\/articles\/4\/essays\/125\/admissions-clause\u0022 class=\u0022node node--type-constitution-essay node--promoted node--view-mode-embedded clearfix\u0022\u003E\n  \u003Ch1 class=\u0022title\u0022\u003E\u003Cspan\u003EAdmissions Clause\u003C\/span\u003E\n\u003C\/h1\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-location\u0022\u003E\n      Article IV, Section 3, Clause 1\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-context\u0022\u003E\n      \n            \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ENew States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; but no new States shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by the Junction of two or more States, or Parts of States, without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n  \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-body\u0022\u003E\n    \n            \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EAt the Constitutional Convention, the Committee\u0026nbsp;of Detail proposed that \u201cnew States shall\u0026nbsp;be admitted on the same terms with the original\u0026nbsp;States.\u201d That proposal would have taken\u0026nbsp;the policy behind the Northwest Ordinance of\u0026nbsp;1787 and made it a constitutional imperative.\u0026nbsp;But Gouverneur Morris wanted the equality of\u0026nbsp;admitted states to be struck because he feared\u0026nbsp;the political power of the Western states would\u0026nbsp;\u201coverwhelm\u201d the East. Over the objections of\u0026nbsp;James Madison, his motion to strike out the\u0026nbsp;requirement of equality won by a vote of seven\u0026nbsp;to two. He then moved to make sure that no state\u0026nbsp;could be formed out of a previous state without\u0026nbsp;the consent of the previous state as well as the\u0026nbsp;\u201cgeneral legislature\u201d (i.e., Congress). In this case\u0026nbsp;as well, he wanted the Eastern states that still had\u0026nbsp;claims to Western lands (viz., Virginia and North\u0026nbsp;Carolina) to have a veto over whether their western\u0026nbsp;counties (which eventually became Kentucky\u0026nbsp;and Tennessee) could become states. This motion\u0026nbsp;passed by a vote of six to five. Like the question\u0026nbsp;of the establishment of lower federal courts, the\u0026nbsp;Convention effectively passed the issue of the\u0026nbsp;status of newly admitted states over to the political\u0026nbsp;process.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EOnce the new Constitution went into effect,\u0026nbsp;however, Congress admitted Vermont and Kentucky\u0026nbsp;on equal terms with the original thirteen\u0026nbsp;states and thereafter formalized the condition in\u0026nbsp;its acts of admission for subsequent states, declaring\u0026nbsp;that the new state enters \u201con an equal footing\u0026nbsp;with the original States in all respects whatever.\u201d\u0026nbsp;Thus Congress, exercising the discretion allowed\u0026nbsp;it by the Framers, adopted a policy of equal status\u0026nbsp;for newly admitted states.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EA number of observers, however, including\u0026nbsp;Gouverneur Morris, had contended that\u0026nbsp;Congress could admit states only from territory\u0026nbsp;that the United States possessed at the time of\u0026nbsp;the Constitution\u2019s formation. That position was\u0026nbsp;echoed by New England Federalists upset with\u0026nbsp;Thomas Jefferson over the purchase of Louisiana.\u0026nbsp;There is no indication of any such limitation, however, in the text or in the view of most\u0026nbsp;of the Framers. Further, time and the admission\u0026nbsp;of new states have made that argument irrelevant.\u0026nbsp;Exercising its discretion, Congress admitted new\u0026nbsp;states from newly acquired territory and opted to\u0026nbsp;give equal status to each.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe Supreme Court adopted the view of\u0026nbsp;Congress regarding the \u201cequal footing\u201d of new\u0026nbsp;states and made it a constitutional requirement.\u0026nbsp;In doing so, the Court chose to impose the very\u0026nbsp;constitutional rule that the Framers had rejected.\u0026nbsp;\u003Cem\u003EPollard\u2019s Lessee v. Hagan\u003C\/em\u003E (1845) (\u201cThere can\u0026nbsp;be no distinction between those states which\u0026nbsp;acquired their independence by force of arms\u0026nbsp;and those which acquired it by the peaceful consent\u0026nbsp;of older states. The Constitution says, the\u0026nbsp;latter must be admitted into the union on an\u0026nbsp;equal footing with the rest.\u201d). By its terms, the\u0026nbsp;Admissions Clause sets the exclusive method\u0026nbsp;by which territories may become states. Thus,\u0026nbsp;Puerto Rico has no right to elect members to the\u0026nbsp;House of Representatives (nor may Congress by\u0026nbsp;statute create such a right), for it is not legally a\u0026nbsp;\u201cstate,\u201d no matter what \u201cfunctional equivalents\u201d\u0026nbsp;to a state Puerto Rico may possess. \u003Cem\u003EIgart\u00faa v.\u0026nbsp;United States\u003C\/em\u003E (2010). Congress may, however,\u0026nbsp;create new Indian enclaves within a state without\u0026nbsp;needing the consent of the host state because\u0026nbsp;such enclaves are not on \u201cequal footing\u201d with\u0026nbsp;the state from which they were formed. \u003Cem\u003ECarcieri\u0026nbsp;v. Kempthorne \u003C\/em\u003E(2007).\u0026nbsp;\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe \u201cequal footing\u201d doctrine remains constant\u0026nbsp;to this day but has engendered problems\u0026nbsp;in construing the legal effect of conditions that\u0026nbsp;Congress has placed on the admission of a num\u0026nbsp;number\u0026nbsp;of states.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EAccording to traditional historical practice,\u0026nbsp;Congress passes an enabling act prescribing the\u0026nbsp;process by which the people of a United States\u0026nbsp;territory may draft and adopt a state constitution.\u0026nbsp;Many enabling acts contain restrictions,\u0026nbsp;such as the prohibition of bigamy in the Utah,\u0026nbsp;Arizona, New Mexico, and Oklahoma acts. The\u0026nbsp;applicant state then submits its proposed constitution\u0026nbsp;to Congress, which either accepts it or\u0026nbsp;requires changes. For example, in 1866, Congress\u0026nbsp;refused the proposed Nebraska constitution\u0026nbsp;because it limited suffrage to white males. Upon\u0026nbsp;approval of the new state constitution, Congress\u0026nbsp;may direct the president to issue a proclamation\u0026nbsp;certifying the entry of the new state into\u0026nbsp;the United States. A number of states, however,\u0026nbsp;drafted constitutions for submission to Congress\u0026nbsp;absent enabling acts and were subsequently\u0026nbsp;admitted.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003ETexas is a special case: it was an independent\u0026nbsp;republic and, under the Resolution of\u0026nbsp;Annexation, has the option of creating up to four\u0026nbsp;additional states out of its territory. Some commentators\u0026nbsp;have wondered whether, under the\u0026nbsp;Admissions Clause, Texas can constitutionally\u0026nbsp;exercise that option unilaterally, or whether those\u0026nbsp;would-be additional states would have to petition\u0026nbsp;Congress independently as well.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EAlthough Congress\u2019s enabling act becomes\u0026nbsp;a \u201cfundamental law\u201d of the state, its provisions\u0026nbsp;must give way to the \u201cequal footing\u201d rights of\u0026nbsp;other states once the new state becomes a member\u0026nbsp;of the Union. In \u003Cem\u003EPollard\u2019s Lessee\u003C\/em\u003E, the Supreme\u0026nbsp;Court held that an enabling act could not divest\u0026nbsp;Alabama of its sovereign ownership rights to\u0026nbsp;land under internal navigable waters, and in\u0026nbsp;\u003Cem\u003ECoyle v. Smith\u003C\/em\u003E (1911), the Court invalidated a\u0026nbsp;provision in Oklahoma\u2019s enabling act that constrained\u0026nbsp;where the state could place its capital.\u0026nbsp;The rule the Court has fashioned is that Congress\u0026nbsp;can regulate the state through the enabling\u0026nbsp;act only insofar as Congress could do so under\u0026nbsp;one of its enumerated powers. Thus, under its\u0026nbsp;power to regulate territories, Congress could, in\u0026nbsp;its enabling act, require Utah to deny the franchise to women in the election of delegates to\u0026nbsp;the state\u2019s constitutional convention (at a time\u0026nbsp;when the U.S. Constitution did not guarantee\u0026nbsp;women\u2019s suffrage), but that restriction could not\u0026nbsp;bind Utah once it had become a state. \u003Cem\u003EAnderson\u0026nbsp;v. Tyree\u003C\/em\u003E (1895). More typically, enforceable provisions\u0026nbsp;in enabling acts have included exemption\u0026nbsp;of federal property from state taxation, the\u0026nbsp;method of regulating public lands, and the rules\u0026nbsp;of commerce among the Indians.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EFinally, despite the ambiguous second semicolon\u0026nbsp;in the clause, new states may be formed\u0026nbsp;out of an existing state provided all parties consent:\u0026nbsp;the new state, the existing state, and Congress.\u0026nbsp;In that way, Kentucky, Tennessee, Maine,\u0026nbsp;West Virginia, and arguably Vermont came into\u0026nbsp;the Union. It is doubtful, however, whether a\u0026nbsp;state could reassign territory (in a swap with\u0026nbsp;another state for example), or whether Congress\u0026nbsp;could \u201cde-annex\u201d to another sovereign\u0026nbsp;any territory that was part of a state without the\u0026nbsp;consent of the affected state.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003E\u0026nbsp;\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n  \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author\u0022\u003E\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--media\u0022\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--photo\u0022 style=\u0022background-image: url(\/sites\/default\/files\/David_Forte.jpg)\u0022\u003E\u003C\/div\u003E\n            \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--info\u0022\u003E\n              \u003Ch4 class=\u0022con-essay-author--name\u0022\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022http:\/\/facultyprofile.csuohio.edu\/csufacultyprofile\/detail.cfm?FacultyID=D_FORTE\u0022\u003EDavid F. Forte\u003C\/a\u003E\n                  \u003C\/h4\u003E\n                  \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--job\u0022\u003E\n         Professor, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law\n      \u003C\/div\u003E\n            \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-tabs\u0022\u003E\n      \u003Cul data-tabs class=\u0022tabs\u0022\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000124-taba\u0022\u003EFurther Reading\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000124-tabb\u0022\u003ECase Law\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000124-tabc\u0022\u003ERelated Essays\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n      \u003C\/ul\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv data-tabs-content\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000124-taba\u0022\u003E\n          \n      \u003Cdiv\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ERalph H. Brock,\u0026nbsp;\u003Cem\u003EThe Ultimate Gerrymander: Dividing Texas Into Four New States\u003C\/em\u003E, 6 Cardozo Pub. L. Pol\u0027y \u0026amp; Ethics J. 651 (2008)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EFrank DiCastri, \u003Ci\u003EAre All States Really Equal? The \u0022Equal Footing\u0022 Doctrine and Indian Claims to Submerged Lands\u003C\/i\u003E, 1997 Wis. L. Rev. 179 (1997)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EAllan Erbsen,\u0026nbsp;\u003Cem\u003EConstitutional Spaces\u003C\/em\u003E, 95 Minn. L. rev. 1168 (2011)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EVasan Kesavan \u0026amp; Michael Stokes Paulsen, \u003Ci\u003EIs West Virginia Unconstitutional?\u003C\/i\u003E, 90 Cal. L. Rev. 291 (2002)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EVasan Kesavan \u0026amp; Michael Stokes Paulsen,\u0026nbsp;\u003Cem\u003ELet\u0027s Mess with Texas,\u003C\/em\u003E\u0026nbsp;82 Tex. L. Rev. 1587 (2004)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ECarolyn Landever, \u003Ci\u003EWhose Home on the Range? Equal Footing, the New Federalism and State Jurisdiction on Federal Lands\u003C\/i\u003E, 47 Fla. L. Rev. 557 (1995)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EGary Lawson \u0026amp; Guy Seidman, The Constitution of Empire: Territorial Expansion and the American Legal History (2004)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EStephen E. Sachs,\u0026nbsp;\u003Cem\u003EConstitutional Backdrops\u003C\/em\u003E, 80 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1813 (2012)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n          \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n        \u003C\/div\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000124-tabb\u0022\u003E\n          \n      \u003Cdiv\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EPollard\u0027s Lessee of Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EAnderson v. Tyree, 12 Utah 129, 42 P. 201 (1895)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EStearns v. Minnesota, 179 U.S. 223 (1900)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ECoyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559 (1911)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EUnited States v. Sandoval, 231\u0026nbsp;U.S. 28\u0026nbsp;(1913)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ECarcieri\u0026nbsp;v. Kempthorne, 497 F. 3d 15 (1st Cir. 2007)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EIgart\u00faa v. United States, 626 F.3d 592 (1st Cir. 2010)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n          \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n        \u003C\/div\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000124-tabc\u0022\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/17878925\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003ETerritories Clause \u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000125\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EProperty Clause\u003C\/a\u003E\n                  \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n\u003C\/article\u003E\n"]}]