[{"command":"add_css","data":[{"rel":"stylesheet","media":"all","href":"\/sites\/default\/files\/css\/css_veuEhhb1658wti0_ZAig66JOyixENU-N9zhjLQSLfOQ.css?delta=0\u0026language=en\u0026theme=heritage_theme\u0026include=eJwrTi1LzdNPzkksLq7Uy8tPSQUAPMsGtA"}]},{"command":"invoke","selector":null,"method":"openEssay","args":["10000107","\n\n\u003Carticle about=\u0022\/constitution\/articles\/3\/essays\/108\/treaties\u0022 class=\u0022node node--type-constitution-essay node--promoted node--view-mode-embedded clearfix\u0022\u003E\n  \u003Ch1 class=\u0022title\u0022\u003E\u003Cspan\u003ETreaties\u003C\/span\u003E\n\u003C\/h1\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-location\u0022\u003E\n      Article III, Section 2, Clause 1\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-context\u0022\u003E\n      \n            \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EThe judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority....\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n  \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-body\u0022\u003E\n    \n            \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EThroughout the Constitutional Convention, the Framers consistently expressed the desire that a national judiciary have jurisdiction over legal issues arising from the nation\u2019s international rights and obligations. Nevertheless, while such a proposition was part of both the Virginia and New Jersey Plans, the delegates were unable to reach a consensus, putting forward numerous alternative formulations. They wanted, in Edmund Randolph\u2019s words, to protect \u201cthe security of foreigners\u201d and \u201cthe harmony of states and the citizens thereof.\u201d\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EIt was not until August 27, 1787, when the delegates were refining the Committee of Detail\u2019s jurisdictional language, that John Rutledge of South Carolina moved to include the words \u201cand treaties made or which shall be made under their authority\u201d after the \u201cUnited States\u201d in the first clause of what would become Article III, Section 2. That language guaranteed the federal judiciary jurisdiction over all treaties entered into by the United States from the moment of its independence. The proposal was unanimously approved. During ratification, Alexander Hamilton explained the provision in \u003Cem\u003EThe Federalist\u003C\/em\u003E No. 80, reasoning that because \u201cthe peace of the whole ought not to be left at the disposal of a part .\u2009.\u2009. the federal judiciary ought to have cognizance of all causes in which the citizens of other countries are concerned,\u201d which \u201chave an evident connection with the preservation of the national peace.\u201d\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe Judiciary Act of 1789 granted limited jurisdiction, and limited rights of appeal, to the newly created federal court system. Under Section 25, the Supreme Court was allowed to hear appeals from the states\u2019 highest courts when such decisions touched on the \u201cvalidity of a .\u2009.\u2009. treaty .\u2009.\u2009. or against any title, right, privilege, or exemption set up or claimed under any .\u2009.\u2009. treaty.\u201d Outside of the appeals permitted by the Judiciary Act, the Court would not go. It refused to offer advisory opinions on the construction of treaties, as President George Washington had asked it to do in 1793, or to review veterans\u2019 pension claims at congressional request. In the latter instance, the Court claimed that such review would exceed the judicial function and was contrary to the separation of powers.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EChief Justice John Marshall provided the earliest construction of the Article III Treaties Clause in \u003Cem\u003EOwings v. Norwood\u2019s Lessee \u003C\/em\u003E(1809), a case concerning the property claims of British subjects whose lands had been confiscated during the Revolution. The Treaty of Paris of 1783 had explicitly preserved the \u201cjust rights\u201d of such persons to reclaim lands in certain instances. Marshall, explaining the origin of the Treaties Clause, and enforcing the application of the Treaty\u2019s provisions, explained:\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cblockquote\u003EThe reason for inserting that clause in the constitution was, that all persons who have real claims under a treaty should have their causes decided by the national tribunals. It was to avoid the apprehension as well as the danger of state prejudices.\u2009.\u2009.\u2009. Each treaty stipulates something respecting the citizens of the two nations, and gives them rights. Whenever a right grows out of, or is protected by, a treaty, it is sanctioned against all the laws and judicial decisions of the States; and whoever may have this right, it is to be protected. But if the person\u2019s title is not affected by the treaty, if he claims nothing under a treaty, his title cannot be protected by the treaty.\u003C\/blockquote\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe mere existence of a treaty, and its application to any one party in a dispute, however, does not assure federal jurisdiction. \u003Cem\u003EMayor, Alderman and Inhabitants of the City of New Orleans v. De Armas\u003C\/em\u003E (1835). While jurisdiction may extend \u201cwithout regard to the character of the parties\u201d involved in any dispute, \u003Cem\u003ECohens v. Virginia\u003C\/em\u003E (1821), the legal rights asserted by the parties must in fact flow from an enforceable treaty.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EFederal jurisdiction also requires that the legal right claimed under any treaty actually be contested. For example, in \u003Cem\u003EMartin v. Hunter\u2019s Lessee\u003C\/em\u003E (1816), Justice Joseph Story noted that a claimant must have relied on a treaty provision to his detriment, with such error evident from the record. At the same time, Story declared that the record need not refer to the disputed interpretation of a treaty in specific terms, for treaties are part of \u201cthe supreme law of the land of which all courts must take notice.\u201d\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EAs far as the relationship between treaties and the \u201claws of Congress\u201d is concerned, the Court has made a clear distinction between those cases involving claims that \u201cgrow directly out of [a] treaty\u201d and are \u201cthus clearly dependent upon it,\u201d and those cases where Congress has acted upon a treaty and created legislation to effect its obligations thereunder. In the latter case, the claim must be founded on the act of Congress. \u003Cem\u003EUnited States v. Weld\u003C\/em\u003E (1888).\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EHistorically, the construction of treaties, especially when they are applied as domestic law, has been understood as the \u201cpeculiar province of the judiciary,\u201d except in \u201ccases purely political.\u201d \u003Cem\u003EJones v. Meehan\u003C\/em\u003E (1899). But under the political-question doctrine, the courts will not determine whether a treaty obligation with another nation has been broken. \u003Cem\u003EClark v. Allen\u003C\/em\u003E (1947). And while treaties can have the force of domestic law, the Constitution remains the supreme law of the land; neither a statute nor a treaty can override the Constitution where specific constitutional guarantees are in issue. \u003Cem\u003EReid v. Covert \u003C\/em\u003E(1957).\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EOver the years, the Court has crafted a number of prudential rules in its interpretation of treaties. Assuming that a treaty\u2019s text is self-executing (i.e., enforceable as domestic law without need for implementing legislation), all interpretations begin with the explicit meaning of its text. \u003Cem\u003EMedellin v. Texas\u003C\/em\u003E (2008). Unambiguous textual provisions are controlling unless their plain meaning would be clearly \u201cinconsistent with the intent or expectations\u201d of the treaty\u2019s signatories. \u003Cem\u003EMaximov v. United States\u003C\/em\u003E (1963). The question of signatory \u201cintent\u201d is especially controversial. The courts will rely on clarifications, interpretations, and understandings of a treaty formulated by the executive branch. But the courts will not infer an obligation from a treaty that has not been articulated in clear terms. \u003Cem\u003ESociety for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts v. New Haven\u003C\/em\u003E (1823).\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EWhere ambiguities do exist, courts can turn to any number of other sources: (1) ratification history, \u003Cem\u003EAir France v. Saks\u003C\/em\u003E (1985); (2) the understanding entertained by the political branches, \u003Cem\u003ECharlton v. Kelly\u003C\/em\u003E (1913); (3) the interpretations held by administrative agencies typically charged with a treaty\u2019s enforcement, \u003Cem\u003EKolovrat v. Oregon\u003C\/em\u003E (1961); or (4) the opinions of \u201csister signatories,\u201d or those nations with which the United States has entered into the treaty, \u003Cem\u003EAbbott v. Abbott\u003C\/em\u003E (2010).\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003ETraditionally, the courts were less likely to accord the legislative branches a say in the interpretation of a treaty. \u003Cem\u003EJones v. Meehan\u003C\/em\u003E. The text would govern, \u003Cem\u003EMaximov v. United States\u003C\/em\u003E, unless an ambiguity caused recourse to ratification history for clarification. \u003Cem\u003ESee Air France v. Saks\u003C\/em\u003E. In \u003Cem\u003ESumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano\u003C\/em\u003E (1982), the Court went so far as to suggest that the parties\u2019 intent would control even over the text. Justice Antonin Scalia vigorously objected to this proposition in \u003Cem\u003EUnited States v. Stuart\u003C\/em\u003E (1989), where the majority had limited its investigation of treaty intent to Senate floor debates. Scalia condemned the \u201cunprecedented\u201d use of such materials: \u201cThe question before us in a treaty case is what the two or more sovereigns agreed to, rather than what a single one of them, or the legislature of a single one of them, thought it agreed to.\u201d\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EAs a rule, courts will only recognize the legal validity of a treaty, and legal claims arising there-from, if it has been \u201cexecuted\u201d into federal law. This can be accomplished in two ways. In the first instance, a treaty may convey an intention that it be \u201cself-executing,\u201d and acknowledged as such during congressional ratification. \u003Cem\u003EFoster v. Neilson \u003C\/em\u003E(1829). In the second, the treaty may require \u201clegislation to carry [it] into effect.\u201d \u003Cem\u003EWhitney v. Robertson\u003C\/em\u003E (1888). The courts will not enforce \u201cnon\u2013self-executing treaties\u201d until they are carried into law by an act of Congress. (See Article VI, Clause 2). Whether a given treaty is self-executing or requires special implementing legislation to give force and effect to its provisions is generally understood as a question for the courts. \u003Cem\u003EDiggs v. Richardson\u003C\/em\u003E (1976).\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EFederal statutes and properly executed treaties have equal status in law, the later in time taking precedence. Therefore, if Congress passes a statute that contradicts earlier treaty obligations of the United States, the courts will enforce the statute over the treaty. In order to avoid such a conflict, however, the courts will construe a law not to be in conflict with extant treaty obligations if such a construction is at all reasonable.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe jurisdictional statute regulating treaty review is currently 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1257. It allows appeal by writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court if the validity of a treaty or of a state statute under a treaty is questioned or if \u201cany title, right, privilege, or immunity is specially set up or claimed\u201d under a treaty. Furthermore, under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1331, \u201cdistrict courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under .\u2009.\u2009. treaties of the United States.\u201d District courts may also take jurisdiction over cases brought in state court involving treaties under the complicated rules of pendent jurisdiction.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n  \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author\u0022\u003E\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--media\u0022\u003E\n            \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--info\u0022\u003E\n              \u003Ch4 class=\u0022con-essay-author--name\u0022\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022http:\/\/law.okcu.edu\/index.php\/faculty-staff\/faculty\/full-time-faculty\/arrow-dennis-w\/\u0022\u003EDennis W. Arrow\u003C\/a\u003E\n                  \u003C\/h4\u003E\n                  \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--job\u0022\u003E\n         Professor of Law, Oklahoma City University School of Law\n      \u003C\/div\u003E\n            \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-tabs\u0022\u003E\n      \u003Cul data-tabs class=\u0022tabs\u0022\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000107-taba\u0022\u003EFurther Reading\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000107-tabb\u0022\u003ECase Law\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000107-tabc\u0022\u003ERelated Essays\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n      \u003C\/ul\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv data-tabs-content\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000107-taba\u0022\u003E\n          \n      \u003Cdiv\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EDennis W. Arrow, Federal Question Doctrines and American Indian Law, 14 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 263 (1989)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EMartin S. Flaherty, \u003Ci\u003EHistory Right? Historical Scholarship, Original Understanding, and Treaties as \u0022Supreme Law of the Land,\u0022\u003C\/i\u003E 99 Colum. L. Rev. 2095 (1999)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EJulian G. Ku, Treaties as Laws: A Defense of the Last-in-Time Rule for Treaties and Federal Statutes, 80 IND. L.J. 319 (2005)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EJohn Norton Moore, \u003Ci\u003ETreaty Interpretation, the Constitution and the Rule of Law\u003C\/i\u003E, 42 Va. J. Int\u0027l. L. 163 (2001)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EPeter J. Spiro, Treaties, International Law, and Constitutional Rights, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1999 (2003)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EMichael P. Van Alstine, \u003Ci\u003EThe Judicial Power and Treaty Delegation\u003C\/i\u003E, 90 Cal. L. Rev. 1305 (2002)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EJohn C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the Original Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1955 (1999)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EJohn C. Yoo, Treaty Interpretation and the False Sirens of Delegation, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1305 (2002)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EErnest A. Young, Treaties as \u201cPart of Our Law,\u201d 88 TEX. L. REV. 91 (2009)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n          \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n        \u003C\/div\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000107-tabb\u0022\u003E\n          \n      \u003Cdiv\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EOwings v. Norwood\u0027s Lessee, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 344 (1809)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ESmith v. Maryland, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 286 (1810)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EMartin v. Hunter\u0027s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ECohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ESociety for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts v. New Haven, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 464 (1823)\u003Cbr\u003E\n\u0026nbsp;\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EFoster v. Neilson, 27 (2 Pet.) 253 (1829)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EUnited States v. Arredondo, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 691 (1832)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EMayor, Alderman and Inhabitants of the City of New Orleans v. De Armas, 34 U.S. 224 (1835)\u003Cbr\u003E\n\u0026nbsp;\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022text-align:justify\u0022\u003EGill v. Oliver\u2019s Executors, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 529 (1850)\u003Cbr\u003E\n\u0026nbsp;\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EUnited States v. Weld, 127 U.S. 51 (1888)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EWhitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EDe Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258 (1890)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ENew York Indians v. United States, 170 U.S. 1 (1898)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EJones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1 (1899)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EDevine v. City of Los Angeles, 202 U.S. 313 (1906)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EMuskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ECharlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447 (1913)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EGully v. First National Bank in Meridian, 299 U.S. 109 (1936)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EBacardi Corp. of America v. Domenech, 311 U.S. 150 (1940)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EClark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EReid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EKolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187 (1961)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EMaximov v. United States, 373 U.S. 49 (1963)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EOneida Indian Nation of New York State v. Cnty. of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661 (1974)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EPhillips Petroleum Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 415 U.S. 125 (1974)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EDiggs v. Richardson, 555 F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir. 1976)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EBritish Caledonian Airways Ltd. v. Bond, 665 F.2d 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1981)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ESumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176 (1982)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EAir France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392 (1985)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EUnited States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353 (1989)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EMedellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EAbbott v. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. 1983 (2010)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n          \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n        \u003C\/div\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000107-tabc\u0022\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000068\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EState Treaties\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000089\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003ETreaty Clause\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000132\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003ESupremacy Clause\u003C\/a\u003E\n                  \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n\u003C\/article\u003E\n"]}]