[{"command":"add_css","data":[{"rel":"stylesheet","media":"all","href":"\/sites\/default\/files\/css\/css_veuEhhb1658wti0_ZAig66JOyixENU-N9zhjLQSLfOQ.css?delta=0\u0026language=en\u0026theme=heritage_theme\u0026include=eJwrTi1LzdNPzkksLq7Uy8tPSQUAPMsGtA"}]},{"command":"invoke","selector":null,"method":"openEssay","args":["10000106","\n\n\u003Carticle about=\u0022\/constitution\/articles\/3\/essays\/107\/judicial-power\u0022 class=\u0022node node--type-constitution-essay node--promoted node--view-mode-embedded clearfix\u0022\u003E\n  \u003Ch1 class=\u0022title\u0022\u003E\u003Cspan\u003EJudicial Power\u003C\/span\u003E\n\u003C\/h1\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-location\u0022\u003E\n      Article III, Section 2, Clause 1\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-context\u0022\u003E\n      \n            \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EThe judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States....\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n  \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-body\u0022\u003E\n    \n            \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EArticle III, Section 2 delineates the scope of the federal judicial power by listing nine kinds of \u201ccases\u201d and \u201ccontroversies\u201d to which the \u201cjudicial power\u201d of the United States may extend. By far the most important is the category encompassing \u201call Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority.\u201d This is often referred to as the \u201cfederal question\u201d jurisdiction, and, although that is something of a misnomer, it is a convenient label.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EFrom the beginning, the Framers intended the scope of the jurisdiction to be broad. The federal question jurisdiction made its first appearance at the Constitutional Convention in the Virginia Plan, which would have authorized federal courts to hear \u201cquestions which may involve the national peace and harmony.\u201d By the time the Committee of Detail began its work, the convention had added to this language a grant of jurisdiction over \u201cCases arising under the Laws passed by the general Legislature.\u201d When the Committee of Detail reported to the convention, the reference to \u201cnational peace and harmony\u201d had disappeared, but the \u201carising under\u201d language remained.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThere was little discussion of this provision at the convention. In the course of a single day, the convention made three important changes. It replaced the reference to \u201claws passed by the Legislature\u201d with \u201claws of the United States.\u201d And, on separate motions, it extended the judicial power first to cases arising under the Constitution and then to cases arising under treaties, in addition to the cases arising under federal laws. When the Committee of Style reported to the convention in September, the provision read substantially as it does today: the federal judicial power extends \u201cto all cases, both in law and equity, arising under this constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority.\u201d\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe potential breadth of this language prompted criticism by opponents of the proposed Constitution during the debates over ratification in the key state of Virginia. George Mason, for example, could find no \u201climitation whatsoever, with respect to the nature or jurisdiction of [the federal] courts.\u201d James Madison, a supporter of ratification, did not dispute this assertion; rather, he asserted that \u201cthe judicial power [of the national government] should correspond with the legislative.\u201d\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EWhen does a case \u201carise under\u201d federal law, so that it falls within the judicial power of the United States? The authoritative answer to this question is found largely in two decisions by\u0026nbsp;Chief Justice John Marshall in the early years of the republic.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe better-known of the two decisions is \u003Cem\u003EOsborn v. Bank of the United States\u003C\/em\u003E (1824). Marshall\u2019s delineation of the constitutional scope of the jurisdictional grant proceeds in two steps. First, he declares that a \u201cquestion\u201d is \u201cfederal\u201d if \u201cthe title or right set up by the party, may be defeated by one construction of the Constitution or law of the United States, and sustained by the opposite construction, provided the facts necessary to support the action be made out.\u201d In other words, a federal question is a question whose answer depends in some way on federal law. Marshall then says that a case \u201carises under\u201d the Constitution or laws of the United States if a federal question \u201cforms an ingredient of the original cause\u201d\u2014that is, is an element of the plaintiff\u2019s claim.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe breadth of this definition is made clear by a companion case in which the Court upheld federal jurisdiction over a suit by the Bank of the United States to recover on negotiable notes issued by a state bank. \u003Cem\u003EBank of the United States v. Planters\u2019 Bank of Georgia\u003C\/em\u003E (1824). The liability of the defendant state bank would appear to have depended solely on state law. How, then, could Marshall have concluded that a federal question formed an element of the \u201coriginal cause\u201d? Marshall\u2019s answer is that there are some federal questions\u2014for example, the federal bank\u2019s capacity to sue\u2014that necessarily exist in every case brought by the bank, even though the particular proposition is not questioned. \u003Cem\u003EOsborn\u003C\/em\u003E thus establishes that, so long as a proposition of federal law is a logical antecedent of the plaintiff\u2019s claim, it is sufficient as a constitutional matter to support federal judicial power over the case.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThree years before \u003Cem\u003EOsborn\u003C\/em\u003E, in \u003Cem\u003ECohens v. Virginia\u003C\/em\u003E (1821), the Court considered a challenge to its own authority to exercise appellate jurisdiction over a case originating in state court. The defendants, convicted of a crime under state law, invoked what we would today call a defense of preemption: they \u201cclaimed the protection of an act of Congress.\u201d They also asserted that the Supreme Court could consider their appeal because it was a case \u201carising under\u201d federal law. The state of Virginia disagreed, taking the position that a case could \u201carise under\u201d the federal Constitution or federal law only if the Constittion or law was the basis for the claim of the party who had initiated the lawsuit.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe state\u2019s interpretation is a plausible reading of the language of Article III, but the Supreme Court rejected it as \u201ctoo narrow.\u201d The Court said that cases are defined by the rights of both parties, and a case \u201cmay truly be said to arise under the constitution or a law of the United States, whenever its correct decision depends on the construction of either.\u201d The \u003Cem\u003ECohens\u003C\/em\u003E definition thus supports the Supreme Court\u2019s jurisdiction to hear appeals from state courts when those courts have decided federal questions.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003ECapacious though they are, neither the \u003Cem\u003EOsborn\u003C\/em\u003E definition nor the one in \u003Cem\u003ECohens\u003C\/em\u003E would necessarily cover all of the cases in which Congress has authorized the \u003Cem\u003Eremoval\u003C\/em\u003E of actions from state to federal court. But in a series of nine-teenth-century decisions the Court made plain that Article III authorizes removal of any case in which a defense under federal law has been invoked, even though the federal issue may prove not to be dispositive.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe leading case is \u003Cem\u003ETennessee v. Davis\u003C\/em\u003E (1880). James Davis was a federal revenue officer whose duties included seizing illicit distilleries. In the course of one such effort \u201che was assaulted and fired upon by a number of armed men.\u201d He fired back, killing one of the men, and was prosecuted in state court for murder. Davis removed the case to federal court under an act of Congress that allowed removal of any suit brought against a federal revenue officer on account of any act done \u201cunder color of\u201d any revenue law. The state challenged the constitutionality of the removal statute, but the Supreme Court held that the statute was valid. The Court relied heavily on Marshall\u2019s opinion in \u003Cem\u003ECohens\u003C\/em\u003E. It emphasized that in order to preserve the supremacy of federal judicial power, it is essential that the national government be able to \u201ctake control\u201d \u201cwhenever and wherever a case arises under the Constitution and laws or treaties of the United States\u2009.\u2009.\u2009.\u2009whether it be civil or criminal, \u003Cem\u003Ein any stage of its progress\u003C\/em\u003E\u201d (emphasis added).\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe Supreme Court\u2019s decisions have thus established that Congress can authorize federal courts to hear cases in which a federal question\u0026nbsp;is (1) a logical antecedent of the plaintiff\u2019s claim (whether or not contested), or (2) the basis of a defense actually raised (even though it may not be dispositive), or (3) the basis of the decision actually made (typically by a state court). The area of uncertainty involves Congress\u2019s power to authorize jurisdiction over cases in which a federal question is an element neither of the original cause nor of the defense, but in which a litigant is a member of a class that Congress seeks to protect (e.g., federal employees sued in state court) or the area is one in which Congress has taken an interest under an Article I grant of power (e.g., consumer protection or nuclear accidents).\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EUntil recently, Supreme Court case law cast little doubt on the breadth of Congress\u2019s authority to vest federal question jurisdiction in federal courts. However, the decision in \u003Cem\u003EMesa v. California\u003C\/em\u003E (1989) makes clear that the power is not unlimited. In \u003Cem\u003EMesa\u003C\/em\u003E, the Court construed the statute that allows removal to federal court of suits brought against federal officers for acts done under color of their federal office (a modern-day version of the statute involved in \u003Cem\u003ETennessee v. Davis\u003C\/em\u003E). The Court held that the statute allows removal only if the officer alleges a federal defense to the state-law claim. The Court explained that if the statute were construed to grant federal jurisdiction simply because a federal officer is a defendant, it would \u201cunnecessarily present grave constitutional problems.\u201d The opinion thus implies that to support \u201carising under\u201d jurisdiction, a federal question must be present somewhere in the case. However, the Court did not rule out the possibility that, under some circumstances, Congress might be able to vest \u201carising under\u201d jurisdiction to protect federal interests even in the absence of a federal question.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EIt is important to emphasize that the broad construction of the \u201carising under\u201d language of Article III has no bearing on the scope of the statutory grant of federal question jurisdiction, even though the statute uses language identical to that of the Constitution. The Court has read the statutory jurisdiction not to extend as far as it could under the Constitution. Full discussion is beyond the scope of this essay; it is sufficient to note that neither a federal defense (as in \u003Cem\u003ECohens\u003C\/em\u003E) nor a \u201clogical antecedent\u201d provides a basis for district court jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1331. Rather, the federal question must be, at a minimum, a necessary element of a \u201cwell pleaded complaint\u201d\u2014the plaintiff\u2019s claim for relief.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EFinally, it should be made clear that federal jurisdiction extends to cases, not issues. When a federal court has jurisdiction over a case that arises under federal law, the jurisdiction extends to the whole case, and the court will often have power to consider other issues in the case whether state or federal.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe Court defined the boundaries of the constitutional \u201ccase\u201d in \u003Cem\u003EUnited Mine Workers v. Gibbs\u003C\/em\u003E (1966). Under \u003Cem\u003EGibbs\u003C\/em\u003E, if a federal court has jurisdiction over a case based on the plaintiff\u2019s federal claims, it can also hear non-federal claims as long as the federal and non-federal claims \u201cderive from a common nucleus of operative fact\u201d and are sufficiently related that the plaintiff \u201cwould ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding.\u201d Congress codified the substance of the Gibbs decision in 1990 when it recognized \u201csupplemental jurisdiction\u201d in section 1367 of the Judicial Code.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EUntil 2011, the removal chapter of the Judicial Code included a provision\u2014section 1441(c)\u2014that appeared to go beyond the limits of judicial power as defined in \u003Cem\u003EGibbs\u003C\/em\u003E. Congress cured this infirmity in the Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011, when it rewrote section 1441(c) to require the district court, upon removal, to sever and remand all claims not within its jurisdiction.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n  \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author\u0022\u003E\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--media\u0022\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--photo\u0022 style=\u0022background-image: url(\/sites\/default\/files\/Arthur_Hellman.jpg)\u0022\u003E\u003C\/div\u003E\n            \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--info\u0022\u003E\n              \u003Ch4 class=\u0022con-essay-author--name\u0022\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022http:\/\/law.pitt.edu\/people\/full-time-faculty\/arthur-d-hellman\u0022\u003EArthur Hellman\u003C\/a\u003E\n                  \u003C\/h4\u003E\n                  \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--job\u0022\u003E\n         Sally Ann Semenko Endowed Chair, University of Pittsburgh School of Law\n      \u003C\/div\u003E\n            \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-tabs\u0022\u003E\n      \u003Cul data-tabs class=\u0022tabs\u0022\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000106-taba\u0022\u003EFurther Reading\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000106-tabb\u0022\u003ECase Law\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000106-tabc\u0022\u003ERelated Essays\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n      \u003C\/ul\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv data-tabs-content\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000106-taba\u0022\u003E\n          \n      \u003Cdiv\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ERay Forrester, \u003Ci\u003EThe Nature of a \u0022Federal Question,\u0022\u003C\/i\u003E 16 Tulane L. Rev. 362 (1942)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EPaul Mishkin, \u003Ci\u003EThe Federal \u0022Question\u0022 in the District Courts\u003C\/i\u003E, 53 Colum. L. Rev. 157 (1953)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EG. Edward White, The Marshall Court and Cultural Change 1814\u20131835, ch. VIII (Oxford 1991)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n          \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n        \u003C\/div\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000106-tabb\u0022\u003E\n          \n      \u003Cdiv\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ECohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EBank of the United States v. Planters\u0027 Bank of Georgia, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904 (1824)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EOsborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ETennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257 (1880)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EMesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121 (1989)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EUnited Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n          \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n        \u003C\/div\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000106-tabc\u0022\u003E\n                  \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n\u003C\/article\u003E\n"]}]