[{"command":"add_css","data":[{"rel":"stylesheet","media":"all","href":"\/sites\/default\/files\/css\/css_veuEhhb1658wti0_ZAig66JOyixENU-N9zhjLQSLfOQ.css?delta=0\u0026language=en\u0026theme=heritage_theme\u0026include=eJwrTi1LzdNPzkksLq7Uy8tPSQUAPMsGtA"}]},{"command":"invoke","selector":null,"method":"openEssay","args":["10000104","\n\n\u003Carticle about=\u0022\/constitution\/articles\/3\/essays\/105\/judicial-compensation-clause\u0022 class=\u0022node node--type-constitution-essay node--promoted node--view-mode-embedded clearfix\u0022\u003E\n  \u003Ch1 class=\u0022title\u0022\u003E\u003Cspan\u003EJudicial Compensation Clause\u003C\/span\u003E\n\u003C\/h1\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-location\u0022\u003E\n      Article III, Section 1\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-context\u0022\u003E\n      \n            \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EThe Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts...shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n  \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-body\u0022\u003E\n    \n            \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EAlong with the Good Behavior Clause, the Judicial Compensation Clause is a guarantee of judicial independence within the Constitution\u2019s separation of powers system. Montesquieu, held in the highest esteem by the Framers, had declared, \u201c[T]here is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated from the legislative and executive.\u201d\u003Cem\u003E L\u2019Esprit des Lois\u003C\/em\u003E (1748). In his influential \u003Cem\u003EThoughts on Government\u003C\/em\u003E (April 1776), John Adams called for an independent judiciary.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cblockquote\u003E[The judges\u2019] minds should not be distracted with jarring interests; they should not be dependent upon any man, or body of men. To these ends, they should hold estates for life in their offices;\u2009.\u2009.\u2009.\u2009and their salaries ascertained and established by law.\u003C\/blockquote\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThree months later, the Declaration of Independence would have as one of its bill of complaints against the king: \u201cHe has made Judges dependent on his Will alone, for the tenure of their offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries.\u201d\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EJustice Joseph Story in his \u003Cem\u003ECommentaries on the Constitution of the United States\u003C\/em\u003E (1833) expressed the same principle: \u201cWithout this provision [the Judicial Compensation Clause] the other, as to the tenure of office [the Good Behavior Clause], would have been utterly nugatory, and indeed a mere mockery.\u201d Alexander Hamilton had already made the point in \u003Cem\u003EThe Federalist\u003C\/em\u003E No. 79: \u201cNext to permanency in office, nothing can contribute more to the independence of the judges than a fixed provision for their support.\u201d A century and a half after, the Supreme Court would affirm that the purpose of the judicial compensation clause was to preserve judicial \u201cindependence of action and judgment\u201d essential to maintaining the Constitution. \u003Cem\u003EEvans v. Gore\u003C\/em\u003E (1920).\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe issue at the Constitutional Convention was whether judges\u2019 salaries, like the president\u2019s, should be fixed during their tenures, or whether Congress could allow for increases. The Convention considered James Madison\u2019s resolution that judges receive \u201cfixed compensation for their services, in which no increase or diminution shall be made.\u201d When Gouverneur Morris moved to strike \u201cno increase,\u201d Madison objected that judges would fall under the blandishments of the legislature, which could offer them raises. But Morris retorted that the fluctuations in the value of money, the increase in judicial business, and the evolving style of living might create a necessity for raising judges\u2019 salaries. On the motion to strike the phrase, Morris, supported by Benjamin Franklin, won. Congress may not reduce judges\u2019 salaries, but it may increase them.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThough Congress may not directly diminish a judge\u2019s salary, what of indirect or collateral reductions? What of taxes, or the effect of inflation? There is no question that the Framers were concerned about collateral reductions. Although there was no income tax or cost of living adjustments at the time, the concept of inflation adjustment was not unfamiliar in the 1780s. For example, Hamilton noted in \u003Cem\u003EThe Federalist \u003C\/em\u003ENo. 79, \u201cIt will readily be understood that the fluctuations in the value of money and in the state of society rendered a fixed rate of compensation in the Constitution inadmissible.\u201d\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe question of the validity of taxes did not arise until the adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment, providing for a federal income tax, and the subsequent social safety net programs. In \u003Cem\u003EEvans v. Gore\u003C\/em\u003E and \u003Cem\u003EMiles v. Graham\u003C\/em\u003E (1925), the Court held that Congress had no power to tax a federal judge\u2019s salary, stating in \u003Cem\u003EMiles\u003C\/em\u003E that \u201chis compensation is protected from diminution in any form.\u201d\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EHowever, in \u003Cem\u003EO\u2019Malley v. Woodrough\u003C\/em\u003E (1939), dealing with the income tax, and \u003Cem\u003EUnited States v. Hatter\u003C\/em\u003E (2001), addressing the Medicare tax, the Court overruled \u003Cem\u003EMiles\u003C\/em\u003E and \u003Cem\u003EEvans\u003C\/em\u003E respectively. The Court held that the judiciary\u2019s independence was not impaired by congressionally enacted taxation. In \u003Cem\u003EHatter\u003C\/em\u003E, the Court held that the Judicial Compensation Clause was not a barrier to a \u201cgenerally applicable, nondiscriminatory tax\u201d to the salaries of federal judges, stating that there \u201cis no good reason why a judge should not share the tax burdens borne by all citizens.\u201d Thus, whether or not a judge was appointed before enactment of the tax did not matter. The Social Security taxes, however, were a different matter, for the law at issue was discriminatory: it had allowed most federal employees to opt out of paying for Social Security, but not federal judges.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EIn \u003Cem\u003EUnited States v. Will\u003C\/em\u003E (1980) and \u003Cem\u003EWilliams v. United States\u003C\/em\u003E (2002), judges challenged the repeal or the denial of annual cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs) for judicial salaries. In \u003Cem\u003EWill\u003C\/em\u003E, the Court found that some repeals of the COLA were invalid depending upon when they took effect. A similar issue arose in \u003Cem\u003EWilliams\u003C\/em\u003E, which dealt with the Ethics Reform Act. That Act had allowed for salary supplements to take account of inflation. However, Congress blocked salary adjustments in 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1999 for federal judges. Though a district court found that Congress could not rescind the adjustments, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. The case was appealed, but in Williams, the Supreme Court denied a writ of certiorari, though Justices Stephen Breyer, Antonin Scalia, and Anthony Kennedy found merit in the challenge.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe issue of the adequacy of judicial compensation remains. Chief Justice John Roberts has argued that Congress\u2019s failure to increase judicial compensation \u201chas now reached the level of a constitutional crisis that threatens to undermine the strength and independence of the federal judiciary.\u201d Under his view, \u201cjudges are no longer drawn primarily from among the best lawyers in the practicing bar.\u201d However, studies have not established a quantifiable relationship between judicial performance and compensation.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003ERetirement of judges has also been also part of the question of compensation. At the time of the Constitutional Convention, the state of New York had required its judges to retire at age sixty, which Alexander Hamilton termed \u201cinhumane,\u201d as it left the retired judge with no income. In \u003Cem\u003EThe Federalist\u003C\/em\u003E No. 79, Hamilton argued against mandatory retirement: \u201c[F]ew there are who outlive the season of intellectual vigor.\u201d After the Civil War, the question of whether retired judges could receive a salary began to be debated. The Judiciary Act of 1869 provided for judicial retirement and a pension equal to their salary. In 1919, Congress allowed federal judges (excepting those on the Supreme Court) to retire from active service at their salary, but continue to serve where needed, an arrangement that came to be termed \u201csenior status.\u201d When Congress attempted in 1933 to reduce the salary of retired judges, the Supreme Court voided the legislation, holding that when a judge retired from active service, he still retained his \u201coffice\u201d and the constitutional guarantee of no diminution of salary. \u003Cem\u003EBooth v. United States\u003C\/em\u003E (1934). Congress extended the option of senior status to Supreme Court justices in 1937.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n  \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author\u0022\u003E\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--media\u0022\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--photo\u0022 style=\u0022background-image: url(\/sites\/default\/files\/Jonathan_Turley.jpg)\u0022\u003E\u003C\/div\u003E\n            \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--info\u0022\u003E\n              \u003Ch4 class=\u0022con-essay-author--name\u0022\u003E\n                      David F. Forte\n                  \u003C\/h4\u003E\n                  \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--job\u0022\u003E\n         Professor, Cleveland Marshall School of Law\n      \u003C\/div\u003E\n            \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-tabs\u0022\u003E\n      \u003Cul data-tabs class=\u0022tabs\u0022\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000104-taba\u0022\u003EFurther Reading\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000104-tabb\u0022\u003ECase Law\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000104-tabc\u0022\u003ERelated Essays\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n      \u003C\/ul\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv data-tabs-content\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000104-taba\u0022\u003E\n          \n      \u003Cdiv\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EJames M. Anderson \u0026amp; Eric Helland, How Much Should Judges Be Paid ?, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1277 (2012)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EScott Baker, Should We Pay Federal Circuit Judges More?, 88 B.U. L. REV. 63 (2008)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EStephen B. Burbank, et al., Leaving the Bench, 1970\u2013 2009: The Choices Federal Judges Make, What Influences Those Choices, and Their Consequences, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2012)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EJonathan L. Entin, Getting What You Pay For: Judicial Compensation and Judicial Independence, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 25 (2011)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003E1 CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN ROBERTS, 2006 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (Jan. 1, 2007)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ERonald D. Rotunda, A Few Modest Proposals to Reform the Law Governing Federal Judicial Salaries, 12 THE PROFESSIONAL LAWYER 1 (A.B.A., Fall 2000)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EAdrian Vermeule, The Constitutional Law of Official Compensation, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 501 (2002)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EAlbert Yoon, Love\u2019s Labor\u2019s Lost? Judicial Tenure Among Federal Court Judges: 1945\u20132000, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1029 (2003)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n          \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n        \u003C\/div\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000104-tabb\u0022\u003E\n          \n      \u003Cdiv\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EEvans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245, 247 (1920)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EMiles v. Graham, 268 U.S. 501 (1925)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EBooth v. United States, 291 U.S. 339 (1934)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EO\u2019Malley v. Woodrough, 307 U.S. 277 (1939)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EUnited States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200 (1980)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EUnited States v. Hatter, 532 U.S. 557 (2001)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EWilliams v. United States, 535 U.S. 911 (2002)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n          \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n        \u003C\/div\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000104-tabc\u0022\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000103\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EGood Behavior Clause\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000176\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EIncome Tax\u003C\/a\u003E\n                  \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n\u003C\/article\u003E\n"]}]