[{"command":"add_css","data":[{"rel":"stylesheet","media":"all","href":"\/sites\/default\/files\/css\/css_veuEhhb1658wti0_ZAig66JOyixENU-N9zhjLQSLfOQ.css?delta=0\u0026language=en\u0026theme=heritage_theme\u0026include=eJwrTi1LzdNPzkksLq7Uy8tPSQUAPMsGtA"}]},{"command":"invoke","selector":null,"method":"openEssay","args":["10000103","\n\n\u003Carticle about=\u0022\/constitution\/articles\/3\/essays\/104\/good-behavior-clause\u0022 class=\u0022node node--type-constitution-essay node--promoted node--view-mode-embedded clearfix\u0022\u003E\n  \u003Ch1 class=\u0022title\u0022\u003E\u003Cspan\u003EGood Behavior Clause\u003C\/span\u003E\n\u003C\/h1\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-location\u0022\u003E\n      Article III, Section 1\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-context\u0022\u003E\n      \n            \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EThe Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour....\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n  \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-body\u0022\u003E\n    \n            \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EThe Framers firmly believed that republican liberty could be secured only under the rule of law, and that the rule of law could not be guaranteed without an independent judiciary. The Good Behavior Clause of Article III anchors judicial independence by protecting judges from being removed at the whim of the other branches.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EGuaranteed life-tenure for judges had become the rule in England after the Act of Settlement in 1701, though it did not come fully into effect until 1760. Prior to that time, many (including the crown) regarded the \u201cking\u2019s courts\u201d as attached to the executive branch. But as William Blackstone summarized the law in his \u003Cem\u003ECommentaries on the Laws of England\u003C\/em\u003E (1765\u20131769), \u201cIn this distinct and separate existence of the judicial power, in a peculiar body of men, nominated indeed, but not removeable at pleasure, by the crown, consists one main preservative of the public liberty.\u201d\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EIt was different in the colonies. Judges did not have same independence from the crown as they were coming to have in England, leading to the complaint in the Declaration of Independence, \u201cHe has made Judges dependent on his Will alone, for the tenure of their offices.\u2009.\u2009.\u2009.\u201d John Adams, wielding great influence during the Second Continental Congress, had pressed for judicial independence. In his \u003Cem\u003EThoughts on Government \u003C\/em\u003E(April 1776), he urged that judges \u201cshould hold estates for life in their offices; or, in other words, their commissions should be during good behavior.\u201d\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EAfter independence, the \u201cgood behavior\u201d standard appeared in some state constitutions, and in Philadelphia, the Framers approved the phrase with no comment. During ratification, Hamilton defended the clause in \u003Cem\u003EThe Federalist \u003C\/em\u003ENo. 78, stating:\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cblockquote\u003EIn a monarchy it is an excellent barrier to the despotism of the prince; in a republic it is a no less excellent barrier to the encroachments and oppressions of the representative body. And it is the best expedient which can be devised in any government to secure a steady, upright, and impartial administration of the laws.\u003C\/blockquote\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe question that arises is whether \u201cgood behavior\u201d is simply a code phrase for life-tenure or whether it also establishes a standard for removal of judges different from \u201chigh crimes and misdemeanors\u201d in the Standards for Impeachment Clause (Article II, Section 4). In his \u003Cem\u003EThoughts on Government\u003C\/em\u003E, Adams had suggested that only \u201cmisbehavior\u201d should be the cause for impeachment.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EUnder English law, there remained two methods of removing life-tenured judges, one by joint action of the executive and legislature, and one by the judiciary. The Act of Settlement provided a removal procedure through a formal request by the crown to both houses of Parliament for one who, in the words of Blackstone, had \u201cbreach[ed]\u2009.\u2009.\u2009.\u2009good behavior.\u201d Addition-ally, a judge\u2019s misbehavior could still lead to his removal from the bench by means of a writ of scire facias issued by a court of equity by which a patent, charter, or land grant\u2014or in the case of judges, an appointment\u2014could be annulled for \u201cmisbehavior.\u201d Prior to independence, some states had similar procedures for the removal of judges.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EAt the Constitutional Convention, the Framers rejected the first English method of removal. John Dickinson moved to add, after the words \u201cgood Behaviour,\u201d the words \u201cProvided that they may be removed by the Executive on the application by the Senate and House of Representatives.\u201d There ensued a vigorous debate, Gouverneur Morris arguing that it would be \u201ca contradiction in terms to say that the Judges should hold their offices during good behavior, and yet be remove-able without a trial.\u201d The Dickenson proposal lost by a vote of seven to one, but no mechanism for \u201ctrial\u201d was added to the Good Behavior Clause. Instead, two weeks later, the convention settled on the \u201chigh crimes and misdemeanors\u201d language for removal of the president, and then, by separate motion, extended the process for impeachment to \u201call civil officers of the United States,\u201d presumably including judges.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EImpeachment is not mentioned in Article III, dealing with the judiciary, though it is in Article I, setting the powers of Congress, and in Article II, dealing with the executive. Nonetheless textually, impeachment is the only method mentioned\u0026nbsp;in the Constitution for the removal of executive officers and of judges.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EHamilton pronounced in \u003Cem\u003EThe Federalist\u003C\/em\u003E No. 79 that impeachment was the only method of removing a judge and that any other cause would \u201cbe liable to abuse\u201d and would \u201cgive scope to personal and party attachments and enmities.\u201d Hamilton did opine that insanity would be a \u201cvirtual disqualification,\u201d though he did not speculate on the method by which a judge could be removed for mental incapacity. He made no reference to the common law writ of scire facias.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThomas Jefferson, perhaps from frustration at not being able to remove Federalist judges, pronounced the \u201chigh crimes and misdemeanors\u201d standard a \u201cbungling way of removing Judges\u2009.\u2009.\u2009.\u2009an impracticable thing\u2014a mere scarecrow.\u201d But Justice Joseph Story, in his \u003Cem\u003ECommentaries on the Constitution of the United States \u003C\/em\u003E(1833), agreed with Hamilton. \u201c[I]nstances of absolute imbecility would be too rare,\u201d he wrote, \u201cto justify the introduction of so dangerous a provision\u201d of removal other than impeachment.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EExcept in one instance, Thomas Jefferson\u2019s attempt to attack the federal judiciary through impeachment failed, but he was able to remove the whole cohort of federal circuit judges sim-ply by having Congress legislate their courts out of existence in the Judiciary Act of 1802, an act upheld by the Supreme Court in \u003Cem\u003EStuart v. Laird\u003C\/em\u003E (1803).\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EOver the history of the republic, judges have been impeached and removed for a variety of misdeeds, not all of them actual crimes. There have been fifteen cases of judicial impeachment tried before the Senate. Among these fifteen officials were one associate justice of the Supreme Court, one commerce court judge, and thirteen district judges. Their charges ranged from \u201cmental instability and drunkenness on the bench\u201d to \u201cimproper business relationship with litigants,\u201d and from \u201cfavoritism in the appointment of bankruptcy receivers\u201d to \u201csexual assault.\u201d\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe first judge removed was John Pickering of the federal district court in New Hampshire, whose trial in 1804 was a precursor to Jefferson\u2019s campaign to remove Samuel Chase from the Supreme Court. Pickering was charged with being biased in some of his decisions and for \u201cbeing a man of loose morals and intemperate habits,\u201d who appeared in court \u201cin a total state of intoxication\u201d and \u201cin a most profane and indecent manner, invoke[d] the name of the Supreme Being,\u201d said actions amounting to \u201chigh misdemeanors.\u201d The Senate heard evidence that showed convincingly that Pickering suffered from a debilitating insanity that voided any imputation of criminal intent. It was politically necessary, however, for the Democrats in Congress to convict Pickering so that they could go on to the impeachment of Justice Chase. To avoid the problem of Pickering\u2019s lack of criminal liability, the Democrats agreed to have the question changed from whether Pickering was guilty of \u201chigh crimes and misdemeanors\u201d to whether he was \u201cguilty as charged.\u201d By a vote of nineteen to seven, Pickering was convicted and removed from office.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe Pickering case raised the continuing problem of whether impeachment is the only mechanism for removing a judge who has not actually committed a crime. In the impeachment trial of President William Clinton, his counsel affirmed that judges were subject to impeachment, but he argued that the \u201cgood Behavior\u201d clause sets a lower standard for the impeachment of judges than does \u201chigh crimes and misdemeanors\u201d for a president. A number of scholars, on the other hand, have asserted that Congress, through the Necessary and Proper Clause, can provide the judiciary with a mechanism, analogous to the old common law writ of scire facias, to police them-selves and remove a judge incapable of carrying out his duties, without having to have recourse to impeachment.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThroughout the debate, Congress has insisted that (1) the Good Behavior Clause means merely no fixed term (i.e., for life), (2) only Congress can remove federal judges using impeachment, and (3) \u201chigh crimes and misdemeanors\u201d does not require the offensive conduct to be a crime. In 1993, the congressionally authorized National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal declared that the Good Behavior Clause defines life tenure and is not a separate basis for what constitutes an impeachable offense for judges.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThere have been instances where the judiciary itself sought the removal of a judge from office. In 1989, for example, the Judicial Conference of the United States (composed of the senior judges of the federal circuits and the chief justice of the Supreme Court) recommended to the Speaker of the House of Representatives that Judge Alcee Hastings be impeached, even though Hastings had been acquit-ted of charges of conspiracy to solicit and accept a bribe. The Judicial Conference deferred to the power of Congress to impeach and convict. The House went forward to impeach Hastings and the Senate convicted him.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EIn 1980, Congress passed the Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act, empowering Judicial Councils (disciplinary bodies of the circuit courts) to suspend case assignments from judges who were mentally or physically unable to discharge their duties or who had engaged in inappropriate conduct. But, Congress declared, \u201cin no circumstances may the council order removal from office of any judge appointed to hold office during good behavior.\u201d\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EIn \u003Cem\u003EChandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit of the United States\u003C\/em\u003E (1970), the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a judicial council\u2019s decision to bar a federal judge, who had been a civil and criminal defendant in a number of proceedings, from hearing cases to which he was assigned, and to prevent further assignment of cases to his docket. In effect, the judicial council had removed the judge from performing his office. The judge asserted that the judicial council had usurped the power of the House of Representatives and of the Senate to impeach and to convict. The Court dismissed the suit on jurisdictional grounds. Justice John M. Harlan, concur-ring, opined that the Court did have jurisdiction, but on reaching the merits, found that the circuit courts possessed disciplinary authority to prevent a judge from hearing cases. Justices William Douglas and Hugo L. Black vigorously dissented asserting that the judicial council had gone too far and that the only constitutionally permissible method of a removing a judge from his duties was through impeachment.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n  \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author\u0022\u003E\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--media\u0022\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--photo\u0022 style=\u0022background-image: url(\/sites\/default\/files\/Jonathan_Turley.jpg)\u0022\u003E\u003C\/div\u003E\n            \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--info\u0022\u003E\n              \u003Ch4 class=\u0022con-essay-author--name\u0022\u003E\n                      David F. Forte\n                  \u003C\/h4\u003E\n                  \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--job\u0022\u003E\n         Professor, Cleveland Marshall School of Law\n      \u003C\/div\u003E\n            \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-tabs\u0022\u003E\n      \u003Cul data-tabs class=\u0022tabs\u0022\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000103-taba\u0022\u003EFurther Reading\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000103-tabb\u0022\u003ECase Law\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000103-tabc\u0022\u003ERelated Essays\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n      \u003C\/ul\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv data-tabs-content\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000103-taba\u0022\u003E\n          \n      \u003Cdiv\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ERaoul Berger, Impeachment of Judges and \u201cGood Behavior\u201d Tenure, 79 YALE L.J. 1475 (1970)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EWilliam S. Carpenter, Repeal of the Judiciary Act of 1801, 9 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 519 (1915)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EHistory of the Federal Judiciary: Impeachments of Federal Judges, Federal Judicial Center, at http:\/\/www.fjc.gov\/history\/home.nsf\/page\/ judges_impeachments.html (accessed January 7, 2014)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ESaikrishna Prakash and Steven D. Smith, How to Remove a Federal Judge, 116 YALE L.J. 72 (2006)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EMartin H. Redish, \u003Ci\u003EResponse: Good Behavior, Judicial\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003EIndependence, and the Foundations of American Constitutionalism\u003C\/i\u003E, 116\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003EYALE L.J.\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003E139 (2006)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EG. W. C. Ross, \u003Ci\u003E\u201cGood Behavior\u201d of Federal Judges\u003C\/i\u003E, 12 U. KAN. CITY L. REV. 119 (1944)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003ERonald D. Rotunda, \u003Ci\u003EAn Essay on the Constitutional\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003EParameters of Federal Impeachment\u003C\/i\u003E, 76\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003EKY. L.J.\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003E707 (1988)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EJeff Sessions \u0026amp; Andrew Sigler, Judicial Independence: \u003Ci\u003EDid the Clinton Impeachment Trial Erode\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003Ethe Principle?\u003C\/i\u003E,\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003E29 CUMB. L. REV. 489 (1999)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EBurke Shartel, \u003Ci\u003EFederal Judges\u2014Appointment, Super-vision, and Removal\u2014Some Possibilities Under the Constitution\u003C\/i\u003E, 28 Mich. L. Rev. 870 (1930)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EJonathan Turley, \u003Ci\u003EThe Executive Function Theory,\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003EThe Hamilton Affair, and Other Constitutional Mythologies\u003C\/i\u003E, 77 N.C. L. Rev. 1791 (1999)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EMartha Andes Ziskind, \u003Ci\u003EJudicial Tenure in the American Constitution: English and American Precedents\u003C\/i\u003E, 1969\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003ESUP. CT. REV.\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003E135 (1969)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n          \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n        \u003C\/div\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000103-tabb\u0022\u003E\n          \n      \u003Cdiv\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EStuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. 299 (1803)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EChandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit of the United States, 398 U.S. 74 (1970)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cdiv class=\u0022WordSection1\u0022\u003E\n\u003Cp\u003E\u003Cspan style=\u0022page:WordSection1\u0022\u003ENixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993)\u003C\/span\u003E\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003E\u0026nbsp;\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n          \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n        \u003C\/div\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000103-tabc\u0022\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000010\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EImpeachment\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000017\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EPunishment for Impeachment\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000046\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EInferior Courts\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000099\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EStandards for Impeachment\u003C\/a\u003E\n                  \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n\u003C\/article\u003E\n"]}]