[{"command":"add_css","data":[{"rel":"stylesheet","media":"all","href":"\/sites\/default\/files\/css\/css_veuEhhb1658wti0_ZAig66JOyixENU-N9zhjLQSLfOQ.css?delta=0\u0026language=en\u0026theme=heritage_theme\u0026include=eJwrTi1LzdNPzkksLq7Uy8tPSQUAPMsGtA"}]},{"command":"invoke","selector":null,"method":"openEssay","args":["10000102","\n\n\u003Carticle about=\u0022\/constitution\/articles\/3\/essays\/103\/supreme-court\u0022 class=\u0022node node--type-constitution-essay node--promoted node--view-mode-embedded clearfix\u0022\u003E\n  \u003Ch1 class=\u0022title\u0022\u003E\u003Cspan\u003ESupreme Court\u003C\/span\u003E\n\u003C\/h1\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-location\u0022\u003E\n      Article III, Section 1\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-context\u0022\u003E\n      \n            \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EThe judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in one supreme Court....\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n  \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-body\u0022\u003E\n    \n            \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EWhen the Constitutional Convention opened in Philadelphia, the very existence of a national judiciary was at issue. Delegates who favored state power argued that national laws could be enforced by state courts, whereas others, such as James Madison, foresaw the need for national judicial power. The \u201cone supreme Court\u201d created by the Constitution reflected ambivalence over the nature and scope of this power, and the Framers left to Congress significant discretion to determine the number of Supreme Court justices; the establishment, structure and jurisdiction of a lower federal judiciary; and the ability to make exceptions to the Court\u2019s appellate jurisdiction.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EWhile considering the question of a unitary executive, the delegates to the Constitutional Convention concluded that the judiciary was to be a legal rather than a political body. The Convention rejected the notion that the judicial branch should be any part of a proposed \u201ccouncil of revision,\u201d which would have overseen the executive power to exercise a veto or to revise laws. Elbridge Gerry remarked that it was foreign to the nature of the judicial office to judge the policy of public measures. Rufus King argued that judges have to consider laws afresh, without having participated in making them.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EFollowing the implicit command of the Constitution, Congress created a Supreme Court in the Judiciary Act of 1789 and set the number of justices at six. The Judiciary Act also established a subordinate federal judicial structure of several district and three circuit courts, each of the latter including two \u201criding\u201d Supreme Court justices(reduced to one in 1793). The act also gave the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over federal questions growing out of litigation in state courts, thus cementing national power, while at the same time allowing state courts to make determinations on federal questions prior to final appeal. However, the act also confined the Supreme Court to questions of law rather than fact\u2014an appellate limitation unusual for the time. This innovation was aimed at calming residual fears of national judicial power overturning local jury findings.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe first chief justice, John Jay, confirmed the intention of the Framers by insisting on the legal, rather than political, function of the Court and its justices. In Hayburn\u2019s Case (1792), he wrote on circuit that Congress could assign only properly judicial tasks to the judiciary, thus upholding federal judges\u2019 refusal to act as pensions claims adjudicators. Jay, speaking for the Court in a letter to President George Washington, also declined to render an advisory opinion Washington had requested concerning treaty interpretation.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EIn Marbury v. Madison (1803), Chief Justice John Marshall deftly reinforced both federal judicial power and the notion of the Court as a legal body. He did so by refusing to enter into a political dispute on the grounds that Congress could not constitutionally grant to the Court powers not authorized by the Constitution\u2014in this case, original jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus. Underlying Marshall\u2019s reasoning is the idea that the Constitution itself is a law to be interpreted by courts, and that courts cannot decide \u201cquestions, in their nature political,\u201d or force coequal branches to perform political or discretionary acts.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe Federalist Congress reduced the number of justices sitting on the Supreme Court to five by the Judiciary Act of 1801, hoping to prevent incoming President Thomas Jefferson from appointing a justice when the sixth sitting justice retired. The 1801 act also established separate circuit court judgeships, obviating the need for Supreme Court justices to ride circuit. But such riding\u2014and a Supreme Court of six\u2014were quickly reinstituted in the Judiciary Act of 1802 under Jefferson, who was suspicious of national judicial power and desirous of keeping justices in\u0026nbsp;expanded, so did the number of circuits and the number of Supreme Court justices to sit on them. The number of justices also expanded and contracted because of the politics of the Civil War and its aftermath, first from nine to ten to support President Abraham Lincoln\u2019s war policies, then to seven to deprive President Andrew Johnson of several appointments. Since 1869, Congress has set the number of justices at nine, despite an unsuccessful effort by President Franklin D. Roosevelt to increase the Court\u2019s size to suit his political agenda.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThere has been a vigorous debate among scholars whether the vesting of judicial power in \u201cone supreme Court\u201d creates a \u201cunitary judiciary\u201d analogous to the idea of a \u201cunitary executive\u201d under Article II, Section 1, Clause 1 (Executive Vesting Clause). The \u201cunitary judiciary\u201d concept has two parts. The first is related to the Supreme Court\u2019s jurisdiction and the extent of its ability to have the final word on all federal question matters. The second part relates to the Supreme Court\u2019s supervisory authority over inferior courts.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003ERegarding the range of the Supreme Court\u2019s jurisdiction, David Engdahl has argued that the use of the terms \u201csupreme\u201d and \u201cinferior\u201d in relation to courts, unlike the use of \u201cinferior officers\u201d in Article II, does not carry any connotation of hierarchy of authority. At the time of the founding, the terms \u201csupreme\u201d and \u201cinferior\u201d described the breadth of a tribunal\u2019s jurisdiction, geographic scope, or some other status. A \u201csupreme\u201d court did not necessarily have appellate review or ultimate authority to have a final say concerning legal interpretations.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EIn contrast, Laurence Claus finds it important that the Framers used the lower-case \u201csupreme\u201d instead of the upper-case \u201cSupreme\u201d and that they included only one, instead of several supreme courts. The word \u201csupreme,\u201d he argues, is used as a description, not a title, signifying that the Court has the \u201clast word\u201d on all matters concerning \u201cthe judicial Power of the United States.\u201d In the same way that the Constitution, federal law, and national treaties are \u201cthe supreme Law of the Land\u201d taking precedence over state constitutions and state laws, the Supreme Court is \u201csupreme\u201d and its rulings take precedence over all \u201cinferior\u201d courts.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EJames Pfander also declares that the term \u201csupreme\u201d relates to the Supreme Court\u2019s ability to review the decisions of courts \u201cinferior\u201d to it in the federal judicial hierarchy, but he asserts that \u201cinferior\u201d courts may include state courts that Congress may constitute as \u201cinferior tribunals\u201d under Article I, Section 8, Clause 9 (Inferior Courts). But Jason Mazzone notes that under the Judiciary Act of 1789, both inferior federal courts and, to some extent, state courts could reach decisions independent of and unappealable to the Supreme Court.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003ESteven Calabresi and Gary Lawson also argue, on the basis of the Constitution\u2019s text and structure, that the Supreme Court has ultimate authority over any inferior courts. Significant is the fact that the word \u201cinferior\u201d is only used elsewhere in the Constitution in relation to \u201cinferior officers,\u201d and they conclude that the Supreme Court has authority over inferior courts in the same way the president has authority over inferior officers.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EBut Amy Barrett counters that the Constitution does not grant the Supreme Court nomination or appointment powers over inferior courts in the way that the president can nominate and appoint inferior officers in the executive branch. Moreover, the Constitution explicitly protects all judges with life tenure during period of good behavior, removing the possibility of Supreme Court judges removing or otherwise punishing inferior judges. Thus, \u201c[i]nferior courts are capable of exercising judicial power wholly independently of the Supreme Court\u2019s direction. They do not depend on the Supreme Court to give them the power, and the Supreme Court cannot take it away.\u201d\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe second part of the unitary judiciary concept relates to the supervisory authority of the Supreme Court\u2014not only its ability to have appellate review of decisions of inferior courts, but also to issue procedural, evidentiary, and other types of rules that inferior courts must follow. Congress has granted the Supreme Court some rule-making authority by statute, but the Supreme Court has issued supervisory rules on inferior courts outside of these statutory\u0026nbsp;bounds on the basis of its \u201cinherent authority\u201d that stems from \u201cthe judicial Power.\u201d The issue and the history are complex. Scholars similarly argue whether the Court has either explicit or implicit power to make rules for lower federal courts, and to what extent Congress, under the Necessary and Proper Clause, can displace the Supreme Court in making such procedural or evidentiary rules.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n  \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author\u0022\u003E\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--media\u0022\u003E\n            \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--info\u0022\u003E\n              \u003Ch4 class=\u0022con-essay-author--name\u0022\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022http:\/\/www.stvincent.edu\/Majors_and_Programs\/Majors_and_Programs\/Politics\/Bradley_C_S__Watson\/\u0022\u003EBradley C. S. Watson\u003C\/a\u003E\n                  \u003C\/h4\u003E\n                  \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--job\u0022\u003E\n         Chairman, Politics Department, Saint Vincent College\n      \u003C\/div\u003E\n            \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-tabs\u0022\u003E\n      \u003Cul data-tabs class=\u0022tabs\u0022\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000102-taba\u0022\u003EFurther Reading\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000102-tabb\u0022\u003ECase Law\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000102-tabc\u0022\u003ERelated Essays\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n      \u003C\/ul\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv data-tabs-content\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000102-taba\u0022\u003E\n          \n      \u003Cdiv\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EAmy Coney Barrett, The Supervisory Power of the Supreme Court, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 324 (2006)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ESteven G. Calabresi \u0026amp; Gary Lawson, The Unitary Executive, Jurisdiction Stripping, and the Hamdan Opinions: A Textualist Response to Justice Scalia, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1002 (2007)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ELaurence Claus, The One Court That Congress Cannot Take Away: Singularity, Supremacy, and Article III, 96 GEO. L.J. 59 (2007)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EDAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS, 1789\u20131888 (1985)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ETHE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789\u20131800, (Maeva Marcus et al. eds., 1985)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EDavid E. Engdahl, What\u2019s in a Name? The Constitutionality of Multiple \u201cSupreme\u201d Courts, 66 IND. L.J.\u003Cbr\u003E\n457 (1991)\u003Cbr\u003E\n\u0026nbsp;\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003E1 JULIUS GOEBEL JR., HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801 (1971)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp class=\u0022MsoNormal\u0022 style=\u0022margin-left:12.0pt;text-align:justify;text-indent:\n-11.95pt;line-height:107%\u0022\u003EJason Mazzone, When the Supreme Court Is Not Supreme, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 979 (2010)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: ESSAYS ON THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1992)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EJames E. Pfander, Federal Supremacy, State Court Inferiority, and the Constitutionality of Jurisdiction-Stripping Legislation, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 191 (2007)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ECharles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49 (1923)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n          \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n        \u003C\/div\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000102-tabb\u0022\u003E\n          \n      \u003Cdiv\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EHayburn\u0027s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EMarbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EEx parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EUnited States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610 (1818)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EUnited States v. Furlong, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184 (1820)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EEakin v. Raub, 12 Serg. \u0026amp; Rawle 330 (Pa. 1825)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EUnited States v. Gooding, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 460\u003Cbr\u003E\n(1827)\u003Cbr\u003E\n\u0026nbsp;\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EUnited States v. Wood, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 430 (1840)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EUnited States v. Murphy, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 203 (1842)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ESkelly v. Jefferson Branch of the State Bank of Ohio, 9\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EOhio St. 606 (1859)\u003Cbr\u003E\n\u0026nbsp;\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EFunk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371 (1933)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EWolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7 (1934)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EMcNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EEdmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651 (1997)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n          \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n        \u003C\/div\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000102-tabc\u0022\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000046\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EInferior Courts\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000075\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EExecutive Vesting Clause\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000101\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EJudicial Vesting Clause\u003C\/a\u003E\n                  \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n\u003C\/article\u003E\n"]}]