[{"command":"add_css","data":[{"rel":"stylesheet","media":"all","href":"\/sites\/default\/files\/css\/css_veuEhhb1658wti0_ZAig66JOyixENU-N9zhjLQSLfOQ.css?delta=0\u0026language=en\u0026theme=heritage_theme\u0026include=eJwrTi1LzdNPzkksLq7Uy8tPSQUAPMsGtA"}]},{"command":"invoke","selector":null,"method":"openEssay","args":["10000096","\n\n\u003Carticle about=\u0022\/constitution\/articles\/2\/essays\/97\/ambassadors\u0022 class=\u0022node node--type-constitution-essay node--promoted node--view-mode-embedded clearfix\u0022\u003E\n  \u003Ch1 class=\u0022title\u0022\u003E\u003Cspan\u003EAmbassadors\u003C\/span\u003E\n\u003C\/h1\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-location\u0022\u003E\n      Article II, Section 3\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-context\u0022\u003E\n      \n            \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003E[The President] shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers....\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n  \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-body\u0022\u003E\n    \n            \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EThe Articles of Confederation vested the powers \u201cof sending and receiving ambassadors\u201d in Congress, though they were delegated to the Committee of the States when Congress was not in session (Article IX). In the Constitutional Convention, the delegates at first followed the example of the Articles by vesting the appointment of American ambassadors as well as the treaty power in the Senate without executive participation. The Committee of Detail adopted Edmund Randolph\u2019s suggestion that the president be given the power to \u201creceive\u201d ambassadors. The Committee of Eleven later transferred to the president the treaty and appointment powers (subject to Senate approval), joining them to the independent power to receive ambassadors and other public ministers, such as consuls and other diplomats accredited to the United States by any foreign state. The convention approved the changes. In this light, it is difficult to say that the framers thought that the power to receive ambassadors was part of any larger executive branch responsibility for foreign affairs. In \u003Cem\u003EThe Federalist\u003C\/em\u003E No. 69, in fact, Alexander Hamilton described the president\u2019s power to receive ambassadors as merely the most \u201cconvenient\u201d expedient, compared with the \u201cnecessity of convening the legislature\u201d whenever a new ambassador arrived in the American capital.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EDoes the power to receive ambassadors necessarily imply a power to refuse their reception? And if it does, what degree of presidential control of foreign relations follows from such a power? In his 1829 book, \u003Cem\u003EA View of the Constitution of the United States\u003C\/em\u003E, William Rawle declared, \u201cUnder the expression, he is to receive ambassadors, the president is charged with all transactions between the United States and foreign nations.\u201d The president can refuse to receive putative ambassadors whose credentials are in serious doubt. Where no such doubt exists, however, a presidential refusal to receive an ambassador amounts to a decision not to \u201crecognize\u201d a foreign government, or at least not to carry on diplomatic relations with it, with all the consequences in international law and diplomacy that may follow from such a rupture.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EFrom an early date, the federal courts have held, until quite recently, that the clause raises only \u201cpolitical questions\u201d to be decided by the other branches, not by the judiciary. Credentials as an ambassador may matter greatly in certain legal cases, but the courts will not inquire further than to assure themselves that the president has or has not received an ambassador as representing his government. \u003Cem\u003EUnited States v. Ortega\u003C\/em\u003E (1825); \u003Cem\u003EIn re Baiz\u003C\/em\u003E (1890).\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe historical debate over the deeper implications of the clause\u2014namely, whether it accords the president an unfettered right to \u201crecognize\u201d another nation for diplomatic purposes\u2014has accordingly taken place in the political arena, at least for the most part. Alexander Hamilton (as \u201cPacificus\u201d) and James Madison (as \u201cHelvidius\u201d) first discussed the question in their debate over President Washington\u2019s Proclamation of Neutrality of 1793. Madison characterized the power of reception as merely ministerial, carrying no discretion to accept or reject the legitimacy of a foreign government\u2014a discretion he would have lodged in Congress. Hamilton, altering the position he expressed in \u003Cem\u003EThe Federalist\u003C\/em\u003E, held that the power \u201cincludes that of judging, in the case of a Revolution of Government in a foreign Country, whether the new rulers are competent organs of the National Will and ought to be recognised or not.\u201d He concluded that the clause touched on \u201can important instance of the right of the Executive to decide the obligations of the Nation with regard to foreign Nations.\u201d\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EAs a practical matter, Hamilton\u2019s argument of 1793 has prevailed historically. As then Representative John Marshall put it in 1800, \u201c[t] he President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations. Of consequence the demand of a foreign nation can only be made on him.\u201d Should a would-be ambassador arrive in the capital and be refused reception by the president, there is nowhere else under the Constitution that he can turn. Likewise, it is difficult to see how the reception of an ambassador, and the consequent opening of diplomatic relations with a previously unrecognized government, can be undone by the action of another branch of government. \u003Cem\u003EUnited States v. Belmont \u003C\/em\u003E(1937). Congress possesses other formal powers over foreign affairs, but this clause has come to be widely understood as giving the president one of his considerable advantages in the conduct of American foreign policy. He has, for example, the power to make agreements incident to his act of receiving ambassadors. Thus, the Supreme Court relied upon the clause to validate President Franklin D. Roosevelt\u2019s signing of the Litvinov Assignment with the U.S.S.R. on the basis of his power to recognize foreign governments and receive ambassadors. \u003Cem\u003EUnited States v. Pink \u003C\/em\u003E(1942).\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe Supreme Court has recently held that the clause does not\u2014at least not invariably\u2014 necessitate the invocation of the \u201cpolitical questions\u201d doctrine. The case involved a statute arguably impinging on the conduct of our diplomatic relations. Congress had legislated an affirmative right of citizens born in Jerusalem to have \u201cIsrael\u201d named as their place of birth in official United States documents. But the executive branch, resisting the mandate of the statute, argued that the courts must either treat the matter as nonjusticiable under the \u201creceive Ambassadors\u201d clause, or, if deciding the merits, hold that Congress may not invade the executive\u2019s control of foreign relations by legislating on the contents of documents issued by the United States where those documents affect our diplomacy. Lower courts took the first position, holding the dispute nonjusticiable as a political question. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the constitutionality of the statute was a fit subject for judicial review, and remanded for further proceedings on the merits of the controversy between Congress and the executive branch. \u003Cem\u003EZivotofsky v. Clinton\u003C\/em\u003E (2012).\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n  \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author\u0022\u003E\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--media\u0022\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--photo\u0022 style=\u0022background-image: url(\/sites\/default\/files\/Matthew_Franck.jpg)\u0022\u003E\u003C\/div\u003E\n            \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--info\u0022\u003E\n              \u003Ch4 class=\u0022con-essay-author--name\u0022\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022http:\/\/www.winst.org\/corac\/scholars\/director.php\u0022\u003EMatthew Franck\u003C\/a\u003E\n                  \u003C\/h4\u003E\n                  \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--job\u0022\u003E\n         Director, William E. and Carol G. Simon Center on Religion and the Constitution, Witherspoon Institute\n      \u003C\/div\u003E\n            \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-tabs\u0022\u003E\n      \u003Cul data-tabs class=\u0022tabs\u0022\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000096-taba\u0022\u003EFurther Reading\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000096-tabb\u0022\u003ECase Law\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000096-tabc\u0022\u003ERelated Essays\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n      \u003C\/ul\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv data-tabs-content\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000096-taba\u0022\u003E\n          \n      \u003Cdiv\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EEdward S. Corwin, The President: Office and Powers 1787\u20131957, 177 (4th ed. 1957)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EAlexander Hamilton, Pacificus no. 1 (29 June 1793), \u003Ci\u003Ein\u003C\/i\u003E 15 The Papers of Alexander Hamilton 33 (Harold C. Syrett et al. eds. 1969)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ELouis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the United States Constitution, 35 (2d ed.1996)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EJames Madison, Helvidius no. 3 (7 September 1793), \u003Ci\u003Ein\u003C\/i\u003E 15 The Papers of James Madison 95 (William T. Hutchinson et al. eds., 1985)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ERESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, Section 303, Comment g (1987)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n          \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n        \u003C\/div\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000096-tabb\u0022\u003E\n          \n      \u003Cdiv\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EUnited States v. Ortega, 27 F. Cas. 359 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1825) (No. 15,971)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003E\u003Ci\u003EIn re\u003C\/i\u003E Baiz, 135 U.S. 403 (1890)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EUnited States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EGuaranty Trust Co. of New York v. United States, 304\u003Cbr\u003E\nU.S. 126 (1938)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EUnited States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EGoldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EZivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421 (2012)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n          \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n        \u003C\/div\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000096-tabc\u0022\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000036\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003ECommerce with Foreign Nations\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000048\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EDeclare War\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000089\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003ETreaty Clause\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000090\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EAppointments Clause\u003C\/a\u003E\n                  \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n\u003C\/article\u003E\n"]}]