[{"command":"add_css","data":[{"rel":"stylesheet","media":"all","href":"\/sites\/default\/files\/css\/css_veuEhhb1658wti0_ZAig66JOyixENU-N9zhjLQSLfOQ.css?delta=0\u0026language=en\u0026theme=heritage_theme\u0026include=eJwrTi1LzdNPzkksLq7Uy8tPSQUAPMsGtA"}]},{"command":"invoke","selector":null,"method":"openEssay","args":["10000094","\n\n\u003Carticle about=\u0022\/constitution\/articles\/2\/essays\/95\/recommendations-clause\u0022 class=\u0022node node--type-constitution-essay node--promoted node--view-mode-embedded clearfix\u0022\u003E\n  \u003Ch1 class=\u0022title\u0022\u003E\u003Cspan\u003ERecommendations Clause\u003C\/span\u003E\n\u003C\/h1\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-location\u0022\u003E\n      Article II, Section 3\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-context\u0022\u003E\n      \n            \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003E[The President] shall from time to time...recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient....\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n  \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-body\u0022\u003E\n    \n            \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EDespite the Article I provision that \u201cAll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States,\u201d the Constitution gives the president, as James Madison put it in\u003Cem\u003E The Federalist\u003C\/em\u003E No. 47, a significant \u201cpartial agency\u201d in the legislative process. Among his most important legislative functions is the duty to recommend measures to the Congress. Through this provision, the president has come to play an important, and often primary, role in the legislative process, though it took more than a century for the implications of the Recommendations Clause to be fully developed. One reading of the Constitution is that Congress proposes legislation, then the president signs or vetoes the bill. In practice, Congress often waits for the president to propose legislation, and it is common for legislators to criticize him if he does not make such proposals.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EAt the Constitutional Convention, the clause originally contained the word \u201cmatters,\u201d but the Framers changed it to \u201cmeasures,\u201d indicating that the president was to recommend specific legislation (including the improvement of existing legislation) and not simply put forth general ideas. On the motion of Gouverneur Morris, the convention also changed the word \u201cmay\u201d to \u201cshall,\u201d as Morris stated, \u201cin order to make it the duty of the President to recommend, thence prevent umbrage or cavil at his doing it.\u201d Beyond those changes, there was little discussion. In \u003Cem\u003EThe Federalist\u003C\/em\u003E No. 77, Alexander Hamilton listed the provision among several minor presidential powers, commenting that \u201cno objection has been made to this class of authorities; nor could they possibly admit of any.\u201d\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EExplicitly, the clause imposes a duty, but its performance rests solely with the president. Congress possesses no power to compel the president to recommend. Unlike the Necessary and Proper Clause of Article I, which limits Congress\u2019s discretion in exercising its delegated powers, the phrase \u201che shall judge necessary and expedient\u201d explicitly grants discretion to the president in fulfilling the clause\u2019s duty. Because this is a political question, there has been little judicial involvement with the president\u2019s actions under the clause. In \u003Cem\u003EYoungstown Sheet Tube Co. v. Sawyer\u003C\/em\u003E (1952), the Court noted that the Recommendations Clause serves as a reminder that the president cannot make law by himself: \u201cThe power to recommend legislation, granted to the president, serves only to emphasize that it is his function to recommend and that it is the function of the Congress to legislate.\u201d The Court made a similar point in striking down the line-item veto. \u003Cem\u003EClinton v. City of New York\u003C\/em\u003E (1998). When President William J. Clinton attempted to shield the records of the president\u2019s Task Force on Health Care Reform as essential to his functions under the Recommendations Clause, a federal circuit court rejected the argument and noted, \u201c[T]he Recommendation Clause is less an obligation than a right. The President has the undisputed authority to recommend legislation, but he need not exercise that authority with respect to any particular subject or, for that matter, any subject.\u201d \u003Cem\u003EAss\u2019n of American Physicians \u0026amp; Surgeons v. Clinton\u003C\/em\u003E (1993).\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EQuestions regarding the scope of the Recommendations Clause remain. Congress often directs agencies to submit legislative recommendations. But President George W. Bush asserted not merely that all recommendations from executive agencies to Congress must be approved by him, but that Congress lacked the power altogether to compel recommendations from the president or any of the executive agencies.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe phrase \u201crecommend to their Consideration\u201d signifies the republican nature of the process. The president\u2019s recommendations are not royal edicts. They are suggestions to the people\u2019s and the states\u2019 representatives. His election is from a different constituency from either the House or the Senate, and his recommendations consequently provide a more national perspective for Congress to consider. Combined with the later addition of the Right of Assembly and Freedom of Petition clauses (in the First Amendment), the Recommendations Clause serves as an additional conduit for mediated public influence on the legislative process.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EExcept in times of emergency or war, early presidents were not actively involved in trying to influence Congress. George Washington sent only three proposals to Congress, and though Thomas Jefferson actively influenced the legislative process, he preferred to act behind the scenes rather than through formal recommendations. John Adams was more aloof than either. But as the national government became more involved in the economy (after the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 and the development of the Industrial Revolution), presidents began to try to affect congressional action.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EActive presidential involvement in pressing for legislation began with Theodore Roosevelt and expanded during the presidency of Woodrow Wilson. With the approach of World War I, the executive branch drafted legislation before working with Congress. With the return of Republican presidents in the 1920s, presidential activism decreased. The breakthrough of the modern presidency with respect to the legislative process came with Franklin D. Roosevelt\u2019s legendary Hundred Days. After calling the Seventy-Third Congress into special session on March 9, 1933, shortly after his inauguration, Roosevelt sent to Congress over the next one hundred days a flurry of proposed laws intended to help the nation cope with the economic disaster of the Great Depression. Most of the laws were actually drafted in the White House, and the Democrat-controlled Congress passed most without hearings or any careful legislative scrutiny.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EAfter FDR, presidentially inspired programs became a mainstay of the legislative process. Though reluctant at first, President Dwight D. Eisenhower established the Office of Congressional Relations to assist him in dealing with Congress. The subsequent record of presidential administrations has been varied, though the role of the president in proposing legislation remains a core feature of the modern presidency.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n  \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author\u0022\u003E\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--media\u0022\u003E\n            \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--info\u0022\u003E\n              \u003Ch4 class=\u0022con-essay-author--name\u0022\u003E\n                      Vasan Kesavan\n                  \u003C\/h4\u003E\n                  \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--job\u0022\u003E\n         Investment Analyst, Valinor Management\n      \u003C\/div\u003E\n            \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-tabs\u0022\u003E\n      \u003Cul data-tabs class=\u0022tabs\u0022\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000094-taba\u0022\u003EFurther Reading\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000094-tabb\u0022\u003ECase Law\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000094-tabc\u0022\u003ERelated Essays\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n      \u003C\/ul\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv data-tabs-content\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000094-taba\u0022\u003E\n          \n      \u003Cdiv\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EEdward S. Corwin, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787\u20131984 (5th ed. rev. 1984)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EGeorge C. Edwards, At the Margins (1989)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EVasan Kesavan \u0026amp; J. Gregory Sidak, The Legislator-in-Chief, 44 Wm. \u0026amp; Mary L. Rev. 1 (2002)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EHarold J. Krent, From a Unitary to a Unilateral Presidency, 88 B.U. L. Rev. 523 (2008)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EJ. Gregory Sidak, The Recommendation Clause, 77 Geo. L.J. 2079 (1989)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EJames L. Sundquist, THE DECLINE AND RESURGENCE OF CONGRESS (1981)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EStephen J. Wayne, THE LEGISLATIVE PRESIDENCY (1978)\u003Cbr\u003E\n\u0026nbsp;\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n          \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n        \u003C\/div\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000094-tabb\u0022\u003E\n          \n      \u003Cdiv\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EYoungstown Sheet \u0026amp; Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EAss\u2019n of American Physicians \u0026amp; Surgeons v. Clinton, 997 F.2d 898 (D.C. Cir. 1993)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EClinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n          \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n        \u003C\/div\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000094-tabc\u0022\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000001\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003ELegislative Vesting Clause\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000031\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EPocket Veto\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000089\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003ETreaty Clause\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000090\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EAppointments Clause\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000093\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EState of the Union\u003C\/a\u003E\n                  \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n\u003C\/article\u003E\n"]}]