[{"command":"add_css","data":[{"rel":"stylesheet","media":"all","href":"\/sites\/default\/files\/css\/css_veuEhhb1658wti0_ZAig66JOyixENU-N9zhjLQSLfOQ.css?delta=0\u0026language=en\u0026theme=heritage_theme\u0026include=eJwrTi1LzdNPzkksLq7Uy8tPSQUAPMsGtA"}]},{"command":"invoke","selector":null,"method":"openEssay","args":["10000091","\n\n\u003Carticle about=\u0022\/constitution\/articles\/2\/essays\/92\/inferior-officers\u0022 class=\u0022node node--type-constitution-essay node--promoted node--view-mode-embedded clearfix\u0022\u003E\n  \u003Ch1 class=\u0022title\u0022\u003E\u003Cspan\u003EInferior Officers\u003C\/span\u003E\n\u003C\/h1\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-location\u0022\u003E\n      Article II, Section 2, Clause 2\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-context\u0022\u003E\n      \n            \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003E...the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n  \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-body\u0022\u003E\n    \n            \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EThe appointment power has become one of the chief powers of the president. The \u201cby law\u201d language concerning inferior officers\u2014sometimes known as the Excepting Clause\u2014authorizes the president in certain cases to exercise the appointment power alone, or through the heads of departments who are themselves his appointees. That greatly expands the scope of the appointment power beyond the mechanism of Senate consent.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe Appointments Clause divides constitutional officers into two classes: principal officers, who must be appointed through the advice and consent mechanism; and inferior officers, who may be appointed through advice and consent of the Senate, but whose appointment Congress may place instead in any of the \u201cthree repositories of the appointment power\u201d in the Excepting Clause. \u003Cem\u003ESee Freytag v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue\u003C\/em\u003E (1991); \u003Cem\u003EUnited States v. Germaine\u003C\/em\u003E (1879). These two methods are the only means of appointing government officers under the Constitution. Most officers are considered inferior officers; but, significantly, most government employees are not considered officers at all.\u0026nbsp;\u003Cem\u003ESee Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Board\u003C\/em\u003E (2010).\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003ECongress itself may not exercise the appointment power; its functions are limited to the Senate\u2019s role in advice and consent and to deciding whether to vest a direct appointment power over a given office in the president, a head of department, or the courts of law. The Framers were particularly concerned that Congress might seek to exercise the appointment power and fill offices with their supporters, to the derogation of the president\u2019s control over the executive branch. The Appointments Clause thus functions as a restraint on Congress and as an important structural element in the separation of powers. Attempts by Congress to circumvent the Appointments Clause, either by making appointments directly, or through devices such as \u201cunilaterally appointing an incumbent to a new and distinct office\u201d under the guise of legislating new duties for an existing office, have been rebuffed by the courts. \u003Cem\u003EBuckley v. Valeo\u003C\/em\u003E (1976); \u003Cem\u003EWeiss v. United States\u003C\/em\u003E (1994). Congress may attempt to define the qualifications for an office (particularly one that Congress creates) so restrictively that Congress effectively exercises the appointment power. The precise constraints on the ability of Congress to encroach on the appointment power in this way have not been established.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe final \u201cby law\u201d language emerged at the end of the Constitutional Convention, as a late addendum to the compromise over the device of presidential nomination and Senate advice and consent for principal officers. The language occasioned little debate. An earlier version of the language would have given the president a broader power to \u201cappoint officers in all cases not otherwise provided for by this Constitution,\u201d but some delegates worried that this language would permit the president to create offices as well as to fill them, a classic case of institutional corruption. The requirement that the president can appoint inferior officers only when Congress has \u201cby Law vest[ed]\u201d that power in the president apparently sought to preclude that possibility.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EAlthough separation of powers values lay behind the language of the Appointments Clause, early judicial interpretations struck a more practical note. Chief Justice John Marshall, sitting as a circuit justice, opined that the \u201cby law\u201d language was the Framers\u2019 means to ensure \u201cthat they had provided for all cases of offices\u201d needing appointments. \u003Cem\u003EUnited States v. Maurice\u003C\/em\u003E (1823). The Supreme Court in \u003Cem\u003EUnited States v. Germaine\u003C\/em\u003E gave its explanation of the Framers\u2019 intent behind the \u201cby law\u201d language as anticipating that \u201cwhen offices became numerous, and sudden removals necessary,\u201d the advice and consent process might prove too \u201cinconvenient.\u201d\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003ETwo chief questions recur under the \u201cby law\u201d language: (1) Who are \u201cinferior Officers,\u201d not subject to the requirement of advice and consent? and (2) Who qualifies as a head of department, when Congress seeks to place the appointment power away from the president?\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EAs noted above, most government employees are not officers and thus are not subject to the Appointments Clause at all. In \u003Cem\u003EBuckley v. Valeo\u003C\/em\u003E, the Supreme Court held that only those appointees \u201cexercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States\u201d are \u201cOfficers of the United States,\u201d and consequently it is only those who exercise such \u201csignificant authority\u201d who must be appointed by a mechanism set forth in the Appointments Clause. Employees not subject to the requirements of the Appointments Clause were described by the Court as \u201clesser functionaries subordinate to officers of the United States.\u201d\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe Framers did not define the line between principal officers and inferior officers, and the Court has been content to approach the analysis on a case-by-case basis rather than through a definitive test. \u003Cem\u003ESee Morrison v. Olson\u003C\/em\u003E (1988). In \u003Cem\u003EMorrison\u003C\/em\u003E, the Court listed certain factors as hallmarks of \u201cinferior Officer\u201d status, such as removability by a higher executive branch official other than the president, and limitations on the officer\u2019s duties, jurisdiction, and tenure. In \u003Cem\u003EEdmond v. United States\u003C\/em\u003E (1997), the Court, while continuing to deny that it had recognized any definitive test, stated that \u201c\u2018inferior officers\u2019 are officers whose work is directed and supervised at some level by others who were appointed by Presidential nomination with the advice and consent of the Senate.\u201d Although the Court has not rejected consideration of the factors announced in \u003Cem\u003EMorrison\u003C\/em\u003E, it has relied on the standard applied in \u003Cem\u003EEdmond\u003C\/em\u003E to distinguish between principal and inferior officers. \u003Cem\u003ESee Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Board\u003C\/em\u003E. Among those officers recognized as \u201cinferior\u201d are district court clerks, federal supervisors of elections, the Watergate special prosecutor, and an independent counsel appointed under the Ethics in Government Act of 1978.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe phrase \u201cheads of departments\u201d also has not been defined precisely by the Court. Judicial interpretations of the phrase refer to the heads of departments that are within the executive branch, \u201cor at least have some connection with that branch.\u201d \u003Cem\u003EBuckley v. Valeo\u003C\/em\u003E. In \u003Cem\u003EFreytag v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue\u003C\/em\u003E, the Court interpreted \u201cheads of departments\u201d to refer \u201cto executive divisions like the Cabinet-level departments,\u201d but seemed to reserve the question whether the heads of non-cabinet executive-branch agencies could be deemed to be \u201cheads of departments\u201d for purposes of the Appointments Clause. In \u003Cem\u003EFree Enterprise Fund\u003C\/em\u003E, the Court answered that question by adopting the reasoning of Justice Antonin Scalia\u2019s concurring opinion in \u003Cem\u003EFreytag\u003C\/em\u003E and holding that the non-cabinet Securities and Exchange Commission constituted a department for purposes of the Appointments Clause because the commission \u201cis a freestanding component of the Executive Branch, not subordinate to or contained within any other such component.\u201d Under this view, the heads of all freestanding agencies and departments exercising executive power under the president would seem to qualify as \u201cheads of departments.\u201d\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n  \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author\u0022\u003E\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--media\u0022\u003E\n            \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--info\u0022\u003E\n              \u003Ch4 class=\u0022con-essay-author--name\u0022\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022http:\/\/www.gibsondunn.com\/lawyers\/dcox\u0022\u003EDouglas Cox\u003C\/a\u003E\n                  \u003C\/h4\u003E\n                  \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--job\u0022\u003E\n         Partner, Gibson, Dunn \u0026amp; Crutcher, LLP\n      \u003C\/div\u003E\n            \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-tabs\u0022\u003E\n      \u003Cul data-tabs class=\u0022tabs\u0022\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000091-taba\u0022\u003EFurther Reading\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000091-tabb\u0022\u003ECase Law\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000091-tabc\u0022\u003ERelated Essays\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n      \u003C\/ul\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv data-tabs-content\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000091-taba\u0022\u003E\n          \n      \u003Cdiv\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ETheodore Y. Blumoff, \u003Ci\u003ESeparation of Powers and the Origins of the Appointments Clause\u003C\/i\u003E, 37 Syracuse L. Rev. 1037 (1987)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EMichael J. Gerhardt, \u003Ci\u003EToward a Comprehensive Understanding of the Federal Appointments Process\u003C\/i\u003E, 21 Harv. J.L. \u0026amp; Pub. Pol\u0027y 479 (1998)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EMemorandum for the General Counsels of the Executive Branch, from Steven G. Bradbury, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Officers of the United States Within the Meaning of the Appointments Clause (Apr. 16, 2007), at http:\/\/www.justice.gov\/olc\/2007\/appointmentsclausev10.pdf\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EEdward Susolik, \u003Ci\u003ESeparation of Powers and Liberty: The Appointments Clause\u003C\/i\u003E, Morrison v. Olson, \u003Ci\u003Eand the Rule of Law\u003C\/i\u003E, 63 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1515 (1990)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n          \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n        \u003C\/div\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000091-tabb\u0022\u003E\n          \n      \u003Cdiv\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EUnited States v. Maurice, 26 F. Cas. 1211 (C.C.D. Va. 1823)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EUnited States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508 (1879)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EBuckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EMorrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EFreytag v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 501 U.S. 868 (1991)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EWeiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163 (1994)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EEdmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651 (1997)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EFree Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n          \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n        \u003C\/div\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000091-tabc\u0022\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000027\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003ESinecure Clause\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000075\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EExecutive Vesting Clause\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000087\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EOpinion Clause\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000092\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003ERecess Appointments Clause\u003C\/a\u003E\n                  \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n\u003C\/article\u003E\n"]}]