[{"command":"add_css","data":[{"rel":"stylesheet","media":"all","href":"\/sites\/default\/files\/css\/css_veuEhhb1658wti0_ZAig66JOyixENU-N9zhjLQSLfOQ.css?delta=0\u0026language=en\u0026theme=heritage_theme\u0026include=eJwrTi1LzdNPzkksLq7Uy8tPSQUAPMsGtA"}]},{"command":"invoke","selector":null,"method":"openEssay","args":["10000075","\n\n\u003Carticle about=\u0022\/constitution\/articles\/2\/essays\/76\/executive-vesting-clause\u0022 class=\u0022node node--type-constitution-essay node--promoted node--view-mode-embedded clearfix\u0022\u003E\n  \u003Ch1 class=\u0022title\u0022\u003E\u003Cspan\u003EExecutive Vesting Clause\u003C\/span\u003E\n\u003C\/h1\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-location\u0022\u003E\n      Article II, Section 1, Clause 1\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-context\u0022\u003E\n      \n            \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EThe executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n  \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-body\u0022\u003E\n    \n            \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EThe Executive Vesting Clause (or \u201cVesting Clause\u201d) grants the president the executive power traditionally associated with chief executives, subject to the many clarifications and constraints listed elsewhere in Article II. The Vesting Clause is best read as granting authority to direct and remove executive officers, a power to control the execution of federal law, and an interstitial power over foreign affairs.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe Articles of Confederation lacked an independent chief executive. Instead, the Continental Congress exercised the executive power, appointing and dominating the secretaries of the executive departments. Execution of the laws by a distracted, plural executive was hardly vigorous. Congress likewise proved a poor steward of foreign affairs, with American diplomats complaining that Congress could not act with the requisite speed or secrecy. Similar problems plagued the states. Though state constitutions formally created separate executives, most were nearly as weak as their federal counterparts. Some executive powers, such as appointments and pardons, were granted to the legislatures. Other constitutions subjected executive authority to statutory limitation, meaning that constitutional allocations of power were default rules. Finally, executive powers occasionally were shared with, or checked by, a council.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EResolving to avoid the problems plaguing state and national executives, the Founders rejected both a triumvirate and a powerful executive council. Instead, they crafted an energetic, responsible, and (largely) unified executive. A\u0026nbsp;single executive could act with vigor and speed and avoid the dissension that might plague a plural executive. A unitary executive also would conduce towards responsibility, because all eyes would be drawn to the chief executive rather than to a plural executive, where each executive would claim credit and shift blame.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EIn discussing the need for a unitary executive, the Founders repeatedly confirmed the chief executive\u2019s law-enforcement power. James Wilson captured the spirit of the reform when he remarked that a \u201csingle magistrate\u201d would supply the \u201cmost energy, dispatch, and responsibility\u201d to the execution of the laws, a view echoed by Alexander Hamilton in \u003Cem\u003EThe Federalist\u003C\/em\u003E No. 70. Likewise, some Founders spoke of the president\u2019s significant role in foreign affairs, discussing the Senate\u2019s check on treaty-making as an exception to the grant of executive power. Early practices confirmed these readings of the Executive Vesting Clause. President George Washington took many actions not traceable to any specific foreign affairs clause in Article II, including issuing the Neutrality Proclamation, asking for the recall of French emissary, Citizen Gen\u00eat, and directing United States diplomats posted overseas. Similarly the first president directed federal law execution and executive officers of various sorts\u2014soldiers, customs officials, the U.S. attorneys, and departmental secretaries, among others.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe Vesting Clause\u2019s rule that the president enjoys those powers traditionally vested with chief executives admits of two limitations. First, the president lacks executive authority explicitly granted to Congress. Hence he cannot declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, or regulate commerce, even though some chief executives had such authority. In these instances, Congress retained portions of the executive power that the Continental Congress had wielded under the Articles of Confederation. Second, specific constitutional provisions check customary\u0026nbsp;executive authority. Despite his executive power, the president cannot make treaties or appointments without the Senate\u2019s advice and consent. In this regard, the Senate acts as a limited executive council. Likewise, the president cannot pardon impeachments or violations of state law.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EFrom the Constitution\u2019s inception, some have doubted whether the Vesting Clause grants any power at all. Some have asserted that the \u201cexecutive Power\u201d merely refers to those specific powers enumerated elsewhere in Article II. Others have argued that the Vesting Clause does no more than designate the title and number of the apex of the executive. To claim more for the Vesting Clause supposedly would make the rest of Article II redundant. There are reasons to reject such claims. First, these arguments shunt aside the eighteenth-century understanding of executive power. The phrase \u201cexecutive Power\u201d was not an empty catchall encompassing any and all authority granted by a constitution to an executive. The phrase encompassed, at a minimum, control of the execution of laws, foreign affairs, and executive officers.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003ESecond, traditional rules of interpretation require us to take seriously the differences across the three vesting clauses. Article I, Section 1 (\u201cAll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States\u2009.\u2009.\u2009.\u201d) makes clear that it vests no powers apart from those enumerated in the rest of Article I. In contrast, Article III, Section 1 (\u201cThe judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may\u2009.\u2009.\u2009.\u2009establish.\u201d) clearly vests the federal courts with judicial authority. The Executive Vesting Clause reads like its Article III counterpart, in sharp contrast to the Article I introductory clause.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThird, although the title and number theory seeks to avoid redundant readings, it fails on its own terms. Because the rest of Article II makes clear that there would be only one executive styled the \u201cpresident\u201d (provisions in Article\u0026nbsp;II repeatedly mention a \u201cpresident\u201d and use the singular pronoun \u201che\u201d), the title and number theory would render the Executive Vesting Clause redundant. If every reading of the clause yields some redundancy, then arguments about redundancy cannot supply a reason for preferring one reading over another.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EWhile the Vesting Clause is most often associated with execution of the laws, foreign affairs, and direction of executive officers, some imagine that it grants additional authority. For instance, many believe that the clause supports an executive privilege that enables the president to shield executive communications from Congress and the judiciary. Others contend that the clause grants the president certain immunities in court, such as immunity from suits challenging his official actions. Perhaps the clause conveys certain \u201cemergency powers\u201d to take extraordinary actions during exigencies, of the sort that Abraham Lincoln took during the Civil War.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe Vesting Clause has played a limited role in constitutional litigation. With some exceptions\u2014including Justice Robert H. Jackson\u2019s concurring opinion in \u003Cem\u003EYoungstown Sheet \u0026amp; Tube Co. v. Sawyer\u003C\/em\u003E (1952)\u2014the Supreme Court has accepted that the clause grants powers beyond those specifically enumerated in Article II. In \u003Cem\u003EMyers v. United States\u003C\/em\u003E (1926), the Court cited the Executive Vesting Clause as the source of removal and supervisory powers over executive officers. \u003Cem\u003ENixon v. Fitzgerald\u003C\/em\u003E (1982) cited the clause as a source of three powers (law enforcement, foreign affairs, and a supervisory power over the executive branch). In a 2003 case touching upon foreign affairs, the judiciary affirmed that the Vesting Clause grants foreign affairs authority. See \u003Cem\u003EAmerican Insurance Ass\u2019n v. Garamendi\u003C\/em\u003E (2003). This marks a departure from prior case law, which had grounded the executive\u2019s foreign affairs powers in necessity and sovereignty. See \u003Cem\u003EUnited States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.\u003C\/em\u003E (1936). In a rather recent case, the Supreme Court repeatedly declared that multilayered removal protections were inconsistent with the grant of executive power, thereby grounding the president\u2019s removal power in the Vesting Clause. See \u003Cem\u003EFree Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board\u003C\/em\u003E (2010). Yet the Court did not disturb the existing scheme of \u201cfor cause\u201d removal restrictions that help grant the independent agencies their autonomy.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EIndeed, despite the willingness to read the clause as granting power, judicial decisions have consistently limited its reach. Post-\u003Cem\u003EMyers\u003C\/em\u003E, the Supreme Court essentially sanctioned the creation of a fourth branch of government in the form of numerous independent agencies that simultaneously exercise legislative, executive, and judicial powers. The most notable such case, \u003Cem\u003EMorrison v. Olson\u003C\/em\u003E (1988), acknowledged that the Executive Vesting Clause granted the president control over prosecutions even as it upheld the constitutionality of the Independent Counsel Act. The \u003Cem\u003EMorrison\u003C\/em\u003E Court concluded that the good-cause removal restriction protecting Independent Counsels did not \u201cunduly trammel on executive authority.\u201d That framework well describes the Supreme Court\u2019s case law on the Vesting Clause: while the clause grants the president substantive power not found elsewhere in the Constitution, those powers are often subject to congressional regulation and modification.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n  \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author\u0022\u003E\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--media\u0022\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--photo\u0022 style=\u0022background-image: url(\/sites\/default\/files\/Sai_Prakash.jpg)\u0022\u003E\u003C\/div\u003E\n            \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--info\u0022\u003E\n              \u003Ch4 class=\u0022con-essay-author--name\u0022\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022http:\/\/www.law.virginia.edu\/lawweb\/faculty.nsf\/FHPbI\/1200266\u0022\u003ESaikrishna Prakash\u003C\/a\u003E\n                  \u003C\/h4\u003E\n                  \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--job\u0022\u003E\n         David Lurton Massee, Jr., Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law\n      \u003C\/div\u003E\n            \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-tabs\u0022\u003E\n      \u003Cul data-tabs class=\u0022tabs\u0022\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000075-taba\u0022\u003EFurther Reading\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000075-tabb\u0022\u003ECase Law\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000075-tabc\u0022\u003ERelated Essays\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n      \u003C\/ul\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv data-tabs-content\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000075-taba\u0022\u003E\n          \n      \u003Cdiv\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ESteven G. Calabresi, \u003Ci\u003ESome Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive\u003C\/i\u003E, 48 Ark. L. Rev. 23 (1995)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ESteven G. Calabresi \u0026amp; Saikrishna Prakash, \u003Ci\u003EThe President\u0027s Power to Execute the Laws\u003C\/i\u003E, 104 Yale L.J. 541 (1994)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ESteven G. Calabresi \u0026amp; Kevin H. Rhodes, \u003Ci\u003EThe Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary\u003C\/i\u003E, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1153 (1992)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EHAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR (1990)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ELawrence Lessig \u0026amp; Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 4 (1994)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EH. Jefferson Powell, The Founders and the President\u2019s Authority over Foreign Affairs, 40 WM. \u0026amp; MARY L. REV. 1471 (1999)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ESaikrishna B. Prakash, The Essential Meaning of Executive Power, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 701 (2003)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ESaikrishna B. Prakash \u0026amp; Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231 (2001)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EABRAHAM D. SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AND CONSTITUTIONAL POWER (1984)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n          \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n        \u003C\/div\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000075-tabb\u0022\u003E\n          \n      \u003Cdiv\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EMyers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EHumphrey\u0027s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EUnited States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EYoungstown Sheet \u0026amp; Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EUnited States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ENixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EMorrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EClinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EAmerican Ins. Ass\u2019n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EFree Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n          \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n        \u003C\/div\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000075-tabc\u0022\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000001\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003ELegislative Vesting Clause\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000085\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003ECommander in Chief\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000089\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003ETreaty Clause\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000090\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EAppointments Clause\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000097\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003ETake Care Clause\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000101\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EJudicial Vesting Clause\u003C\/a\u003E\n                  \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n\u003C\/article\u003E\n"]}]