[{"command":"add_css","data":[{"rel":"stylesheet","media":"all","href":"\/sites\/default\/files\/css\/css_veuEhhb1658wti0_ZAig66JOyixENU-N9zhjLQSLfOQ.css?delta=0\u0026language=en\u0026theme=heritage_theme\u0026include=eJwrTi1LzdNPzkksLq7Uy8tPSQUAPMsGtA"}]},{"command":"invoke","selector":null,"method":"openEssay","args":["10000070","\n\n\u003Carticle about=\u0022\/constitution\/articles\/1\/essays\/71\/state-bill-of-attainder-and-state-ex-post-facto\u0022 class=\u0022node node--type-constitution-essay node--promoted node--view-mode-embedded clearfix\u0022\u003E\n  \u003Ch1 class=\u0022title\u0022\u003E\u003Cspan\u003EState Bill of Attainder and State Ex Post Facto\u003C\/span\u003E\n\u003C\/h1\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-location\u0022\u003E\n      Article I, Section 10, Clause 1\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-context\u0022\u003E\n      \n            \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ENo State shall...pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law....\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n  \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-body\u0022\u003E\n    \n            \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EThe Framers regarded bills of attainder and ex post facto laws as so offensive to liberty that they prohibited their use by both Congress (Article I, Section 9, Clause 3) and the states. The Framers had observed the use of bills of attainder by Parliament, particularly in cases of treason, and they were determined to deny the national legislature any such power. The Bill of Attainder Clause was part of the Framer\u2019s plan to limit and refine what they saw as the unacceptable English abuse of the law of treason. As Justice Samuel Chase noted in \u003Cem\u003ECalder v. Bull\u003C\/em\u003E (1798), the Framers applied the prohibition to the states \u201c[t]o prevent such and similar acts of violence and injustice.\u201d There is also historical evidence that the clause was designed to prohibit what the Framers observed as recent abusive state practices in the taking of private property.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe issue of ex post facto laws was more nuanced. Many of the Founders regarded retroactive laws, both civil and criminal, as contrary to the principle of legality itself. Roman law as well as Henry de Bracton (1210\u20131268), Sir Edward Coke (1552\u20131634), and Sir William Blackstone (1723\u20131780) in English law, and the influential Baron de Montesquieu (1689\u20131755), condemned the practice. Thomas Jefferson noted in an 1813 letter to Isaac McPherson, \u201cThe sentiment that ex post facto laws are against natural right, is so strong in the United States, that few, if any, of the state constitutions have failed to proscribe them.\u201d At Philadelphia, some Framers, such as James Wilson, thought ex post facto laws so extra-legal that they were void \u003Cem\u003Eab initio\u003C\/em\u003E; no textual prohibition was necessary. But a majority of the delegates wanted the prohibition stated in express terms.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EAll seemed to agree that ex post facto \u003Cem\u003Ecriminal laws\u003C\/em\u003E were forbidden, but there was more ambiguity as to the validity of ex post facto \u003Cem\u003Ecivil laws\u003C\/em\u003E. Part of the issue lay in the difference between a new law that changed preexisting legal obligations, and one that merely impacted (albeit severely) preexisting legal relationships. When Rhode Island, for example, issued a massive amount of paper money, it vitiated creditors\u2019 holdings even though the legislature had not changed the terms of the contracts. Yet even here, some observers termed the issuance of paper money an ex post facto law. More seriously, other states did change the terms of contracts that is, of legal relationships, tolling the period for repayment. These kinds of measures constituted the \u201cfluctuating policy\u201d and \u201clegislative interferences\u201d that James Madison decried in \u003Cem\u003EThe Federalist\u003C\/em\u003E No. 44.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EAt the Constitutional Convention, George Mason moved to remove the ex post facto prohibition from the states precisely because he believed it would prevent some state retroactive legislation in civil areas that he thought beneficial. Elbridge Gerry supported Mason, but apparently only because he wanted the clause rewritten to apply specifically to civil cases. Mason\u2019s motion was unanimously rejected. In the ratifying\u0026nbsp;conventions, Anti-Federalists such as Patrick Henry also feared the impact of ex post facto prohibition on state economic legislation.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EAfter the Convention, most Federalists believed the prohibition applied only to criminal statutes, a view adopted by the Supreme Court beginning with \u003Cem\u003ECalder v. Bull\u003C\/em\u003E (1798). In \u003Cem\u003ECalder\u003C\/em\u003E, Justice Samuel Chase noted that if the Ex Post Facto Clause (Article I, Section 9, Clause 3) applied to retroactive civil legislation, then the impairment of contracts clause (Article I, Section 10, Clause 1) would have been superfluous. As Robert Natelson has pointed out, in the end, the resulting prohibitions in the Constitution form a coherent pattern. The Ex Post Facto Clause prohibited retroactive criminal legislation, whereas the prohibition on the states from issuing paper money and from impairing the obligation of contracts covered the most objectionable forms of retroactive civil laws. Finally, the pattern was completed in the Fifth Amendment by the Takings Clause and the Due Process Clause, each of which limited the federal government\u2019s ability to enact certain kinds of retroactive civil laws.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EIn recent cases, federal courts have applied the understanding of the Ex Post Facto Clause as applicable to criminal but not civil matters. So, for example, the Tenth Circuit found that a state regulation imposing a $25 monthly supervision fee on parolees did not violate the Ex Post Facto and Bill of Attainder Clauses because it was not punitive in nature and had legitimate legislative purpose.\u003Cem\u003E Taylor v. Sebelius\u003C\/em\u003E (2006). The First Circuit held that a state constitutional amendment preventing the imprisoned from voting in state elections did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because there was a non-excessive and \u201cobvious rational nonpunitive purpose for disenfranchisement.\u201d \u003Cem\u003ESimmons v. Galvin\u003C\/em\u003E (2009). In \u003Cem\u003EIn re DNA Ex Post Facto Issues\u003C\/em\u003E (2009), the Fourth Circuit found that requirements that prisoners must provide DNA samples and pay a $250 fee was not punitive enough to violate the Ex Post Facto Clause, but the requirement that the fee be paid before allowing a prisoner to be paroled or released did violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe substantive legal content of the Bill of Attainder and the Ex Post Facto Clauses in Sections 9 and 10 of Article I are fundamentally the same. Consult the entries on Article I, Section 9, Clause 3.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n  \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author\u0022\u003E\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--media\u0022\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--photo\u0022 style=\u0022background-image: url(\/sites\/default\/files\/David_Forte.jpg)\u0022\u003E\u003C\/div\u003E\n            \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--info\u0022\u003E\n              \u003Ch4 class=\u0022con-essay-author--name\u0022\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022http:\/\/facultyprofile.csuohio.edu\/csufacultyprofile\/detail.cfm?FacultyID=D_FORTE\u0022\u003EDavid F. Forte\u003C\/a\u003E\n                  \u003C\/h4\u003E\n                  \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--job\u0022\u003E\n         Professor, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law\n      \u003C\/div\u003E\n            \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-tabs\u0022\u003E\n      \u003Cul data-tabs class=\u0022tabs\u0022\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000070-taba\u0022\u003EFurther Reading\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000070-tabb\u0022\u003ECase Law\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000070-tabc\u0022\u003ERelated Essays\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n      \u003C\/ul\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv data-tabs-content\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000070-taba\u0022\u003E\n          \n      \u003Cdiv\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EJ. Richard Broughton, \u003Ci\u003EOn Straddle Crimes and the\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003EEx Post Facto Clauses\u003C\/i\u003E,\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003E18 GEO. MASON L. REV.\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003E719\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003E(2011)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EJoan Comparet-Cassani, \u003Ci\u003EExtending the Statute of Limitations in Child Molestation Cases Does Not Violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of Stogner\u003C\/i\u003E, 5\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003EWHITTIER J.\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003ECHILD \u0026amp; FAM. ADVOC. 303 (2006)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EWayne A. Logan, \u003Ci\u003E\u201cDemocratic Despotism\u201d and Constitutional Constraint: An Empirical Analysis of Ex Post Facto Claims in State Courts\u003C\/i\u003E, 12\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003EWM. \u0026amp; MARY\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003EBILL RTS. J. 439 (2004)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003ERobert G. Natelson, \u003Ci\u003EStatutory Retroactivity: The\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003EFounders\u2019 View\u003C\/i\u003E, 39\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003EIDAHO L. REV. 489 (2003)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EDuane L. Ostler, \u003Ci\u003EThe Forgotten Constitutional Spot-light: How Viewing the Ban on Bills of Attainder as a Takings Protection Clarifies Constitutional Principles\u003C\/i\u003E, 42\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003EU. TOL. L. REV. 395 (2011)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EDaniel E. Troy, \u003Ci\u003ESymposium: When Does Retroactivity\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003ECross the Line? Winstar, Eastern Enterprises and Beyond: Toward a Definition and Critique of Retro-activity\u003C\/i\u003E, 51\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003EALA. L. REV.\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003E1329 (2000)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n          \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n        \u003C\/div\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000070-tabb\u0022\u003E\n          \n      \u003Cdiv\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ECalder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EEastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ETaylor v. Sebelius, 189 Fed.Appx. 752, 756\u201358 (10th Cir. 2006)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EChan v. Gantner, 464 F.3d 289 (2d Cir. 2006)\u0026nbsp;\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EHouston v. Williams, 547 F.3d 1357, 1364 (11th Cir. 2008)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003E\u003Ci\u003EIn re \u003C\/i\u003EDNA Ex Post Facto Issues, 561 F.3d 294, 299\u2013301\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003E(4th Cir. 2009)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ESimmons v. Galvin, 575 F.3d 24, 45 (1st Cir. 2009)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EACORN v. United States, 618 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2010)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EDorsey v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2321 (2012)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n          \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n        \u003C\/div\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000070-tabc\u0022\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000061\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EBill of Attainder\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000062\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EEx Post Facto\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000069\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EState Coinage\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000071\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EObligation of Contract\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000149\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EDue Process Clause\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000150\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003ETakings Clause\u003C\/a\u003E\n                  \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n\u003C\/article\u003E\n"]}]