[{"command":"add_css","data":[{"rel":"stylesheet","media":"all","href":"\/sites\/default\/files\/css\/css_veuEhhb1658wti0_ZAig66JOyixENU-N9zhjLQSLfOQ.css?delta=0\u0026language=en\u0026theme=heritage_theme\u0026include=eJwrTi1LzdNPzkksLq7Uy8tPSQUAPMsGtA"}]},{"command":"invoke","selector":null,"method":"openEssay","args":["10000068","\n\n\u003Carticle about=\u0022\/constitution\/articles\/1\/essays\/69\/state-treaties\u0022 class=\u0022node node--type-constitution-essay node--promoted node--view-mode-embedded clearfix\u0022\u003E\n  \u003Ch1 class=\u0022title\u0022\u003E\u003Cspan\u003EState Treaties\u003C\/span\u003E\n\u003C\/h1\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-location\u0022\u003E\n      Article I, Section 10, Clause 1\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-context\u0022\u003E\n      \n            \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ENo State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal....\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n  \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-body\u0022\u003E\n    \n            \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EIn addition to granting the government powers to regulate trade and raise revenue that it either lacked or could not enforce under the Articles of Confederation, the Framers intended the Constitution to centralize much, if not all, power over foreign affairs. Many of the federal government\u2019s enumerated powers relate to foreign affairs and have corresponding restrictions on states in Article I, Section 10. Article VI of the Articles of Confederation had permitted the states to conclude treaties with foreign governments with the consent of Congress. States could also grant letters of marque and reprisal after Congress had declared war. While some of Article I, Section 10\u2019s proscriptions, such as the ability to levy tonnage duties or enter into \u201ccompacts or agreements,\u201d may be permitted by Congress, others, such as the prohibitions described here, are absolute.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003ETreaties, as well as alliances and confederations, are formal, binding agreements between nations that are the subjects of international law. \u201cCompacts and agreements\u201d are usually made by governmental officials, such as the executive, or by subsidiary governmental units, such as states or municipalities. In the late eighteenth century, governments issued letters of marque and reprisal to authorize private ships to attack certain foreign shipping and gain booty for their efforts. Issuing them was regarded as an act of war.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EIn \u003Cem\u003EThe Federalist \u003C\/em\u003ENo. 44, James Madison noted that these proscriptions (like the prohibition on treaties) either \u201cneed[ed] no explanation\u201d or (like the restrictions on letters of marque and reprisal) were \u201cfully justified by the advantage of uniformity in all points which relate to foreign powers; and of immediate responsibility to the nation in all those for whose conduct the nation itself is to be responsible.\u201d Justice Joseph Story concurred, writing in his \u003Cem\u003ECommentaries on the Constitution of the United States\u003C\/em\u003E (1833) that the power to issue letters of marque and reprisal \u201cis appropriately confined to the national government\u201d because \u201cthe protection of the whole Union is confided to the national arm, and the national power,\u201d and no state \u201cshould possess military means to overawe the Union, or to endanger the general safety.\u201d As noted foreign-affairs scholar Louis Henkin remarked, \u201cthese restrictions are as clear as words can make them and have raised no issues.\u2009.\u2009.\u2009. \u201d\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe courts have had little occasion to deal with the clause, though in \u003Cem\u003EHolmes v. Jennison\u003C\/em\u003E (1840), Justice Roger B. Taney, writing for himself and three other Justices, commented that the clause \u201cpositively and unconditionally\u201d forbade states from entering into treaties, and that \u201ceven the consent of Congress could not authorize\u201d them to do so. Taney, citing Emmerich de Vattel (1714\u20131767), also distinguished formal \u201ctreaties,\u201d\u0026nbsp;which were expressly forbidden to states, from \u201cagreements\u201d and \u201ccompacts,\u201d which Congress could authorize.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe Supreme Court has not had an opportunity recently to distinguish between a \u201ctreaty\u201d and a foreign \u201ccompact\u201d or \u201cagreement.\u201d In fact, in \u003Cem\u003EU.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Commission\u003C\/em\u003E (1978), the Supreme Court described the original understanding of the terms as historically \u201clost.\u201d It may be that Court would consider the distinction a political question. As one author has noted, states and municipalities have recently entered into a number of such compacts and agreements without the consent of Congress and have attempted to distinguish these compacts and agreements from treaties by inserting language that these agreements constitute political commitments with no legal effect. Another reason that many state-initiated compacts and agreements have not been challenged in court as violating the State Treaties Clause is that the executive branch has encouraged such agreements. Michael Ramsey argues that the founders did indeed distinguish between treaties and compacts, drawing upon ancient Roman distinctions maintained by authorities such as Hugo Grotius (1583\u20131645) and de Vattel. Ramsey also asserts that states reserve all foreign affairs powers not delegated to the federal government or prohibited to the states by the Constitution.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n  \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author\u0022\u003E\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--media\u0022\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--photo\u0022 style=\u0022background-image: url(\/sites\/default\/files\/Brannon_Denning.jpg)\u0022\u003E\u003C\/div\u003E\n            \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--info\u0022\u003E\n              \u003Ch4 class=\u0022con-essay-author--name\u0022\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022http:\/\/cumberland.samford.edu\/faculty\/brannon-p-denning\u0022\u003EBrannon P. Denning\u003C\/a\u003E\n                  \u003C\/h4\u003E\n                  \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--job\u0022\u003E\n         Professor of Law, Cumberland School of Law, Samford University\n      \u003C\/div\u003E\n            \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-tabs\u0022\u003E\n      \u003Cul data-tabs class=\u0022tabs\u0022\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000068-taba\u0022\u003EFurther Reading\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000068-tabb\u0022\u003ECase Law\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000068-tabc\u0022\u003ERelated Essays\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n      \u003C\/ul\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv data-tabs-content\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000068-taba\u0022\u003E\n          \n      \u003Cdiv\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003ETess DeLiefde, \u003Ci\u003EFilling in the Gaps: A New Approach to\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003ETreaty Implementation Reconciling the Supremacy Clause and Federalism Concerns\u003C\/i\u003E, 66\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003EU. MIAMI L.\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003EREV. 567 (2012)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ELouis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the U.S. Constitution (2d ed. 1996)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EDuncan B. Hollis, \u003Ci\u003EThe Elusive Foreign Compact\u003C\/i\u003E, 73 MO. L. REV. 1071 (2008)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EMICHAEL RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION\u2019S TEXT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS (2007)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n          \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n        \u003C\/div\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000068-tabb\u0022\u003E\n          \n      \u003Cdiv\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EHolmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540 (1840)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EU.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm\u2019n, 434 U.S. 452 (1978)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n          \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n        \u003C\/div\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000068-tabc\u0022\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000049\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EMarque and Reprisal\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000074\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003ECompact Clause\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000089\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003ETreaty Clause\u003C\/a\u003E\n                  \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n\u003C\/article\u003E\n"]}]