[{"command":"add_css","data":[{"rel":"stylesheet","media":"all","href":"\/sites\/default\/files\/css\/css_veuEhhb1658wti0_ZAig66JOyixENU-N9zhjLQSLfOQ.css?delta=0\u0026language=en\u0026theme=heritage_theme\u0026include=eJwrTi1LzdNPzkksLq7Uy8tPSQUAPMsGtA"}]},{"command":"invoke","selector":null,"method":"openEssay","args":["10000066","\n\n\u003Carticle about=\u0022\/constitution\/articles\/1\/essays\/67\/appropriations-clause\u0022 class=\u0022node node--type-constitution-essay node--promoted node--view-mode-embedded clearfix\u0022\u003E\n  \u003Ch1 class=\u0022title\u0022\u003E\u003Cspan\u003EAppropriations Clause\u003C\/span\u003E\n\u003C\/h1\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-location\u0022\u003E\n      Article I, Section 9, Clause 7\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-context\u0022\u003E\n      \n            \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ENo Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n  \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-body\u0022\u003E\n    \n            \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EThe Appropriations Clause is the cornerstone\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003Eof Congress\u2019s \u201cpower of the purse.\u201d It assigns to Congress the role of final arbiter of the use of public funds. The source of Congress\u2019s power to spend derives from the Necessary and Proper Clause (Article I, Section 8, Clause 18) or, as some modern commentators aver, from Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 (Taxation and Spending Clauses), or possibly as an implication from the Appropriations Clause itself. The Appropriations Clause provides Congress with a mechanism to control or to limit spending by the federal government. The Framers chose the particular language of limitation, not authorization, for the first part of the clause and placed it in Section 9 of Article I, along with other restrictions on governmental actions to limit, most notably, executive action.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003Cp\u003EThe Virginia Plan offered at the opening of the Constitutional Convention did not contain an appropriations clause, although the plan did refer, albeit indirectly, to Congress\u2019s authority under the Articles of Confederation to appropriate public funds. The Appropriations Clause first appeared at the Convention as part of a proposed division of authority between the House of Representatives and the Senate. A part of that proposal declared that all bills raising or appropriating money\u2014\u201cmoney bills\u201d\u2014were to originate in the House, and were not subject to alteration or amendment in the Senate. Further, no money could be drawn from the \u201cpublic Treasury, but in pursuance of appropriations that shall originate in the House of Representatives.\u201d The Convention rejected both the provision vesting exclusive control of money bills in the House of Representatives (resolved in Article I, Section 7, Clause 2) and the associated appropriations clause. Late in the Convention, the Committee of Eleven, appointed to consider unresolved parts of the Constitution, offered a compromise to permit the Senate to amend or concur in amendments of money bills, provided that \u201cno Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.\u201d The Convention incorporated the proposal, resulting, with only minor changes made by the Committee of Style and Arrangement, in the final language of the first part of the Appropriations Clause.\n\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cp\u003EIn \u003Ci\u003EThe Federalist\u003C\/i\u003E No. 58, James Madison described the centrality of the power of the purse\u2019s role in the growth of representative government and its particular importance in the Constitution\u2019s governmental structure:\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cblockquote\u003EThe House of Representatives cannot only refuse, but they alone can propose the supplies requisite for the support of government. They, in a word, hold the purse\u2014that powerful instrument by which we behold, in the history of the British Constitution, an infant and humble representation of the people gradually enlarging the sphere of its activity and importance, and finally reducing, as far as it seems to have wished, all the overgrown prerogatives of the other branches of the government. This power over the purse may, in fact, be regarded as the most complete and effectual weapon with which any constitution can arm the immediate representatives of the people, for obtaining a redress of every grievance, and for carrying into effect every just and salutary measure.\u003C\/blockquote\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EUnder the Articles of Confederation, under which Congress possessed the power to appropriate, there was no independent executive authority. With the creation of an executive under the Constitution, the Founders decided, in the words of Justice Joseph Story in \u003Ci\u003ECommentaries on the\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003EConstitution of the United States \u003C\/i\u003E(1883), \u201cto preserve in full vigour the constitutional barrier between each department\u2009.\u2009.\u2009.\u2009that each should possess equally\u2009.\u2009.\u2009.\u2009the means of self-protection.\u201d An important means of self-protection for the legislative department was its ability to restrict the executive\u2019s access to public resources \u201cbut in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.\u201d Justice Story continues:\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cblockquote\u003EAnd the [legislature] has, and must have, a controlling influence over the executive power, since it holds at its own command all the resources by which a chief magistrate could make himself formidable. It possesses the power over the purse of the nation and the property of the people. It can grant or withhold supplies; it can levy, or withdraw taxes; it can unnerve the power of the sword by striking down the arm which wields it.\u003C\/blockquote\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe second part of the clause, the \u201cStatement and Account\u201d provision, resulted from an amendment offered by George Mason of Virginia in the final days of the Convention. Mason proposed that \u201can Account of the public expenditures should be annually published.\u201d Questions concerning the wisdom and practicality of this proposal led to the adoption of an amendment, offered by James Madison, to substitute the less-demanding \u201cfrom time to time\u201d for \u201cannually.\u201d This \u201cwould enjoin the duty of frequent publications,\u201d Madison argued, \u201cand leave enough to the discretion of the legislature.\u201d The requirement for a \u201cStatement and Account,\u201d said Justice Story, makes Congress\u2019s responsibility as guardian of the public treasure \u201ccomplete and perfect\u201d by requiring an account of receipts and expenditures \u201cthat the people may know, what money is expended, for what purposes, and by what authority.\u201d Today, the \u201cdiscretion of the legislature\u201d is a \u201cplenary power to exact any reporting and accounting [the Congress] considers appropriate in the public interest.\u201d \u003Ci\u003EUnited\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003EStates v. Richardson \u003C\/i\u003E(1974).\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe courts have consistently recognized the primacy given to Congress by the Appropriations Clause in allocating the resources of the Treasury. As the Supreme Court declared in \u003Ci\u003ECincinnati\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003ESoap Co. v. United States \u003C\/i\u003E(1937), the Appropriations Clause \u201cwas intended as a restriction upon the disbursing authority of the Executive department.\u201d It means simply that \u201cno money can be paid out of the Treasury unless it has been appropriated by an act of Congress.\u201d In \u003Ci\u003EUnited States\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003Ev. MacCollom \u003C\/i\u003E(1976), the Court articulated an\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003E\u201cestablished rule\u201d that \u201cthe expenditure of public funds is proper only when authorized by Congress, not that public funds may be expended unless prohibited by Congress.\u201d\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe power reserved to Congress by the Appropriations Clause is, as Madison described it, \u201cthe most complete and effectual weapon,\u201d because, as one court determined, \u201cany exercise of a power granted by the Constitution to one of the other Branches of Government is limited by a valid reservation of congressional control over funds in the Treasury.\u201d \u003Ci\u003EOffice of Personnel\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003EManagement v. Richmond \u003C\/i\u003E(1990).\u003Ci\u003E See also Knote v. United States \u003C\/i\u003E(1877). For example, because public funds may only be paid out of the Treasury \u201caccording to the letter of the difficult judgments reached by Congress,\u201d private litigants may not use equitable principles of estoppel to require the payment of benefits for which there is no appropriation. \u003Ci\u003EOffice of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond\u003C\/i\u003E. Similarly, a court may no more order the obligation or a payment of funds for which there is no appropriation, \u003Ci\u003EReeside v. Walker\u003C\/i\u003E (1850), than it may make or order an appropriation. \u003Ci\u003ERochester Pure Water District v. United States Environmental Protection Agency \u003C\/i\u003E(1992);\u003Ci\u003E National Ass\u2019n of Regional Councils v. Costle \u003C\/i\u003E(1977). A possible exception may be the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau established by Congress in 2011. It is a regulatory agency that receives its funding from the Federal Reserve, which is itself self-funded and outside of the appropriations oversight of Congress, though Congress could change its manner of funding by revising the underlying law.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003ECongress has broad authority to give meaning to the Appropriations Clause. As a technical matter, Congress regularly enacts statutes, specifically styled as appropriations acts, of varying types, durations, and effect. To satisfy the Appropriations Clause, however, Congress need do no more than enact a law expressly directing a payment out of a designated fund or source in the Treasury. As the Court of Claims explained, an appropriation is \u201cper se nothing more than the legislative authorization prescribed by the Constitution that money may be paid out at the Treasury.\u201d \u003Ci\u003ECampagna v. United States\u003C\/i\u003E (1891).\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003ECongress also may, and does, adjust, suspend, or repeal various provisions of law through appropriations acts. \u003Ci\u003EUnited States v. Dickerson\u003C\/i\u003E (1940); \u003Ci\u003ERobertson v. Seattle Audubon Society\u003C\/i\u003E (1992); \u003Ci\u003EUnited States v. Bean\u003C\/i\u003E (2002). The Supreme Court has insisted, however, that Congress must clearly articulate its purposes when it uses the appropriations process to adjust, suspend, or repeal other provisions of law. \u003Ci\u003EUnited States v.\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003EWill \u003C\/i\u003E(1980). Nevertheless, Congress has \u201cwide\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003Ediscretion in\u2009.\u2009.\u2009.\u2009prescribing details of expenditures,\u201d \u003Ci\u003ECincinnati Soap Co. v. United States\u003C\/i\u003E (1937), and indeed has a long and consistent practice of setting conditions on the expenditure of appropriations. One particularly noteworthy example was the Boland Amendments of the 1980s, which limited the use of appropriated funds by any agency or entity of the United States involved in intelligence activities to support the Nicaraguan insurgency against the Sandinista regime.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThere are limits to the length to which Congress may go in its exercise of the appropriations power. Congress\u2019s power, in this respect, like all of its other powers, is subject to the Bill of Rights and other structural constraints in the Constitution. Congress may not, for example, in the guise of appropriating, subject named individuals to bills of attainder explicitly prohibited by the Constitution. \u003Ci\u003EUnited States v. Lovett \u003C\/i\u003E(1946). It may not preclude or\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003Edirect an act in derogation of an individual\u2019s First Amendment rights. \u003Ci\u003ELegal Service Corp. v. Velazquez\u003C\/i\u003E (2001). Similarly, just as a presidential pardon may not effect payment of a claim out of the Treasury barred by act of Congress, \u003Ci\u003EHart v. United States\u003C\/i\u003E (1886), or permit the recovery of the proceeds of confiscated property deposited in the Treasury, \u003Ci\u003EKnote v. United States\u003C\/i\u003E, Congress cannot, through a\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003Erider in an appropriations act, impair the express and enumerated power of the President to grant pardons. \u003Ci\u003EUnited States v. Klein\u003C\/i\u003E (1871).\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n  \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author\u0022\u003E\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--media\u0022\u003E\n            \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--info\u0022\u003E\n              \u003Ch4 class=\u0022con-essay-author--name\u0022\u003E\n                      Gary Kepplinger\n                  \u003C\/h4\u003E\n                  \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--job\u0022\u003E\n         Deputy General Counsel (Retired), Government Accountability Office\n      \u003C\/div\u003E\n            \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-tabs\u0022\u003E\n      \u003Cul data-tabs class=\u0022tabs\u0022\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000066-taba\u0022\u003EFurther Reading\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000066-tabb\u0022\u003ECase Law\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000066-tabc\u0022\u003ERelated Essays\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n      \u003C\/ul\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv data-tabs-content\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000066-taba\u0022\u003E\n          \n      \u003Cdiv\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003E2 OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL, U.S. GOV\u2019T ACCOUNT-ABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-382SP, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW (3d ed. 2004)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EJ. Gregory Sidak, \u003Ci\u003EThe President\u0027s Power of the Purse\u003C\/i\u003E, 1989 Duke L.J. 1162 (1989)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EKate Stith, \u003Ci\u003ECongress\u0027s Power of the Purse\u003C\/i\u003E, 97 Yale L.J. 1343 (1988)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ECharles Tiefer, Congressional Practice and Procedure (1989)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n          \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n        \u003C\/div\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000066-tabb\u0022\u003E\n          \n      \u003Cdiv\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EReeside v. Walker, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 272 (1850)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EUnited States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EKnote v. United States, 95 U.S. 149 (1877)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EHart v. United States, 118 U.S. 62, 67 (1886)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ECampagna v. United States, 26 Ct. Cl. 316, 317 (1891)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ECincinnati Soap Co. v. United States, 301 U.S. 308 (1937)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EUnited States v. Dickerson, 310 U.S. 554 (1940)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EUnited States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EUnited States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EUnited States v. MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317 (1976)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ENational Ass\u2019n of Regional Councils v. Costle, 564 F.2d 583 (D.C. Cir. 1977)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EUnited States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200 (1980)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EOffice of Personnel Management v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414 (1990)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003ERobertson v. Seattle Audubon Society, 503 U.S. 429 (1992)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003ERochester Pure Water District v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, 960 F.2d 180 (D.C. Cir. 1992)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ELegal Service Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EUnited States v. Bean, 537 U.S. 71 (2002)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n          \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n        \u003C\/div\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000066-tabc\u0022\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000029\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EOrigination Clause\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000033\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003ESpending Clause\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000051\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EArmy Clause\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000058\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003ENecessary and Proper Clause\u003C\/a\u003E\n                  \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n\u003C\/article\u003E\n"]}]