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At the Constitutional Convention, the Commit-tee of Detail took the Convention\u2019s resolutions on national legislative authority and particularized them into a series of enumerated congressional powers. This formalized the principle of enumerated powers, under which federal law can govern only as to matters within the terms of some power-granting clause of the Constitution. By including the Necessary and Proper Clause at the conclusion of Article I, Section 8, the Framers set the criteria for laws that, even if they are not within the terms of other grants, serve to make other federal powers effective.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EAlthough modern scholars often express bafflement at the Necessary and Proper Clause, the meaning and purpose of the clause would actually have been clear to an eighteenth-century citizen. The enumeration of congressional powers in Article I, Section 8 is similar to the enumeration of powers that one would find in an eighteenth-century private agency instrument or corporate charter. That is not surprising, as\u0026nbsp;the Founders viewed the Constitution as, in the words of James Iredell, \u201ca great power of attorney,\u201d in which the principals (\u201cWe the People\u201d) grant power to official agents (the government). Eighteenth-century agency law understood that grants of power to agents generally carried implied powers in their wake: the enumerated, or \u003Cem\u003Eprincipal\u003C\/em\u003E, granted powers were presumptively accompanied by implied, or \u003Cem\u003Eincidental\u003C\/em\u003E, powers that were needed to effectuate the principal powers. As William Blackstone wrote, \u201c[a] subject\u2019s grant shall be construed to include many things, besides what are expressed, if necessary for the operation of the grant.\u201d Agency instruments accordingly often referred to \u201cnecessary,\u201d \u201cproper,\u201d or (most restrictively) \u201cnecessary and proper\u201d incidental powers of agents. A Committee of Detail composed of lawyers and a businessman would have written, and a public accustomed to serving as or employing agents in a wide range of everyday affairs would have recognized, the Necessary and Proper Clause as a provision clarifying the scope of incidental powers accompanying the grants of enumerated (or principal) congressional powers.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003ESo understood, the Framers crafted the Necessary and Proper Clause to serve three great purposes. The first was to facilitate organization of the government, such as empowering Congress to organize the judicial department and to create executive offices. The second was to help effectuate the other enumerated powers of Congress. The third, and most general, was to define the limits of these implied or incidental powers.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EAs to the first purpose, the Constitution could not prescribe all points of government organization, so Detail Committee member Edmund Randolph proposed empowering Congress to \u201corganize the government.\u201d James Wilson proposed the \u201cnecessary and proper\u201d clause as a substitute, authorizing laws \u201cfor carrying into Execution\u201d the \u201cother\u201d federal powers. The committee, and then the Convention, approved. The organizational function of this clause was recognized from the outset. Among Congress\u2019s first acts were establishing executive departments and staffs, determining the number of Justices of the Supreme Court, and allocating the judicial power among federal courts. The Supreme Court has acknowledged the Necessary and Proper Clause as the source of Congress\u2019s power to legislate about judicial process and procedure.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EAs to the second and more significant purpose, the clause also supports laws for carrying into execution \u201cthe foregoing Powers,\u201d that is, those specified for the legislature itself in Article I, Section 8. It thus enhances the other powers given to Congress. During the ratification debates, opponents dubbed it the \u201csweeping clause\u201d and the \u201cgeneral clause,\u201d arguing that it subverted the principle of enumerated powers by giving sweeping general legislative competence to Congress. The Anti-Federalist Brutus, for example, said it \u201cleaves the national legislature at liberty, to do every thing, which in their judgment is best.\u201d Defenders of the Constitution strongly disagreed. At Pennsylvania\u2019s ratification convention, James Wilson, the author of the clause, explained that the words \u201cnecessary and proper\u201d are \u201climited and defined by the following, \u2018for carrying into execution the foregoing powers.\u2019 It is saying no more than that the powers we have already particularly given, shall be effectually carried into execution.\u201d It authorizes what is \u201cnecessary to render effectual the particular powers that are granted.\u201d Congress thus can make laws about something otherwise outside the enumerated powers, insofar as those laws are \u201cnecessary and proper\u201d to effectuate federal policy for something within an enumerated power.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe third purpose has the broadest implications for constitutional law. The Articles of Confederation expressly forbade any inference of incidental powers by specifying that \u201c[e]ach state retains\u2009.\u2009.\u2009.\u2009every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this Confederation expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled\u201d (emphasis added). The Constitution contains no such clause, and it is therefore appropriate to find some measure of implied congressional powers. Had the Constitution been silent about implied powers, the ordinary back-ground rules of agency law would have mandated inferring some measure of such powers to effectuate the enumerated powers, but would have left uncertainty about how broadly or narrowly to construe the implied powers. By selecting a relatively restrictive phrase\u2014\u201cnecessary and proper,\u201d in the conjunctive\u2014to describe the range of implied congressional powers, the Constitution eliminated that uncertainty by limiting implied powers to those that bear a close relationship to the principal powers.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EAccordingly, every law enacted under the Necessary and Proper Clause must meet four requirements: (1) it must be incidental to a principal power; (2) it must be \u201cfor carrying into Execution\u201d a principal power; (3) it must be \u201cnecessary\u201d for that purpose; and (4) it must be \u201cproper\u201d for that purpose. And, because the clause provides that all such laws \u201cshall be\u201d necessary and proper for executing federal powers, rather than prescribing that such laws \u201cshall be deemed by Congress\u201d to be necessary and proper, these inquiries are all objective, contrary to Brutus\u2019s suggestion of unreviewable congressional discretion.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EIn \u003Cem\u003EMcCulloch v. Maryland\u003C\/em\u003E (1819), Chief Justice John Marshall confirmed the original understanding of the clause. He noted that other grants of power by themselves \u201caccording to the dictates of reason\u201d would \u201cimply\u201d a \u201cmeans of execution.\u201d He went on, however, to declare that the Constitution \u201chas not left the right of Congress to employ the necessary means for the execution of the powers conferred on the Government to general reasoning.\u201d For the Chief Justice, the Necessary and Proper Clause makes express a power that otherwise would only have been implied and thus might have been subject to cavil. By implanting the clause among the powers of Congress, the Framers confirmed that Congress may act to make the constitutional plan effective. In his parsing of the words of the clause, he concluded that the Necessary and Proper Clause authorizes laws enacted as means \u201creally calculated to effect any of the objects intrusted to the government.\u201d Arguments for laws that lack this crucial means-to-end characteristic find no support in Marshall\u2019s opinion or in the Necessary and Proper Clause.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EWhile modern case law does not fully reflect the original meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause, it has moved significantly towards conformance with original meaning in recent years, at least with respect to several of the clause\u2019s requirements. Most notably, the modern Supreme Court has recognized, after a long period of neglect, the requirement that laws under the Necessary and Proper Clause be incidental to a principal power, as Marshall emphasized in \u003Cem\u003EMcCulloch\u003C\/em\u003E. The \u003Cem\u003EMcCulloch\u003C\/em\u003E case concerned in large measure whether the Necessary and Proper Clause authorized Congress to incorporate a national bank, given that neither the power to create a corporation nor the power to create a bank is among the principal (enumerated) powers of Congress. The Chief Justice devoted the bulk of his opinion to explaining why the power to incorporate a bank was incidental, that is, not as great as a principal power. He said that incorporation was \u201cnot, like the power of making war, or levying taxes, or of regulating commerce, a great substantive and independent power, which cannot be implied as incidental to other powers,\u201d but rather \u201cmust be considered as a means not less usual, not of higher dignity.\u201d If a power is not incidental\u2014if it is of the same \u201cdignity\u201d or (as founding-era agency lawyers would say) as \u201cworthy\u201d as the principal enumerated powers\u2014then it cannot be implied under the Necessary and Proper Clause, no matter how convenient, useful, or even indispensable it might be to effectuation of a principal power. This basic idea played a key role nearly two centuries later in Chief Justice John Roberts\u2019 decisive opinion for the Court in \u003Cem\u003ENational Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius\u003C\/em\u003E (2012), in which the Court upheld the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) provision known as the \u201cindividual mandate\u201d to purchase government-approved health insurance under the taxing power but found the mandate unsupportable by either the Commerce Clause or the Necessary and Proper Clause. In explaining why the mandate was not authorized by the Necessary and Proper Clause, Chief Justice Roberts wrote, extensively quoting \u003Cem\u003EMcCulloch\u003C\/em\u003E, that the clause \u201cvests Congress with authority to enact provisions \u2018incidental to the [enumerated] power\u2019.\u2009.\u2009.\u2009. Although the Clause gives Congress authority to \u2018legislate on that vast mass of incidental powers which must be involved in the constitution,\u2019 it does not license the exercise of any \u2018great substantive and independent power[s]\u2019 beyond those specifically enumerated.\u201d He concluded that a governmental power to force people to buy a\u0026nbsp;product could not be \u201c \u2018incidental\u2019 to the exercise of the commerce power.\u2009.\u2009.\u2009. Rather, such a conception of the Necessary and Proper Clause would work a substantial expansion of federal authority.\u201d Accordingly, it is now clear that any power claimed by Congress under the Necessary and Proper Clause must be incidental\u2014meaning that it must \u003Cem\u003Enot\u003C\/em\u003E be the sort of power that an ordinary reader would assume must be enumerated as a principal power in order to exist.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EIn addition to being incidental to a principal power, any law enacted under the Necessary and Proper Clause must be \u201cfor carrying into Execution\u201d some other federal power. The Necessary and Proper Clause allows Congress to decide whether, when, and how to legislate \u201cfor carrying into Execution\u201d the powers of another branch; but it respects and even reinforces the principle of separation of powers. Unlike Randolph\u2019s authorization to \u201corganize the government\u201d\u2014which the Committee of Detail replaced with Wilson\u2019s more exacting phrase\u2014\u201claws\u2009.\u2009.\u2009.\u2009for carrying into Execution\u201d the powers reposed in another branch\u2014can only mean laws to help effectuate the discretion of that other branch, not laws to control or limit that discretion. It gives Congress no power to instruct or impede another branch in the performance of that branch\u2019s constitutional role. For example, Congress could not, under the guise of this clause, dictate to courts how to decide cases, \u003Cem\u003EUnited States v. Klein\u003C\/em\u003E (1871), or tell the President whom to prosecute. Of course, when the clause is invoked to effectuate ends within Congress\u2019s own powers, it compounds Congress\u2019s discretion: not only the selection of means, but also the selection of policy ends, rests in Congress\u2019s own discretion.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EIncidental laws that carry into execution federal powers must also be \u201cnecessary\u201d for that purpose. The requirement of necessity entails some degree of causal connection between the implementing law and the implemented power. The degree of that required causal connection between the means chosen and the particular \u201cend\u201d sought, i.e., the specific enumerated power, has been a contentious issue for more than two centuries. Thomas Jefferson, and the State of Maryland in \u003Cem\u003EMcCulloch\u003C\/em\u003E, famously argued that a \u201cnecessary\u201d law must be indispensable to the achievement of a permissible governmental end. Alexander Hamilton equally famously argued that necessity in this context meant merely that a law \u201cmight be conceived to be conducive\u201d to a permissible end. And somewhat less famously, but no less importantly, James Madison trod a middle ground, describing necessity as requiring \u201ca definite connection between means and ends\u201d in which the executory law and the executed power are linked \u201cby some obvious and precise affinity.\u201d\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EIn \u003Cem\u003EMcCulloch\u003C\/em\u003E, Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, upheld the Second Bank of the United States, utilizing the very rationale that Secretary Hamilton, and James Wilson before him, had employed. Marshall rejected Jefferson\u2019s view that the clause limits Congress to \u201cthose means without which the grant of power would be nugatory.\u201d That would have precluded Congress from deliberating alternatives, and the Court read the clause instead as vesting \u201cdiscretion, with respect to the means by which the powers it confers are to be carried into execution.\u201d \u003Cem\u003EMcCulloch\u003C\/em\u003E countenanced \u201cany means calculated to produce the end,\u201d giving Congress \u201cthe capacity to avail itself of experience, to exercise its reason, and to accommodate its legislation to circumstances.\u201d According to \u003Cem\u003EMcCulloch\u003C\/em\u003E, unless otherwise inconsistent \u201cwith the letter and spirit of the constitution,\u201d any law that is \u201cappropriate,\u201d \u201cplainly adapted to that end,\u201d and \u201creally calculated to effect any of the objects entrusted to the government\u201d is valid under the Necessary and Proper Clause. For the judiciary \u201cto inquire into the degree of its necessity,\u201d Marshall said, \u201cwould be\u2009.\u2009.\u2009.\u2009to tread on legislative ground.\u201d\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003ESo long as a law promotes an end within the scope of some enumerated power, extraneous objectives do not render it unconstitutional. Indeed, one means might be preferred over others precisely because it advances another objective as well. For example, besides helping Congress effectuate various enumerated powers, a bank could make private loans to augment business capital or to satisfy consumer wants; while these extraneous ends could provide no independent constitutional justification, Hamilton urged them as principal reasons why Congress should incorporate a bank.\u0026nbsp;\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003ERecord-keeping and reporting requirements regarding drug transactions, if apt as means to enforce federal taxes on those transactions, are no less valid because crafted for police ends that are not within any enumerated power. Extraneous objectives are constitutionally immaterial; but to invoke the Necessary and Proper Clause, a sufficient link to some enumerated-power end is constitutionally indispensable.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003E\u003Cem\u003EMcCulloch\u003C\/em\u003E remains the classic elucidation of this clause, but it has been elaborated in many other cases, such as in the proceedings concerning the Legal Tender Act of 1862. Congress, in an effort to stabilize commerce and support military efforts during the Civil War, determined that new paper currency must be accepted at face value as legal tender. The Supreme Court, in the \u003Cem\u003ELegal Tender Cases\u003C\/em\u003E (1871), affirmed Congress\u2019s discretion to choose among means it thought conducive to enumerated-power ends. The Court upheld Congress\u2019s choice, even though better means might have been chosen, and though the legal tender clause proved to be of little help: \u201cThe degree of the necessity for any Congressional enactment, or the relative degree of its appropriateness, if it have any appropriateness, is for consideration in Congress, not here,\u201d said the Court.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EModern cases have interpreted these precedents to require that laws under the Necessary and Proper Clause accomplish valid legislative ends \u201cby rational means,\u201d \u003Cem\u003ESabri v. United States\u003C\/em\u003E (2004), or by \u201ca means that is rationally related to the implementation of a constitutionally enumerated power,\u201d \u003Cem\u003EUnited States v. Comstock\u003C\/em\u003E (2010). In \u003Cem\u003EComstock\u003C\/em\u003E, four Justices (Samuel Alito, Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, and Clarence Thomas) expressed\u2014in three different opinions and three different forms\u2014some measure of unease with this \u201crational basis\u201d formulation of the required means-ends connection, though only Justice Thomas has specifically endorsed the Madisonian formulation as an alternative.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EFinally, laws under the Necessary and Proper Clause must be \u201cproper\u201d for executing federal powers. It is textually clear\u2014and five Justices in \u003Cem\u003ENFIB v. Sebelius\u003C\/em\u003E have confirmed\u2014that the requirement of propriety is separate from and in addition to the requirement of necessity. Given the agency-law origins of the Necessary and Proper Clause, it is evident that the term \u201cproper\u201d imports into the clause basic fiduciary principles, that is, the means must be true to the end of effectuating a principal power. As Chief Justice Marshall famously warned, \u201cShould Congress, in the execution of its powers, adopt measures which are prohibited by the Constitution, or should Congress, under the pretext of executing its powers, pass laws for the accomplishment of objects not intrusted to the Government, it would become the painful duty of this tribunal, should a case requiring such a decision come before it, to say that such an act was not the law of the land.\u201d\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe modern Supreme Court has not elaborated upon this requirement of propriety in detail, but a majority of Justices of the Court have endorsed some version of it in recent years. Several late twentieth-century cases held that laws failed to be \u201cproper\u201d if they violated principles of federalism by compelling state officials to enforce federal law, \u003Cem\u003EPrintz v. United States\u003C\/em\u003E (1997), or by wrongly using Article I powers to abrogate state sovereign immunity, \u003Cem\u003EAlden v. Maine\u003C\/em\u003E (1999). In \u003Cem\u003ENFIB v. Sebelius\u003C\/em\u003E, four Justices clarified that \u201cthe scope of the Necessary and Proper Clause is exceeded not only when the congressional action directly violates the sovereignty of the States but also when it violates the background principle of enumerated (and hence limited) federal power,\u201d and a fifth (Chief Justice Roberts) noted that laws are not \u201cproper\u201d when they \u201cundermine the structure of government established by the Constitution\u201d and specifically found that the individual mandate of the PPACA \u201cis not a \u2018proper\u2019 means\u201d for effectuating the statute\u2019s insurance reforms.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EOn the other hand, the Court has decided a number of recent cases involving the Necessary and Proper Clause, most notably \u003Cem\u003ESabri v. United States\u003C\/em\u003E (2004) and \u003Cem\u003EUnited States v. Comstock\u003C\/em\u003E (2010), without conducting a separate inquiry into whether the challenged law is \u201cproper.\u201d It remains to be seen how fully an analysis of propriety becomes integrated into modern doctrine.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe Necessary and Proper Clause, along with its in-built limitations, is the relevant source of congressional power in many contexts. For example, federal tax lien and collection laws; record-keeping, reporting, and filing requirements; and\u0026nbsp;civil and criminal penalties for non-payment are not themselves exertions of Congress\u2019s power to tax, but are laws \u201cnecessary and proper for carrying into Execution\u201d the federal taxing power. That is why \u201cprovisions extraneous to any tax need\u201d are not rendered valid simply by inclusion in a tax statute. \u003Cem\u003EUnited States v. Kahriger\u003C\/em\u003E (1953); see also \u003Cem\u003ELinder v. United States\u003C\/em\u003E (1925). Similarly, with regard to federal condemnation of property, \u201cthe really important question to be determined\u201d is whether \u201cit is necessary or appropriate to use the land in the execution of any of the powers granted to it by the constitution.\u201d\u003Cem\u003E United States v. Gettysburg Electric Railway Co.\u003C\/em\u003E (1896). Finally, some scholars believe that the Necessary and Proper Clause is the source of federal spending authority, though modern doctrine locates that power in the Article I, Section 1 Taxation Clause (while other scholars locate it in the Article IV, Section 3 (Territories and Property Clauses).\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EPerhaps the best-known use of the clause is to regulate matters that do not constitute commerce among the states (or with foreign nations or the Indian tribes) in order to effectuate exercises of Congress\u2019s power under the Commerce Clause. The Necessary and Proper Clause\u2019s enhancement of Congress\u2019s power over commerce among the states had been judicially recognized decades before Congress began to exercise that power extensively. See \u003Cem\u003EGilman v. Philadelphia\u003C\/em\u003E (1866). Its means-to-end logic underlay the Supreme Court\u2019s approval of anti-trust prosecutions for local monopolies when the government could prove a purpose to restrain interstate trade, \u003Cem\u003EAddyston Pipe \u0026amp; Steel v. United States\u003C\/em\u003E (1899), but not when the government omitted to prove such a purpose, \u003Cem\u003EUnited States v. E.C. Knight Co.\u003C\/em\u003E (1895). The same rationale sustained an amendment to the Safety Appliance Act, which prescribed safety equipment for railcars used only within a state, because the amendment increased safety for interstate cars and cargos on the same rails. \u003Cem\u003ESouthern Railway v. United States\u003C\/em\u003E (1911). Likewise, the Interstate Commerce Commission could authorize carriers to disregard state limits on rates for trips within a state, as a means to eliminate price discrimination against interstate commerce. \u003Cem\u003EShreveport Rate Case\u003C\/em\u003E (1914). Upholding the wage and hour provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act on this ground in \u003Cem\u003EUnited States v. Darby\u003C\/em\u003E (1941), the Court cited not only those older cases but also\u003Cem\u003E NLRB v. Jones \u0026amp; Laughlin Steel Corp\u003C\/em\u003E. (1937) as illustrating the rationale of the Necessary and Proper Clause.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe Necessary and Proper Clause does not confer \u003Cem\u003Egeneral \u003C\/em\u003Eauthority over a matter simply because its regulation in some respects might serve an enumerated-power end; it only supports the \u003Cem\u003Eparticular\u003C\/em\u003E regulations that have such an effect. For example, what mattered in \u003Cem\u003EJones \u0026amp; Laughlin\u003C\/em\u003E was not that steel manufacturing impacts interstate commerce, but rather that applying the particular National Labor Relations Act provisions prohibiting those factories\u2019 unfair labor practices would promote Congress\u2019s policy of uninterrupted interstate commerce in steel. Similarly, in \u003Cem\u003EHeart of Atlanta Motel v. United States\u003C\/em\u003E (1964), Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act was held applicable, not because hotels affect interstate commerce, but because prohibiting racial discrimination by hotels promotes Congress\u2019s interstate commerce policy of unimpeded travel.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EOften the Supreme Court has not articulated the Necessary and Proper Clause basis of its so-called \u201caffecting commerce doctrine,\u201d but has instead written as though matters affecting commerce could be reached directly under the commerce power. This omission led to one of the most confused areas of all constitutional law. Justice Sandra Day O\u2019Connor, however, did emphasize it: first in her dissent in \u003Cem\u003EGarcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority\u003C\/em\u003E (1985), and then for the majority in \u003Cem\u003ENew York v. United States\u003C\/em\u003E (1992). Justice Scalia specifically articulated the role of the Necessary and Proper Clause in his concurring opinion in \u003Cem\u003EGonzalez v. Raich\u003C\/em\u003E (2005).\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n  \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author\u0022\u003E\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--media\u0022\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--photo\u0022 style=\u0022background-image: url(\/sites\/default\/files\/David_Engdahl.jpg)\u0022\u003E\u003C\/div\u003E\n            \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--info\u0022\u003E\n              \u003Ch4 class=\u0022con-essay-author--name\u0022\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022http:\/\/www.law.seattleu.edu\/Faculty\/Faculty_Profiles\/David_Engdahl.xml\u0022\u003EGary Lawson\u003C\/a\u003E\n                  \u003C\/h4\u003E\n                  \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--job\u0022\u003E\n         Philip S. Beck Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law\n      \u003C\/div\u003E\n            \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-tabs\u0022\u003E\n      \u003Cul data-tabs class=\u0022tabs\u0022\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000058-taba\u0022\u003EFurther Reading\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000058-tabb\u0022\u003ECase Law\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000058-tabc\u0022\u003ERelated Essays\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n      \u003C\/ul\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv data-tabs-content\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000058-taba\u0022\u003E\n          \n      \u003Cdiv\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ERandy E. Barnett, \u003Ci\u003ENecessary and Proper\u003C\/i\u003E, 44 UCLA L. Rev. 745 (1997)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EJ. Randy Beck\u003Ci\u003E, The New Jurisprudence of the Necessary\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003Eand Proper Clause\u003C\/i\u003E, 2002\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003EU. ILL. L. REV.\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003E581 (2002)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EDavid E. Engdahl, \u003Ci\u003EThe Necessary and Proper Clause as an Intrinsic Restraint on Federal Lawmaking Power\u003C\/i\u003E, 22 Harv. J.L. \u0026amp; Pub. Pol\u0027y 107 (1998)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EDavid E. Engdahl, \u003Ci\u003ESense and Nonsense About State Immunity\u003C\/i\u003E, 2 Const. Comment. 93 (1985)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EStephen A. Gardbaum, \u003Ci\u003ERethinking Constitutional Federalism\u003C\/i\u003E, 74 Tex. L. Rev. 795 (1996)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EGary Lawson \u0026amp; Patricia B. Granger, \u003Ci\u003EThe Proper Scope of Federal Power: A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause\u003C\/i\u003E, 43 Duke L.J. 267 (1993)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n          \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n        \u003C\/div\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000058-tabb\u0022\u003E\n          \n      \u003Cdiv\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EMcCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EGilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713 (1865) The Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1871) United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895) United States v. Gettysburg Electric Ry. Co., 160 U.S.668 (1896)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EAddyston Pipe \u0026amp; Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ESouthern Ry. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20 (1911)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EShreveport Rate Case, 234 U.S. 342 (1914)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ELinder v. United States, 268 U.S. 5 (1925)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003ENLRB v. Jones \u0026amp; Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EUnited States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EUnited States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22 (1953)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EHeart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EGarcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ENew York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EPrintz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EAlden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ESabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600 (2004)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EGonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EUnited States v. Comstock\u003Ci\u003E,\u003C\/i\u003E 560 U.S. 126 (2010)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ENational Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n          \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n        \u003C\/div\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000058-tabc\u0022\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000037\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003ECommerce Among the States\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000046\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EInferior Courts\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000125\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EProperty Clause\u003C\/a\u003E\n                  \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n\u003C\/article\u003E\n"]}]