[{"command":"add_css","data":[{"rel":"stylesheet","media":"all","href":"\/sites\/default\/files\/css\/css_veuEhhb1658wti0_ZAig66JOyixENU-N9zhjLQSLfOQ.css?delta=0\u0026language=en\u0026theme=heritage_theme\u0026include=eJwrTi1LzdNPzkksLq7Uy8tPSQUAPMsGtA"}]},{"command":"invoke","selector":null,"method":"openEssay","args":["10000054","\n\n\u003Carticle about=\u0022\/constitution\/articles\/1\/essays\/55\/militia-clause\u0022 class=\u0022node node--type-constitution-essay node--promoted node--view-mode-embedded clearfix\u0022\u003E\n  \u003Ch1 class=\u0022title\u0022\u003E\u003Cspan\u003EMilitia Clause\u003C\/span\u003E\n\u003C\/h1\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-location\u0022\u003E\n      Article I, Section 8, Clause 15\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-context\u0022\u003E\n      \n            \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EThe Congress shall have Power To ...provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions....\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n  \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-body\u0022\u003E\n    \n            \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EFor the Founders, the militia arose from the posse comitatus, constituting the people as a whole and embodying the Anglo-American idea that the citizenry is the best enforcer of the law. \u201cA militia when properly formed,\u201d wrote Richard Henry Lee in his \u003Ci\u003ELetters From the Federal Farmer \u003C\/i\u003E(1787\u20131788), \u201care in fact the people\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003Ethemselves\u2009.\u2009.\u2009.\u2009and include all men capable of bearing arms.\u201d From its origins in Britain, the posse comitatus (from medieval Latin meaning \u201cthe force of the country\u201d) was generally understood to constitute the constabulary of the shire. When order was threatened, the \u201cshire reeve,\u201d or sheriff, would raise the \u201chue and cry,\u201d and all citizens who heard it were bound to render assistance in apprehending a criminal or maintaining order. The Framers transferred the power of calling out the militia from local authorities to the Congress.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe Anti-Federalists were not pleased. They wanted the militia to remain under state control as a check on the national government. Many feared that an institution intended for local defense could be dispatched far from home. As Luther Martin objected in \u003Ci\u003EGenuine Information\u003C\/i\u003E (1788),\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cblockquote\u003E\n\u003Cp\u003EAs it now stands, the Congress will have the power, if they please, to march the whole militia of Maryland to the remotest part of the union, and keep them in service as long as they think proper, without being in any respect dependent upon the government of Maryland for this unlimited exercise of power over its citizens.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/blockquote\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EIn the \u201cCalling Forth\u201d Act of 1792, Congress exercised its powers under the Militia Clause and delegated to the president the authority to call out the militia and issue it orders when invasion appeared imminent or to suppress insurrections. While the act gave the president a relatively free hand in case of invasion, it constrained his authority in the case of insurrections by requiring that a federal judge certify that the civil authority and the posse comitatus were powerless to meet the exigency. The president had also to order the insurgents to disband before he could mobilize the militia. This was the procedure that President George Washington followed during the Whiskey Rebellion of 1794.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003ECongress authorized the president to federalize the militia in the Militia Act of 1792 (reiterated in 1795):\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cblockquote\u003E[W]henever the United States shall be invaded, or be in imminent danger of invasion from any foreign nation or Indian tribe, it shall be lawful for the President of the United States to call forth such number of the militia of the state, or states most convenient to the place of danger, or scene of action, as he may judge necessary to repel such invasion, and to issue his orders for that purpose to such officer or officers of the militia, as he shall think proper.\u003C\/blockquote\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EBut even such clear language was insufficient to prevent a challenge to presidential authority during the War of 1812. At the outset of the conflict, President James Madison ordered the governors of Connecticut and Massachusetts to provide militia detachments for the defense of the maritime frontiers of the United States. These governors, however, were Federalists who opposed the war. They claimed that they, not the president, had the authority to determine whether an emergency existed. Governor Caleb Strong of Massachusetts requested an opinion of his state\u2019s Supreme Judicial Court, which concluded that this right was \u201cvested in the commanders in chief of the militia of the several states.\u201d \u003Ci\u003EOp. of Justices\u003C\/i\u003E, 8 Mass. 548 (1812).\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe issue was finally resolved by the Supreme Court in 1827 in \u003Ci\u003EMartin v. Mott\u003C\/i\u003E. Although the case explicitly concerned the validity of a court-martial of a militiaman, the decision rendered by Justice Joseph Story validated the claim that the president had the exclusive right to judge whether there was an exigency sufficient for calling forth the militia. State governors, however, retain concurrent authority to call out their respective militias to handle civil and military emergencies, as well as to repel invasions (Article I, Section 10, Clause 3). \u003Ci\u003EHouston v. Moore\u003C\/i\u003E (1820).\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003ECongress\u2019s authority to call out the militia is limited to three purposes: to execute the laws, stamp out domestic insurrections, and defeat foreign invasions. Absent from the list is the ability to call the militia for offensive use in foreign wars. In 1912, Attorney General George W. Wickersham authored an opinion contrasting the army with the militia, arguing that the militia\u2019s service should be domestic in nature. Historically, however, the militia was used across the Canadian border in 1812 and across the Florida border in the Seminole War of 1818.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n  \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author\u0022\u003E\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--media\u0022\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--photo\u0022 style=\u0022background-image: url(\/sites\/default\/files\/Mackubin_Owens.jpg)\u0022\u003E\u003C\/div\u003E\n            \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--info\u0022\u003E\n              \u003Ch4 class=\u0022con-essay-author--name\u0022\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022http:\/\/www.usnwc.edu\/Academics\/Faculty\/Mackubin-Owens-(1).aspx\u0022\u003EMackubin Owens\u003C\/a\u003E\n                  \u003C\/h4\u003E\n                  \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--job\u0022\u003E\n         Professor of National Security Affairs, United States Naval War College\n      \u003C\/div\u003E\n            \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-tabs\u0022\u003E\n      \u003Cul data-tabs class=\u0022tabs\u0022\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000054-taba\u0022\u003EFurther Reading\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000054-tabb\u0022\u003ECase Law\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000054-tabc\u0022\u003ERelated Essays\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n      \u003C\/ul\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv data-tabs-content\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000054-taba\u0022\u003E\n          \n      \u003Cdiv\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EOp. of Justices 8 Mass. 548 (1812)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EClarence A. Berdahl, War Powers of the Executive in the United States (1921)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ELawrence Delbert Cress, Citizens in Arms: The Army and militia in American Society to the War of 1812 (1982)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003ERobert J. Delahunty, \u003Ci\u003EStructuralism and the War Powers:\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003EThe Army, Navy, and Militia Clauses\u003C\/i\u003E,\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003E19 GA. ST. U.\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003EL. REV. 1021 (2003)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003ERichard A. Epstein, \u003Ci\u003EExecutive Power, the Commander\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003EIn Chief, and the Militia Clause\u003C\/i\u003E, 34\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003EHOFSTRA L.\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003EREV. 317 (2005)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EHerbert Lawrence Fenster, \u003Ci\u003EThe Great War Powers Misconstruction\u003C\/i\u003E, 5\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003EJ. NAT\u2019L SECURITY L. \u0026amp; POL\u2019Y\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003E339\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003E(2012)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EJ. Norman Heath, \u003Ci\u003EExposing the Second Amendment:\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003EFederal Preemption of State Militia Legislation\u003C\/i\u003E,\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003E79\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003EU. DETROIT MERCY L. REV. 39 (2001)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003ERICHARD H. KOHN, \u003Ci\u003EThe Constitution and National\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003ESecurity: The Founders\u2019 Intent\u003C\/i\u003E,\u003Ci\u003E in \u003C\/i\u003ETHE UNITED\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003ESTATES MILITARY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789\u20131989 (Richard H. Kohn ed., 1991)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EMILITARY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES FROM THE CIVIL WAR THROUGH THE WAR POWERS ACT OF 1973 (Richard H. Kohn ed., 1979)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EALLAN R. MILLETT \u0026amp; PETER MASLOWSKI, FOR THE COMMON DEFENSE: A MILITARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, FROM 1607\u20132012 (2012)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n          \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n        \u003C\/div\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000054-tabb\u0022\u003E\n          \n      \u003Cdiv\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EMeade v. Deputy Marshal, 16 F. Cas 1291 (C.C.D. Va. 1815) (No. 9372)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EHouston v. Moore, 3 S. \u0026amp; R. (Pa.) 169 (1817), \u003Ci\u003Eaff\u0027d\u003C\/i\u003E, Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1 (1820)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EMartin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19 (1827)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ETexas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1869)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ETarble\u0027s Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1872)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EDunne v. People, 94 Ill. 120 (1879)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ECox v. Wood, 247 U.S. 3 (1918)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EThe Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EPerpich v. Department of Defense, 496 U.S. 334 (1990)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n          \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n        \u003C\/div\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000054-tabc\u0022\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000048\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EDeclare War\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000051\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EArmy Clause\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000053\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EMilitary Regulations\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000055\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EOrganizing the Militia\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000074\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003ECompact Clause\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000085\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003ECommander in Chief\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000141\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003ETo Keep and Bear Arms\u003C\/a\u003E\n                  \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n\u003C\/article\u003E\n"]}]