[{"command":"add_css","data":[{"rel":"stylesheet","media":"all","href":"\/sites\/default\/files\/css\/css_veuEhhb1658wti0_ZAig66JOyixENU-N9zhjLQSLfOQ.css?delta=0\u0026language=en\u0026theme=heritage_theme\u0026include=eJwrTi1LzdNPzkksLq7Uy8tPSQUAPMsGtA"}]},{"command":"invoke","selector":null,"method":"openEssay","args":["10000050","\n\n\u003Carticle about=\u0022\/constitution\/articles\/1\/essays\/51\/captures-clause\u0022 class=\u0022node node--type-constitution-essay node--promoted node--view-mode-embedded clearfix\u0022\u003E\n  \u003Ch1 class=\u0022title\u0022\u003E\u003Cspan\u003ECaptures Clause\u003C\/span\u003E\n\u003C\/h1\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-location\u0022\u003E\n      Article I, Section 8, Clause 11\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-context\u0022\u003E\n      \n            \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EThe Congress shall have Power To ...make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water....\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n  \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-body\u0022\u003E\n    \n            \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EUnder the Captures Clause, Congress has the\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003Epower to make rules for the confiscation, dis-position, and distribution of captured enemy property. Although the original understanding suggests that the clause covers the seizure of enemy shipping as prizes, the war against terrorism has spurred debate over whether it also includes enemy prisoners. Three main arguments have developed over the reach of the Captures Clause: (1) The clause does not apply to prisoners, and therefore the power over enemy prisoners rests with the President; (2) the clause applies only to property, not persons, but Congress can regulate the treatment of prisoners via its authority to regulate and govern the armed forces; and (3)the clause applies to prisoners, and moreover Congress has additional authority through the Offenses Against the Law of Nations and Declare War Clauses.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe roots of the Captures Clause can be traced to Article IX of the Articles of Confederation, which vested in Congress the power \u201cof establishing rules for deciding in all cases, what captures on land or water shall be legal, and in what manner prizes taken by land or naval forces in the service of the united states shall be divided or appropriated.\u201d The original understanding of the clause appears to be that Congress alone has the power to establish rules governing the circumstances under which wartime \u201ccaptures\u201d\u2014generally enemy ships or vessels aiding the enemy and their valuable goods\u2014will be adjudged lawful \u201cprizes,\u201d to which the captors are entitled at least partial title. This construction is supported by the practice that, during the Revolutionary War, captors could not claim lawful title to captured property until after a prize court had granted it.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EUnder this interpretation, the term \u201ccaptures,\u201d as understood by the Framers of the Constitution, includes only enemy property. The term could not include captured enemy soldiers, as persons can neither be \u201cdivided\u201d nor \u201cappropriated,\u201d nor can they be treated as legally awarded prizes. This approach is bolstered by the fact that the term capture was under-stood under international law, as listed in \u003Ci\u003EBouvier\u2019s Law Dictionary \u003C\/i\u003E(1914), as \u201cthe taking of property by one belligerent from another or from an offending neutral.\u201d\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThere was little commentary among the Framers regarding the breadth of the notion of wartime captures, so scholars have resorted to discerning contemporaneous historical practice. Presidentialists argue that during the war for independence, the Continental Congress frequently issued letters of marque and reprisal exclusively to privateers \u201cto make Captures of British Vessels and Cargoes,\u201d pursuant to rules established by Congress. Presidentialists conclude that the Captures Clause authorizes Congress to regulate captures by private parties only and not by the armed forces of the United States. But congressionalists note that although the bulk of congressional authorizations and concern related to the actions of private vessels outfitted against the British, early Continental Congress resolutions asserted the power to control captures by both private and public vessels.Thus Congress has some constitutional authority to prescribe rules for at least some elements of military conflict.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EAlthough the executive\u2019s power to conduct war necessarily includes the power to seize persons and property on the battlefield, the Supreme Court has construed the Captures Clause to deny the executive constitutional power to seize enemy property off the battlefield. In \u003Ci\u003EBrown v. United\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003EStates \u003C\/i\u003E(1814), the Court concluded that, by virtue of the Captures Clause, the executive lacks inherent constitutional authority to confiscate property owned by subjects of enemy nations, and must seek congressional authorization in order to do so. Congress has long conferred such power upon the executive by enacting laws such as the Trading with the Enemy Act.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EIn recent cases arising from the War on Terror, the Court has generally avoided a discussion of the Captures Clause. Its only reference comes in \u003Ci\u003EHamdan v. Rumsfeld\u003C\/i\u003E (2006)\u003Ci\u003E,\u003C\/i\u003E where the Court referred to the Captures Clause as an example of congressional powers distinct from the President\u2019s powers in executing war, but did not clarify the powers included in the Captures Clause. Furthermore, five members of the Court found the detention of enemy combatants for the duration of the conflict to be \u201cso fundamental and accepted an incident to war as to be an exercise of the \u2018necessary and appropriate force\u2019 Congress has authorized the President to use,\u201d without clarifying whether Congress even needed to authorize the President to execute his war powers in areas \u201cso fundamental and accepted.\u201d\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n  \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author\u0022\u003E\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--media\u0022\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--photo\u0022 style=\u0022background-image: url(\/sites\/default\/files\/John_Yoo.jpg)\u0022\u003E\u003C\/div\u003E\n            \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--info\u0022\u003E\n              \u003Ch4 class=\u0022con-essay-author--name\u0022\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022http:\/\/www.law.berkeley.edu\/php-programs\/faculty\/facultyProfile.php?facID=235\u0022\u003EJohn Yoo\u003C\/a\u003E\n                  \u003C\/h4\u003E\n                  \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--job\u0022\u003E\n         Emanuel S. Heller Professor of Law, University of California-Berkley School of Law\n      \u003C\/div\u003E\n            \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-tabs\u0022\u003E\n      \u003Cul data-tabs class=\u0022tabs\u0022\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000050-taba\u0022\u003EFurther Reading\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000050-tabb\u0022\u003ECase Law\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000050-tabc\u0022\u003ERelated Essays\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n      \u003C\/ul\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv data-tabs-content\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000050-taba\u0022\u003E\n          \n      \u003Cdiv\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EDavid J. Barron \u0026amp; Martin S. Lederman, \u003Ci\u003EThe Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb\u2014Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding\u003C\/i\u003E,\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003E121 HARV. L. REV 689 (2008)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EELLEN C. COLLIER, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, INSTANCES OF USE OF UNITED STATES FORCES ABROAD, 1798\u20131993 (1993)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003ERobert J. Delahunty and John C. Yoo, \u003Ci\u003EMaking War\u003C\/i\u003E, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 123 (2007)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003ELOUIS FISHER, CONGRESSIONAL ABDICATION ON WAR \u0026amp; SPENDING (2000)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003ELOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (2D ED. 1996)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EHAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR (1990)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EC. Kevin Marshall, \u003Ci\u003EPutting Privateers in Their Place:\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003EThe Applicability of the Marque and Reprisal Clause to Undeclared Wars\u003C\/i\u003E, 64\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003EU. CHI. L. REV.\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003E953 (1997)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EMichael Stokes Paulsen, \u003Ci\u003EThe War Power\u003C\/i\u003E, 33 HARV. J.L. \u0026amp; PUB. POL\u2019Y 113 (2010)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003ESaikrishna Prakash, \u003Ci\u003EUnleashing the Dogs of War: What\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003Ethe Constitution Means by \u201cDeclare War\u003C\/i\u003E,\u003Ci\u003E\u201d \u003C\/i\u003E93\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003ECOR-NELL L. REV. 45 (2007)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003ESaikrishna Prakash, \u003Ci\u003EThe Separation and Overlap of\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003EWar and Military Powers\u003C\/i\u003E, 87\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003ETEX. L. REV.\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003E299\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003E(2008)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EMichael D. Ramsey, \u003Ci\u003ETextualism and War Powers\u003C\/i\u003E, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1543 (2002)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EIngrid Wuerth, \u003Ci\u003EThe Captures Clause,\u003C\/i\u003E 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1683 (2009)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EJohn C. Yoo, \u003Ci\u003EThe Continuation of Politics by Other\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003EMeans: The Original Understanding of War Powers\u003C\/i\u003E,\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003E84 CAL. L. REV. 167 (1996)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EJohn C. Yoo, \u003Ci\u003EWar and Constitutional Texts\u003C\/i\u003E, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1639 (2002)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n          \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n        \u003C\/div\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000050-tabb\u0022\u003E\n          \n      \u003Cdiv\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EBrown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110 (1814)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EPrize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EHamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n          \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n        \u003C\/div\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000050-tabc\u0022\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/17750649\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EPiracy and Felonies\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000048\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EDeclare War\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000074\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003ECompact Clause\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000085\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003ECommander in Chief\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000118\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003ETreason\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000119\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EPunishment of Treason\u003C\/a\u003E\n                  \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n\u003C\/article\u003E\n"]}]