[{"command":"add_css","data":[{"rel":"stylesheet","media":"all","href":"\/sites\/default\/files\/css\/css_veuEhhb1658wti0_ZAig66JOyixENU-N9zhjLQSLfOQ.css?delta=0\u0026language=en\u0026theme=heritage_theme\u0026include=eJwrTi1LzdNPzkksLq7Uy8tPSQUAPMsGtA"}]},{"command":"invoke","selector":null,"method":"openEssay","args":["10000049","\n\n\u003Carticle about=\u0022\/constitution\/articles\/1\/essays\/50\/marque-and-reprisal\u0022 class=\u0022node node--type-constitution-essay node--promoted node--view-mode-embedded clearfix\u0022\u003E\n  \u003Ch1 class=\u0022title\u0022\u003E\u003Cspan\u003EMarque and Reprisal\u003C\/span\u003E\n\u003C\/h1\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-location\u0022\u003E\n      Article I, Section 8, Clause 11\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-context\u0022\u003E\n      \n            \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EThe Congress shall have Power To ...grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal....\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n  \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-body\u0022\u003E\n    \n            \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EAt the time of the Founding, the sovereign of\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003Eany nation could authorize holders of \u201cletters of marque and reprisal\u201d to engage in hostile actions against enemies of the state. The common understanding of \u201cReprisal\u201d is a seizure of property (or sometimes persons) of a foreign state as redress for an injury committed by that state. Because the word \u201cMarque\u201d is the French equivalent of \u201cReprisal,\u201d the constitutional term \u201cMarque and Reprisal\u201d is best understood as a single phrase.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe only serious debate over the meaning of the Marque and Reprisal Clause is not whether it extends to authorizing private parties (known as \u201cprivateers\u201d) to engage in reprisals for private, commercial gain. Rather, it centers on whether the clause gives Congress authority over all forms of hostilities short of declared wars.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThat debate mirrors the larger war powers debate over the Declare War Clause. Supporters of congressional power construe the Declare War Clause and the Marque and Reprisal Clause jointly to cover all forms of armed conflict, from covert action to a full and open armed conflict. Under this reading, the President lacks any power whatsoever to initiate hostilities (except perhaps defensively to repel invasions), no matter their scope. They contend that the Declare War Clause requires Congress to authorize wars, whereas the Marque and Reprisal Clause requires Congress to authorize lower level hostilities, whether by public forces or by privateers.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003ESupporters of presidential war powers on the other hand, maintain that the Marque and Reprisal Clause was originally understood as a narrower power to vest sovereign authority to use force against enemy nations with private parties. The argument is that Congress could authorize privateers to engage in military hostilities, with neither government funding nor oversight (other than after-the-fact judicial determinations of prizes by the prize courts). The Marque and Reprisal power allows Congress to \u201coutsource\u201d American warfighting capabilities to private parties, which would have held out great attraction to some revolutionary Americans who feared standing armies and navies.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThus, the supporters of presidential war powers contend, the Marque and Reprisal Clause is best read in conjunction with Congress\u2019s power over the purse. Congress has exclusive authority over all funding of military hostilities, whether through public appropriations for a national military or letters of marque and reprisal for private actors. But Congress has no power to control directly the President\u2019s ability to initiate hostilities with whatever resources Congress has previously made available to him. Under this framework, locating the Marque and Reprisal Clause in Article I prevents the President from engaging in hostilities free from congressional control over resources, whether in the form of public appropriations or the issuance of letters of marque and reprisal to private actors. The clause thus helps fill a hole that would otherwise exist in Congress\u2019s control over the \u201csinews of war.\u201d\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EOutside of the law reviews and scholarly debates over the allocation of war powers, the Marque and Reprisal Clause has played little if any role in modern times. The United States has not issued letters of marque and reprisal since the War of 1812, and has not seriously considered doing so since Andrew Jackson\u2019s presidency. In addition, the 1856 Declaration of Paris prohibits privateering as a matter of international law. Although the United States has not ratified the Declaration, it has upheld the ban in practice.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EDuring the Iran-Contra controversy of Ronald Reagan\u2019s administration, Members of Congress objected to the President\u2019s private financing of hostilities, absent prior congressional consent. Congress did not expressly invoke the Marque and Reprisal Clause, however, in objecting to executive branch action. The recent emergence of piracy has led some to propose a resurrection of letters of marque and reprisals, which would give private actors an incentive to protect commercial shipping while allowing the U.S. Navy to focus on more important missions.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n  \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author\u0022\u003E\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--media\u0022\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--photo\u0022 style=\u0022background-image: url(\/sites\/default\/files\/John_Yoo.jpg)\u0022\u003E\u003C\/div\u003E\n            \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--info\u0022\u003E\n              \u003Ch4 class=\u0022con-essay-author--name\u0022\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022http:\/\/www.law.berkeley.edu\/php-programs\/faculty\/facultyProfile.php?facID=235\u0022\u003EJohn Yoo\u003C\/a\u003E\n                  \u003C\/h4\u003E\n                  \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--job\u0022\u003E\n         Emanuel S. Heller Professor of Law, University of California-Berkley School of Law\n      \u003C\/div\u003E\n            \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-tabs\u0022\u003E\n      \u003Cul data-tabs class=\u0022tabs\u0022\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000049-taba\u0022\u003EFurther Reading\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000049-tabb\u0022\u003ECase Law\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000049-tabc\u0022\u003ERelated Essays\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n      \u003C\/ul\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv data-tabs-content\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000049-taba\u0022\u003E\n          \n      \u003Cdiv\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EEllen C. Collier, ed., Congressional Research Service, Instances of Use of United States Forces Abroad, 1798\u20131993 (1993)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003ERobert J. Delahunty and John C. Yoo, \u003Ci\u003EMaking War\u003C\/i\u003E, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 123 (2007)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ELOUIS FISHER, CONGRESSIONAL ABDICATION ON WAR \u0026amp; SPENDING (2000)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003ELOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (2D ED. 1996)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EHAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EC. Kevin Marshall, \u003Ci\u003EPutting Privateers in Their Place:\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003EThe Applicability of the Marque and Reprisal Clause to Undeclared Wars\u003C\/i\u003E,\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003E64 U. CHI. L. REV. 953\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003E(1997)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EMichael Stokes Paulsen, \u003Ci\u003EThe War Power,\u003C\/i\u003E 33 HARV. J.L. \u0026amp; PUB. POL\u2019Y 113 (2010)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003ESaikrishna Prakash, \u003Ci\u003EUnleashing the Dogs of War: What\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003Ethe Constitution Means by \u201cDeclare War\u003C\/i\u003E,\u003Ci\u003E\u201d \u003C\/i\u003E93 COR-NELL L. REV. 45 (2007)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003ESaikrishna Prakash, \u003Ci\u003EThe Separation and Overlap of\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003EWar and Military Powers\u003C\/i\u003E,\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003E87 TEX. L. REV. 299\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003E(2008)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EMichael D. Ramsey, \u003Ci\u003ETextualism and War Powers\u003C\/i\u003E, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1543 (2002)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EJ. Gregory Sidak, \u003Ci\u003EThe Quasi War Cases\u2014And Their\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003ERelevance to Whether \u201cLetters of Marque and Reprisal\u201d Constrain Presidential War Powers\u003C\/i\u003E,\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003E28 HARV.\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003EJ.L. \u0026amp; PUB. POL\u2019Y 465 (2005)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EJohn C. Yoo, \u003Ci\u003EThe Continuation of Politics by Other\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003EMeans: The Original Understanding of War Powers\u003C\/i\u003E,\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003E84 CAL. L. REV. 167 (1996)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EJohn C. Yoo, \u003Ci\u003EWar and Constitutional Texts\u003C\/i\u003E, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1639 (2002)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n          \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n        \u003C\/div\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000049-tabb\u0022\u003E\n          \n      \u003Cdiv\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EBas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37 (1800)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n          \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n        \u003C\/div\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000049-tabc\u0022\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000074\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003ECompact Clause\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000085\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003ECommander in Chief\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000118\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003ETreason\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000119\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EPunishment of Treason\u003C\/a\u003E\n                  \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n\u003C\/article\u003E\n"]}]