[{"command":"add_css","data":[{"rel":"stylesheet","media":"all","href":"\/sites\/default\/files\/css\/css_veuEhhb1658wti0_ZAig66JOyixENU-N9zhjLQSLfOQ.css?delta=0\u0026language=en\u0026theme=heritage_theme\u0026include=eJwrTi1LzdNPzkksLq7Uy8tPSQUAPMsGtA"}]},{"command":"invoke","selector":null,"method":"openEssay","args":["10000047","\n\n\u003Carticle about=\u0022\/constitution\/articles\/1\/essays\/48\/offenses-against-the-law-of-nations-clause\u0022 class=\u0022node node--type-constitution-essay node--promoted node--view-mode-embedded clearfix\u0022\u003E\n  \u003Ch1 class=\u0022title\u0022\u003E\u003Cspan\u003EOffenses Against the Law of Nations Clause\u003C\/span\u003E\n\u003C\/h1\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-location\u0022\u003E\n      Article I, Section 8, Clause 10\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-context\u0022\u003E\n      \n            \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EThe Congress shall have Power\u0026nbsp;... To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations....\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n  \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-body\u0022\u003E\n    \n            \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EThe power of Congress to define \u201coffenses\u0026nbsp;against the law of nations\u201d encompasses three\u0026nbsp;subjects: 1) piracies and 2) felonies committed\u0026nbsp;on the high seas, and 3) offenses against the law\u0026nbsp;of nations. At the time of the framing, piracy was\u0026nbsp;the only universal crime contrary to the law of\u0026nbsp;nations, and Congress quickly dealt with it in a\u0026nbsp;1790 statute. (See Piracy and Felonies Clause) But\u0026nbsp;although piracy is defined by the law of nations,\u0026nbsp;\u201cfelonies committed on the high seas,\u201d such as\u0026nbsp;murder, must be specifically defined by Congress.\u0026nbsp;\u003Cem\u003EUnited States v. Furlong\u003C\/em\u003E (1820). Determining\u0026nbsp;the grounds on which Congress can define\u0026nbsp;offenses against the law of nations, however, has\u0026nbsp;been more difficult.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe inability of the government to conduct\u0026nbsp;foreign affairs effectively under the Articles of\u0026nbsp;Confederation led the Continental Congress\u0026nbsp;to pass a resolution in 1781 asking the states to\u0026nbsp;\u201cprovide expeditious, exemplary and adequate\u0026nbsp;punishment . . . for the infractions of the immunities\u0026nbsp;of ambassadors and other public ministers,\u0026nbsp;authorized and received as such by the United\u0026nbsp;States in Congress assembled.\u201d Leaving the issue\u0026nbsp;in the hands of the states, however, impelled\u0026nbsp;Edmund Randolph, in his opening speech to the\u0026nbsp;Constitutional Convention in 1787, to emphasize\u0026nbsp;that this was one of the major defects of the\u0026nbsp;Articles of Confederation.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EAt the Constitutional Convention, the Article\u0026nbsp;I, Section 8, Clause 10 went through a number\u0026nbsp;of redactions. At one point, Gouverneur Morris\u0026nbsp;thought the term \u201cdefine\u201d too rigid (as applied\u0026nbsp;to piracy and felonies), because it was \u201climited\u0026nbsp;to preexisting meaning.\u201d He thought \u201cdesignate\u201d\u0026nbsp;might give Congress more discretion. But other\u0026nbsp;delegates insisted that \u201cdefine\u201d was broad enough\u0026nbsp;to be \u201capplicable to the creating of offenses also,\u201d as\u0026nbsp;the Supreme Court would later affirm in \u003Cem\u003EFurlong\u003C\/em\u003E.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EGouverneur Morris then later argued that\u0026nbsp;Congress should also have the power to \u201cdefine\u201d\u0026nbsp;offenses against the law of nations, but James\u0026nbsp;Wilson expressed a concern. \u201cTo pretend to\u0026nbsp;define the law of nations which depended on\u0026nbsp;the authority of all the Civilized Nations of the\u0026nbsp;World, would have the look of arrogance, that\u0026nbsp;would make us look ridiculous.\u201d But Gouverneur\u0026nbsp;Morris thought that Congress must be given the\u0026nbsp;discretion to make specific what may be ambiguous.\u0026nbsp;He responded: \u201cThe word define is proper\u0026nbsp;when applied to offenses in this case; the law of\u0026nbsp;nations being often too vague and deficient to\u0026nbsp;be a rule.\u201d This time, Morris\u2019s position prevailed\u0026nbsp;and was later supported by Justice Joseph Story in\u0026nbsp;the seminal case of \u003Cem\u003EUnited States v. Smith\u003C\/em\u003E (1820):\u0026nbsp;\u201cOffences, too, against the law of nations, cannot,\u0026nbsp;with any accuracy, be said to be completely\u0026nbsp;ascertained and defined in any public code recognized\u0026nbsp;by the common consent of nations.\u201d Story\u0026nbsp;continued, \u201c[T]here is a peculiar fitness in giving\u0026nbsp;the power to define as well as to punish; and\u0026nbsp;there is not the slightest reason to doubt that this\u0026nbsp;consideration had very great weight in producing\u0026nbsp;the phraseology in question.\u201d\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe question of the range of discretion possessed\u0026nbsp;by Congress in defining what is an offense\u0026nbsp;against the law of nations has continued to be\u0026nbsp;debated. In the main, the judiciary has regarded\u0026nbsp;Congress\u2019s power as limited by what is objectively\u0026nbsp;part of the law of nations, but has accorded discretion\u0026nbsp;to Congress in making such a determination.\u0026nbsp;In \u003Cem\u003EUnited States v. Arjona\u003C\/em\u003E (1887), the Court\u0026nbsp;declared that Congress need not formally define\u0026nbsp;an offense as \u201cagainst the law of nations\u201d in a\u0026nbsp;statute that criminalized counterfeiting foreign\u0026nbsp;securities, so long as it was punishing an action\u0026nbsp;that was in fact contrary to customary international\u0026nbsp;law. The Court stated, \u201c[I]f the thing\u0026nbsp;made punishable is one which the United States\u0026nbsp;are required by their international obligations\u0026nbsp;to use due diligence to prevent, it is an offense\u0026nbsp;against the law of nations.\u201d However, the Court\u0026nbsp;insisted, \u201cWhether the offense as defined is an\u0026nbsp;offense against the law of nations depends on the\u0026nbsp;thing done, not on any declaration to that effect\u0026nbsp;by congress.\u201d\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003ESimilarly, in \u003Cem\u003EEx parte Quirin \u003C\/em\u003E(1942), the\u0026nbsp;Court upheld Congress\u2019s statutory establishment\u0026nbsp;of military commissions to try enemy aliens\u0026nbsp;when it \u201cincorporated by reference . . . all offenses\u0026nbsp;which are defined as such by the law of war,\u201d itself\u0026nbsp;a part of the law of nations.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EIn \u003Cem\u003ESosa v. Alvarez-Machain\u003C\/em\u003E (2004), the Court\u0026nbsp;was forced to confront its own power in defining\u0026nbsp;offenses against the law of nations. The case dealt\u0026nbsp;with the meaning of the Alien Tort Statute, which\u0026nbsp;Congress had enacted as part of the Judiciary Act\u0026nbsp;of 1789. The statute read, \u201cThe district courts\u0026nbsp;shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action\u0026nbsp;by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation\u0026nbsp;of the law of nations, or a treaty of the United\u0026nbsp;States.\u201d The Court concluded that the Alien Tort\u0026nbsp;Statute did not grant the courts any new causes of\u0026nbsp;action, but only allowed for jurisdiction to hear\u0026nbsp;individual suits based on common law violations\u0026nbsp;of the law of nations that existed at the time of the\u0026nbsp;founding, such as infringement of safe conducts,\u0026nbsp;diplomatic immunity, or piracy. Because the\u0026nbsp;Supreme Court later rejected the idea of a \u201cfederal\u0026nbsp;common law\u201d (\u003Cem\u003EErie v. Tompkins\u003C\/em\u003E (1938)), the Alien\u0026nbsp;Tort Statute has only limited scope: there remains\u0026nbsp;but a \u201cnarrow class of international norms\u201d that\u0026nbsp;the Court could recognize and enforce. In concurrence\u0026nbsp;in \u003Cem\u003ESosa\u003C\/em\u003E, Justice Antonin Scalia insisted\u0026nbsp;that the courts could enforce such rules, but not\u0026nbsp;on its own cognizance of them. Rather, the courts\u0026nbsp;have jurisdiction over such offenses only because\u0026nbsp;Congress has authorized them to do so.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EIn recent years, the courts have begun a\u0026nbsp;more detailed examination of the meaning and\u0026nbsp;the limits of the clause. The Offenses against the\u0026nbsp;Law of Nations provision made a brief, but consequential,\u0026nbsp;appearance in the Supreme Court\u2019s\u0026nbsp;decision of \u003Cem\u003EHamdan v. Rumsfeld\u003C\/em\u003E (2006). Hamdan\u0026nbsp;had been charged with conspiracy to commit\u0026nbsp;acts of terrorism. The Court noted that Congress\u0026nbsp;had not specifically defined \u201cconspiracy\u201d\u0026nbsp;as an offense against the law of nations. Rather,\u0026nbsp;through Article 21 of the Uniform Code of Military\u0026nbsp;Justice, Congress has \u201c\u2018incorporated by reference\u2019\u0026nbsp;the common law of war, which may render\u0026nbsp;triable by military commission certain offenses\u0026nbsp;not defined by statute.\u201d But the Court indicated\u0026nbsp;that, if Congress wishes to incorporate a rule\u0026nbsp;from the law of nations, that precedent must be\u0026nbsp;\u201cplain and unambiguous\u201d in international law.\u0026nbsp;Conspiracy was not. The opinion left open the\u0026nbsp;question of Congress\u2019s power to define expressly\u0026nbsp;on its own an offense like conspiracy as an offense\u0026nbsp;against the law of nations.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EA number of federal circuit courts have been\u0026nbsp;drawn into discussion of the allowable breadth of\u0026nbsp;the Offenses Against the Law of Nations Clause,\u0026nbsp;with differing conclusions. In 1980, Congress\u0026nbsp;passed the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement\u0026nbsp;Act (MDLEA). The law proscribes various drugrelated\u0026nbsp;offenses on board any vessel within the\u0026nbsp;jurisdiction of the United States or any vessel if\u0026nbsp;the individual is a citizen or resident alien of the\u0026nbsp;United States. In \u003Cem\u003EUnited States v. Davis\u003C\/em\u003E (9th Cir.\u0026nbsp;1990), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found\u0026nbsp;that Congress intended to give extraterritorial\u0026nbsp;effect to the act under its power to define \u201cpiracies\u0026nbsp;and felonies on the high seas.\u201d\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EIn \u003Cem\u003EUnited States v. Martinez-Hidalgo\u003C\/em\u003E (3d Cir.\u0026nbsp;1993), the Third Circuit determined that, under\u0026nbsp;Article I, Section 8, Clause 10, Congress could\u0026nbsp;constitutionally criminalize drug trafficking on\u0026nbsp;the high seas even when the offense had no nexus\u0026nbsp;with the United States, because \u201cthe trafficking of\u0026nbsp;narcotics is condemned universally by law-abiding\u0026nbsp;nations,\u201d which would only be relevant if the\u0026nbsp;court was invoking the law of nations provision of\u0026nbsp;the clause. Congress would not have such power,\u0026nbsp;the court suggested, if the prohibited conduct\u0026nbsp;\u201cwere generally lawful throughout the world.\u201d\u0026nbsp;\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EIn \u003Cem\u003EUnited States v. Bellaizac-Hurtado\u003C\/em\u003E (11th\u0026nbsp;Cir. 2012), however, the Eleventh Circuit went\u0026nbsp;further. Differing from other circuits, it found\u0026nbsp;that drug trafficking was not an offense against\u0026nbsp;the law of nations either at the founding or at\u0026nbsp;the present time. The clause limits Congress to\u0026nbsp;defining only established offenses under the\u0026nbsp;law of nations, which the court defined as \u201ccustomary\u0026nbsp;international law.\u201d The court declared,\u0026nbsp;\u201cThe power to \u2018define\u2019 offenses against the law\u0026nbsp;of nations does not grant Congress the authority\u0026nbsp;to punish conduct that is not a violation of the\u0026nbsp;law of nations.\u201d\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003E\u003Cem\u003EHamdan\u003C\/em\u003E and \u003Cem\u003EBellaizac-Hurtado\u003C\/em\u003E represent\u0026nbsp;the first times that acts of Congress were struck\u0026nbsp;down as exceeding the law of nations provision.\u0026nbsp;And with \u003Cem\u003ESosa\u003C\/em\u003E opening the door, albeit narrowly,\u0026nbsp;to federal common law based on the customary\u0026nbsp;international law, it is reasonable to expect more\u0026nbsp;challenges to Congress\u2019s ability to define the law\u0026nbsp;of nations based on the court\u2019s interpretation of\u0026nbsp;customary international law.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe clause permits Congress not only to\u0026nbsp;establish criminal sanctions but civil legislation\u0026nbsp;as well. In any event, like the other delegated\u0026nbsp;grants of power to Congress, the clause defining\u0026nbsp;Offenses Against the Law of Nations is limited by\u0026nbsp;other \u201cconstitutional limitations,\u201d \u003Cem\u003Eex parte Quirin\u003C\/em\u003E,\u0026nbsp;such as the First Amendment\u2019s free speech\u0026nbsp;guarantees. \u003Cem\u003EBoos v. Barry\u003C\/em\u003E (1988).\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003ELastly, an additional question raised by\u0026nbsp;scholars is whether the clause grants Congress\u0026nbsp;power to define offenses and prescribe remedies\u0026nbsp;for violation of the rights of individuals,\u0026nbsp;or whether it also allows Congress to \u201cpunish\u201d\u0026nbsp;foreign states for their transgressions of international\u0026nbsp;law. The latter interpretation bears upon\u0026nbsp;the relative war and foreign affairs powers of\u0026nbsp;Congress and the President.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n  \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author\u0022\u003E\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--media\u0022\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--photo\u0022 style=\u0022background-image: url(\/sites\/default\/files\/Jack_Goldsmith.jpg)\u0022\u003E\u003C\/div\u003E\n            \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--info\u0022\u003E\n              \u003Ch4 class=\u0022con-essay-author--name\u0022\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022http:\/\/facultyprofile.csuohio.edu\/csufacultyprofile\/detail.cfm?FacultyID=D_FORTE\u0022\u003EDavid F. Forte\u003C\/a\u003E\n                  \u003C\/h4\u003E\n                  \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--job\u0022\u003E\n         Professor, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law\n      \u003C\/div\u003E\n            \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-tabs\u0022\u003E\n      \u003Cul data-tabs class=\u0022tabs\u0022\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000047-taba\u0022\u003EFurther Reading\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000047-tabb\u0022\u003ECase Law\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000047-tabc\u0022\u003ERelated Essays\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n      \u003C\/ul\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv data-tabs-content\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000047-taba\u0022\u003E\n          \n      \u003Cdiv\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003E1 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 19, 25 (Max Farrand ed., 1911)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003E2 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 614\u2013615 (Max Farrand ed., 1911)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003E21 Journals of the Continental Congress 1136 (1781)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003E29 Journals of the Continental Congress 654\u2013666 (1785)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EAnthony J. Bellia, Jr. \u0026amp; Bradford R. Clark,\u0026nbsp;\u003Cem\u003EThe Federal Common Law of Nations\u003C\/em\u003E, 109 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (2009)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EJ. Andrew Kent,\u0026nbsp;\u003Cem\u003ECongress\u0027s Under-Appreciated Power to Define and Punish Offenses against the Law of Nations\u003C\/em\u003E, 85 Tex. L. Rev. 843 (2007)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EEugene Kontorovich,\u0026nbsp;\u003Cem\u003EThe \u0022Define and Punish Clause\u0022\u003C\/em\u003E\u003Cem\u003E\u0026nbsp;and the Limits of Universal Jurisdiction\u003C\/em\u003E, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1 (2008)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EEugene Kontorovich,\u0026nbsp;\u003Cem\u003EBeyond the Article I Horizon: Congress\u0027s Enumerated Powers and Universal Jurisdiction Over\u0026nbsp;\u003C\/em\u003E\u003Ci\u003EDrug Crimes\u003C\/i\u003E, 93 Minn. L. Rev. 1191 (2009)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EEugene Kontorovich,\u0026nbsp;\u003Cem\u003EDiscretion, Delegation, and Defining in the Constitution\u0027s Law of Nations Clause,\u003C\/em\u003E\u0026nbsp;106 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1675 (2012)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EMark K. Moller,\u0026nbsp;\u003Cem\u003EOld Puzzles, Puzzling Answers: the Alien tort Statute and Federal Common Law in\u0026nbsp;\u003C\/em\u003ESosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 2004 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 209 (2004)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ECharles D. Siegal, \u003Ci\u003EDeference and Its Dangers: Congress\u0027 Power to \u0022Defin\u003C\/i\u003Ee...Offenses Against the Law of Nations, 21 Vand. J. Transnat\u0027l L. 865, 874\u2013879 (1988)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EBeth Stephens, \u003Ci\u003EFederalism and Foreign Affairs: Congress\u0027s Power to \u0022Define and Punis\u003C\/i\u003Eh...\u003Ci\u003EOffenses Against the Law of Nations,\u0022\u003C\/i\u003E 42 Wm. \u0026amp; Mary L. Rev. 447 (2000)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EErnest A. Young,\u0026nbsp;\u003Ci\u003EHistorical Practice and the Contemporary Debate Over Customary\u0026nbsp;International Law\u003C\/i\u003E, 109 Colum. L. Rev. Sidebar 31 (2009)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n          \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n        \u003C\/div\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000047-tabb\u0022\u003E\n          \n      \u003Cdiv\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EUnited States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610 (1818)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EUnited States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153 (1820)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EUnited States v. Furlong, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184 (1820)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EUnited States v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 479 (1887)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EErie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003E\u003Ci\u003EEx parte\u003C\/i\u003E Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EReid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EBoos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EUnited States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1990)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EUnited States v. Martinez-Hidalgo, 993 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1993)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ESosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EHamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EU.S. v. Bellaizac-Hurtado, 700 F.3d 1245 (11th Cir. 2012)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n          \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n        \u003C\/div\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000047-tabc\u0022\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/17750649\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EPiracy and Felonies\u003C\/a\u003E\n                  \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n\u003C\/article\u003E\n"]}]