[{"command":"add_css","data":[{"rel":"stylesheet","media":"all","href":"\/sites\/default\/files\/css\/css_veuEhhb1658wti0_ZAig66JOyixENU-N9zhjLQSLfOQ.css?delta=0\u0026language=en\u0026theme=heritage_theme\u0026include=eJwrTi1LzdNPzkksLq7Uy8tPSQUAPMsGtA"}]},{"command":"invoke","selector":null,"method":"openEssay","args":["10000043","\n\n\u003Carticle about=\u0022\/constitution\/articles\/1\/essays\/44\/counterfeiting\u0022 class=\u0022node node--type-constitution-essay node--promoted node--view-mode-embedded clearfix\u0022\u003E\n  \u003Ch1 class=\u0022title\u0022\u003E\u003Cspan\u003ECounterfeiting\u003C\/span\u003E\n\u003C\/h1\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-location\u0022\u003E\n      Article I, Section 8, Clause 6\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-context\u0022\u003E\n      \n            \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EThe Congress shall have Power To...provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting the Securities and current Coin of the United States....\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n  \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-body\u0022\u003E\n    \n            \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EIn England, counterfeiting was a treasonous act. The American colonies differed widely in their attitude towards counterfeiting. New York, for example, applied the death penalty, while Connecticut limited punishment to six months in jail. During the Revolution, the British counterfeited state and continental paper scrip to depreciate the currency.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EAt the Constitutional Convention, Gouverneur Morris voiced concern that \u201c[b]ills of exchange\u2009.\u2009.\u2009.\u2009might be forged in one State and carried into another.\u201d Another delegate feared that the counterfeiting of \u201cforeign paper\u201d might embarrass foreign relations. Consequently, when Oliver Ellsworth moved to allow Congress the power to punish \u201ccounterfeiting the securities and current coin of the U. States,\u201d it was unanimously approved. Yet in light of the Necessary and Proper Clause, it is not clear why there was a need for this power to be defined in the Constitution at all. Justice Joseph Story later declared in his \u003Cem\u003ECommentaries on the Constitution of the United States \u003C\/em\u003E(1833) that \u201cthis power [to provide for the punishment of counterfeiting] would naturally flow, as an incident, from the antecedent powers to borrow money, and regulate the coinage; and, indeed, without it those powers would be without any adequate sanction.\u201d\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003ENonetheless, there are three reasons why a separate delegated power to punish counterfeiting is appropriate. First, the Framers took pains to undo the British law on treason, which included counterfeiting and was often punished by parliamentary bills of attainder. Thus, the Constitution defines the crime of treason in terms that leave Congress no power to expand it. The Constitution also prohibits bills of attainder. But the Framers did want authority over the remaining formerly treasonous crime of counterfeiting to be left in the hands of the national legislature. Otherwise, having denied Congress the power to define treason, it might be inferred that the Constitution also denied Congress the power to legislate against counterfeiting.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003ESecond, the Framers lodged all the incidents of the foreign-affairs power in the national government. Counterfeiting of foreign securities was a serious breach of international comity. The clause empowers Congress to deal with an important element of the nation\u2019s international obligations.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThird, the clause betokens federal supremacy in the field of monetary policy. In \u003Cem\u003EThe Federalist\u003C\/em\u003E No. 42, James Madison includes the power over counterfeiting as among those powers \u201cwhich provide for the harmony and proper intercourse among the States.\u201d The implication is that, like commerce, the power over counterfeiting is exclusive and plenary. Justice Joseph Story was explicit: \u201cthis power would seem to be exclusive of that of the States, since it grows out of the Constitution, as an appropriate means to carry into effect other delegated powers, not antecedently existing in the States.\u201d\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EIn the hands of the judiciary, however, the power became limited and eventually superfluous. In\u003Cem\u003E Fox v. Ohio\u003C\/em\u003E (1847), the Supreme Court upheld an Ohio law that punished the \u201cpassing\u201d or \u201cuttering\u201d of counterfeited money. The Court reasoned that the actual act of counterfeiting was an offense directed at the federal government, whereas uttering counterfeited money was a \u201cprivate harm\u201d within a state\u2019s police power. Moreover, the Court noted, England had distinguished between the two offenses, making counterfeiting a treasonous offense, but the passing or \u201cuttering\u201d of counterfeit coin was neither \u201ctreason nor misprision of treason.\u201d As the Supreme Court of South Carolina explained in \u003Cem\u003EState v. Tutt \u003C\/em\u003E(1831): \u201cThe offence against the Government of the United States consists in discrediting its currency. That against the State in defrauding its citizens. The offence against the State is certainly of the more palpable and dangerous character.\u201d The result is that although the federal government has exclusive power to punish the actual act of counterfeiting, states have the concurrent power to punish the passing of counterfeited currency. The federal and state governments possess concurrent power to punish the possession of devices for making counterfeited money. \u003Cem\u003EBaender v. Barnett\u003C\/em\u003E (1921).\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EIn cases upholding the right of Congress to punish counterfeiting coinage, \u003Cem\u003EUnited States v. Marigold\u003C\/em\u003E (1850), and counterfeiting foreign currency, \u003Cem\u003EUnited States v. Arjona\u003C\/em\u003E (1887), the Court justified Congress\u2019s power under the Coinage Clause, the Necessary and Proper Clause, the Commerce Clause, and the Counterfeiting Clause. In practical terms, there seems little if any activity that can be reached under the Counterfeiting Clause that could not also be reached by other congressional powers. The Court, however, does apply the First Amendment as a limit to legislation passed under the Counterfeiting Clause. In \u003Cem\u003ERegan v. Time, Inc.\u003C\/em\u003E (1984), the Court struck down a portion of the statute permitting limited reproduction of United States currency \u201cfor philatelic, numismatic, educational, historical, or newsworthy purposes\u201d as being content-based.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003ECongress passed the first anti-counterfeiting statute in 1790. The current federal prohibition on counterfeiting is found in 18 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 470\u2013513 (2004), which generally provides for an unspecified fine or imprisonment of not more than twenty years, or both, for its violation.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n  \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author\u0022\u003E\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--media\u0022\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--photo\u0022 style=\u0022background-image: url(\/sites\/default\/files\/David_Forte.jpg)\u0022\u003E\u003C\/div\u003E\n            \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--info\u0022\u003E\n              \u003Ch4 class=\u0022con-essay-author--name\u0022\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022http:\/\/facultyprofile.csuohio.edu\/csufacultyprofile\/detail.cfm?FacultyID=D_FORTE\u0022\u003EDavid F. Forte\u003C\/a\u003E\n                  \u003C\/h4\u003E\n                  \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--job\u0022\u003E\n         Professor, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law\n      \u003C\/div\u003E\n            \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-tabs\u0022\u003E\n      \u003Cul data-tabs class=\u0022tabs\u0022\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000043-taba\u0022\u003EFurther Reading\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000043-tabb\u0022\u003ECase Law\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000043-tabc\u0022\u003ERelated Essays\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n      \u003C\/ul\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv data-tabs-content\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000043-taba\u0022\u003E\n          \n      \u003Cdiv\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ENathan K. Cummings, \u003Ci\u003EThe Counterfeit Buck Stops Here: National Security Issues in the Redesign of U.S. Currency\u003C\/i\u003E, 8 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 539 (1999)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ELYNN GLASER, COUNTERFEITING IN AMERICA (1968)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EKENNETH SCOTT, COUNTERFEITING IN COLONIAL AMERICA (1957)\u003Cbr\u003E\n\u0026nbsp;\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n          \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n        \u003C\/div\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000043-tabb\u0022\u003E\n          \n      \u003Cdiv\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EState v. Tutt, 18 S.C.L. (2 Bail.) 44 (1831)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EFox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 410 (1847)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EUnited States v. Marigold, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 560 (1850)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EUnited States v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 479 (1887)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ESexton v. California, 189 U.S. 319 (1903)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EBaender v. Barnett, 255 U.S. 224 (1921)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ERegan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641 (1984)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n          \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n        \u003C\/div\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000043-tabc\u0022\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000037\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003ECommerce Among the States\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000041\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003ECoinage Clause\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000058\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003ENecessary and Proper Clause\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000069\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EState Coinage\u003C\/a\u003E\n                  \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n\u003C\/article\u003E\n"]}]