[{"command":"add_css","data":[{"rel":"stylesheet","media":"all","href":"\/sites\/default\/files\/css\/css_veuEhhb1658wti0_ZAig66JOyixENU-N9zhjLQSLfOQ.css?delta=0\u0026language=en\u0026theme=heritage_theme\u0026include=eJwrTi1LzdNPzkksLq7Uy8tPSQUAPMsGtA"}]},{"command":"invoke","selector":null,"method":"openEssay","args":["10000037","\n\n\u003Carticle about=\u0022\/constitution\/articles\/1\/essays\/38\/commerce-among-the-states\u0022 class=\u0022node node--type-constitution-essay node--promoted node--view-mode-embedded clearfix\u0022\u003E\n  \u003Ch1 class=\u0022title\u0022\u003E\u003Cspan\u003ECommerce Among the States\u003C\/span\u003E\n\u003C\/h1\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-location\u0022\u003E\n      Article I, Section 8, Clause 3\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-context\u0022\u003E\n      \n            \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EThe Congress shall have Power...To regulate Commerce...among the several States....\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n  \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-body\u0022\u003E\n    \n            \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EThe Commerce Among the States Clause\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003E(or, \u201cthe Commerce Clause\u201d) operates both as a power delegated to Congress and as a constraint upon state legislation. No clause in the 1787 Constitution has been more disputed, and none has generated as many cases.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003ETo this day, the debate over the extent of the commerce power centers on the definitions of \u201cto regulate,\u201d \u201ccommerce,\u201d and \u201camong the several States.\u201d\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe narrowest definition of \u201cto regulate\u201d is to \u201cmake regular,\u201d that is, to facilitate the free flow of goods, but not, except in cases of danger, to prohibit the flow of any good. Some scholars and a number of Supreme Court Justices have supported that narrow definition. In fact, in 1886, the House Judiciary Committee declared that a proposed bill that would have prohibited the sale of oleomargarine was against the original intent of the Framers. The Committee reasoned that the purpose of the Commerce Clause was to prevent state barriers to commerce, not to give Congress the power to do the same.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003ENonetheless, the Supreme Court has never formally accepted a limited view of what \u201cto regulate\u201d means. From the beginning, Chief Justice John Marshall in \u003Ci\u003EGibbons v. Ogden\u003C\/i\u003E (1824) saw the power to regulate as coextensive with the other delegated powers of Congress. He declared: \u201cThis power, like all others vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the constitution.\u201d In other words, \u201cto regulate\u201d is descriptive of the essential and core Congressional power to legislate. The manner in which Congress decides to regulate commerce, Marshall said, is completely at the discretion of Congress, subject only to the political check of the voters. Its exercise, therefore, is nonjusticiable. This power, as it later turned out, includes the power to prohibit the transportation of articles, as well as to control their exchange and the manner of transportation. In \u003Ci\u003EChampion\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003Ev. Ames \u003C\/i\u003E(1903), the Supreme Court (5\u20134) upheld\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003Ea congressional ban on the interstate transportation of lottery tickets over the dissent on Chief Justice Melville Fuller, though all states at that time had prohibited such lotteries.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EEven if \u201cregulation\u201d is a political question, the definition of \u201ccommerce,\u201d however, is not up to Congress. It has an objective quality and is determinable by the courts. For many scholars such as Randy Barnett, Richard Epstein, and Raoul Berger, commerce means the trading, bartering, buying, and selling of goods, and they include the incidents of transporting those goods within the definition. Commerce would not include manufacturing or agriculture. Robert Pushaw and Grant Nelson assert a somewhat broader view, believing that commerce means \u201cany market-based activity\u201d having an economic component. Jack Balkin suggests a much more expansive concept, namely that the term \u201ccommerce\u201d in the eighteenth century meant all forms of social and economic intercourse between persons, including but not limited to \u201ctraffic,\u201d which was then the term for trade. The transportation of goods is not literally part of the exchange of goods, Balkin observes, but it would be part of commerce as intercourse.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EJustice Clarence Thomas has embraced the limited definition of commerce as trade: \u201cAt the time the original Constitution was ratified, \u2018commerce\u2019 consisted of selling, buying, and bartering, as well as transporting for these purposes.\u201d He noted that the etymology of the word \u003Cem\u003Ecom-merce\u003C\/em\u003E meant \u201cwith merchandise.\u201d \u003Cem\u003EUnited States v. Lopez\u003C\/em\u003E (1995). Much of the modern Supreme Court\u2019s jurisprudence, however, regards commerce as comprising \u201ceconomic activity\u201d generally.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EIn \u003Cem\u003EGibbons v. Ogden\u003C\/em\u003E, Chief Justice Marshall declared that commerce is more than \u201ctraffic,\u201d that is, more than mere trade. It is \u201ccommercial intercourse,\u201d which includes both trade and the manner in which trade is carried on. Thus, he held that the government, under the definition of commerce as he affirmed, had the right to prescribe the rules of navigation for trade.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThough Marshall\u2019s notion of commerce was relatively narrow, his conception of the third term of the clause, \u201camong the several States,\u201d was quite broad. Some commentators have defined \u201camong the several States\u201d as the trading and movement of goods between two or more states. But Chief Justice Marshall thought \u201camong\u201d had a wider purview than would the word \u201cbetween:\u201d \u201cComprehensive as the word \u2018among\u2019 is, it may very properly be restricted to that commerce which concerns more States than one.\u201d Although this was a broader concept, Marshall nonetheless saw that there is some commerce that Congress cannot reach: \u201cThe enumeration presupposes something not enumerated; and that something, if we regard the language or the subject of the sentence, must be the exclusively internal commerce of a State.\u201d Purely local activities (i.e., commerce that does not concern \u201cmore States than one\u201d), therefore, remain outside of the reach of Congress under the Commerce Among the States Clause.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EAfter \u003Cem\u003EGibbons v. Ogden\u003C\/em\u003E, there was little occasion for the Supreme Court to investigate the breadth of federal commerce power until the late nineteenth century and the advent of national economic legislation. (However, the Court considered many cases involving the so-called dormant commerce power: the power of the states to enact legislation that affects interstate commerce when Congress is silent, i.e., has not enacted any legislation.) From 1895 on, the Court experimented with differing notions of the commerce power until 1938, when it signaled that it was abdicating any serious role in monitoring Congress\u2019s exercise of this delegated power.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EIn \u003Cem\u003EUnited States v. E.C. Knight Co.\u003C\/em\u003E (1895), the Supreme Court declared that the Sherman Antitrust Act could not constitutionally be interpreted to apply to monopolies in manufacturing, for \u201ccommerce\u201d did not reach manufacturing. \u201cManufacture is transformation\u2014the fashioning of raw materials into a change of form for use.\u2009.\u2009.\u2009. The buying and selling and the transportation incidental thereto constitute commerce.\u201d Any effect manufacturing has on commerce was merely \u201cindirect\u201d and could not be reached under the commerce power.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThis qualitative distinction between manufacturing and commerce held for forty years, but the Court was not ungenerous in otherwise upholding federal regulatory legislation. If companies engaged in price-fixing and marketing schemes, the Court held them to be \u201cin commerce\u201d and subject to Congress\u2019s power to regulate commerce. \u003Cem\u003EAddyston Pipe \u0026amp; Steel Co. v. United States \u003C\/em\u003E(1899). In an expansionary gloss to the qualitative distinction, the Court also held that goods in the \u201cstream of commerce,\u201d such as cattle at the Chicago stockyards and slaughterhouses on the way from farm to nationwide distribution, also fell under the commerce power. \u003Cem\u003ESwift \u0026amp; Co. v. United States \u003C\/em\u003E(1905); \u003Cem\u003EStafford v. Wallace\u003C\/em\u003E (1922). Beyond manufacturing, the Court had earlier declared that insurance contracts were not items of trade and therefore could not be reached by Congress under the commerce clause. \u003Ci\u003EPaul v. Virginia\u003C\/i\u003E (1869).\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EIn \u003Ci\u003EChampion v. Ames\u003C\/i\u003E, the Court added a new perspective on the commerce power. It eschewed any scrutiny on whether the purpose of congressional regulation of interstate commerce had to be focused on the regulation of goods in commerce, in this case, lottery tickets. So long as the good traveled across state lines, the Court held, Congress could regulate or prohibit it, even if Congress\u2019s purpose was moral. The dissenters pointed out unsuccessfully that legislation to regulate morals had been traditionally left to the states under their police power. Soon thereafter, on this basis, the Court upheld the Pure Food and Drug Act, \u003Ci\u003EHipolite Egg Co. v. United States\u003C\/i\u003E (1911); legislation restricting interstate prostitution, \u003Ci\u003EHoke v. United States\u003C\/i\u003E (1913); and even personal immorality connected with interstate commerce, \u003Ci\u003ECaminetti v. United States\u003C\/i\u003E (1917) (crossing a state line with a paramour, when no money exchanged hands). These cases stood for what later came to be called the \u201cjurisdictional element\u201d test, namely, that Congress could regulate the transportation and disposition of any item that travelled across state lines, and it was not clear that the item even had to be commercial.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThus, outside of the \u201cjurisdiction\u201d test, the Court applied a limiting qualitative test to legislation, the purpose and effect of which was to regulate manufacturing, as in the laws regulating child labor, \u003Ci\u003EHammer v. Dagenhart\u003C\/i\u003E (1918), and railroad retirement plans, \u003Ci\u003ERailroad Retirement Board v.\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003EAlton Railroad \u003C\/i\u003ECo. (1935). Manufacturing was\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003Enot, in its nature, \u201ccommerce,\u201d even though it might have an effect on commerce. Similarly, regarding commerce \u201camong the several States,\u201d the Court balked if Congress sought to regulate goods after their interstate transportation had come to rest, \u003Ci\u003EA.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v.\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003EUnited States \u003C\/i\u003E(1935), or before transportation had\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003Ebegun, \u003Ci\u003ECarter v. Carter Coal Co\u003C\/i\u003E. (1936).\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EAs limited as the Court\u2019s use of the qualitative test was, an alternative test had begun to develop that would have approved even more congressional legislation. Traditionally ascribed to the opinion of Justice Charles Evans Hughes in the \u003Ci\u003EShreveport Rate Case\u003C\/i\u003E (1914), which permitted federal regulation of intrastate railroad rates to harmonize with interstate railroad rates, this quantitative test asserted that Congress could regulate a local activity, even manufacturing, if that local activity had a \u201csubstantial\u201d effect on interstate commerce (i.e., \u201ccommerce which concerns more States than one\u201d when the concern was \u201csubstantial\u201d). Although Hughes\u2019 language in the case could be read as referring, not to Congress\u2019s power under the Commerce Clause, but rather to the Necessary and Proper Clause (Article I, Section 8, Clause 18), the case became symbolic of a turn towards an expansion of congressional legislative power under the Commerce Clause itself. Over the next two decades, a minority of Justices continued to argue in favor of a quantitative test. The dispute between those espousing a qualitative version of the power and those supporting a quantitative interpretation increased during the 1930s as more extensive federal regulatory legislation came before the Supreme Court.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EIn 1935, Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo, concurring in the unanimous opinion in \u003Ci\u003ESchechter\u003C\/i\u003E, suggested a test that would allow the government to regulate local activities if they had a proximate or foreseeable effect on interstate commerce: \u201cThe law is not indifferent to considerations of degree. Activities local in their immediacy do not become interstate and national because of distant repercussions.\u201d The following year, in striking down the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act in \u003Ci\u003ECarter v. Carter Coal\u003C\/i\u003E Co., the Court seemingly accepted Cardozo\u2019s proximate cause test. (Cardozo dissented from the decision on procedural grounds.) Writing for the majority, Justice George Sutherland declared: \u201cThe word \u2018direct\u2019 implies that the activity or condition invoked or blamed shall operate proximately\u2014not mediately, remotely, or collaterally\u2014to produce the effect. It connotes the absence of an efficient intervening agency or condition.\u201d\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EA year later, in \u003Ci\u003ENLRB v. Jones \u0026amp; Laughlin Steel\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003ECorp\u003C\/i\u003E. (1937), Chief Justice Hughes, in upholding the National Labor Relations Act\u2019s regulation of factory working conditions, clearly rejected the qualitative test. But he filled his opinion with overlapping justifications, some sounding in the quantitative test language, or again a possible use of the Necessary and Proper Clause, but the proximate cause language was prominent. The commerce power could not reach activities that were \u201cindirect and remote,\u201d he wrote. Federal power could reach those activities that have a \u201cclose and intimate effect\u201d on interstate commerce. An industry organized on a national level had such an effect, he declared. Soon, however, Justice Cardozo died, and other Justices retired. By 1941, in \u003Ci\u003EUnited States v. Darby\u003C\/i\u003E, it was clear that the new majority rejected the qualitative test and the causal tests in \u003Ci\u003ESchechter, Carter,\u003C\/i\u003E and \u003Ci\u003EJones \u0026amp;\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003ELaughlin\u003C\/i\u003E. Instead, the Court fully embraced a very\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003Eexpansive quantitative test and, as events were to show, these Justices were able to find that any local activity, taken either separately or in the aggregate, \u003Ci\u003EWickard v. Filburn \u003C\/i\u003E(1942), always had a sufficiently\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003Esubstantial effect on interstate commerce to justify congressional legislation. By these means, the Court turned the commerce power into the equivalent of a general regulatory power.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe Court invoked newly expanded interpretation of the commerce power to approve wider federal criminal legislation as well as major social reforms such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964. But in \u003Ci\u003EUnited States v. Lopez\u003C\/i\u003E and \u003Ci\u003EUnited\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003EStates v. Morrison \u003C\/i\u003E(2000), the Supreme Court\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003Elimited Congress\u2019s power under the Commerce Clause for the first time since in the 1930s. In \u003Ci\u003ELopez\u003C\/i\u003E, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist wound\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003Ehis way among the Court\u2019s precedents to strike down a federal law that had criminalized the possession of a gun near a school. He declared that the commerce power extended to: (1) \u201cthe use of the channels of interstate commerce\u201d; (2) the regulation of \u201cinstrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce\u201d; and (3) a local commercial activity having a \u201csubstantial relation\u201d to interstate commerce. Rehnquist emphasized two points in his opinion. First, possessing a gun is not a commercial activity, and the effects prong of the commerce power only applies when the regulated activity is commercial. Second, he insisted that the rule of \u003Ci\u003Esubstantial\u003C\/i\u003E effects must be observed. In his opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist did not overrule any prior case.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EJustice Stephen G. Breyer, for the dissent, agreed that there are limits to the commerce power\u2014it does not grant a general federal police power. But he could not express what those limits were. He argued that there is a sufficient connection between guns near schools, the impact on the educational process, and the eventual connection to the nation\u2019s economy to justify the regulation, but he could not, under his formula, put forward any activity that could not thus be reached by Congress under the Commerce Clause. Concurring with the majority, Justice Thomas suggested that, upon the proper occasion, the Court should reexamine some of its more expansionary precedents dealing with the \u201caffects\u201d test, implying that he would revive the qualitative test instead.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003ESubsequent to the decision, Congress amended the law, requiring that the particular gun found in possession near to a school must be shown to have traveled in interstate commerce, thus validating the law under the \u201cjurisdictional element\u201d test. Later, Justice Thomas urged that, even while the \u201csubstantial effects\u201d remains current Supreme Court doctrine, it should be applied to limit the \u201cjurisdictional element\u201d test. Thus, Thomas would require that any item travelling across state lines could only be regulated if it could be shown to have exerted a substantial effect on interstate commerce. \u003Ci\u003EAlderman v. U.S.\u003C\/i\u003E (2011) (Thomas, J., dissenting).\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EIn \u003Ci\u003EUnited States v. Morrison\u003C\/i\u003E, the Court struck down a suit for damages for rape, even though the suit would have been permitted under the Violence Against Women Act. Here, Chief Justice Rehnquist explained \u003Ci\u003ELopez\u003C\/i\u003E by emphasizing that noneconomic activities (violence against women, or violence against men, or violence in general) could not be aggregated to establish a substantial connection to interstate commerce. Moreover, Rehnquist asserted that it was the Court\u2019s independent duty to determine whether a regulated activity is commercial and whether it substantially affects commerce, even if Congress has explicitly found otherwise, a position that the Court earlier adopted in \u003Ci\u003EJones \u0026amp; Laughlin\u003C\/i\u003E. As Justice Hugo Black had earlier noted in \u003Ci\u003EHeart\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003Eof Atlanta Motel v. United States \u003C\/i\u003E(1964): \u201cwhether\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003Eparticular operations affect interstate commerce sufficiently to come under the constitutional power of Congress to regulate them is ultimately a judicial rather than a legislative question, and can be settled finally only by this Court.\u201d\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EHowever, a majority of the Supreme Court reaffirmed the expansive scope of the commerce power in \u003Ci\u003EGonzales v. Raich\u003C\/i\u003E (2005). In that case, the Court found that the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA) preempted a California law that legalized marijuana\u2014in this case, totally locally home-grown marijuana\u2014 for medicinal uses. The Court found that marijuana was a commercial product, albeit illegal, and, citing \u003Ci\u003EWickard v. Filburn\u003C\/i\u003E, found that the aggregate effect of home-grown marijuana substantially impacted the federal government\u2019s legitimate policy of controlling certain illegal substances.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThus, the line that the Court has drawn is between an activity that is \u201ccommercial\u201d or economic and one that is not. Non-economic activities cannot be aggregated to show a substantial effect on commerce, but economic activities, no matter how small or local, can be so aggregated. In \u003Ci\u003ENational Federation of Independent\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003EBusiness v. Sebelius \u003C\/i\u003E(2012), by a narrow majority,\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003Ethe Supreme Court added an additional line: the government may not aggregate the economic affects of a commercial \u003Ci\u003Einactivity\u003C\/i\u003E (a decision not to buy insurance) to find that there is a substantial effect on commerce. In fact, for the first time since \u003Ci\u003EGibbons,\u003C\/i\u003E the Court glossed the meaning of \u201cto regulate.\u201d Congress, the Court declared, has the power to regulate an activity, but an inactivity, by its nature, does not yet exist and cannot be regulated.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EAs noted earlier, lurking behind the debate over the commerce power and occasionally hinted at in some of the Court\u2019s opinions is the Necessary and Proper Clause. In \u003Ci\u003EGibbons v.\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003EOgden, \u003C\/i\u003EChief Justice Marshall noted that there\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003Emay be some \u201cinternal concerns\u201d with which it may be \u201cnecessary to interfere, for the purpose of executing some of the general powers of the government.\u201d Thus, even if the commerce power in and of itself cannot reach particular local activities, Congress may still be able to regulate them if to do so has an appropriate connection to commerce. As Marshall said five years before \u003Ci\u003EGibbons \u003C\/i\u003Ein\u003Ci\u003E McCulloch v. Maryland \u003C\/i\u003E(1819):\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cblockquote\u003ELet the end be legitimate [for example, the protection of interstate commerce], let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.\u003C\/blockquote\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EAs Marshall stated it, the required connection between the regulation of the local activity and the protection of Congress\u2019s policy on interstate commerce may produce a connection similar to what later became the proximate cause test devised by Justice Cardozo in \u003Ci\u003ESchechter\u003C\/i\u003E and developed by Justice Sutherland in \u003Ci\u003ECarter v.\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003ECarter Coal\u003C\/i\u003E.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EOne should also recall Marshall\u2019s limitation, again from \u003Ci\u003EMcCulloch v. Maryland\u003C\/i\u003E, on the uses of the Necessary and Proper Clause (\u003Ci\u003Esee\u003C\/i\u003E Article I, Section 8, Clause 18 for a fuller explication):\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cblockquote\u003EShould Congress, in the execution of its powers, adopt measures which are prohibited by the constitution; or should Congress, under the pretext of executing its powers, pass laws for the accomplishment of objects not entrusted to the government; it would become the painful duty of this tribunal, should a case requiring such a decision come before it, to say that such an act was not the law of the land.\u003C\/blockquote\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EIt would follow that Congress could regulate a local activity only if its purpose comports with its delegated power to regulate commerce and the regulation is plainly adapted to its interstate commerce purpose.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe \u201csubstantial effects test\u201d could be recast as falling under the Necessary and Proper Clause. But in his concurrence in \u003Ci\u003EGonzales v. Raich\u003C\/i\u003E, Justice Antonin Scalia separated the Necessary and Proper Clause from the substantial effects test. He rejected the substantial effects test as \u201cincomplete,\u201d and he thus found that locally grown marijuana could \u003Ci\u003Enot\u003C\/i\u003E be reached directly under the commerce power. Rather, he argued, \u201cThe regulation of an intrastate activity may be essential to a comprehensive regulation of interstate commerce even though the intrastate activity does not itself \u2018substantially affect\u2019 interstate commerce.\u201d He decided therefore that prohibiting locally grown marijuana was \u201cnecessary and proper\u201d to the integrity of Congress\u2019s overall regime of regulating controlled substances. In dissent, Justice Thomas argued against the use of the Necessary and Proper Clause in this case. He declared that punishing persons who had grown their own marijuana for their own medicinal purposes was not \u201cplainly adapted\u201d to maintaining the coherence of the federal controlled substances program. Nor was it \u201cproper\u201d for the federal government to prohibit a non-economic activity under the guise of protecting interstate commerce.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe second constitutional role of the Commerce Clause is to act as an extrinsic restraint on state legislation that may impede or intrude upon interstate commerce. The Supreme Court has built up a prodigious amount of case law commentary on the Commerce Clause when it is in its \u201cdormant\u201d state.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe traditional view is that the Constitution grants Congress plenary power over interstate commerce. Justice Scalia agrees that Congress has \u003Ci\u003Eplenary \u003C\/i\u003Epower (it can control all aspects of interstate commerce), but denies that it has \u003Ci\u003Eexclusive\u003C\/i\u003E power. Thus, he believes that the states can enter the field until Congress acts. \u003Ci\u003ETyler Pipe Industries\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003Ev. Washington State Department of Revenue \u003C\/i\u003E(1987).\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003EBut for the majority of Justices, the Commerce Clause operates as a limit on the legislative powers of the states \u003Ci\u003Eeven when Congress has not acted\u003C\/i\u003E.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EIf Congress has legislated upon a subject within its commerce power, then, due to the Supremacy Clause (Article VI, Clause 2), any state law to the contrary falls. Congress may even consent to state regulation that directly regulates interstate commerce. \u003Ci\u003EPrudential Insurance Co. v.\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003EBenjamin \u003C\/i\u003E(1946). But the question remains. To\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003Ewhat extent may a state legislate upon a subject that impacts interstate commerce in the absence of congressional action? Does it matter if the state law discriminates against interstate commerce, either in purpose or effect?\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EIt was inevitable that the states, even in the honest exercise of their police powers, would trench on interstate commerce. How far the states can even incidentally intrude upon interstate commerce has been the subject of scores of Supreme Court cases, often with inconsistent holdings. A detailed treatment of that complicated history is beyond the scope of this essay, but in 1970 in \u003Ci\u003EPike v. Bruce Church, Inc\u003C\/i\u003E., the Court consolidated its dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence into the following test: \u201cWhere the [state] statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.\u201d\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EA few decades ago, some scholars opined that the \u003Ci\u003EPike\u003C\/i\u003E test was a codification of an \u003Ci\u003Ead hoc\u003C\/i\u003E balancing test. More recent scholarship, however, has indicated that the Supreme Court rarely, if ever, decides a dormant Commerce Clause case on balancing grounds since it would be attempting to compare incommensurables. Rather, the \u003Ci\u003EPike \u003C\/i\u003Etest describes a series of separate standards\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003Eby which a state statute can be determined to be within its constitutional powers.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThose determinative principles for state statutes are as follows:\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Col\u003E\n\t\u003Cli\u003EThe statute must have a \u201clegitimate\u201d and \u201cpublic\u201d purpose. It must be within the state\u2019s police power, and not designed either to regulate interstate commerce as such, or to discriminate against out-of-state economic interests in favor of private in-state interests in the same market. If, however, the state is acting as a \u201cmarket participant\u201d similar to a private entity, the dormant Commerce Clause is not a bar to its economic decisions even if they impact or discriminate against interstate commerce, though the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV may be a constraint.\u003C\/li\u003E\n\t\u003Cli\u003EThe effect on interstate commerce must be \u201cincidental\u201d rather than the primary purpose of the statute.\u003C\/li\u003E\n\t\u003Cli\u003EThe interest must be \u201clocal.\u201d It must regulate elements that are peculiar to the state, such as its harbors, and not impose a pattern of \u201cmultiple inconsistent burdens\u201d with other states\u2019 conflicting laws on an interstate enterprise.\u003C\/li\u003E\n\t\u003Cli\u003EThe statute must \u201cregulate even-handedly,\u201d that is, its impact may not be discriminatory absent compelling reasons.\u003C\/li\u003E\n\t\u003Cli\u003EThe statute must \u201ceffectuate\u201d its local public interest. If there is little evidence of such a result, the court may infer that the interstate impact was intentional and hence unconstitutional, after all.\u003C\/li\u003E\n\u003C\/ol\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EIf a state statute survives all these criteria, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on interstate commerce is \u201cclearly excessive\u201d in relation to the asserted local benefits. This last clause is indeed a balancing test (weighted in favor of the state), but the Court rarely, if ever, reaches it, preferring to decide the issue on one of the antecedent principles.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EJustice Scalia does not believe the Court should be monitoring the states\u2019 impact on interstate commerce, outside of discrimination against interstate commerce or creating multiple inconsistent burdens. \u003Ci\u003ECTS Corp. v. Dynamics\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003ECorp. of America \u003C\/i\u003E(1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003EHe believes that the Constitution gives the power to Congress to cure (or approve of) any excessive state action by legislation. Justice Thomas would rather use the Import-Export Clause to strike down state discriminations against interstate commerce. \u003Ci\u003ECamps Newfound\/Owatonna, Inc.\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003Ev. Town of Harrison \u003C\/i\u003E(1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting).\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n  \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author\u0022\u003E\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--media\u0022\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--photo\u0022 style=\u0022background-image: url(\/sites\/default\/files\/David_Forte.jpg)\u0022\u003E\u003C\/div\u003E\n            \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--info\u0022\u003E\n              \u003Ch4 class=\u0022con-essay-author--name\u0022\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022http:\/\/facultyprofile.csuohio.edu\/csufacultyprofile\/detail.cfm?FacultyID=D_FORTE\u0022\u003EDavid F. Forte\u003C\/a\u003E\n                  \u003C\/h4\u003E\n                  \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--job\u0022\u003E\n         Professor, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law\n      \u003C\/div\u003E\n            \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-tabs\u0022\u003E\n      \u003Cul data-tabs class=\u0022tabs\u0022\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000037-taba\u0022\u003EFurther Reading\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000037-tabb\u0022\u003ECase Law\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000037-tabc\u0022\u003ERelated Essays\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n      \u003C\/ul\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv data-tabs-content\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000037-taba\u0022\u003E\n          \n      \u003Cdiv\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EAlbert Abel, \u003Ci\u003EThe Commerce Clause in the Constitutional Convention and in Contemporary Comment\u003C\/i\u003E, 25 Minn. L. Rev. 432 (1941)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EJack M. Balkin, \u003Ci\u003ECommerce\u003C\/i\u003E, 109 MICH, L. REV. 1 (2010)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp align=\u0022right\u0022 style=\u0022text-align:right\u0022\u003ERandy E. Barnett, \u003Ci\u003ENew Evidence of the Original Mean-ing of the Commerce Clause\u003C\/i\u003E, 55\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003EARK. L. REV. 847\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px\u0022\u003E(2003)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ERandy E. Barnett, \u003Ci\u003EThe Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause\u003C\/i\u003E, 68\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003EU. CHI. L. REV. 101 (2001)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ERaoul Berger, \u003Ci\u003EJudicial Manipulation of the Commerce\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003EClause\u003C\/i\u003E, 74\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003ETEX. L. REV. 695 (1996)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EBARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION (1998)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EBrannon P. Denning, \u003Ci\u003EWhy the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV Cannot Replace the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine\u003C\/i\u003E, 88\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003EMINN. L. REV. 384\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003E(2003)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ERichard A. Epstein, \u003Ci\u003EThe Proper Scope of the Commerce\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003EPower\u003C\/i\u003E, 73\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003EVA. L. REV. 1387 (1987)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EBarry Friedman \u0026amp; Genevieve Lakier, \u003Ci\u003E\u201cTo Regulate,\u201d\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003ENot \u201cTo Prohibit\u201d: Limiting the Commerce Power\u003C\/i\u003E,\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003E2012 SUP. CT. REV. 255 (2013)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ERobert J. Pushaw \u0026amp; Grant S. Nelson, \u003Ci\u003EA Critique of the\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003ENarrow Interpretation of the Commerce Clause\u003C\/i\u003E, 96\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003ENw. U. L. Rev. 695 (2002)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EMartin H. Redish \u0026amp; Shane V. Nugent, \u003Ci\u003EThe Dormant\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003ECommerce Clause and the Constitutional Balance of Federalism\u003C\/i\u003E, 1987\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003EDUKE L.J. 569 (1987)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EDonald H. Regan, \u003Ci\u003EThe Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause\u003C\/i\u003E, 84\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003EMICH. L. REV. 1091 (1986)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003ERonald D. Rotunda, \u003Ci\u003EThe Doctrine of the Inner Political\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003ECheck, the Dormant Commerce Clause, and Federal Preemption\u003C\/i\u003E, 53\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003ETRANSP.\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003EPRAC. J. 263 (1986)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n          \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n        \u003C\/div\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000037-tabb\u0022\u003E\n          \n      \u003Cdiv\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EMcCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EGibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ECooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EPaul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1869)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EUnited States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EAddyston Pipe \u0026amp; Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EChampion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ESwift \u0026amp; Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EHipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45 (1911)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EHoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EShreveport Rate Case, 234 U.S. 342 (1914)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ECaminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EHammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EStafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495 (1922)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EA.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ERailroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton Railroad Co., 295 U.S. 330 (1935)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ECarter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ENLRB v. Jones \u0026amp; Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px\u0022\u003E(1937)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EUnited States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EWickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EPrudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EH.P. Hood \u0026amp; Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EDean Milk v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EHeart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EKatzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970) Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976) Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm\u2019n,\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px\u0022\u003E432 U.S. 333 (1977)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EPhiladelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EReeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EKassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp. of Delaware, 450 U.S. 662 (1981)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EMinnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ESouth-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ECTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69 (1987)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ETyler Pipe Industries v. Washington State Dep\u2019t of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232 (1987)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EUnited States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ECamps Newfound\/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564 (1997)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EUnited States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EGonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EAlderman v. U.S., 131 S. Ct. 700 (2011)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003ENational Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n          \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n        \u003C\/div\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000037-tabc\u0022\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000033\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003ESpending Clause\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000034\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EUniformity Clause\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000041\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003ECoinage Clause\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000058\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003ENecessary and Proper Clause\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000064\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EExport Taxation Clause\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000065\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EPort Preference Clause\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000069\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EState Coinage\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000073\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EImport-Export Clause\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000132\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003ESupremacy Clause\u003C\/a\u003E\n                  \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n\u003C\/article\u003E\n"]}]